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Libya and the essence of the agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC countries

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[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] L [/yt_dropcap]ibya is planning to double its crude oil production next year. Although it has been an OPEC member since 1962, as well as the African country with the largest (and best quality) oil reserves, for obvious geopolitical reasons it has not been involved in the recent agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC countries, which favours the Russian Federation, reconnects Russia to Saudi Arabia, thus avoiding too close a link between Russia and Iran, and make Russia play a primary broker’s role in the Middle East.

Also Iran has no intention to sabotage this agreement on oil prices, which will certainly favour also the Shiite republic.

Conversely Nigeria and Libya itself have increased their production, while the whole non-OPEC area, Russia, Brazil, Canada, Norway and Kazakhstan have increased stocks, especially because a decrease in oil and gas demand is expected, starting from China.

According to the statements made by the President of the National Oil Corporation (NOC), Mustafa Sanalla, currently Libya extracts 708,000 barrels/day, but production is expected to soon reach 900,000 and level off at around 1 million barrels per day in late 2017.

It is worth recalling that, pending the crazy and senseless Libyan civil war, production had fallen to 200,000 barrels per day.

Later it was NOC itself to deal with the various armed groups deployed to patrol the pipelines in exchange for considerable money payments and resorting to the effective support of General Khalifa Haftar’s forces.

In fact, Libya’s new presence on the global oil market was made possible by an agreement reached last September between NOC and General Khalifa Haftar, who holds power over most Libyan ports and, above all, on Ras Lanuf and Es Sider.

As already said, Libya was not involved in the agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC countries, along with Nigeria and Iran which, however – as stated by the Oil Minister, Zangrneh – supports the process of controlled reduction of the Vienna-based cartel’s oil production and of the even larger oil production of the non-OPEC area.

For the time being, the agreement is operating particularly between Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Venezuela.

Moreover, for the first time since 2012, few days ago Iran resumed its oil exports to Europe.

If the agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC countries works, Iran will have every interest in becoming an integral part of it.

If Saudi Arabia – albeit unwillingly – withdraws 4.5% of its daily oil production from the market, equivalent to 500,000 barrels a day, all the non-OPEC area will cooperate and contribute to this bullish operation for a total of 600,000 barrels a day, while the Russian Federation is ready to cut its daily production by 300,000 barrels.

Hence, with specific reference to Libya, a quick economic revival is expected – driven, as usual, by oil and gas – which will certainly not bring back the country to the glories of Muammar El Gaddafi’s leadership, with its 1.6 million barrels a day, but will certainly allow to somehow rebuild this poor and very unfortunate country.

Hence Libya as a sort of oil “replacement economy” for the rest of OPEC, which will allow to improve its economy but could even weaken – and virtually stultify – the OPEC and non-OPEC countries’ efforts to make the oil barrel price rise again.

Nevertheless we do not believe that NOC will shoot itself in the foot. Quite the reverse. We are certain that Libya will follow the rise on the markets with careful daily adjustments of its oil production.

Furthermore, in the second half of 2017, nothing prevents OPEC from adapting to another further decrease in oil production. If an oil barrel price of 60 US dollars were recorded – as is likely – also Iran would have an interest in participating in the process.

So far Iraq has lobbied to avoid having to enter into the agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC countries, considering that it must back a military and social effort against terrorism and the so-called Al Baghdadi’s “Caliphate”, but it eventually agreed to a daily ceiling of 4.35 million barrels a day.

Russia pressed for the agreement also with Iraq and, despite extraction restrictions, probably the increase above 60 dollars a barrel will allow high liquidity.

According to the independent analysts of this particular market, currently compliance with the agreement accounts for 90% approximately. This will enable Saudi Arabia, which has agreed to make the largest cuts, to stabilize the Middle East region. It will also enable Russia to become the great player and mediator in the Middle East and even the United States to make the oil shale extraction very profitable.

According to the most reliable economic intelligence analyses, however, the break-even point of the US shale oil is well under 30 US dollars per barrel – and this is the real Saudi Arabia’s problem.

Saudi Arabia did everything – even cutting the oil barrel price down, as until recently – to eliminate the North American competition since the very beginning, although the shale oil production cost in the United States varies greatly from one region to the other.

