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The global strategy of General Khalifa Haftar

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] T [/yt_dropcap]he agreement between the Libyan factions signed in Morocco on December 17, 2015 has not been implemented yet. It implied an enlightened “process of national reconciliation” – obviously bottom-up – that no one wanted to put in place while bullets were whizzing and the self-styled “Caliphate” of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi established itself in the Sirte region.

But, in the naive mentality of the major international decision-makers, only Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army was the true enemy of national reconciliation. The former US Secretary of State, John Kerry, referred precisely to the former Gaddafi’s protégé when he said that the “battles of individuals, having only their own interest in mind, jeopardize the security of Libya”.

We know for a fact that, for some strange alchemy, the former Secretary of State stated the exact opposite of truth, with haughtiness and self-conceit. Hence we can infer that Haftar’s forces were inevitable to eliminate the jihadist militants in the Sirte region, which however is a fact.

Therefore, when the old Gaddafi’s General launched ”Operation Dignity” (Karama) on May 16, 2014, he had some goals in mind, including Libya’s unity – a sentiment much more widespread than we may believe among the populations – in addition to the inevitable establishment of a military-civilian dictatorship, the only form of government capable of disarming and stabilizing the whole Libyan crisis arc, not with UN-style talk but with deeds.

From the very beginning Haftar had the support of Algeria, well-aware of the resilience and dangerousness of permanent jihad. He was also helped by Egypt, willing to protect its citizens working for the Libyan economy which, before Gaddafi’s fall, was by far the most prosperous economy in the Maghreb region.

Abdel Fattah Al Sisi – that only Italy’s terrible mismanagement of the “Regeni affair” has made depart from our interests, promptly replaced by France’s – does not want the Muslim Brotherhood in his way, a real jihadi “third international”, and is arming Haftar, the sworn enemy of every totalitarian Islamism.

Haftar can also rely on the support of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, that want neither the Muslim Brotherhood, namely the backbone of both current Libyan governments, nor the structural crisis of one of the largest oil producers in Africa. Finally he is also helped by France, which, despite everything, had a moment of strategic lucidity in the Libyan region.

Fortunately, in that moment, President Hollande was asleep.

Obviously Italy has made no strategic choice and it is still betting on an impossible unity government immediately – that, if any, would count nothing – and on the UN strange and idealistic geopolitics, which I think is based on the horoscope of the day.

Conversely, Renzi’s Italy at first and Gentiloni’s later rolled the dice (a game forbidden in the Islamic culture) by betting only on Fajez Al-Serraj’s government that, with its twenty ministers counts for little or nothing even in the streets of Tripoli where it has its headquarters, on the sea which saw the sinking of Italo Balbo’s aircraft, shot down “by mistake” by the friendly fire of Italy’s anti-aircraft guns.

Hence, in my opinion, Italy should have had to deal also with Khalifa Haftar, who is not a disarmed prophet as Serraj or Savonarola, but a very armed prophet, such as Cyrus, Romulus and Theseus – just to quote Machiavelli’s Prince, in which the disarmed leaders always ruin themselves and fail.

The end of political realism, replaced by an idealism half-way between the 1968 movement and Rousseau-style thinking, is a decisive cultural problem of our time, as we will see later on.

Currently for Khalifa Haftar, the other strong point – namely the void filled, as taught by the ancient doctrine of Sun Tzu in his Art of War – is the agreement with the Russian Federation, signed aboard the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier returning victoriously from the Middle East on January 11 last.

Thanks to the decisive mediation of the Algerian intelligence services, Russia will grant to the Libyan General military equipment and, in particular, advanced electronic devices for surveillance and signal intelligence.

Russia, which has already won its war in Syria, another Western void filled by Russia and Assad’s Alawites, is now a leader in the South-Mediterranean basin and therefore has the immediate need to find a place and a credible ally in the Libyan system.

The Russians still know how to wage a war and, therefore, they know that only one or two bases in the East- Mediterranean basin are undefended and can be strategically silenced, even without explicit acts of war.

Instead of waiting for Kantian “perpetual peace”, Russia has chosen the horse on which to bet, namely Khalifa Haftar, and it is supporting him not with pacifist talk, but with its weapons and its political and strategic support at international level.

