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Additional considerations on Syria

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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A complex strategic game is underway between Russia, Iran, Syria and, consequently, between Assad’ supporters and the other actors of the current Syrian war balance.

Firstly, note must be taken of the statements made by the Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani who, on January 15 last, said that “the fragmentation of regional areas in the Middle East will anyway pave the way for the Takfiri forces (i.e. the “Infidels”) on all Islamic territories”. He also added, with an interesting nuance, that this runs counter to the interests of the whole Islamic world” – and hence Iran.

In other words, Shamkhani, who speaks in the name and on behalf of the Supreme Leadership Authority and Supreme Leader, Rahbar Khamenei, means two things: he means that Iran will fight for the integrity of Syria, and within its old borders, and that Iran is anyway ready to fight against the Takfiri, namely the “apostates”, both in the Shiite and in the Sunni world.

Iran has no interest in setting a “democracy” fire to the Middle East, as conversely was the case for the United States with the notorious “Arab Springs” and the creation of the so-called “Caliphate” between Iraq and Syria.

Furthermore, in Iran, the Shiite fight against the Sunni Takfirism entails   some future clash with Saudi Arabia, although Shamkhani has been clear in saying that what he states does not even regard Saudi Arabia’s regime.

Shamkhani added: “The fall of the ruling Saudi Royal Family does not mean that it would be replaced by a new regime better adapted to the needs.” It is better to control and protect, at a very high political cost, rather than creating strategic void conditions which would be uncontrollable.

Once again, the “Arab springs” lesson has been fully understood and learnt by the Middle East powers.

Moreover Iran insists on the fact it does not want to destabilize anyone – and the same holds true for Russia itself, which has even invited Saudi Arabia in the future conference for the New Middle East.

For all those who are winning the war in Syria the essential strategic aim is to maintain the current system, with the United States losing and – hopefully now reluctantly – linked to Saudi Arabia.

Furthermore, the Americans still have a lukewarm attitude – as in Obama’s perspective – vis-à-vis Israel, the only right card they were not able to play and which will finally be played by the current Trump Presidency.

And we expect so not just in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, on Monday 15 last, Bashar al-Assad’ Syrian Arab Army launched an effective attack on the military emplacements and installations of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, the new franchise of the Al-Nusra Front, the Syrian group of al-Qaeda operating in the region along with the jihad of Harakat Harar al-Sham, another contentious union of small jihadist groups.

Since yesterday the 42nd Brigade of the 4th Mechanized Division of Assad’s forces has been repeatedly hitting al-Fijah areas, in the Wadi Barada region, in an emplacement that the jihadist forces not signatories to the agreement held and refused to leave, according to the letter of the Treaty signed on December 30, 2016 in Astana.

Wadi had been recently held by the Free Syrian Army, the main operator of the West’s “blind kittens”.

Fateh al-Sham is even supposed of having killed a mediator of the peace treaty.

Looking at the Chiefs of Staff’s maps and documents, Wadi Barada is the point linking Central Syria’s water needs and the closure of the Syrian, Russian and Iranian front on Damascus, of which Wadi is the primary gateway.

Bashar al-Assad’s and the Lebanese Hezb’ollah forces are still at work – liberating Wadi means to ensure the survival of Damascus and to open the way to Idlib.

Meanwhile, Russia and Bashar al-Assad’ Syrian Arab Army keep on bombing Isis-Daesh emplacements between Maskanah and the Deir Hafer plain.

We are in Aleppo’s Eastern region, which is also central to put an end to the war. The Russian and Syrian bombings are targeted to destroy the main road for the supplies of the so-called “Caliphate”, going from Raqqa to East Aleppo.

According to internal military sources, Russia even supported and protected the Turkish control area north of Al Bab, by throwing bombs in air raids.

Furthermore, again according to Syrian sources, the Russian Air Force has already created its own fixed structure, which should support and cover the Syrian ground offensive precisely in the Deir Hafer region.

As expected, Russia is using the truce of December 30 last to strengthen its positions in Syria.

Rumours are rife that there is a plan to strengthen the naval base of Tartus, in the Mediterranean, and that the Russian air forces will be increased in the Humaynim base.

