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Opportunity within Constraints: The OSCE and its Next Italian Presidency

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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The current OSCE Chairperson-in-Office is the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sebastian Kurz. The OSCE Chairmanship is held for one calendar year by the OSCE participating State designated as such by a decision of the Ministerial Council. Kurz has outlined his activity in the largest security structure in the world which tries to prevent internal conflicts between members and beyond.

The OSCE comprises 57 participating States and 11 Partners for co-operation (5 Asian and 6 Mediterranean). The network allows a range of operations never experienced before by a network for collective security. Furthermore, these are crucial areas for the future development of the globe and not only at an economic level. The latest action, but certainly not the least relevant, is the 2017 Business Conference for “green” and telecommunication technologies, which will be held in Vienna on January 25. This is a good example of the activities carried out by the OSCE, an international security and stability structure which could potentially replace or otherwise improve the work of other collective security organizations. In a recent interview, Minister Steinmeier, the previous Chairperson, noted that the OSCE has organized as many as 300 major events in Vienna, Berlin, and in the whole region of the organization. In terms of geographic scope, the OSCE truly does represent the world from ‘Vancouver to Vladivostok.’

From Ukraine to Turkmenistan to Armenia, ODIHR – hence the OSCE – has endeavored to observe the proper organization and development of many legislative and local elections and will do so also in the near future: in February, elections will be held in Liechtenstein and, on February 12, in Turkmenistan; on March 15, elections will be held in the Netherlands; in April 2017, presidential elections are scheduled in France and, on April 2, elections will be held in Armenia. Furthermore, in May and June the OSCE will also carry out electoral observation activities in Serbia and Mongolia. It is important to note that ODIHR is the human rights institution of the OSCE. Its mandate tasks ODIHR with assisting governments in meeting their commitments in the field of human rights and democracy. To this effect, ODIHR observes (ie, does not “monitor”) elections, promotes and monitors respect for human rights, and runs democracy assistance projects throughout the OSCE region. In addition, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly also leads election observation missions, and some OSCE field operations carry out elections-related activities, including training for election commission members, media and police, as well as voter education initiatives.

These are all highly sensitive areas where observing the regularity of the electoral process is key to international political legitimacy and hence also to the economic and financial stability of those new governments. Keep in mind that election observation is conducted with a view to assess the electoral process and make recommendations in order to improve it so that participating States meet their commitments in this area. While, initially, the issue may make a cynical proponent of Hobbes or Machiavelli smile, think of what would happen if all these elections were devoid of international legitimacy and certification? The process of democratic maturation would surely be lessened and damaged. There would be the blocking of international funding, destabilizations carried out by various international actors, the “sword jihad” and the economic disruption of those countries, as well as tumultuous refugee migration.

Hence, if Trump’s new US Presidency does not want NATO as a guiding star – an organization that the US President believes, and not entirely wrongly, to be obsolete – or if the EU is only going to be a “general partnership” for individual EU Member States’ interests, only the OSCE will be in a position to convey and meet in a credible way the demands for collective security. This reality should not be disregarded too easily.

The amount of electoral activity and scope of political importance coming before the OSCE should not be underestimated. Next June general elections will be held in France and, on June 18, elections are also scheduled in Albania. On June 26, presidential elections will take place in Iceland, a country which only those who know the full complexion of NATO’s network can understand. We do not know yet when general elections will be held in Germany, while next September parliamentary elections are scheduled in Norway. No matter whether they are democratic countries, it is clear they are essential countries for global balance. In 2017 important elections will be held in Slovenia and Bulgaria even though, once again, we do not know yet the precise dates. In 2017 also the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) will hold its municipal elections, which are crucial in political terms. Finally, in October 2017, presidential elections are due in Kyrgyzstan and parliamentary ones in the Czech Republic. These are all on the OSCE electoral observation activities list and should make everyone understand the importance and impact of the organization.

Hence, during the 2018 Presidency – granted to Italy by consensus via the Ministerial Council – it shall also monitor the efficacy of the electoral process in Ukraine. This means not only with specific reference to elections, but also in relation to the extremely complex issue of intercontinental migration and the relationship with Southern Mediterranean countries. Hence the decisive lines of Italy’s foreign policy and the essential issues for the structure and future of many European countries and many of the other 57 OSCE Member States will be decided between 2017 and 2018, the latter year being under the OSCE Italian Presidency.