Quos Deus perdere vult, dementat could be the motto of Western geopolitics in recent years.

“Operation Dignity” is certainly a decisive ally of Tobruk government but, in spite of aid, the other government, namely the Tripoli one, has lost control also over what should be its capital city – hence it would make no longer sense to support it.

But whoever forgets Machiavelli is bound to study it in defeat.

Furthermore Russia has always wanted a base in North Africa: in 2010 it asked the Algerian government to have access to the Mers-el-Kebir base, which at that time was denied to it.

Today, however, Russia has Libya available – a country it has always dreamt of having even when Gaddafi was in power. Just before being overthrown, as a result of the combined effect of jihadists and European democracies, Gaddafi had bought weapons from Russia – allegedly to the tune of four billion US dollars – while he had accepted the presence of Russian “instructors” for his Armed Forces.

Russia cannot sell weapons directly to Haftar, owing to the UN embargo in force since 2011, but it can make them be “assigned” by Algeria, which already has 90% of its arsenal in Russian arms.

Moreover, the militants of the so-called “Caliphate” are fleeing from the Sirte region and central Libya southwards, namely on the Libyan border with Algeria, Chad and Niger.

In fact it was exactly Chad to seal its borders with Libya on January 3 last.

Moreover Algeria wants to continue talks with all Libyan players, but it would prefer to have two Russian bases in Cyrenaica, which have already been planned, instead of the empty and dumb indolence of Western idealists.

Meanwhile, however, it is betting on the strongest horse, namely Khalifa Haftar.

In the meantime Russia has become China’s largest oil supplier, by supplanting Saudi Arabia. This happens exactly after the agreement signed by OPEC and non-OPEC countries, which has led to a decrease in production both for the Arab-Islamic producers and for the Russian ones, thus making the oil barrel price rise again.

While, however, history is magistra vitae, as it should be, it is nonetheless true that Haftar wanted to become Commander-in-chief of the new post-Gaddafi’s Libyan Armed Forces. Nevertheless, due to the endless hair-splitting and pedantry of politics in the Maghreb region, Yussuf Al-Mangoush was chosen. He immediately created a private militia of jihadists and had several loyalist officers killed.

Probably Al-Mangoush also ordered to kill General Abdel Fattah Younis, the powerful Head of Eastern Libya’s rebels.

And again, if the West is not a blind kitten, as unfortunately I suspect, the Misrata forces – that support Al Serraj’s government against remuneration (even Italy’s) – will still be more of a challenge for Haftar’s ”Operation Dignity”.

Instead of doing like that 1968 activist who pushed his way through the police and the red revolutionaries with a white sheet, shouting “Peace!”, but being given an awful beating by both of them, Italy and the rest of the EU should deal with Haftar – and now we will see what Trump’s America will do. They should also open a “dialogue” (a word which is now particularly fashionable) with Khalifa al-Gwell, the leader of Tobruk government, and finally decide to design a new map of Libya, where possible.

Possibly by force and not only with bombastic statements of principle.

This means two governments – and we would also do a favour to Serraj by taking him seriously – with one single Army led by Haftar and, above all, a border between Eastern and Western Libya controlled by Egyptians, Saudis, Algerians, Tunisians and a Multinational Force in Libya established under a UN mandate as interposition force by Italy, Spain, France, the United States and Russia.

Currently, the tension between Misrata Forces and “Operation Dignity” is very high and could affect also the city of Tripoli, but the conflict would also directly concern the central oil-producing region, while Haftar is operating tribal alliances in the South, the same strategy which enabled him to conquer the Libyan Oil Crescent.

In all likelihood, the centre of gravity of this war will still be the Sirte region, where Khalifa Haftar will do his utmost to block Misrata forces.

Moreover, at the meeting of the African Union held in Brazzaville on 30 January last, Al-Serraj said he wanted to create an “anti-terrorist” unit and, to this end, he could meet General Haftar.

The agreement that Al Serraj has in mind is certainly the appointment of Haftar as Commander-in-chief of the joint Libyan Armed Forces, but above all the preservation of his Tripoli government and his current job.