Saudi Arabia dreams of reducing the number of companies operating in the US shale oil sector to fewer than ten, so as to later try to achieve a vertical consolidation of that market with some large international players.

On the other hand, the Saudi oil production cost is very low and the country can afford a trade war with the US shale oil as long as it wants.

With specific reference to natural gas, which has a structurally different market compared to the oil one, a trade war is foreseen in the near future between some US operators and the EU traditional Russian gas suppliers, while Gazprom will take remedial measures by flooding European countries with low-cost natural gas.

Hence another trade war looming over the energy systems, not to mention the fact that if very low oil prices had continued to dominate the markets for another two years, Saudi Arabia would have gone into default in mid-2018 – and the 30 US dollars a barrel prolong Saudi Arabia’s life by approximately six months.

The other “poor” OPEC countries are in the same situation as the rich Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia, however, has favoured the too low oil prices with a view to destroying the US and, above all, the Russian production.

Now, with the new agreement, the OPEC area becomes a point of reference for Russian geopolitics, and even Libya will increasingly operate in close connection with Russia, considering that it was exactly the Russian pressure that led to the “finalization” of the Algiers agreement and, later, to the Doha agreement.

Nevertheless Saudi Arabia, which has monetary reserves to the tune of 655 billion US dollars, cannot accept – for a long period of time – even a barrel price above 60 US dollars, unless it cuts its public spending and starts its external indebtedness.

Furthermore also Russia has the problem of the impoverishment of its oil fields in Western Siberia. Hence the production reduction, which for Moscow is not high, is a blessing for prices and for extending the lifecycle of oil wells – not to mention the fact that the sanctions, imposed as a result of the Ukrainian issue, blocked the arrival of modern extraction technologies in Russia, with the related increase in production costs.

Therefore if – thanks to this agreement with OPEC – Vladimir Putin succeeds in reaching the level of 100 US dollars per barrel within a time frame acceptable to international investors, the new “big game” in Central Asia and the Greater Middle East will begin.

Saudi Arabia began to extract large and unexpected oil quantities in the mid-1980s, on the basis of a political and financial agreement with the United States, which further destroyed the Soviet economy – but now the mechanism is working exactly in the opposite way.

Currently the Russian oil barrel production cost is equal to 5.4 US dollars. Saudi Arabia’s cost is only 3 US dollars, while obviously the next start of offshore extraction activities will only increase production costs.

In Libya, the production cost – net of the country’s political disaster – is similar to the Saudi one, but data shows that, without an increase – as expected – in production and prices, the Libyan State, or what remains of it, would have no more funds by the end of this year.

To some extents this is also the Russian problem.

Russia’s federal deficit amounts to 1.5 trillion rubles (23.2 billion US dollars) and, according to the relevant Ministers, the Russian Reserve Fund could dry up just at the end of 2017.

Hence, without the oil price recovery, the whole Russian strategic architecture would go to ruin, thus causing an even more severe geopolitical disaster than the one which led to the USSR collapse – as Putin put it.

However, as we have seen, if the agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC countries works – and is even strengthened during the year – the stabilization (and diversification) of the Russian economy and, consequently, the stabilization of the entire Middle East crisis arc, will be a reality.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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The future of JCPOA after Iranian Presidential election

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The triumph of hardliner, Ebrahim Raisi in the recently held Iranian Presidential election is likely to pose a challenge with regard to the renewal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action JCPOA/Iran Nuclear Agreement (in 2019, US had imposed sanctions on him for Human Rights violations). Raisi who has been serving as Iran’s Chief Justice from March 2019, will take over as President in August 2021 and will be replacing moderate Hassan Rouhani.

While he has not opposed the JCPOA in principle, he is likely to be a tougher negotiator, than his predecessor. This was evident from his first news conference, where he said that Iran will not  kowtow to the west by limiting its missile capabilities or addressing concerns with regard to Iran’s role in the region’s security. In the news conference, also stated, that he will not be meeting US President Joe Biden.