One issue which the 2018 Italian Presidency will certainly give great attention to is the solution of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. As we may recall, the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia led to the Armenian occupation of approximately 20% of Azeri territory and military operations ended with the bilateral agreement reached in Bishkek in 1994. Heaven knows how badly this agreement is desired by Russia, which does not want backyard wars on its borders. Indeed, all international resolutions, namely Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 of the UN Security Council, as well as the others adopted by the UN General Assembly itself, call for the unilateral withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azeri territory. Please note, however, that no Resolution, Declaration, or Decision was taken by the OSCE on this topic so far this year but it could very well be a main topic on the overall 2017 or 2018 agenda.

This will be an interesting test at the strategic level: how can the OSCE make its decisions and negotiated talks credible and enforced? As we have seen repeatedly, the UN “Blue Helmets” are not always effective or comprehensive. They freeze the clash until they are on the field, but unfortunately later everything returns inevitably to the way it was. Hence, during the Italian Presidency, it would be useful for the OSCE – as a collective security framework – to equip itself with an effective system to control decisions on the field. A purely military system is not needed. Rather, a network of “sensors” on the ground would be enough. These sensors could signal to other traditional military structures – ranging from NATO to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, up to individual countries such as Turkey and Russia – the need to assess, control, and prevent undesired or compromising clashes in the new Eurasian framework.

What this truly means is that the large alliances born on the basis of the Cold War are obsolete. NATO is obsolete and will not be taken seriously by Donald Trump’s new US Republican Presidency, even if he does not have the fortitude to try to disband or withdraw formally from the organization. The new US President does not want useless entities standing in his way: if he wants a global agreement with the Russian Federation – and certainly so – he will reach it without, and possibly against, the Atlantic Alliance itself. It is worth noting that the issue does not only lie in the American money spent on European security while the EU and NATO de facto earn a “peace dividend” for which they have not paid a penny. As we might soon see with the new US President, this is not the only problem. The issue is much broader. As Lord Ismay used to say, NATO was established to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” Today the Atlantic strategic equation is completely different. If anything, the issue is now about keeping the Germans in, the Russians close, and the Americans not aloof or dismissive.

Indeed, Russia has no direct national security interest in keeping the United States out of the regions in which it currently operates and is currently winning the geostrategic game. In Syria, in Central Asia, in new regional wars taking shape across the Middle East, Russia wants to make the United States matter in a positive way – which it would consider a welcome change from Barack Obama’s vision which lacked strategic and logical sense, torn between naïve and disastrous, and was too heavily ideological. “Democratic interventionism” in geostrategically important countries must be done by consensus and not unilaterally. Russia does not want to bear the whole burden of its international operations, which have pulled many chestnuts out of the fire and taken the United States off the hook in Syria at least. In all likelihood, a great peace conference will be held in the Middle East, or, in any case, there will be a network of bilateral and trilateral relations which will redesign a new balance of regional power. Russia will certainly be the final arbiter, after its progress in Syria, as well as the agreements with Israel and the stabilization of the Shiite system along the Iraqi and Jordanian borders. Not to mention Russia extended invitations to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to participate in the upcoming negotiations on Syrian peace.

Some might ask what will or can the OSCE do in this regard, since it is certainly desired by many to have a leading role in Syria, and not only in terms of observing future elections? Unfortunately, the OSCE cannot and will not monitor elections in Syria. Syria is neither a Participating state nor a Partner for co-operation of the OSCE. The Organization therefore cannot conduct any activities in that country. But can the Italian Presidency in 2018 come up with new ideas and a new perception of regional equilibria, capable of providing original and safe solutions? Within the OSCE could it try to ensure the management of migrant flows, as many European and Italian leaders are calling for? It would certainly be good if the Italian Presidency made inroads in making the Russian Federation a more integral and cooperative partner for the OSCE. The organization likes to stress that the Russian Federation is one of the founding participating States of the CSCE and therefore has always been a full-fledged participating State of the OSCE. But when it comes to the desire to see perhaps China have a more participatory or partnership role with the OSCE, there are problems: China, quite simply, cannot become a participating State as it is not part of the Euro-Atlantic region. Turkey is already a member and it should be made more active explicitly within the framework of OSCE collective security action. This is in terms of both migrants and refugees, who should not be a tool to blackmail Germany with EU money, as well as the redesign of arrival lines and, most importantly, the selection of migrants/refugees from the Middle East. Potentially, within the OSCE and the framework of the 2018 Italian Presidency, an important issue will lie in further integrating and progressing the Maghreb countries – at least those not destabilized forever by the silly madness of the “Arab Spring” – into a collective security project for migrant and Mediterranean stability. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Israel are all OSCE partners for Co-operation, after all, but they cannot become formal participating States.