At least by capitalizing on his international connections and support, namely the “disarmed prophets” of the West.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs "La Centrale Finanziaria Generale Spa", he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group and member of the Ayan-Holding Board. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d'Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: "A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title of "Honorable" of the Académie des Sciences de l'Institut de France

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Battling it out at the UN: Potholes overshadow US-Iran confrontation

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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It’s easy to dismiss Iranian denunciations of the United States and its Middle Eastern allies as part of the Islamic republic’s long-standing rhetoric. The rhetoric makes it equally easy to understand American distrust.

But as President J. Trump and Hassan Rouhani, his Iranian counterpart, gear up for two days of diplomatic sabre rattling at the United Nations in advance of next month’s imposition of a second round of harsh US sanctions, both men risk fuelling a conflict that could escalate out of hand.

Both are scheduled to address the UN general assembly on Tuesday and Mr. Trump is slated to chair a meeting on Wednesday of the Security Council expected to focus on Iran.

Adding to the likely drama at the UN, European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, speaking alongside Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, snubbed Mr. Trump, by announcing the creation of a payment system that would allow oil companies and businesses to continue trading with Iran despite US sanctions.

The risk of escalation is enhanced by the fact that Messrs. Trump and Rouhani are sending mixed messages.

Mr. Trump’s administration insists that its confrontational approach is designed to alter Iranian behaviour and curb its policies, not topple its regime.

Yet, the administration stepped up its engagement with exile groups associated with the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, a controversial Saudi-backed organization that calls for the violent overthrow of the government in Tehran and enjoys support among current and former Western officials, as Messrs. Trump and Rouhani battle it out at the UN.

John Bolton, who has repeatedly advocated regime change before becoming Mr. Trump’s national security advisor, is scheduled to give a keynote address at the United Against Nuclear Iran’s (UANI) annual summit during the UN assembly. So is Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, another hardliner on Iran.

Mr. Pompeo and Mr, Bolton, who has spoken in the past at events related to the Mujahedeen, had so far since coming to office refrained from addressing gatherings associated with opposition groups.

The administration left that to Mr. Trump’s personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, who last weekend told the Iran Uprising Summit organized by the Organization of Iranian-American Communities, a Washington-based group associated with the Mujahedeen and attended by the exile’s leader, Maryam Rajavi, that US. sanctions were causing economic pain and could lead to a “successful revolution” in Iran.

“I don’t know when we’re going to overthrow them. It could be in a few days, months, a couple of years. But it’s going to happen,” Mr. Giuliani, said speaking on the day of an attack on a military march in the southern Iranian city of Ahvaz that killed 25 people and wounded at least 70 others.

Messrs. Bolton, Pompeo and Giuliani’s hardline stems from US suspicions rooted in anti-American and anti-Western attitudes that are grafted in the Islamic republic’s DNA and produced the 444-day occupation in 1979 of the US Embassy in Tehran. They are reinforced by the humiliation of a failed US military operation to rescue 66 Americans held hostages during the occupation.

Iranian rhetoric; bombastic threats against Israel; denial of the Holocaust, support for anti-American insurgents in Iraq, the brutal regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthi rebels in Yemen and Hamas in the Gaza Strip; propagation of religiously inspired republican government as an alternative to conservative monarchy in the Gulf; and degrees of duplicity regarding its nuclear program, reaffirm America’s suspicion.

Iran’s seemingly mirror image of the United States traces its roots further back to the 1953 US-supported overthrow of the nationalist government of prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh and his replacement by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi whom Washington staunchly supported till his fall in 1979.

Iranian concerns were reinforced by American backing of Iraq in the 1980s Gulf war, US support for Kurdish and Baloch insurgents, the broad spectrum of support of former and serving US officials for the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, unequivocal Saudi signals of support for ethnic strife as a strategy to destabilize Iran, and Mr. Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear program despite confirmation of its adherence to the accord.

Responses by the US and its Gulf allies as well as a series of statements by militant Iranian Arab groups, including the Ahvaz Resistance Movement, suspected of being responsible for this weekend’s attack, have only deepened Iranian distrust.

Those statements included one by the Arab Liberation Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz effusively praising Saudi Arabia on its national day that the kingdom celebrated a day after the attack.

Yadollah Javani, the deputy commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, the target of the attack, vowed revenge for what he termed years of conspiracies against the Iranian revolution by its enemies.

