Connect with us

Eastern Europe

Parliamentary elections in Armenia and its impact on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Dr. Najiba Mustafayeva

Published

on

The Parliamentary elections in Armenia will be held on 2 April 2017. Following constitutional amendments, endorsed previously by voters in a referendum in December 2015, Armenia is “transitioning from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary political system”. The changes considerably reduce the president`s authority in favor of the prime minister and the national parliament. Thus, for the first time, Armenian citizens will elect members of parliament (MPs) “under the revised political system”.

Notable the elections will be held one year before the start of the second and last parliamentary term of current Armenian president Serzh Sarkisian and the end of Armenia’s transition to a parliamentary political system. The National Assembly which will be elected in April will also choose the next president of the state, which will obtain a formal honorary role.

In anticipation of this event Armenia attempted to freeze the negotiation process on Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, aimed at maintaining the current status quo in affront to international law and first of all, 1993 UN Security Council resolutions.

However, the April escalation 2016 demonstrated that “the status quo has been already changed”given to fact that some strategic heights that had been under the Armenian occupation were retaken by the Azerbaijani armed forces “for the first time since a ceasefire agreement was signed in 1994”.

The “four day war” also yielded some dynamics in diplomatic efforts, emphasizing urgent conflict resolution efforts in order to prevent the resumption of a full-scale war with possible security implications for the whole region. Thus, the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia met in Vienna and Saint Petersburg, and “the ceasefire has largely been adhered on the LoC”.

Aftermath Armenia attempted to utilize its traditional provocative policy of recognition of the so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”, aimed at spoiling the negotiation process.

International organizations and world states adhere to the position that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan, and the military forces of Armenia must be withdrawn from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan, which finds its legal consolidation in the documents adopted by international organizations on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including the above-mentioned resolutions of the UN Security Council.

Moreover, on June 16, 2015, Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has delivered its judgment in the case of “Chiragov and other v. Armenia”, declared that “violation of the applicants` rights occurred on the sovereign territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan” and found “the Republic of Armenia responsible for the breaches of the applicants’ rights”. Furthermore, dealing with the categories of “effective control” and “belligerent occupation”, the supranational judicial institution provides a legal assessment of the issues mainly stem from the facts of military aggression. Thus, with reference to the 1907 Hague Convention on respecting the laws and customs of war on land and 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, the Court noted that notion of effective control in fact denotes belligerent occupation. Concerning the jurisdiction of Armenia in the framework of its effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surroundings territories, the Court noted in particular that “numerous reports and public statements, including from members and former members of the Armenian government, demonstrated that Armenia, through its military presence and by providing military equipment and expertise, had been significantly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from an early date”.

Thus, Armenia`s occupation of the Azerbaijani territories has been proved in the judgment of the supranational (international) court, the decisions of which have legally binding nature. The ECHR puts an ultimate end to the Armenian speculations on this issue.

Dr. Najiba Mustafayeva, a research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) in Azerbaijan. She specializes in international law, human rights and conflict resolution.

Continue Reading
Comments

Eastern Europe

India and Visegrad Four: Meeting Each Other Halfway

Published

on

Members of the Visegrad Group (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) are set on expanding cooperation with India. That such cooperation is of mutual interest was confirmed by Indian Foreign Minister Subramaniam Jaishankar’s visit to Hungary and Poland in August. Hungary and Poland pursue the most active foreign policy within the Visegrad Four.

This trend is not new – it clearly manifests itself in the policies of the Visegrad Group after the 2008 economic crisis. The Indian economy demonstrates an impressively fast growth rate (more than 7% annually). As it became clear in wake of the visit, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic want to cooperate with India in the transport, energy, agricultural and defense sectors, Hungary – in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, and all together – in investment and research projects.

Significantly, unlike cooperation with China, cooperation with India does not present a political dilemma for these countries. For the West, India is a democratic state, while China is accused of violating democratic freedoms, and Sino-US economic negotiations are in limbo. In addition, a certain rapprochement between India and the USA against the background of the economic differences between China and the USA makes it more convenient for the Visegrad Four to expand cooperation with India.