Furthermore, in another crucial point of the war in Syria, reliable Russian sources inform us that Bashar al-Assad’s forces are advancing in East Ghouta, in the region of Damascus, and hitting jihadist positions in Autaya and Nashabiyan, areas where Jaysh al-Islam operated.

Bashar al-Assad’ Syrians had the support of some agents of the Iranian intelligence services and, above all, of a hit squad of Free Palestine Movement which, in the current Syrian war, is usually armed precisely by Iran.

Another battle that helps to understand the war is the one in Deir Ezzor, where Daesh-Isis is operating massively.

Obviously if the “Caliphate” loses Deir Ezzor, Bashar al-Assad’s forces and Russia will have all clear way to Raqqa.

For the time being, Bashar al-Assad’ Syrians are taking back some significant military positions and installations, such as the helicopter fields that Daesh/Isis had previously regained, while the so-called “Caliphate” definitely wants to keep Deir Ezzor airport, which is the axis of Isis jihadists’ territorial resilience to protect Raqqa, which is still their “capital city”.

In essence, the crisis points of the current war in Syria are the offensives of Assad’s Damascus forces towards Deir Ezzor and Palmyra, as well as the “Caliphate” response in the Deir Ezzor region.

Among other things, there is also the already mentioned issue of Wadi Barada and Ghouta East. If the operations in Wadi Barada are successful for the Syrian forces, the way to Beit Jinín, the crucial area running between Damascus and the Golan Heights, will be open for Assad’s Army.

This is an essential point for Israel’s involvement in the war that no one wants and is definitely not in Israel’s plans.

In the coming days, the role played by Turkey in East Aleppo will be very decisive, because the Turkish forces should conquer Al Bab, the current lowest point of the “Islamic State” military force and possibly the key for breaking it up and destroying it definitely.

These are the forces on the ground but, at cultural and political levels, we are witnessing a new and largely unexpected phenomenon.

One of today’s active forces is what we could define new totalitarian Islamism, which obviously include the so-called “Islamic State”, but also all the jihadism operating in the Middle East, including the Muslim Brotherhood’s old network, which is at the origin of the current chaos.

These are forces which, apart from the so-called “Caliphate”, are fighting for greater and more decisive political presence in all their Sunni or non-Sunni penetration areas.

Furthermore there is Iran, which does not want to create the all too familiar “Shiite camp” and is not interested in doing so, but supports its interests in Syria, Yemen, the Unites Arab Emirates and the wide minorities of “the Party of Ali” throughout the Fertile Crescent.

As stated by the Iranian leader mentioned at the beginning of this article, for the time being Iran does not want to wage war, but the Shiite Iran is seeking stability so as to later negotiate with the existing powers in the region from a position of strength.

We are reminded of the recent statement made by a commander of the Pasdaran, namely the Iranian “Revolutionary Guards”, informing us of the fact that his army structure already controlled four Arab capital cities, namely Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana’a.

Hence Turkey is basically distant from NATO policies in the Middle East – if it were ever close to them – and Russia has gained, on the ground, the decisive support of the Atlantic Alliance’ second military force.

Iran will continue to play its “Shiite International” card, but without abrupt or dangerous operations, which could isolate it from Russia, its inevitable global ally, and from the “Sunni camp”, which has a vested interest in bringing the conflict with Iran closer.

Up to a certain extent, however.

No one, in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, wants military confrontation with Iran, considering that their Shiite minorities are now active on their own territory.

As Shamkhani said, the very resilience of their States would be in danger.

Furthermore Russia will remain in Syria until three key strategic goals are reached: the elimination of every US jihadist or non-jihadist proxy; the creation of a series of alliances, also with Donald Trump’s United States, so as to monitor truces and Syria’s internal stability under Bashar al-Assad; finally, the agreement with Turkey for its areas of interest in the Syrian and Iraqi territory.

Furthermore there is also the control of Iran’s ambitions and designs which, in Russia’s opinion, must only be regional and designed to protect its borders.

Russia does not want to build its Shiite “Saudi Arabia” to which it should be linked in a region where strategic autonomy is the essential factor for those who know how to wage war and hence how to make peace.

This is what is happening, while the European Union pretends to exist and the widest regime change of our time is taking place not in Syria, but in the United States.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Whither the Arab and the Muslim world?