If, as is likely, the Russian Federation will be present – with two bases in Libya – in the territories controlled by Khalifa Haftar and the Tobruk government – while the West in general and other “humanitarian operators” in specific are still tinkering with Fajez al-Serraj’s Tripoli government – the 2018 Italian Presidency should try to be an influential thought-leader and potential change-agent in order to settle the Libyan issue. This is speaking optimisictally, however, as it has to be stressed that Libya is neither a participating State nor a partner for Co-operation with the OSCE. The OSCE does not have a mandate to deal with issues related to Libya, nor can it take any initiative to convene an international conference on that subject. But that does not mean OSCE leadership cannot be a moral and humanitarian voice for good over this conflict area.

We must remove from this increasingly important collective security organization the impression of it being a Northern-countries-of-the-world-only club, as the incomparable Willi Brandt called them. If Italy succeeds in this endeavor, of being a true thought-leader and change-agent for the world, it will have a chance to replace two declining organizations which have been weakened significantly as of late, namely NATO and the EU, with a new, broad, and credible collective security network. If we remain linked to old orthodox thinking and we are afraid of our own shadows, every effort will be in vain and Italy shall move to a phase for which it is totally unprepared: a nationalized and autonomous foreign and defense policy absent any real consensus or partnership beyond its own borders.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs "La Centrale Finanziaria Generale Spa", he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group and member of the Ayan-Holding Board. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d'Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: "A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title of "Honorable" of the Académie des Sciences de l'Institut de France

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A European Response to US Withdrawal from the INF Treaty

MD Staff

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Ahead of the meeting of President Putin and President Trump in Paris on November 11th 2018, 79 European political, diplomatic and military leadership figures are appealing to both Russia and the US not to take unilateral action that would jeopardise the future of the INF without further efforts, such a move would likely trigger an arms race and damage the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The full statement is reproduced below.

ELN statement November 2018

President Trump’s declared intention to withdraw the United States from the 1987 US-Russia Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) calls into question not only the fate of this pivotal accord but also the future of nuclear arms control, with potentially grave consequences for European security.

The INF treaty may indeed have been violated. And it may be anachronistic. But it is symbolic of great power cooperation on nuclear risks and it has been a stabilising force in Europe’s security over the past three decades.  Europe is the sandpit in which US-Russia confrontation over INF will be played out.  Europe is entitled to a say in what happens next.

US intentions have been poorly communicated in Europe. This leaves America’s European Allies supporting Washington’s judgment about Russian non-compliance, but not necessarily Washington’s response.  Divergent European and American approaches to the INF crisis would be highly damaging.

Even more troubling would be the likely consequences of the Treaty’s demise.

The New START Agreement, which limits US and Russian strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, expires in 2021 and the INF crisis increases the risk that it will not be extended or replaced.  Collapse of INF would spur the development of new nuclear and strategic conventional weapon systems, including INF-class missiles. These systems claim to strengthen deterrence but are more likely to fuel an arms race. The costs to international nuclear stability, European security, and taxpayers in all countries concerned could be high. And unless INF is maintained or replaced, its loss will deepen international cynicism about gradual nuclear disarmament, with consequent damage to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Strong voices in the US share these views.

The INF crisis has focused the attention of European decision-makers on arms control. They should now move beyond statements of concern towards action on the following recommendations:

The INF’s collapse is still preventable. If the two sides work in good faith on the non-compliance issues instead of just trading allegations, solutions can be found. Non-governmental experts and organisations, including the ELN, have developed proposals that address all the issues raised by each side, including the new Russian cruise missile and the configuration of US missile defence installations in Europe. We urge Washington and Moscow to use the coming months to explore these proposals seriously and halt the INF’s breakdown. Neither side should unilaterally withdraw without further effort.

Moscow – which has always protested that it has not deployed non-compliant missiles – should pledge that it will not deploy such missiles against Europe, provided that NATO and the United States do not deploy them. We welcome NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg’s recent statement that any such NATO deployment is improbable.

European governments, especially members of NATO, should make clear that if Russia can verifiably demonstrate that it is INF-compliant, they will support the transparent verification of NATO’s land-based ballistic missile defence installations by Russia.