Apparently, New Delhi and Beijing are becoming part of European competition. India, however, will have to work hard to strengthen its economic, political and cultural presence in Europe if it wants to catch up with Beijing, which began working with Europe earlier and has been doing it more successfully and dynamically.

India positions itself as a self-sufficient civilization striving to become a connecting link between Europe and Asia. In many ways, the EU has the same vision of India. Given the situation, fitting Indian-European relations into a wider geopolitical context is at odds with China’s civilizational regionalism – the desire to keep Asian policy within the framework of the wider-context Chinese civilization and its sphere of influence. Therefore, the appearance of new, Asian players in Europe is not welcomed by Beijing, although it does not declare it openly.

The prospect of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU deprives India of one of the most valuable allies in Europe. Hence the search for new partners within the EU. Countries of the Visegrad Group come handy and, to some extent, could compensate the loss. Poland is an ardent ally of the United States in the EU, the United States is India’s ally in Asia. Slovakia and the Czech Republic are more pro-German and could somewhat contribute to New Delhi’s cooperation with Berlin.

India is also guided by economic considerations. The Visegrad Four expands relations with Japan, South Korea, Brazil and other rapidly developing economies. The absence of India on this list seems illogical. The participants believe that the economic potential of the Visegrad Four is not used to maximum capacity: 95% of trade between India and the EU is provided by countries of “old” Europe.

Apart from all that, India needs diplomatic support for its desire to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Although a reform of this structure is still a matter of remote future and is hardly realistic, India continues to push for it. Poland performs the functions of a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2018-2019. Both parties view diplomatic cooperation of Poland and the other four countries with India as mutually beneficial. The latest example of such cooperation is Poland’s protest against Pakistan’s intention to include the issue of Kashmir in the agenda of the UN Security Council.

What could present some obstacles to the rapid expansion of India’s extensive partnership with the Visegrad Four is certain disagreements over the future of Europe, as well as the orientation of the two main “Visegradians” – Hungary and Poland – to various international partners.

Hungary opposes the presence of American NGOs, the financial and political dominance of Brussels and Washington, as well as the EU migration policy, but advocates constructive relations with Russia and China to the point of participation in the Chinese “One Belt, One Road” Project.

Poland favors building up the US military presence in Europe and is against improving relations with Russia, but, like Hungary, it opposes migration policy and the financial dictatorship of Brussels. Warsaw has a restrained attitude to the One Belt, One Road Project for fear of spoiling Washington’s mood.

Slovakia and the Czech Republic speak for the development of trade and economic relations with Asian partners, but in a format that would not disrupt their interaction with the export-oriented German economy. Like Poland and Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic do not support the EU migration policy.

Under the circumstances, India will adhere to a nuance-based approach in relations with the Visegrad Four. In 2020, after Warsaw takes over the presidency of the Visegrad Four, it can be assumed that this will be the time for Poland to pursue its plans in cooperation with India. The Indian-Hungarian dialogue and relations between Slovakia and the Czech Republic will follow separate scenarios. 

From our partner International Affairs

Continue Reading

Eastern Europe

Ukraine crisis through the prism of Armenian political discourse

Published

on

Armenia’s perplexing decision to side with  Russia on the Crimean and broader Ukrainian crisis – related issues has subjected the country to public and political backlash in Ukraine and beyond. Notably, pro-Russian narratives have been a salient feature of Armenian political discourse during the Ukrainian crisis.  This reached a point, where the Armenian leadership hailed the annexation of Crimea as a model exercise of the right to self-determination. Yet, the 2018 “Velvet Revolution” engendered a glimmer of hope that along with other changes, the new Armenian government may revise its unequivocal support for Russia’s controversial foreign policy choices and actions.  This provokes an inquiry into dominant narratives about the Ukrainian crisis in Armenian political discourse.

