The process of growth and modernization in Brazil has been always described as an example to be followed by other developing countries. Nevertheless, the Brazilian ‘locomotive’ has stopped.
The country is going through a period of dramatic political and economic instability. Although the Olympics Games should have been an international show of Brazilian power, they revealed the structural weakness of a country full of ambiguities and contradictions instead. Petrobras’ inquiry, combined with negative effects of the economic crisis, seem to have temporarily buried the China of South America. Oil wealth becoming yet another time not a blessing but a curse.
“In a broader sense, the hydrocarbons and its scarcity phychologization, its monetization (and related weaponization) is serving rather a coercive and restrictive status quo than a developmental incentive” – diagnoses prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic, and concludes: “That essentially calls not for an engagement but compliance.“
To describe the history of the nation we need to focus our attention on oil, because the black gold is the embodiment of the success -and fall- of the Brazilian economy.
Oil – how black is gold
One the central drivers of Brazilian economic growth has been the production and the export of natural resources and their products. Looking at Brazil’s GDP between 1982 and 2015, three main trends can be observed. (i) A stable growth pattern from 1982 to 2002. (ii) The GDP rocketing up between 2003 and 2012, with a light slowdown during 2009-2010 caused by the financial crisis. (iii) A fall of GDP’s values between 2012 and 2015. Analyzing the evolution of the percentage of annual GDP growth’s, it is not possible to identify a specific trend. The most significant point that can be made is the constant growth of the GDP between 2004 and 2008, which was around 5% per year. The economic growth does not just imply a dramatic increase of GDP but also the improvement in social-economic status of millions of poor brasilians. Starting from 2001 the level of absolute poverty – defined as the percentage living with less than two dollars per day – decreased 12%. The levels of relative poverty – defined as the percentange of people with less than 50% of the average income – fell by 25% between 2002 and 2013.
Graph 1: Trend of Brazilian GDP 1982 e il 2014
Graph 2: Percentage of GDP Grotwh 1982-2014
Graph 3: Trends of poverty levels 1995-2013
The value of export and of the satellite activities of natural resources for Brazilian is represented by their proportion on the total GDP. As clearly shown in Graph 4, one of the engines of the Brazilian boom in the 2000s has been oil. Its incidence on GDP increased remarkably from 1999, a stable growth that reached its peak during 2000s. Between 2003 and 2006 oil rents produced around 3% of total GDP. Graph 5 shows the cost of oil per barrel from 1980 to 2015. To clarify, the most important oil reserve in Brazil is Pré-Sal, which needs to compete in a market in which the price is of at least 70 dollars per barrel in order to be profitable. The fall of the international price of oil, then, has been penalizing the Brazilian economy that was already damaged by the crisis of Chinese demand and the slowdown of FDI.
Graph 4: Percentage of oil and natural resources on Brazilian GDP 1982-2012
Graph 5: Trends of oil barrel 1980-2014
Eike Batista, imagine of Brazilian fable
The story of Erike Batista is bond with the growth and the fall of Brazilian economy. Batista has been one of the richest man in the world, 8th in the Forbes rank of worldwide billionaires and owner of 30 billion dollars in 2012. However, this changed in 2014 when he admitted to the loss of his wealth and his debt of one billion dollars. How is it possible that this self-made billionaire lost his wealth totalling a whopping 30 billion dollars? The success and the fall of Batista’s business is connected to oil. In the 80s, after completing his metallurgic studies, he went to Amazon forest to implement machines in the research and the extraction of gold. In the 1983 he bought a small society in the Canadian stock exchange, of extraction and trade of natural resources., that gained the value of 1.7 billion dollars in a few years. In 2002 he sold his company for 875 million. The devaluation of the asset was due to wrong investment done by the society in Greece, Russia and Czech Republic, which cost million of loss.