The US has been guarded in its response to the election result. Commenting on the verdict and its likely impact on the Iran Nuclear deal, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated:

“The ultimate decision for whether or not to go back into the deal lies with Iran’s supreme leader, and he was the same person before this election as he is after the election,

Iran-China relations in recent years

Chinese President Xi Jinping congratulated Raisi on his triumph, describing Iran and China as ‘comprehensive strategic partners’. The Chinese President said that he was willing to work with Iran on a host of issues. Only last year, Iran and China had signed a 25 year strategic comprehensive agreement which sought to give a strong boost not just to economic ties between Tehran and Beijing, but security ties as well. One of the reasons cited for Tehran moving closer to Beijing has been the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the Iran, P5+1 agreement/JCPOA in 2018 and its lack of flexibility. From Beijing’s point of view, the deal was important not just for fulfilling its oil needs (according to the agreement, China would receive Iranian oil at a cheaper price (the beginning of 2021 witnessed a rise in Iranian oil imports to China).

While there is no doubt, that the Biden Administration has made attempts to revive the Iran Nuclear deal in recent months and the Vienna negotiations in which US has been indirectly involved, a solution does not seem in sight in the short run given that Raisi will replace Rouhani only in August. Also, if both sides stick to their stated position things are likely to get tougher. Interestingly, a senior Iranian official, presidential chief of staff Mahmoud Vaezi  indicated that US had agreed to move over 1000 Trump era sanctions, including those on insurance, oil and shipping.

The JCPOA has taken a break at the Vienna talks for some days and commenting on this Mikhail Ulyanov permanent representative to Russia said:

“The task is to make full use of this break to ensure that all participants get final political instructions on the remaining controversial issues,”

Obstacles

While many democrats and strategic analysts had been arguing that the Biden administration needed to show greater urgency and move away from stated positions with regard to a return to the JCPOA, opposition from not just Republicans, but hawks within his party made any such agreement impossible.

Apart from domestic opposition, Biden will also need to deal with pressure from Israel. While it is true that GCC countries, like Saudi Arabia and UAE, earlier opposed to the deal have been seeking to improve ties with Iran and have also softened their opposition to the deal, Israel has been opposed to JCPOA. The recently elected Israeli Prime Minister, Naftali Bennett’s stand vis-à-vis JCPOA is the same as Benjamin Netanyahu’s. After the Iranian election, the Israeli PM said:

“Raisi’s election is, I would say, the last chance for world powers to wake up before returning to the nuclear agreement, and understand who they are doing business with,”

Role of China and Russia

It would be pertinent to point out, that days before the election the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had stated that the US should remove sanctions vis-à-vis Iran. Given the fact, that Raisi is Anti-west it is likely that China and Russia could play an important role in the revival of JCPOA.

While there is merit in the Biden administration’s approach of removing sanctions against Iran in a stage wise manner, since this may be politically more feasible, Washington needs to think innovatively and bear in mind that  a rigid approach vis-à-vis Tehran will only make Anti-western sentiment in Iran more pronounced, and  leave it with no choice, but to move closer to China. GCC countries like UAE and Saudi Arabia which have been working towards resolving tensions with Iran could also play an important role in talks between the Biden Administration and a dispensation headed by Raisi.

In conclusion, the Biden Administration clearly has its task cut out. While negotiating with Raisi may not be easy, the fact that the Iranian President elect has support of the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, is important.

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Syria’s difficult rebirth

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It is now ten years since a peaceful demonstration against Bashar al-Assad’s regime organised by students in Deraa was brutally repressed by police and government forces, thus triggering a chain of events that plunged Syria into a terrible civil war.

The fighting – which saw the total destruction of historic cities such as Aleppo and Raqqa, the UNESCO heritage site of Palmyra and a large part of the capital Damascus – caused the death of some 250,000 fighters of all sides of the conflict (loyalist soldiers, ISIS guerrillas, Kurdish irredentist fighters, Islamist militants of the Syrian Liberation Army, militiamen of the Syrian Democratic Forces), as well as the death of at least 230,000 civilians, victims of the brutal occupation by the troops of the Islamic Caliphate or “collateral victims” of the fighting and bombing of villages and towns.

The civil conflict quickly turned into a “small world war”, with the armed intervention of various extra-regional players: Turkey on the side of Islamist rebels; Russia and Iran supporting the government in Damascus, and the United States

supporting the Kurds and the “democrats” of the “Syrian Democratic Forces”.