As Washington is genuinely concerned about Chinese intermediate range missiles remaining outside any arms control mechanism, it should construct a joint US-Russian approach towards Beijing and should be able to count on support from European and Asian partners. These efforts might be unsuccessful but would demonstrate a continuing US commitment to nuclear arms control.

Europeans should urge the US and Russia to immediately resume talks on strategic stability.  To create some measure of stability and mutual confidence, the two sides should agree the extension of the New START Treaty as a priority. At the 11 November 2018 Trump-Putin meeting, the leaders should also agree a statement of reassurance to the international community that nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought.

While Ukraine will remain the primary joint agenda item in the NATO-Russia Council, Europeans should advance proposals for wider, more up-to-date arms control designed to increase decision time and predictability for both NATO and Russian leaders.

As part of a broader response, Europeans should press the case for the security benefits of restraint and collaborative arms control, vigorously countering the pernicious belief that arms control could be ineffective, or even detrimental, to national security.

If implemented, these steps would prevent the INF crisis further worsening the West-Russia confrontation. It could turn a crisis into an opportunity for fresh, innovative arms control that is fit for the 21st century.

Signatories

Austria

  • Wolfgang Petritsch, Former EU Special Envoy for Kosovo & Former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bulgaria

  • Solomon Passy, President Atlantic Club Bulgaria; Former Chairman of the UN Security Council
  • Professor Todor Tagarev, Former Defence Minister; Former Director of the Defence Institute

Croatia

  • Budimir Loncar, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of former Yugoslavia; Former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the Non-Aligned Movement
  • Professor Ivo Slaus, Honorary President, World Academy of Art and Science

Czech Republic

  • Jan Kavan, Former Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and former President of the UN General Assembly

Denmark

  • Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Former Minister for Foreign Affairs
  • Mogens Lykketoft, Former Foreign Minister; Former President of the UN General Assembly

Finland

  • Dr Tarja Cronberg, Member of the European Parliament, Chair of the European Parliament’s delegation for relations with Iran
  • Elisabeth Rehn, Former Minister of Defence
  • Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, Former Chief of Defence
  • Professor Raimo Väyrynen, Former President of the Academy of Finland; Former Director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs

France

  • General (Ret.) Bernard Norlain, Former General Officer, Air Defence Commander and Air Combat Commander of the French Air Force
  • Paul Quilès, Former Minister of Defence

Georgia

  • Ambassador Tedo Japaridze, Former Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Vice-Chairman, International Relations, Anakila Development Consortium

Germany

  • Angela Kane, Former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs & Under-Secretary-General
  • Volker Rühe, Former Defence Minister
  • Rudolf Scharping, Former Defence Minister
  • Karsten Voigt, Former German-American coordinator in the Federal Foreign Office, Former President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
  • Brigadier General (ret.) Dr Klaus Wittmann, Former Bundeswehr General

Hungary

  • János Martonyi, Former Foreign Affairs Minister

Italy

  • Giancarlo Aragona, Former Secretary General of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
  • Hon. Margherita Boniver, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Professor Francesco Calogero, Former Secretary-General of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
  • General (rt.) Vincenzo Camporini, Former Chief of the Joint Defence Staff, Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force
  • Giorgio La Malfa, Former Minister for European Affairs
  • Admiral Giampaolo di Paolo, Former Minister of Defence; Former Chairman of NATO Military Committee
  • Arturo Parisi, Former Defence Minister
  • Professor Carlo Schaerf, Co-founder, International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO).
  • Stefano Silvestri, Former Under Secretary of State for Defence, Former President of the Italian International Affairs Institute
  • Ambassador Stefano Stefanini, Former Permanent Representative to NATO, Former Diplomatic Advisor to the President of Italy
  • Carlo Trezza, Former Ambassador for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Former Chairman of the Missile Technology Control Regime

Netherlands

  • Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, Former Deputy Prime Minister, Former Minister of Economic Affairs
  • Bert Koenders, Former Foreign Minister
  • Marietje Schaake, Member of the European Parliament
  • Klaas de Vries, Former Minister for Interior Affairs and Kingdom Relations

Norway

  1. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Former Prime Minister of Norway, Former Director-General of the World Health Organisation (WHO)
  2. Espen Barth Eide, Former Foreign Minister, Former Minister of Defence

Poland

  • Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Former Defence Minister and Chair, Executive Council, Euro-Atlantic Association