Mr. Javani was referring to past US attempts to destabilize Iran and a four-decade long global Saudi campaign that included backing of Iraq in the Gulf war during the 1980s and an estimated $100 billion investment in support of anti-Iranian, anti-Shiite ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim groups.

All of this means that mounting hostility between the United States and Iran is muddied as much by fact as by perception – a combustible mix that is easily exploitable by parties on both sides of the divide seeking to raise the ante.

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Attack in Iran raises spectre of a potentially far larger conflagration

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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An attack on a military parade in the southern Iranian city of Ahwaz is likely to prompt Iranian retaliation against opposition groups at home and abroad. It also deepens Iranian fears that the United States. Saudi Arabia and others may seek to destabilize the country by instigating unrest among its ethnic minorities.

With competing claims of responsibility by the Islamic State and the Ahvaz National Resistance for the attack that killed 29 people and wounded 70 others in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan, which borders on Iraq and is home to Iran’s ethnic Arab community, it is hard to determine with certainty the affiliation of the four perpetrators, all of whom were killed in the incident.

Statements by Iranian officials, however, accusing the United States and its allies, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel, suggest that they see the Ahvaz group rather than the Islamic State as responsible for the incident, the worst since the Islamic State attacked the Iranian parliament and the mausoleum of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Tehran in 2017.

Iran’s summoning, in the wake of the attack, of the ambassadors of Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark, countries from which Iranian opposition groups operate, comes at an awkward moment for Tehran.

It complicates Iranian efforts to ensure that European measures effectively neutralize potentially crippling US sanctions that are being imposed as a result of the US withdrawal in May from the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic republic’s nuclear program.

Ahvaz-related violence last year spilled on to the street of The Hague when unidentified gunmen killed Ahwazi activist Ahmad Mola Nissi. Mr. Nissi was shot dead days before he was scheduled to launch a Saudi-funded television station staffed with Saudi-trained personnel that would target Khuzestan, according to Ahvazi activists.

This week, a group of exile Iranian academics and political activists, led by The Hague-based social scientist Damon Golriz, announced the creation of a group that intends to campaign for a liberal democracy in Iran under the auspices of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the ousted Shah of Iran who lives in the United States.

While Iran appears to be targeting exile groups in the wake of the Ahvaz attack, Iran itself has witnessed in recent years stepped up activity by various insurgent groups amid indications of Saudi support, leading to repeated clashes and interception of Kurdish, Baloch and other ethnic insurgents.

Last month, Azeri and Iranian Arab protests erupted in soccer stadiums while the country’s Revolutionary Guards Corps reported clashes with Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish insurgents.

State-run television warned at the time in a primetime broadcast that foreign agents could turn legitimate protests stemming from domestic anger at the government’s mismanagement of the economy and corruption into “incendiary calls for regime change” by inciting violence that would provoke a crackdown by security forces and give the United States fodder to tackle Iran.

The People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran or Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK), a controversial exiled opposition group that enjoys the support of serving and former Western officials, including some in the Trump administration, as well as prominent Saudis such as Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former Saudi intelligence chief, who is believed to be close to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has taken credit for a number of the protests in Khuzestan.

The incidents fit an emerging pattern, prompting suggestions that if a Gulf-backed group was responsible for this weekend’s attack, it may have been designed to provoke a more direct confrontation between Iran and the United States.

“If the terrorist attack in Ahvaz was part of a larger Saudi and UAE escalation in Iran, their goal is likely to goad Iran to retaliate and then use Tehran’s reaction to spark a larger war and force the US to enter since Riyadh and Abu Dhabi likely cannot take on Iran militarily alone… If so, the terrorist attack is as much about trapping Iran into war as it is to trap the US into a war of choice,” said Trita Parsi of the National Iranian American Council.

Iran appears with its response to the Ahvaz attack to be saying that its fears of US and Saudi destabilization efforts are becoming reality. The Iranian view is not wholly unfounded.

Speaking in a private capacity on the same day as the attack in Ahvaz, US President Donald J. Trump’s personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, declared that US. sanctions were causing economic pain that could lead to a “successful revolution” in Iran.