Over the last ten years, 5.6 million Syrians have fled the country and are living precariously in refugee camps in the neighbouring countries of the Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey.

6.7 million people have had to leave their homes and are considered “internally displaced”, i.e. refugees within Syria’s borders, while at least 5 million people – trapped in the north-west of Syria and in the Idlib region, where scattered troops of the Islamic Caliphate are still operating – are in need of humanitarian assistance.

According to data from the UN Refugee Agency, over 13 million Syrians have lost everything and are surviving on government aid and international charity.

Besides this humanitarian catastrophe, the government of Assad (who has been confirmed as President of the Republic for a fourth term) is facing an economic emergency that began after the first clashes in 2011 and has progressively worsened during the civil war.

According to the World Bank, the loss in terms of GDP between 2011 and 2016 was around 226 billion dollars, while the cost of destroying civilian housing and infrastructure exceeded 117 billion dollars.

The prices of basic necessities, such as food and fuel, have increased 20-fold compared to the period before the conflict, while the Syrian pound has progressively depreciated.

It is estimated that at least 70 per cent of the population currently lives below the poverty line and has limited food supply. According to World Vision International, life expectancy for Syrian children in 2021 has fallen by thirteen years.

The situation is further worsened by a huge water emergency: since last January, the water level of the Euphrates has dropped to the point that, due to the lack of water, the Tabqa and Tishreen dams risk closure, with severe damage to agriculture, electricity production and the supply of running water to the populations of the entire north-east region.

The Covid-19 pandemic has not spared this unfortunate country, although the official estimates of infected and dead people – albeit high – are not very reliable due to the impossibility for the health authorities to carry out the mass screening necessary to know the real extent of the contagion.

On the military front, the situation is still rather confused.

Government troops, with Russian and Iranian help, managed to inflict an almost definitive defeat on the ISIS militia.

The men of the Caliphate – after having been expelled from Aleppo, Palmyra and Raqqa (which had even been designated by Al Baghdadi as the capital of the Islamic State) – have partly fled to the Iraqi desert, from where they continue to carry out actions against the Iraqi forces, and have partly dispersed in small groups in the desert and mountainous area of Idlib and Deir Es Zor, in the so-called Aleppo-Hama-Raqqa triangle, where they continue a troublesome and sometimes bloody guerrilla warfare that has nothing to do with the overwhelming victories that brought them close to definitive military victory in 2014-2015.

Today ISIS is content with ambushing government military convoys and perpetrating extortion against the population trapped in the region, in view of self-financing for reasons of mere survival.

The Syrian army, however, is finding it increasingly difficult to definitively get rid of ISIS from the Syrian territory, both because of the difficulties connected with the need to effectively control a vast desert and mountainous area, and because it has not yet managed to completely defeat the Kurdish guerrillas of the “Syrian Democratic Forces”, still supported by the United States, and because it must also deal with the scattered Islamist armed formations of the “Syrian Liberation Army” supported by Turkey.

Therefore, despite having avoided the definitive defeat that seemed close between 2013 and 2015, Bashar al-Assad’s regime cannot easily and calmly tackle the problem of rebuilding the country.

After having secured his fourth term in office through elections (the outcome of which was a foregone conclusion because only Alawites and Christians voted massively for him, while the Sunnis mostly abstained or were “dissuaded” from taking part in the election), the Syrian President is trying to strengthen his government by reorganising his security apparatus with fully trusted and loyal men.

Last May the President appointed his loyal General Jamal Mahmoud Younes as Head of the Committee for the Security of the Eastern Region, who is also responsible for the security of the Homs Governorate.

Younes, who comes from the Assad family’s “fief” of Latakia, is considered to be very close to the President’s brother, Maher al-Assad, under whose orders he served in the Fourth Armoured Division from 2012 to 2013. Maher is considered to be very close to Iran and Russia.

Another prominent member of the new Syrian security apparatus is General Ramadan Yusef Al Ramadan, also an Alawite and subject to personal sanctions by the European Union – together with his colleague Younes – for his role in the repression of the first incidents in Deraa in 2011.