Portugal

  • Ricardo Baptista Leite MP, MD, Member of Parliament

Russia

  • Ambassador Anatoly Adamishin, Former Deputy Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the UK
  • Dr Alexey Arbatov, Former Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defence Committee; Head of the Center for International Security, Institute of World Economy and International Relations
  • General Vladimir Dvorkin, Lead scientist at the Center of the International Safety of the Institute of Economic and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences
  • Ambassador Boris Pankin, Former Foreign Minister of the former USSR
  • Dr Dmitry Polikanov, Chairman of the Trialogue Club and member of the Expert Council of the Russian Government
  • Igor Yurgens, Chairman of the Management Board of the Institute for Contemporary Development

Serbia

  • Goran Svilanović, Secretary-General, Regional Cooperation Council

Sweden

  • Dr Hans Blix, Former Foreign Minister and former IAEA Director General
  • Ingvar Carlsson, Former Prime Minister
  • Rolf Ekeus, Former Ambassador to the United States, former High Commissioner on national minorities in Europe
  • Gunnar Hökmark, MEP
  • Henrik Salander, Former Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Secretary-General of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission

Turkey

  • Professor Mustafa Aydin, President, International Relations Council of Turkey
  • Hikmet Çetin, Former Foreign Minister
  • Ambassador Ünal Çeviköz, Former Ambassador to the United Kingdom
  • Vahit Erdem, Former Head of the Turkish Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
  • Osman Faruk Loğoğlu, Former Turkish Ambassador to the United States and former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Özdem Sanberk, Former Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Former Under Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

United Kingdom

  • Rt. Hon Margaret Beckett, Former Foreign Secretary
  • Sir Tony Brenton, Former UK Ambassador to Russia
  • Lord Des Browne, Former Minister of Defence; Member of the House of Lords
  • Lord Menzies Campbell of Pittenweem, Former Leader of the Liberal Democrats
  • Rt. Hon. Charles Clarke, Former Home Secretary
  • Stephen Gethins, MP
  • Lord David Hannay of Chiswick, Former Ambassador of the UK to the EEC, Former Ambassador of the UK to the UN
  • Sir Nick Harvey, former Member of Parliament and former Minister of State for the Armed Forces
  • Rt. Hon. Lord John Kerr of Kinochard, Former British Ambassador to the United States and the EU
  • Rt. Hon. Lord Tom King of Bridgwater, Former Defence Secretary
  • Gen. Sir John McColl, Former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Deputy SACEUR)
  • Gen. Lord David Ramsbotham, Retired General Army, Former Adjutant General; Former ADC General to HM the Queen
  • Lord David Richards of Herstmonceux, Former Chief of the Defence Staff
  • Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, Former Foreign Secretary, Former Defence Secretary
  • Rt. Hon. Sir John Stanley, Former Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls; Former Minister for the Armed Forces
  • Baroness Elizabeth Symnons of Vernham Dean, Former Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence Minister
  • Sir Adam Thomson, Former UK Perm Rep to NATO; Director, European Leadership Network
  • Lord David Triesman, Former Foreign Office Minister and Chairman of the Football Association
  • Lord William Wallace of Saltaire, Member of the House of Lords
  • Rt. Hon the Admiral Lord Alan West of Spithead, First Sea Lord and Commander in Chief of the Royal Navy
  • Rt. Hon. Baroness Shirley Williams, Former Leader of the Liberal Democrats in the House of Lords, Former Adviser on Nuclear Proliferation to the Prime Minister
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Serbian question in Montenegro

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On August 5, 1999 the government of Montenegro announced a platform for new relations between Serbia and Montenegro, in order to review the status of Montenegro and electoral law. The Constitutional Court rejected this revision as being illegal. A little later, the question of Montenegrin independence was again raised – this time with the support of the European Union and the US administration. Montenegrin government has pursued a policy that has encouraged pro-independence policy, which resulted in the separation of Montenegro from Serbia in 2006. Montenegrin Serbs have been strong advocates of a joint state with Serbia, however, they were outvoted. And then at the referendum, the majority of the Orthodox population was for a common state with Serbia, but ruling Democratic Party of Socialists, along with national minorities, managed to win majority.

Many analysts expected that in future the absolute majority of citizens will be loyal to independent Montenegro, and that ethnic Montenegrins would make more than half of the population. However, the situation is completely different. Montenegro today is a deeply divided state. Montenegrin Serbs still do not accept the results of the referendum. They consider and publicly point out that the referendum was undemocratic with many irregularities. According to the 2011 census, Montenegrins make 44.98% of the population, Serbs 28.73%, Bosnians 8.65%, Albanians 4.91%, Muslims 3.31%, Roma 1.01%, and Croats 0.97%. It is important to point out that the citizens were pressured to declare themselves as Montenegrins. Otherwise, the Serbs would be an absolute majority in Montenegro.