“I don’t know when we’re going to overthrow them. It could be in a few days, months, a couple of years. But it’s going to happen,” Mr. Giuliani told an audience gathered in New York for an Iran Uprising Summit organized by the Organization of Iranian-American Communities, a Washington-based group associated with the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq.

Mr. Giuliani is together with John Bolton, Mr. Trump’s national security advisor, a long-standing supporter of the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq that calls for the violent overthrow of the Iranian regime.

Mr. Bolton, last year before assuming office, drafted at the request of Mr. Trump’s then strategic advisor, Steve Bannon, a plan that envisioned US support “for the democratic Iranian opposition,” “Kurdish national aspirations in Iran, Iraq and Syria,” and assistance for Iranian Arabs in Khuzestan and Baloch in the Pakistani province of Balochistan and Iran’s neighbouring Sistan and Balochistan province.

The Trump administration has officially shied away from formally endorsing the goal of toppling the regime in Tehran. Mr. Bolton, since becoming national security advisor, has insisted that US policy was to put “unprecedented pressure” on Iran to change its behaviour”, not its regime.

Messrs. Bolton and Giuliani’s inclination towards regime change is, however, shared by several US allies in the Middle East, and circumstantial evidence suggests that their views may be seeping into US policy moves without it being officially acknowledged.

Moreover, Saudi support for confrontation with Iran precedes Mr. Trump’s coming to office but has intensified since, in part as a result of King Salman’s ascendance to the Saudi throne in 2015 and the rise of his son, Prince Mohammed.

Already a decade ago, Saudi Arabia’s then King Abdullah urged the United States to “cut off the head of the snake” by launching military strikes to destroy Iran’s nuclear program.

Writing in 2012 in Asharq Al Awsat, a Saudi newspaper, Amal Al-Hazzani, an academic, asserted in an op-ed entitled “The oppressed Arab district of al-Ahwaz“ that Khuzestan “is an Arab territory… Its Arab residents have been facing continual repression ever since the Persian state assumed control of the region in 1925… It is imperative that the Arabs take up the al-Ahwaz cause, at least from the humanitarian perspective.”

More recently, Prince Mohammed vowed that “we won’t wait for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia. Instead, we will work so that the battle is for them in Iran.”

Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a prominent UAE scholar, who is believed to be close to Emirati Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, played into Iranian assertions of Gulf involvement in this weekend’s attack by tweeting that it wasn’t a terrorist incident.

Mr. Abdulla suggested that “moving the battle to the Iranian side is a declared option” and that the number of such attacks “will increase during the next phase”.

A Saudi think tank, believed to be backed by Prince Mohammed last year called in a study for Saudi support for a low-level Baloch insurgency in Iran. Prince Mohammed vowed around the same time that “we will work so that the battle is for them in Iran, not in Saudi Arabia.”

Pakistani militants have claimed that Saudi Arabia has stepped up funding of militant madrassas or religious seminaries in Balochistan that allegedly serve as havens for anti-Iranian fighters.

The head of the US State Department’s Office of Iranian Affairs, Steven Fagin, met in Washington in June with Mustafa Hijri, head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), before assuming his new post as counsel general in Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The KDPI has recently stepped up its attacks in Iranian Kurdistan, killing nine people weeks before Mr. Hijri’s meeting with Mr. Fagin. Other Kurdish groups have reported similar attacks. Several Iranian Kurdish groups are discussing ways to coordinate efforts to confront the Iranian regime.

Similarly, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) last year appointed a seasoned covert operations officer as head of its Iran operations.

Said Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Khalid bin Salman, Prince Mohammed’s brother: President “Trump makes clear that we will not approach Iran with the sort of appeasement policies that failed so miserably to halt Nazi Germany’s rise to power, or avert the costliest war ever waged.”

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Turkey’s Great Game in Syria

Ahmet S. Yayla, Ph.D.

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With ISIS on the run in the desert of South Syria, Al Qaeda’s affiliated jihadists in Idlib brace for the final assault by the combined forces of the Syrian Army, the Russian air force and the Iranian proxies. The president of Turkey, who fancies that he could be the new Caliph himself, implores the United States to join in the quashing of Bashar Al-Assad “before he kills again.” While there are some common of interests between Washington and Ankara, the United States gains nothing by assisting Erdogan’s Syrian gambit, because the cure he would bring could be worse than the disease. On the other hand, the President’s call five months ago to pull out of Syria altogether would be risky.