Batista exploited new opportunities that arose during the Brazilian economic boom. Between 2001 and 2002 he created and subsequently sold two companies to the Brazilian state; a thermodynamics and an iron production company. The holding that would make a Batista billionaire was OGX (Petròleo e Gàs Participacoes), specialized in the research and refinement of oil and gas. The market strategy of OGX was aggressive from the beginning. In 2007 he arranged the rights of exploration for 21 areas for OGX doubling the amount offered by its competitors. The next year OGX was able to produce barrels at the cost of 145 dollars per barrel and it announced their structures would be able to produce 1 million barrel per day in 2019. Batista’s ambitions and his confidence in Brazilian economy encouraged him to invest a large amount of money to build up an harbour at Acu, 400 km away from Rio de Janeiro. The project was supposed to create a centre for the refinement and the trade of oil products, thereby radically increasing OGX’ productivity.
From 2008 onwards, the Brazilian magistrate started to investigate bribes that Batista allegedly gave to the Governator of Amapà, Waldex Gòez, concessions of privileges for his companies. Even though the media caught wind of the investigation, the judiciary case was closed without any charges. The slowdown of Brazilian economy and the fall of the oil barrel started to strain foreign investors and foreign shareholders and lead them to reduce investments into Batista’s companies. The final blow was caused by the Abu Dhabi fund, Mudabala Development, which retired from EBX – one of Batista’s holdings – and asked for the liquidation of all their stock options which totaled 1.5 billion dollars. The financial pressure then cut the liquidity of Batista’s companies, which, having invested a lot of money, survived using financial leverage. Like a balloon, EBX snapped under the weight of financial debts that made Batista lose all of his assets.
In March 2014, a group of Brazilian judges started to investigate the relationship between the Worker’s Party and the public oil company Petrobras. The charge was that executive directors of Petrobras and of the main building societies (Btp) developed a corrupt system in which Btp would receive contracts for the construction of oil platforms increasing the building costs between 1% and 3%. In exchange, governmental parties would obtain illegal funds to sponsor political campaigns. The companies involved were Camargo Corrêa, Oas, Utc-Constram, Odebrecht, Mendes Júnior, Engevix, Queiroz Galvão, Iesa Óleo & Gás e Galvão Engenharia and members of the Workers’ Party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Pmdb) and the Progressive Party. (Pp).
The main consequence of the inquiry was the delegitimization of the Workers’ Party that led Brazil from 2002 onwards. The President, Dilma Rouseleff was forced to leave office despite the fact she was not personally involved in the investigation. The successor of former President Lula endured immediate pressure to resign for her knowledge of systematic corruption as Chairman of Petrobras and Minister of Energy (2003-2005). Nevertheless, the impeachment of Rouseleff regarded the charge of having transferred public funds from national banks to finance social expenses that went beyond the fixed amount allocated for public expenses. However, the charges that led to her dismissal did not include the Petrobas scandal. Eduardo Cunha was the political leader leading the group that called for Dilma’s dismissal. Paradoxically, he was not only found with a secret million dollar bank account in Switzerland, but was also barred from assuming any public position for eight years due to an investigation for his involvement in corruption and bribes. Some representatives of worldwide left-wing parties talk about a conspiracy to dismiss the Workers’ Party. The Brazilian and international elite allegedly exploited the economic crisis to destroy the consensus of Lula and Rouseleff’s party, which had always had significant popular support. Lula won the election in 2002 with 46.4% of the votes against just 23.3% of his opposing candidate José Serra. In 2006, Lula was confirmed President with 48.6% in the next election. His successor, Dilma Rouseleff, won in 2010 with 46.9% of the votes. Even though she experienced a small decline, Rouseleff won the election in 2014 with 41.6% of the votes. These Brazilian governments made enemies in the international market due to their politics of nationalization and semi-nationalization of natural resources. For example, Petrobras, founded in 1953, was partially privatized during the 90s. However, Lula started a propagandist campaign in 2007 to return company under state control. In addition, to prevent the private exploitation of the Pré-Sal oil reserve, Lula’s government passed a law to give to Petrobras the monopoly to explore the area and extract oil from Pré-Sal.