The goal of the Montenegrin government is that Montenegrins are an absolute majority in the state, and this plan is implemented even before separation from Serbia. According to the census of 2003 year, 63.49% of the population said that they speak Serbian language, but Montenegrin government decided in 2004 to rename Serbian language. To that end, Montenegro has copmletely changed school programs. The Cyrillic alphabet is almost completely out of use, and almost all state correspondence is in Latin alphabet , Serbian poets were thrown out of school textbooks. Already on the 2011 census 42.88% of the population said that they speak Serbian language. Serbian National Council of Montenegro, in September this year, stated:

“The authority in Montenegro, in a coalition with minority nations, has stopped every prospect for citizens who declare themselves nationally as Serbs. In all spheres of social and political life she opposed, especially Bosniaks and Albanians, to the Serbs, discriminating all Serbs who are not ready to change their own identity in the already obvious project of the assimilation of the Serbian people in the national Montenegrins”. Discrimination against Serbs, is best illustrated by the statistics. In the last four years, in Montenegro, on average, only 13 Serbs received a state job annually. This is 37 times less than the number of Montenegrins, since the state institutions annually employed on average 486 citizens who declared themselves as Montenegrins.

The average number of employed Serbs is smaller even when compared with Bosniaks. According to official statistics, 82.11% of Montenegrins work in public administration, and only 7% of Serbs. All this is done with the aim that the Montenegrin Serbs are no longer a significant demographic and political factor in Montenegro. Basically, Montenegrin Serbs are the main opponents of Milo Djukanovic and the Democratic Party of Socialists. It is important to note that the Democratic Party of Socialists is the ruling political party in Montenegro since the introduction of multy – party system in 1990. The main political goals of Montenegrin Serbs are, one state with Serbia and brotherly relations with Russia. It is precisely for this reason that the West is silent on the discrimination of the Serbs.

Montenegrin Serbs were the main opponents of Montenegro’s entry into NATO. One of the main reasons for that is NATO’s aggression against Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Russia’s position that NATO expansion is dangerous and unnecessary. NATO aggression on Serbia and Montenegro, began 19 years ago. Aggression started without the approval of the UN Security Council. The attacks that lasted without interruption for 78 days severly damaged infratucture, commercial buildings, schools, health facilities, media houses, cultural monuments. The cost of the damage is estimated between 30 and 100 billion dollars. The final number of victims has not been officially declared, but Serbian estimates range between 1, 200 and 2, 500 dead and about 5, 000 injured.

From the above reasons and facts, Montenegrin government avoided the referendum on NATO, because most of the population was against the entry into NATO. The decision on entry into NATO was taken in the Parliament. By entering Montenegro into NATO, the West achieved a significant geopolitical victory. The territory of Montenegro has important geo – strategic signifance. It has access to the Adriatic Sea, controls the Strait of Otranto. From Montenegro, NATO will have an even stronger impact on the Raska (Sandzak) region in Serbia, northern Kosovo, as well as in eastern Republic of Srpska.

In Montenegro, for years there is a project of changing the traditional Serbian/Slavic – Orthodox identity into Montenegrin, Roman Catholic and Western identity. That is why Russia is also the target of the Montenegrin authorities.

“The Serbian Orthodox Church remains the main frontman of Greater Serbian nationalism towards the region and Montenegro, the striking fist of what ideologues of “big Serbia” and imperial Russia in the Balkans want, and must remain the subject of Montenegro‘s state policy in the coming period”, stated Milo Djukanovic, president of Montenegro. Djukanovic publicly also stated that Montenegro wants to change its “ civilization circle”. And in new” civilization circle”, except Serbia, there is no place neither for Russia. On this statement every analyst who deals with situation in Montenegro should pay attention. Under the rule of Milo Djukanovic and his Democratic Party of Socialists, began an open revision of official history. And among the revision are also the relations between Russia and Montenegro throughout history. Regarding Russian-Montenegrin relations, history is clear.