Idlib, Home to some three million people, half of whom are the displaced people running away from Assad’s atrocities, has also been an uncertain sanctuary for former Salafist-jihadi fighters, who may number  30,000 according to the US military. The UN special envoy for Syria estimates there are around 10,000 al-Qaeda affiliated fighters in Idlib, most of whom under the control of Hay’atTahrir al-Sham, (HTS), al-Qaeda’s latest rebranding, which hold nearly 60 percent of the city. The rest of Idlib is controlled by Turkey-backed militias. Turkey has a dog in this fight; the Western coalition does not.

Armies of four major players in the area vie for territory: Syria, Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Ankara agreed to help create de-escalation zones and 12 observation posts to protect civilians during the Astana peace talks in January 2017.

The battle for Idlib has differing objectives for the four armies on the field.

For Syria, the Idlib offensive allows al-Assad to kill thousands of Sunni rebels with barrel bombs, Russian airstrikesand Iranian militias, all with an unforgettable exclamation point. Brutal, yes, but it’s a strategy that has worked in the area for 5,000 years.

For Russia, driving on Idlib will be the final blow against the rebels and the guarantee of Russia’s permanent military bases in Tartus and Latakia.

For Iran, conquering Idlib would remove the last major obstacle to the Shia land bridge from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. Iran wants to extend its influence in the region and have uninterrupted access to Lebanon to boost Hezbollah’s power and its supply chain.

For Turkey and Erdogan, the Idlib strategy is complicated. It is estimated that an assault would drive more than 700,000 people toward the Turkish border. But Turkey, with more than 3 million refugees already and a spiraling financial crisis, won’t accept another humanitarian flood, according to Turkey’s foreign minister. Additionally, Turkey has been investing in northern Syria to extend its influence including in Idlib by providing humanitarian aid via NGO’s such as the IHH (Humanitarian Relief Foundation), opening schools, and sending teachers and imams to establish a favorable Turkish sphere of influence for long-term investment; therefore, Turkey fears to lose the ground it already controls.

Since January 2017 Erdogan anticipated that he could trust Russia and Iran and have a military presence in the region per the Astana agreement. According to Erdogan, Turkish military presence would thwart a Syrian offense against Idlib. He also wanted to extend Turkish control of northern Syria along the Turkish border, including the cities of al-Bab and Afrin, in an effort to block a Kurdish-controlled corridor along the same border. On both counts, Erdogan miscalculated.

Erdogan has been playing a dangerous game both at home and abroad. He closely but surely distanced Turkey from the West; particularly the U.S. Under his control, Turkey has become an authoritarian state, jailing thousands of people on false charges. Among the victims are hundreds of journalists, including several Western reporters and an American Christian pastor.

The fact is, Turkey no longer behaves as a U.S. ally. Under Erdogan, Turkey allowed more than 40,000 foreign fighters to pass through her borders to join Salafist Jihadi terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq from 2013 to 2016. Though Turkey may be an enemy of Assad, the Erdogan regime has been a silent partner with Russia and Iran.

Erdogan’s disdain for the United States also stems from a New York federal court case involving the Iranian embargo. Turkish Halkbank and gold trader Reza Zarrab, under the orders of Erdogan, helped Iran to circumvent the American embargo banning the sale of Iranian oil and transferring millions of dollars to Iran and its proxies. Turkey’s president likely thought the Trump Administration would kill the Zarrab case.

Realizing his ill-intended policies and demands were not being met by the Trump Administration, Erdogan decided to play the Russia card. Turkey, a NATO member nation, recently purchased Russian s-400 missile systems amid US protests and will install these weapons systems in 2019.

The U.S. should set its priorities in the region based on international and humanitarian values and to eradicate the conflict in the long run by promoting the protection of the civilians first. U.S. military assets in Syria should stay put for four reasons. First, to act as a deterrent to al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons and other atrocities. Second, to frustrate Turkish expansion and control of Syria’s northern border. Third, to control Iranian ambitions in the region. Fourth, to assist the local allies to prevent the re-emergence of Islamic State 2.0.

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