Ramadan has been appointed Head of the Security Committee of the Latakia Governorate, an extremely sensitive area because it is actually under Russian military control.

Assad therefore finds himself in the need to reconcile the difficult requirements of definitively defeating the insurgency, resolving the very severe economic situation and coexisting – as reasonably as possible – with the presence of two cumbersome allies, Russia and Iran, which – after having ensured his survival – seem determined to permanently establish themselves on Syrian territory.

Russia, whose help has been fundamental in preventing the collapse of the Damascus regime, continues to provide air and ground military support to the fight against the insurgents still active and to exploit the credit it has acquired with the regime to strengthen its presence in the region on a permanent basis.

In early June, the Russian Defence Minister authorised the start of works for the renovation of the Khmeimim air base in the Latakia region, after the runway had already been lengthened to support the fast traffic of Russian military vehicles (one aircraft per minute). The new airport was even used a few days ago for a mysterious mission that took a Russian aircraft to Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion airport.

This mysterious episode shows that Russia’s presence in the area could even be functional to the search for a stabilisation of relations between Israel and Syria (President Putin has never made a secret of his sympathy for Israel).

The Iranian military presence in Syria is of a very different calibre and dangerousness for Israeli security.

Iran already has a strong military presence in the region: from the Lebanon – where Hezbollah politically and militarily controls the whole south of the country and the sensitive area bordering the Galilee – to Iraq, handed over to the pro-Iranian Shiites by George W. Bush with the 2003 war.

While, as reported by Israeli intelligence sources, the Iraqi nuclear programme has resumed at full speed at the same time as the development of the capacity to construct modern ballistic missiles – effective also as carriers of nuclear warheads – over the next few years Syria could become – against its will – a dangerous nuclear outpost on the Israeli border.

A nightmarish prospect made even more worrying by the very recent election of a hardliner like Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi as President of the Republic of Iran. A prospect that would not help Syria to get out of its decades-long crisis, but would bring it back to the front line in the confrontation with Israel, if Russia did not make its voice heard.

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Intelligence and Evolution of Democracy in Jordan

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The relationship between democracy and the character of secret intelligence presents an interesting puzzle. The very concept of democracy demands that an intelligence agency serves democratic interests by providing one country’s security and preparedness against potential threats both internal and external. The core notion is that a stronger and safer country can turn itself into a heaven where democracy can continue to be practiced.

The role of intelligence in the building of democracy and political stability in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is crucial. Jordan, strategically located in the Middle East, presents a long-run import-export relationship.

On the one hand, Jordan, a country of few natural resources, imports oil products and natural gas to meet its energy needs. On the other hand, Jordan exports a valuable resource which is security in terms of intelligence, geographic security, and stability. Jordanian General Intelligence Department’s (GID’s), Dairat al Mukhabarat, primary objective is to defend Jordan from internal and external threats that target its political stability, violate its sovereignty, or undermine the security of its people.

The focus of GID’s operations is the collection of intelligence pertaining to security issues within the Middle East, including surveillance of paramilitary groups and guarding borders to prevent an influx of terrorists from the wider region. The agency is accountable to ministerial control, but in practice reports to the King briefing him on matters of national security. The GID also provides the Prime Minister with regular analyses of the kingdom’s political climate, and it is committed to preserving the power of the Jordanian constitution when executing its duties.

Justice, Human Rights and Transparency

Justice, transparency, the respect of human rights and security are key ingredients to build accountability, trust, and stability, which are necessary for the functioning of democracies and market economies. The GID has been at the forefront of efforts to consolidate Jordan’s architecture of democracy making the safeguard of these ingredients a cornerstone of its mission.

Practically, Jordan’s intelligence agency fully recognizes the International Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Convention against Torture. The detainment quarters of the agency meet internationally approved standards and are recognized as an official state prison making it accessible for inspection and review, in accordance with the “Jordanian Prison Administration laws.”

On Justice, the Jordanian Constitution provides that the judiciary is an independent power and divides courts into three types: regular courts, religious courts, and special courts. The Military Council of the GID falls in the third type of courts. Specifically, in accordance with Law 24 of 1964 on the General Intelligence Department (the so-called “GID Law”), the Intelligence Director appoints members of the Military Council and ratifies its decisions that pertain to officers and members of the GID. Judgments of the said Council are considered as final and are not open to any means of contestation.