The first instance of official Russian – Montenegrin diplomatic contact was made in 1711, when Russian Tsar Peter the Great sent his envoys to “duke of Serb land” Metropolitan Danilo. Since then, Russia has always helped Montenegro and the Serbs. It is precisely because of this help through centuries that  in Montenegro there is a pro – Russian cult. Russia has for centuries been the protector of Montenegro, and played a key role in helping Montenegro remove the Ottoman Empire. The people of Montenegro remember that and are very grateful to Russia. As a result of that, there is the term  in Montenegro ”Mother Russia”. However, today Montenegro’s foreign policy is being adapted to the private interests of Milo Djukanovic and his Democratic Party of Socialists. This could be seen on the marking of the establishment of 140th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Montenegro and the United Kingdom, in June this year. Than, in old royal capital Cetinje,  president of Montenegro Milo Djukanovic stated:

“We do not forget that London was among the first to support twenty years ago the democratic turn and the European course of Montenegro. At that time, the British Know How Fund and the British Council played a particularly important role. But also the Government of Great Britain, with its decisive and comprehensive support … Time has shown that the struggle of our English admirers and friends for Montenegro in the twenties of the last century was not futile. The United Kingdom has strongly supported Montenegro in the process of joining NATO, where we again are allies.” When it comes to Montenegrin-British relations, history is clear. Within the so-called Eastern Question, which stretched from the end of the 18th century to the beginning of the First World War, and which in essence signified the global conflict of the West against Russia, the essence was not to allow Russia to get out to the warm sea. First via the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, and later at any point in the Mediterranean that would be available to Russia. At the same time, Britain and the West always considered Serbs (and under the Serbs should not only be regarded the Serbs from Serbia) as the “Balkan Russians” or “little Russians”. Knowing that besides Bosphorus, Russia could only get to the Mediterranean via the Serbian-Adriatic Sea, Britain in the wish to neutralize Russia’s aspirations, from the late 18th century practically conserved the Ottoman state and did not allow her ruin almost to the beginning of the 20th century, which significantly prolonged the occupation of the Balkans by Ottomans. The current British policy towards Montenegro is based on the disabling of any Russian influence. Britain will help Djukanovic until this regime carry out unquestionably anti-Russian policy. That’s what is happening now.

Serbia and Russia should jointly respond to this policy, and stand in protection of Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbs in Montenegro. This is primarily reflected in the insistence on the recognition of fundamental rights, which are guaranteed by the Constitution of Montenegro. Russia has all the preconditions for the development of soft power in Montenegro. Regarding the soft power of Russia in Montenegro, progress is notable but not enough. A special accent should be placed on the Russian – Montenegrin historical links, and in this regard, scientific conferences should be organized in which Russian and Montenegrin historians would remind the people of Montenegro, as well as the intellectual community, for all the assistance Russia has provided to Montenegro over the centuries. And  therefore send a clear message that it will not allow revision of history. Also, it would be wisely that serious Russian investments come to Montenegro.

The largest number of foreign tourists in Montenegro are Russians. In accordance with that, Russian investments in Montenegrin tourism should be significantly increased. In Montenegro, all TV news stations are pro – Western, as well as almost all daily newspapers. Brainwashing in Montenegro is performed on a daily basis. Montenegro urgently needs pro – Russian television, which would make the media scene of Montenegro more balanced. In this way, Russia would clearly position itself in Montenegro and help resolve the Serbian question, but also would satisfied its interests in this small, but strategically important Balkan country.

First published in our partner International Affairs

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Strange bedfellows: Ideology trumps defense of ethnic, religious and minority rights

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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A global rise of nationalist and populist tendencies has not only given anti-migrant, Islamophobic, anti-Semitic and racist tendencies a new lease on life, but opened the door to alliances between groups that once would have had nothing to do with one another.

Developments in Israel, Indonesia and Germany suggest renewed nationalism and populism is in some cases redefining how states perceive concepts of national interest and purpose and how religious and ethnic communities seek to shield themselves against discrimination, persecution and/or extremism.

The redefinition was no more evident than when Israel, founded as a safe haven for Jews irrespective of creed, sect or political belief, sided against its own ambassador with authoritarian Hungarian President Victor Orban, a proponent of Christianity rather than multi-culturalism as the glue of European society, in denouncing billionaire left-wing philanthropist George Soros, a survivor of the Holocaust.

In doing so, Israel, founded on the belief that Jews needed a state to shield themselves against discrimination and persecution rooted in anti-Semitic prejudice and racism that has been endemic in Christian culture, sided not only with a Christian nationalist leader in Hungary but with a global right-wing trend that sees Mr. Soros as the mastermind of a globalist movement, determined to subvert the established order and dilute the white, Christian nature of societies through immigration.