Some influential voices, such as independent Brazilian experts and academics raised concerns about the nature of the process. Pedro Fassoni Arruda argues that there were secret powers behind the impeachment that were also involved in the coup d’etat in 1964. In a similar vein, Pablo Ortellado criticised the framing of Rouseleff in the media. Sapelli contends that the modern political history of Brazil is characterized by a deep fragmentation of parties, which means every President has to deal with many small personalist parties. The external support that every government needs to administrate generated the construction of a system of corruption intrinsic to Brazilian society. Many experts believe that judge’s actions could enforce the trust of markets and investors in Brazilian institutions. Cutting the ambiguous bonds that exist between parties and companies should help to make the legal framework more stable and safe, strengthening the power of the Law. This could be a message from Brazil to all the world, that whoever is corrupted, no matter what status, will be punished.
Recently, the news reported the Brazilian parliament approved a law with 292 in 393 to abolish the monopoly of Petrobras on the reserve of Pré-Sal. This law seems to be just the first step of a greater project of privatization pursued by President Michel Temer. With strong politics of liberalization for Brazilian natural resources, Brazil seems to offer intriguing opportunities for business and investments for many multinationals. If Petrobras’ inquiry is just conspiracy or smart intuition is hard to understand. Surely, the destiny of Brazil will be, another time, defined by black gold. For better or worse.
Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline – An ‘apple of discord’ between Azerbaijan and Russia?
A broad range of strategic, economic and cultural ties between Azerbaijan and Russia create an illusion of quite stable bilateral relations between the states. Nevertheless, considering the recent geopolitical developments in the South Caucasus after the Second Karabakh war and the growing role of Azerbaijan as both producer and transit hub for natural resources, one can assume that there is a prospect of growing uncertainties that may or already generate tensions. These tensions can be observed in the context of energy diplomacy, used as a strategic tool by both states to gain access to, and consolidate within external markets. This article summarizes the potential and existential rivalry perspectives between Azerbaijan and Russia in terms of integration to the EU energy market via their gas pipelines, particularly cleavages over the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline.
European Energy Union: Tendencies in the gas market
The concept of the ‘energy union’ has been developed during the presidency of Jean-Claude Juncker and extends to five dimensions. The following two dimensions are relevant in the context of relations with external markets: 1. Security, solidarity and trust; and 2. Energy efficiency. The former promotes cooperation between EU member states implying energy security and diversification of the energy sources. The latter, on the other hand, emphasizes the need to reduce dependency on imports and stimulate local growth in energy sectors. Both strategies consider a long-term perspective aimed at creating an independent and self-sufficient energy market within the framework of environmental standards. To determine whether these strategies managed to diversify and simultaneously ensure independence from external actors in the European gas market, let us recall the statistical data of imports and local gas production in the EU over the last years.
Tendencies in the EU energy market over the last couple of years, particularly in the sector of gas, reveal its high dependence on imports from abroad. Although the net gas imports fell by 7 per cent in 2020 amounting to 81 bcm, the overall EU production of gas fell by almost 23 per cent (16 bcm). According to the Quarterly Report of the Union, the local gas production in the first quarter of 2021 reached the second-lowest production rate over the last decade, falling by 11 per cent respectively. In this regard, the European internal energy market needs a sustainable supply of natural gas resources, mostly, for residential heating needs. Currently, about 44% of extra EU net gas imports are piped via Russian pipelines, 12% through Algeria, and 1,2% through TAP pipeline. Although import indicators suggest that Russia holds the dominant position in supplying the EU energy needs, the ever-growing gas supplies from Azerbaijan cause concerns on the part of Russian stakeholders. Accordingly, in 2020, Gazprom’s supplies to the Turkish market decreased by 72% compared to March 2019, the Russian RBK reports. Could the further steps of the official Baku on the European energy front challenge positions of the Russian energy giant Gazprom? To answer this question, it is necessary to briefly present the already launched and planned projects in which Azerbaijan is directly involved.