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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An agreement to establish diplomatic relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel and a Saudi-Pakistani spat over Kashmir coupled with feuds among Gulf states and between Turkey, the kingdom, and the Emirates drive nails into the notion that the Arab and Islamic world by definition share common geopolitical interests on the basis of ethnicity or religion and embrace kinship solidarity.

The UAE-Israel agreement weakens the Palestinians’ efforts to create a state of their own but their criticism of the UAE’s move to become the third Arab country after Egypt and Jordan to officially recognize the Jewish state is based on a moral rather than a legal claim.

The UAE and Israel see their relations with the United States and the perceived threat from Iran as bigger fish to fry.

Both countries hope that an upgrading of their relations will keep the US engaged in the Middle East, particularly given that it puts pressure to follow suit on other Gulf states that have similar concerns and have engaged with Israel but not to the degree that the UAE has.

The UAE and Israel further worry that a potential victory by presumptive Democratic candidate Joe Biden in the US’ November presidential election could bring to office an administration more willing than President Donald J. Trump to seek accommodation with Iran and emphasize human rights and basic freedoms.

The establishment of diplomatic relations strengthens the UAE’s position as one of the United States’ most important partners in the Middle East and allows Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu to argue that his hardline policy towards the Palestinians does not impede a broader peace between the Jewish state and Arab nations.

Mr. Netanyahu is however concerned that his argument may resonate less with a Biden administration that potentially could be less empathetic to Israel’s annexationist aspirations on the West Bank as well as with the right-wing in Israel that may not feel that the UAE is worth surrendering what they see as historical Jewish land.

Ironically, the price of suspending annexation in exchange for diplomatic relations with the UAE gets Mr. Netanyahu off the hook in the short term.

Mr. Netanyahu had pledged to annex parts of the West Bank on July 1 but has dragged his feet since because the Trump administration, while endorsing the principle, opposed any tangible move on the ground. Mr. Trump feared that annexation would have pre-empted his ability to claim some success for his controversial Israel-Palestinian peace plan.

Emirati officials had made clear that a formal annexation of parts of the West Bank, captured from Jordan during the 1967 Middle East war, would preclude the establishment of formal relations with Israel.

The question now is whether the UAE will put paid to that notion by opening their embassy in Jerusalem, whose status under international law has yet to be negotiated, rather than Tel Aviv.

So is what the UAE, alongside Jordan and Egypt, will do if and when Israel legally incorporates West Bank lands sometime in the future.

The UAE’s willingness to formally recognize Israel constituted the latest nail in the coffin of Arab and Muslim solidarity that has been trumped by hardnosed interests of the state and its rulers.

As Messrs. Trump and Netanyahu and UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed were putting the final touches on their coordinated statements, traditional allies Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were locked into an escalating spat over Kashmir.

India last year revoked the autonomy of the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir and imposed a brutal crackdown.

Muslim countries with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the lead, much like in the case of China’s brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims, have been reluctant to jeopardize their growing economic and military ties to India, effectively hanging Pakistan out to dry.

The two Gulf states, instead of maintaining their traditional support for Pakistan, feted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi as developments in Kashmir unfolded.

In response, Pakistan hit out at Saudi Arabia where it hurts. In rare public criticism of the kingdom, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi suggested that Pakistan would convene an Islamic conference outside the confines of the Saudi-controlled Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) after the group rejected Islamabad’s request for a meeting on Kashmir.

Targeting Saudi Arabia’s leadership and quest for Muslim religious soft power, Mr. Qureishi issued his threat eight months after Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan under Saudi pressure bowed out of an Islamic summit in Kuala Lumpur convened by the kingdom’s critics, including Qatar, Turkey, and Iran.

Saudi Arabia fears that any challenge to its leadership could fuel demands that Saudi Arabia sign over custodianship of Mecca and Medina to a pan-Islamic body.

The custodianship and Saudi Arabia’s image as a leader of the Muslim world is what persuaded Crown Prince Mohammed to reach out to Israel primarily to use that as well as his embrace of dialogue with Jewish and Christian groups to bolster his tarnished image in Washington and other Western capitals.