Israel’s acknowledgement of the redefinition of its raison d’etre came in response to a Facebook posting by Yossi Amrani, the Jewish state’s representative in Hungary. Responding to anti-immigration billboards depicting a smiling Mr. Soros with the slogan, ‘Let’s not let Soros have the last laugh,’ Mr. Amrani, backed by Hungarian Jewish leaders, warned that they evoked “sad memories, but also sow hatred and fear.”

Israel’s foreign ministry, days before a visit to Hungary by prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu, rather than taking a firm stand on rising anti-Semitism, effectively defined the Jewish state’s interest as joining Mr. Orban in denouncing a Jew.

As a result, Israel, despite seeing itself as the fulfilment of  the Biblical prophecies of the Ingathering of the Exiles and the protector of Jewish rights, opted for denouncing a Jew together with a leader whose policies prompted the European parliament to pursue unprecedented disciplinary action against Hungary over alleged breaches of the European Union’s core values, including minority rights.

“In no way was the (ambassador’s) statement meant to delegitimize criticism of George Soros, who continuously undermines Israel’s democratically elected governments by funding organizations that defame the Jewish state and seek to deny it the right to defend itself,” the ministry said.

The implicit message, like Israel’s decision to bar entry to its Jewish critics despite its law of return that grants anyone who is Jewish a right to citizenship, was that Israel rather than being the potential home of all Jews was a home only to those who support the government’s policies.

Mr. Netanyahu’s alignment of Israel with right-wing nationalist and populist forces like his support for ultra-orthodox Jewish groups that deny equal rights for less stringent religious trends in Judaism on issues such as marriage, divorce, conversion and prayer at Jerusalem’s Western Wall, are likely to drive a wedge between the Jewish state and world Jewry, particularly in the United States.

The wedge, that puts Israel at odds with the Jewish Diaspora, could be deepened by this week’s Democratic Party success in regaining a majority in the US House of Representatives. Jews historically tend to vote Democratic in the US, a stark contrast with Mr. Netanyahu’s growing alliance with right-wing evangelists who support Israel because they believe the Messiah will only return to a Holy Land controlled by Jews.

Many evangelists, however, also believe that Jews will not be saved on the Day of Judgement without first converting to Christianity.

Israel’s divisive approach to World Jewry is not without its supporters in the Jewish Diaspora. Anti-Muslim and anti-migration sentiments have prompted some Jews to form their own group within Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) political party.

The notion that bigotry and prejudice are the best defense against rising anti-Semitism has meant that AfD Jews have little compunction about joining a party whose members favour abandoning Germany’s culture of remembrance and atonement for its Nazi past.

One AfD leader, Alexander Gauland, described Nazism as a “speck of bird poop in more than 1,000 years of successful German history.

To be fair, the issue of rising prejudice and bigotry is not the exclusive perch of right-wing nationalist and populists. Britain’s Labour Party, traditionally a home for Jewish voters and activists, has been plagued by charges of anti-Semitism and reluctance to put its own house in order.

Moreover, the emergence of strange bedfellows in a world in which ideological affinity replaces defense of a community’s minority rights is not uniquely Israeli or Jewish.

Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest Islamic movements with some 94 million members in Indonesia, in a bid to reform Islam and counter all political expressions of the faith, risks being tainted by its potential tactical association with Islamophobes and Christian fundamentalists who would project their alliance as Muslim justification of their perception of the evils of Islam.

Nahdlatul Ulama is not alone in the Muslim world’s opportunistic engagement with the Christian right.

Saudi rulers, who long aligned themselves with a supremacist, intolerant interpretation of Islam that viewed Christians as swine and Jews as apes have discovered that they share with evangelists and fundamentalist Christians, a significant voting bloc in the United States and part of President Donald J. Trump’s support base, conservative family values as well as political interests.

In a first, Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, last week met with a delegation of US evangelists that included Reverend Johnnie Moore, Israel-based evangelical political strategist-turned-novelist Joel Rosenberg, former congresswoman Michele Bachmann; and prominent religious broadcasters.

The jury is out on whether the fallout of the rise of nationalism, populism and extremism heralds a new world in which bigotry and prejudice are legitimized as a defense strategy against discrimination, racism and persecution and an anti-dote to radicalism – a world that would likely prove to be far more divided and polarized and likely increasingly unsafe for minorities on the receiving end.

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