The relationship between the intelligence agency and the judiciary, a key-component of democracy, is solid. The public prosecution at the State Security Court normally issues warrants and, provides them to the General Intelligence Department for the detainment of individuals connected to terrorism. The conviction of ringleaders of terrorist plots that originate from neighboring countries like Iraq and Syria is crucial part of the judicial-intelligence partnership to maintain internal stability, prerequisite for Jordan’s democratic evolution. A representative case of the intelligence-judicial cooperation is the conviction of an attempted suicide bomber who took part in the 2005 Amman bombings in Jordan but survived, when her explosive belt failed to detonate.

The GID also leads the national fight against corruption in all its forms, perceiving the phenomenon of corruption as major obstacle to the kingdom’s democratic evolution and economic development. In this regard, the GID has incorporated the anti-corruption directorate that was set up in 1996 and conducts secret investigations of corruption cases and collects relevant data, disrupts corrupt practices, makes referrals to the public prosecutor, and eventually to civil courts when sufficient evidence is available.

Senior members of the GID are not immune to secret investigations for corruption practices. In a self-cleansing process, the GID’s former head for the period of 2005-2008 was sentenced to 13 years in prison on charges of embezzling public funds, money laundering and abuse of office. The anti-corruption directorate has run a project titled “Strengthening the Capacity of Government and People to Act against Corruption” with the aim to expose the Department’s staff to international best practices in fighting corruption and attend specialized training workshops.

Since its establishment, the Anti-Corruption Directorate has uncovered numerous cases of fraud that helped save the state treasury hundreds of millions of Jordanian Dinars (JD). As consequence, people, including non-Jordanians, were referred to courts, including civil servants. In addition, foreign nationals have been expelled from the kingdom for fraud practices. The fraud cases involve bribes, embezzlement of funds, the forgery of official documents, smuggling operations, tax evasion, and copyright infringements. Last but not least, middlemen who are trafficking in the illegal sale of kidneys and other human organs have also been arrested throughout the years.

The Fight against Terror

Most important, the GID carries out intelligence operations to protect the security of the state. Specifically, the GID maintains several task forces devoted to specialized areas of intelligence, including counterintelligence. The government employs GID staff to monitor the security of government information systems and personnel.

Additionally, an anti-terrorism task force conducts operations to gather information on organizations active in Jordan and throughout the Middle East. It is not coincidence that Jordan has aided international anti-terrorism efforts and has repeatedly succeeded in foiling terrorist plots and dismantling terror organizations that planned to launch attacks in or outside of Jordan. Such organizations included, for example, Mohammad Army (1989), Bay’at Al-Imam Organization (1994), Khader Abu Hosher (1999), Jordanian Afghans (2001), and the Reform and Defiance Movement (1998).

Jordan’s geopolitical position has long made it a prey for terrorist activities targeting Jordanian and foreign nationals. For example, in 2005, rockets aimed at two US warfare ships visiting the Jordanian port of Aqaba narrowly missed their targets. There were two claims of responsibility, both from groups believed to be affiliated with Zarqawi, then militant leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. In 2004, Jordan became target of the Al-Jayousi terrorist group that planned to unleash a Chemical Weapons attack against GID’s headquarters. The objective was to damage its facilities and image of a fortress agency, because of GID’s major role in combating terrorism at the national and regional levels. In late 2006, the Jordanian intelligence thwarted a bomb attack against foreign tourists traveling through Queen Alia International Airport in Amman. Several of the convicted conspirators were Iraqis. An attack against American troops deployed at a military base in the south of the kingdom was foiled by the Jordanian intelligence in 2019.

The Kingdom has also been repeatedly targeted by the terrorist group of ISIS, but all planned attacks have been thwarted by GID. An ISIS-linked planned combined attack against Jordanian military and security sites, moderate religious scholars, and media stations was prevented in 2018. Notably, in 2018 alone, the GID foiled 62 terrorist operations abroad and 32 internal operations. In 2020, the GID thwarted several ISISlinked terrorist operations including a major one that aimed at simultaneously targeting the intelligence building in the city of Zarqa, security officials in the northern city of Irbid and an Armenian Orthodox Church in the Ashrafyeh area near the Al-Wehdat camp. 