The UAE’s recognition of Israel puts Saudi Arabia more than any other Gulf state in the hot seat when it comes to establishing relations with Israel and it puts Prince Mohammed bin Zayed in the driver’s seat.

That is all about interests and competition and has little to do with Arab or Muslim solidarity.

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Rejiggering Gulf Security: China’s Game of Shadow Boxing

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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China and its Gulf partners appear to be engaged in a game of shadow boxing.

At stake is the future of Gulf security and the management of differences between the region’s conservative monarchies and revolutionary Iran.

With governments passing to one another unofficial subtle messages, intellectuals and journalists are the ones out front in the ring.

In the latest round, Baria Alamuddin, a Lebanese journalist who regularly writes columns for Saudi media, has cast subtlety aside.

Ms. Alamuddin warned in strong and rare anti-Chinese language that China was being lured to financially bankrupt Lebanon by Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Lebanese Shiite militia.

Writing in Arab News, the Saudi Arabia’s primary English-language newspaper, Ms. Alamuddin suggested that the Lebanese Shiite militia’s seduction of China was occurring against the backdrop of a potential massive 25-year cooperation agreement between the People’s Republic and Iran.

Her tirade was as much a response to reports of the alleged landmark agreement as it was to a declaration by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah that China was willing to invest in Lebanon’s infrastructure.

“Chinese companies are ready to inject money into this country. If this happened, it would bring money to the country, bring investment, create job opportunities, allow heavy transport, and so on,” Mr. Nasrallah said.

In a state-controlled media outlet in a country that has studiously backed some of the worst manifestations of Chinese autocratic behavior, including the brutal crackdown on Uyghur Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang and the repression of democratic expression and dissidents, Ms. Alamuddin did not mince words.

“Chinese diplomacy is ruthless, mercantile and self-interested, with none of the West’s lip service to human rights, rule of law or cultural interchange.”

“Chinese business and investment are welcome, but Beijing has a record of partnering with avaricious African and Asian elites willing to sell out their sovereignty. Chinese diplomacy is ruthless, mercantile and self-interested, with none of the West’s lip service to human rights, rule of law or cultural interchange,” Ms. Alamuddin charged.

She quoted a Middle East expert of a conservative US think tank as warning that “vultures from Beijing are circling, eyeing tasty infrastructure assets like ports and airports as well as soft power influence through Lebanon’s universities.”

She went on to assert that “witnessing how dissident voices have been mercilessly throttled in Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang, Lebanese citizens are justifiably fearful that their freedoms and culture would be crushed under heavy-handed, authoritarian Chinese and Iranian dominance, amid the miserable, monolithic atmosphere Hezbollah seeks to impose.”

Ms. Alamuddin’s outburst implicitly recognized that China was signaling Gulf states, at a time of heightened uncertainty about the reliability of the United States’ regional defense umbrella, that they need to reduce tensions with Iran if the People’s Republic were to engage in helping create a new regional security architecture.

China was signaling Gulf states, at a time of heightened uncertainty about the reliability of the United States’ regional defense umbrella, that they need to reduce tensions with Iran.

Expressing concern about last month’s US decision to withdraw troops from Europe a day after Ms. Alamuddin’s stark criticism of China, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Assistant Secretary-General for political affairs and negotiation Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg suggested that “a more systematic framework, with organic feedback to the leadership and decision-makers” was needed for US-Gulf security discussions.

The GCC groups the Gulf’s six monarchies: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain.

China has been subtly pressuring Gulf states through academic and Communist party publications and public statements by prominent scholars with close ties to the government in Beijing.

Its messaging has primarily targeted Saudi Arabia, the one Gulf state that has so far refrained from engaging in any gestures towards Iran that could facilitate a dialing down of tension.

recent article in a renowned Chinese journal laid out the principles on which China is willing to break with its long-standing foreign and defense policy principles to engage in Gulf security.

The principles included “seeking common ground while reserving differences,” a formula that implies conflict management rather than conflict resolution.

Most Gulf states have extended a helping hand to Iran, the Middle East country most hard hit by the coronavirus pandemic.

The Iranian and UAE foreign ministers agreed in a recent video call to cooperate during the health crisis.

“We agreed to continue dialogue on [the] theme of hope—especially as [the] region faces tough challenges, and tougher choices ahead,” said Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on Twitter.