 Essentially, the escalation of Ukrainian crisis has reinforced Armenian political  leadership’s fears about the possible resumption of “Cold War” with ensuing consequences for small and war-torn Armenia. Former president Sargsyan even invoked the Ukrainian crisis  as a justification for Armenia’s decision to join the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). By confirming its allegiance to Russia, Armenia would avoid angering the Kremlin and prompting into taking punitive measures against its possible “disobedience.” A closer look at Armenian discourse, shows a tendency to treat Ukraine’s “outright defiance” for Russia’s strategic interests as  the core rationale behind the devastating crisis. No wonder, the Armenian leadership would condemn  the EU’s “recklessness”  and  ‘interference’ in the sphere of Russia’s privileged interests, which  inevitably  fuelled instability in the EU-Russia volatile neighbourhood. Sargsyan even attributed the setbacks of the EU-backed Eastern Partnership to its anti-Russian nature. It follows that by joining the EAEU, Armenia did not support the EU’s destabilizing policy and thus refrained from adding fuel to the fire. 

Another major fear is that the escalating Russia-USA confrontation over the Ukrainian crisis would adversely affect the Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement.  Both USA and Russia are the permanent Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group on the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. While their relations get steadily deteriorated, there is not much to ensure their all-out involvement in moving the needle on long-standing Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Rather, by putting all their weight behind the Ukrainian issue, both Washington and Moscow would not do much to challenge the status quo in Karabakh. Overall, there are concerns that all the negativity accumulated throughout the Ukrainian crisis between Russia and the USA would inevitably get projected onto their  relations over Karabakh, thus making matters more complex.

Furthermore, a huge source of fears and concerns about the Ukrainian crisis, is the crippling effect of Western sanctions against Russia on the Armenian economy. As a result of heavy economic dependence on Russia, the latter’s economic downturns significantly compound Armenia’s economic crisis. Notably, as a single country, Russia is the main external trade partner of Armenia, being the destination for around 20 per cent of Armenian exports and source of 70 per cent of remittances. Russia also maintains lead in the realm of foreign investments in Armenia. There are more than 1,400 enterprises with Russian capital, which is over one fourth of all economic entities with involvement of foreign capital .Moreover, Russia is home to more than 2.5 million Armenian migrants, whose  remittances account for around 10 percent of Armenia’s GDP. Meanwhile, the depreciation of Russian ruble means that the remittances sent from Russia have decreased in value .  Moreover,  the ruble’s devaluation,  has led to the price increases in Armenian exported products to Russia  thus affecting trade volumes.

According to various estimates, the sanctions against the Russian banking sector, which has profound involvement in the Armenian economy, have adversely affected the Armenian economy and even contributed to electricity price hikes in 2015.

Besides, the sanctions against Russia have resonated with Armenia, due to its heavy dependence on Russian military equipment. The Washington’s intention of pressuring the foreign governments into relinquishing Russian defense acquisitions would put conflict-stricken Armenia between a rock and a hard place: while the country seeks to keep good ties to the USA, it is too crippled to cope without  the Russian weaponry.

Beyond that, the Armenian political discourse has long revolved around the narrative of “Crimea precedent” –  given that the “self determination” of Crimea would positively affect the resolution of Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Strikingly,  former president Sargsyan went so far as to frame the referendum in Crimea  as an exercise of peoples’ right to self-determination via free expression of will. Clearly, Sargsyan’s treatment of the Crimean “referendum” as a “model of self-determination” was bound to upset Armenian-Ukrainian ties. The situation came to a head in March  2014, when Armenia voted against the UN General Assembly   resolution on the “territorial integrity of Ukraine” declaring Crimea’s recent secession vote invalid. Thus, Armenia endorsed the legitimacy of an illegal and thoroughly rigged referendum.

Ukraine was quick to recall  its ambassador to Armenia for consultation, and summoned the Armenian ambassador to Ukraine over Yerevan’s shocking position on the annexation of Crimea.

Given former opposition leader Pashinyan’s critical stances on Russian coercive policies, it would be easy to resort to speculations about possible foreign policy changes, including Armenia’s on stance on the Ukrainian crisis.  Yet from the outset of his prime minstership Pashinyan confirmed Armenia’s unequivocal and unwavering support for Russian policies. Notably, at  his very first meeting with Pashinyan,  Putin stressed the necessity of keeping up the cooperation in the international arena, focusing particularly on UN, where the two nations “have always supported each other.” No wonder, post-revolution Armenia voted against another UN resolution on the de-occupation of Crimea in December, 2018. The resolution expressed grave concerns  over the Russian military buildup in Crimea and called on Russia to end its “temporary occupation” of the Ukrainian region.