Jordan has long experience in the fight against terrorism since Afghanistan became fertile ground for the first generation of jihadist groups, the second generation coming from Iraq and the third generation active in Syria. Given this reality, Jordan’s efforts focus on the rule of law, and the fight against terrorism through mechanisms and operations supported by GID. As King Abdallah pointed out in a letter to the GID in mid-February 2021, the agency must remain a model of efficient intelligence in countering terrorism and security threats to the kingdom and be in position to provide the best modern intelligence assessments to decision-makers in the political, economic, and security-related fields.

In practice, Jordan’s GID supports a four-track plan in the fight against terrorism. The first track is Legislation. Jordan has endorsed in April 2014 the amendment of the 2006 anti-terror law that focuses on terror-related crimes and funding. The 2014 amended law foresees the death penalty for those who commit terrorist crimes that result in the death of people, partial or total damage of facilities, and use explosives, chemicals, and radioactive materials. Financial activities in support of extremist groups, attempts for recruitment to terrorist organizations, and the creation of websites encouraging terrorist activities are penalized under the amended law.

The second track lies in Executive Measures. Following United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 on countering terrorism, Jordan has taken a series of measures to comply with the resolution, including the adoption of the anti-money laundering Act of 2007. Jordan has also updated the specifications of personal identification documents in compliance with international safety standards, thus minimizing forgery risks.

The third track is based on Treaties and Conventions. Jordan is party to both formal and informal anti-terror treaties and conventions and has contributed to a number of regional and international treaties with the aim to combat terrorism.

The fourth track highlights GID’s cooperation with government ministries. A representative cooperation is with the interior ministry’s programs to contain jihadist ideology applied since 2007 to prisoners. The programs include religious lessons and interviews with scholars and imams to fight this ideology, through dialogues and by holding sessions of psychological counseling and social rehabilitation.

Jordan continues to be in the eye of a storm as armed jihadist groups and al-Qaida as well as ISIS militants attempt to pour into the country. Because of this reality, Jordan employs its intelligence agency to mobilize regional and international cooperation with sister agencies based on defensive, operational and intelligence strategies to counter takfiri and jihadist groups emanating from crisis ridden Syria. Jordanian intelligence has foiled in 2012, one of the largest terrorist attacks planned on Jordanian; the attack was scheduled to be executed by militants from Syria who intended to attack western diplomats and to detonate explosives in two shopping malls and in the district of Abdoun. In late April 2014, the Jordanian air force destroyed vehicles transporting weapons to the kingdom from Syria. Throughout the last years, Jordan’s GID has intensified actions to alert friendly countries and strategic allies on armed jihadist organizations active in Syria and the possible infiltration of militants to neighboring countries, through unannounced visits and meetings with security strategy makers and implementers in certain Arab countries, and western capitals.

Public Opinion Perspectives

The main characteristic of the GID like all intelligence agencies is that they operate in secrecy, and unlike governments they do not seek popularity or public approval for their activities, nor are they expected to seek popular ratings within public opinion. The secret nature of GID’s tasks and duties limits the ability of any study to explore public opinion perspectives and restricts any opinion poll to general perceptions.  

That said, a Jordanian research center has produced statistical evidence on the level of trustworthiness that GID enjoys within the public, and on relations between different branches of the Jordanian state, civil and military, not based on a single public opinion poll, but on an accumulating amount of data from polls conducted by the center over a 19-year period (2001-2020).

According to them, the General Intelligence Department along with the Armed Forces are the most trusted institutions in Jordan.

Jordanians have come to realize that the security and stability Jordan enjoys is no coincidence, but a result of the efforts of the Jordanian security apparatus, and the GID in particular. This perception has brought the agency that usually operates in secret and seeks no popularity or approval into the limelight as the first line of defense against groups that target Jordan.

As the kingdom has marked its second centennial, the political and security challenges plaguing the region, necessitate the effectiveness of GID’s role in safeguarding the security of Jordan and its state institutions, prerequisite for the kingdom’s sustainable democratization.

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