UAE officials said earlier that there were limits to a reduction of tensions. They said a real détente would only be possible once Iran changed its behavior, meaning a halt to support for proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen and a surrender of its nuclear ambitions.

The Chinese-Gulf shadow boxing takes place against a slow-moving and seemingly troubled US and Chinese-backed Pakistani effort to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The Chinese-Gulf shadow boxing takes place against a slow-moving and seemingly troubled US and Chinese-backed Pakistani effort to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan said last week without providing details that he had averted a military confrontation between the two Gulf powers. He said mediation was “making progress but slowly.”

Ms. Alamuddin’s column coupled with Saudi Arabia’s refusal to capitalize on the pandemic as way to reduce tensions, suggests that Saudi Arabia has yet to fully embrace Mr. Khan’s efforts.

Mr. Khan’s efforts are likely to be further complicated by the disclosure last month by Pakistani law enforcement that a Baloch gang leader, who was detained in 2017, had confessed to giving “secret information and sketches regarding army installations and officials to foreign agents,” believed to be Iranians.

It was not immediately clear what prompted the disclosure.

Pakistan has long asserted that Iran and India have lent support to Baloch nationalist militants responsible for multiple attacks on military and Chinese targets in the South Asian state.

“The Iran-Pakistan border issues are mainly affected by the sectarian rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. For Pakistan, this is a costly and difficult diplomatic situation at this time,” said Michael Kugelman, a South Asia scholar at the Wilson Center in Washington.

Pakistan has a vested interest in helping dial down Saudi-Iranian tensions. It takes, however, two to tango and a mediator whose efforts are not burdened by bilateral issues of his own with any of the parties.

To move the pendulum, more will be required than a regional go-between or subtle nudging. With the US likely to refrain from doing the heavy lifting, that task may be left to China. If Ms. Alamuddin is an indication, China is already discovering that changing the paradigm in the Middle East is easier said than done.

Author’s note: This story was first published in Inside Arabia

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Evolving Japan-UAE ties

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Mohamed bin Zayed with Japan's Abe. Image Credit: WAM

Japan and the UAE share a unique relationship with each other. Japan recognised the UAE as an independent state in 1971 and opened its Embassy in the UAE in 1974 and on the other hand, UAE opened its embassy in Japan in 1973. Both nations share strong bilateral economic relations, dating back to 1961 when the first shipment of the crude oil was exported from Umm Al-Sharif offshore field in Abu Dhabi to Japan. Japan is known to be the world’s fourth-largest importer of oil. In 2017, it was the second-largest export market, behind China, for Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. The UAE became the top destination in the Middle East region for Japan’s exports, valued at $7.18 billion in 2019, taking economic bilateral relations to a great level. However, on 19 July 2020, UAE spacecraft rocketed into blue skies from a Japanese launch centre at the start of a seven-month journey to Mars on the Arab’s world’s first interplanetary mission. This mission gave a boost to its strategic relations as well as space cooperation.

Understanding their bilateral relations

The longstanding cordial relationship between the UAE and Japan has been honored for decades. In 2013, PM Shinzo Abe visited the UAE and both nations jointly announced the statement on the strengthening of the Comprehensive Partnership between Japan and the UAE towards stability and prosperity. The relations between both countries have mostly focused on the economy and trade ever since they established their diplomatic relations. Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces H.H. Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan visited Japan as an official guest in February 2014 to follow up the Joint Statement issued during the Prime Minister’s visit to the UAE in May 2013.

In 2016, the number of Japanese citizens living in the UAE totalled 4,000, while hundreds of Emirati citizens are in Japan for education and investment purposes.

According to the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), In 2017, Japan imported Dh57.3 billion worth of oil from the UAE.

In 2018, the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Initiative (CSPI) was signed between the two countries when Abe visited the UAE. With the signing of the CSPI, the relationship between Japan and the UAE entered a new era of strategic partnership for the future and joint cooperation strategy between the institutions of the two countries. They also agreed to increase trade in areas which included renewable energy, advanced robots, artificial intelligence and health care. Ensuring cordial energy ties are critical under the CSPI. In 2018, Japan also acquired an oil concession in Abu Dhabi for the coming 40 years which proved that Japan is an important strategic energy partner in the UAE.