Overall, consistent with his predecessor, Pashinyan keeps supporting even the most controversial Russian foreign policy actions, ranging from  the Ukrainian crisis to that in Syria, etc.

There has been an ingrained belief  among the Armenian leadership that Armenia only benefits from Russia’s restoring greatness and its greater involvement in its “Near abroad.”  All these goes into Armenia’s inferiority complex of a weak and small state, bound by neighboring Turkish-Azerbaijani hostilities.  It is in this context that Russia is broadly perceived as a pivotal security ally in Armenian political thinking  and in public consciousness.  Overall, there is a broad consensus among the representatives of Armenian political elite that the acute threats posed to Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey prompt to put heavy reliance on Russia. Thus, despite some resentment that Russian policy may generate, Armenia has to abstain from ‘provoking’ Russia’. Otherwise, the latter would ‘hit where it hurts’, by arming Azerbaijan, increasing gas prices or even mistreating the Armenian community in Russia. That said, Armenia’s solidarity with Russia on Ukrainian crisis comes as an unsurprising consequence of the enormously asymmetric nature of Russian-Armenian relations.

Continue Reading

Eastern Europe

Lithuania’s voice in NATO is getting stronger, Karoblis is happier

Published

on

Lithuania’s voice in NATO is getting stronger but pushy. It uses new arguments to attract NATO attention to fulfill its individual goals. And it should be admitted that Lithuania successfully exploited its military weakness to obtain military strength.

About 500 troops are deploying to new training facilities in the country and will stay through the winter in preparation for a massive divisional exercise in Europe that will see 20,000 U.S. troops in Europe known as Defender 2020.

The troops deploying to Lithuania this October are the 1st Armored Battalion of the 9th Regiment, 1st Division, along with 30 Abrams tanks, 25 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles and 70 wheeled vehicles to the Gen. S.Žukauskas Training Area in Pabradė.

Defender, which will strain the beleaguered U.S. logistics system, will move thousands of U.S. troops from forts in the United States to sealift ships that will take them to Europe, testing investments in European security.

Lithuanian authorities do not hide their satisfaction with U.S. troops arriving. “The geopolitical situation in the region hasn’t changed,” Giedrimas Jeglinskas, Lithuania’s vice minister of national defence, said in an interview with Defense News. “For us this is a great thing. We see that the U.S. is in the region, and U.S. presence is the biggest deterrent that we could ever hope for. We’ve said for a long time that we want U.S. soldiers on our soil — and we can argue about whether its permanent rotational forces or a permanent rotation — but the fact is that they are there.”

But even such steps are not enough to Lithuania. Thus, Lithuania’s Minister of National Defence Raimundas Karoblis calls for NATO to deploy air defences in the country. In order to achieve another aim – to have reliable air defence – Karoblis insists that that NATO should deploy air defence measures to Lithuania in order to protect the international battalion stationed in the country.

It is interesting that Lithuania has moved from requests to strong political recommendations.

“It was already agreed during the [2016] Warsaw Summit, and it is not implemented. This issue was also raised by several commanders of the battle group,” Karoblis told journalists during a joint press conference with visiting German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer on October, 10.

Huge NATO is almost cornered by small Lithuania

Germany leads the international NATO battalion deployed in Lithuania since 2017, with around 600 German troops stationed in Lithuania as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP).

Karoblis said air defence measures are primarily necessary to protect the foreign troops serving in the battalion, since Lithuania does not have necessary systems for that.

“It’s about the security of the soldiers who are deployed here,” the minister said.

So, NATO has no chance but provide necessary defence for their soldiers.

On the one hand, Lithuania shows its commitment in defending foreign troops properly. On the other hand, it defends its own troops and territory at the expense of others.

In this particular case Lithuania creatively developed the way how to attract the Alliance possibilities to strengthen Lithuania’s own military capabilities. It is paradoxically, but in this case Lithuanian Military Independence is equal to Lithuanian Military Dependence on others.

Continue Reading

Latest

Trending

Copyright © 2019 Modern Diplomacy