The leadership of the UAE has been keen on strengthening ties with Japan in areas like education, scientific research and industry. It aims to seek its ties with Japan to new levels as Japan possesses advanced technology which would serve the sustainable and comprehensive development goals in the UAE. Cooperation is very strong in the education field. The first Japanese school was inaugurated in the UAE in 2009 and began teaching the Arabic language, Islamic education and social studies to the students of the Emirates along with the Japanese curriculum. Furthermore, around 100 students from the Emirates are studying in Japanese universities for bachelors, masters and even PhD degrees.

In 2019, an attempt of initiating to teach Japanese as a second foreign language in some UAE high schools was discussed among both countries. Akihiko Nakajima, new Japanese ambassador to the UAE affirmed that ‘both nations are currently giving importance to educational cooperation’. The friendly ties were further strengthened in recent times when Sheikh Hazza Bin Zayed Al-Nahyen, Deputy Chairman of Abu Dhabi Executive Council and Dr Sultan Ahmad Al-Jaber, Minister of State and Special Envoy to Japan, attended the enthronement ceremony of the Japanese Emperor Naruhito in 2019. They wished that Japan shall achieve a brighter and more prosperous future during the ‘Reiwa Era’.

Japan and the UAE have been closely cooperating in space sciences. In October 2018, ‘KhalifaSat’ was launched into outer space from the Tanegashima Space Centre in Japan aboard an H-IIA rocket. In January 2020, Shinzo Abe made an official visit to the UAE and other Gulf countries to further bolster the strong ties which have been evolving on multiple fronts like trade, energy, technology, space and education. “UAE-Japan relations are historic and based on trust, cooperation, respect and mutual interests,” Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed said. Abe and Sheikh Mohammad also witnessed the signing of an Energy Cooperation Agreement between supreme Petroleum Council, represented by Adnoc (Abu Dhabi National Oil Company), and Japan’s agency for natural resources and energy.

Space Cooperation

The lift-off of the Mars orbiter named Amal or Hope probe on 19th July 2020, from a Japanese launch centre is to be followed soon by China and the United States. Amal blasted off from the Tanegashima space centre aboard a Mitsubishi heavy industries H-IIA rocket. This has given a major boost to space cooperation between Japan and the UAE. Amal is set to reach Mars by February 2021, which will mark the year the UAE celebrates 50 years since the country’s formation. It points out that the launching of Amal was well planned in line with the celebration of 50 years of the country’s formation. “The UAE is now a member of the club and we will learn more and we will engage more and we’ll continue developing our space exploration program,” UAE Space Agency chief Mohammed Al Ahbabi told a joint online news conference from Tanegashima. The Amal statecraft costs $200 million and it is about the size of a small car, carries three instruments to study the upper atmosphere and monitor climate change. Japan’s services of such launches are known well for accuracy and on-time record. However, the providers are working to cut costs to be more competitive internationally. Japan also has its own Mars mission planned in 2024, where it aims to send spacecraft to the Martian moon Phobos to collect samples to bring back to Earth in 2029.

The objective of the UAE’S mission is to provide a comprehensive image of the weather dynamics and fundamentally, building a human settlement on Mars within the next 100 days. Omran Sharaf, the mission’s project manager said, “What is unique about this mission is that for the first time the scientific community around the world will have a holistic view of the Martian atmosphere at different times of the day at different seasons. Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation has said that ‘Hope Probe’ exemplifies the distinctive strategic partnership between the UAE and Japan.

It is the first time that the UAE attempted to send a deep space mission, that of a mission to Mars. It clearly sends a strong message to the Arab youth that if the UAE is able to reach Mars in less than 50 years, then they certainly can do much more. Emiratis also believed that it represented a step forward for the Arab world and for scientists.

However, energy remains a key priority in the ongoing relations between the two countries which may contribute significantly to energy development and economic diversification in the UAE and Japan. Through space and strategic cooperation, the two countries are looking to expand and deepen the fields of cooperation. A successful mission to Mars will indeed be a major step for the oil-dependent economy seeking a great future in space. The launch of the hope probe demonstrates that effective space cooperation is a driving force for strengthening their bilateral ties. Hope is expected to begin transmitting information back to earth by September 2021.

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