Azerbaijan’s ‘energy diplomacy’ and Russia’s counterstrategy
In 2020 South Gas Corridor (SGC) project officially started operating, connecting three sub-pipeline routes: South Caucasus Pipeline Expansion (SCPX), the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The project aims to ensure commercial gas delivery from Shah Deniz field to Turkey, continuing to European markets and finally landing in Southern Italy (Melendugno). The initiative was supported by numerous financial institutions and stakeholders from Asia and Europe such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). According to the estimates, the current gas supply via the corridor is amounting to 10 billion bcm.
At the 7th Ministerial Meeting of the SGC Advisory Council, the president of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev noted the necessity of strengthening bilateral as well as multilateral energy relations and mentioned the Memorandum of understanding between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan: “[…] That will also be very helpful for future energy cooperation in the Caspian Sea and beyond”. President Aliyev has also emphasized that Azerbaijan already has become a reliable transit of energy resources from the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea. In this regard, the recent intensification of talks upon the realization of the Trans-Caspian Gas pipeline project is not surprising.
Within the framework of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project, natural gas will be delivered from the port of Turkmenbashi via the pipeline to the Sangachal terminal through the Caspian Sea with an annual capacity of 32 billion bcm. However, despite numerous attempts to bring the issue to the agenda both by the Western partners (EU and the United States) and Azerbaijan, there have been no significant steps towards the implementation of the project. The reason for the constant extension of negotiations over the last two decades may be both the reliability of the capabilities of the Turkmen natural gas resource pool, and external intervention in the negotiation process and attempts to discredit it by Russia and Iran.
Firstly, the credibility of the Turkmen gas supply capacity is quite questionable. After the Central Asia-China gas pipeline opened in December 2009, Turkmenistan has gradually become the biggest gas supplier to the Chinese energy market in Central Asia. Currently, Turkmenistan covers nearly 60% of China’s pipeline gas imports, whereas over 90% of Turkmenistan’s overall exports are gas exports to the Chinese energy market. Therefore the sufficiency of Turkmenistan’s gas reserves for the Trans-Caspian pipeline is still a matter of discussion. The official Ashgabat in the meantime refrains from specifying details on its capabilities.
Another challenge is posed by the joint attempts of Russia and Iran, circumvented by the pipelines, to prevent the realization of the initiative, to protect their local energy markets. Additionally, the Kremlin needs to eliminate any potential external supplier of natural pipeline gas to the EU, to sustain the status quo. Turkmenistan has already become the biggest gas supply hub in Central Asia and the prospect of its expansion towards Europe poses a strategic challenge to Russia.
“Along with the new Iranian gas pipeline, the Chinese export route gave Turkmenistan strong leverage that strengthened its ability to bargain with Russia. However, these export routes do not hurt Russian interests that much, since Moscow’s main objective at the moment is to keep Turkmen gas away from the lucrative European energy market”. (Vasánczki 2011).
Both Russia and Iran refer to environmental damage the pipeline could cause in the Caspian Sea, and recall the so-called Tehran Convention (the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea). However, the experience with the SGC and other pipeline projects in the region suggest no environmental crisis to be expected. On the other hand, there are allegations regarding the long-disputed Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. Moscow and Tehran are aligned in their concerns about the extraction and transportation of energy resources and believe that such issues should be resolved within the framework of five Caspian states.
According to Marco Marsili, the Russian energy strategy is inclined in a “Grand Strategy” aimed at re-establishing a sphere of influence in the area previously controlled by the USSR. As he further notes in his article: “If the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline comes to fruition, then it will also further enhance Azerbaijan’s status as both a producer and transit hub. Additionally, the pipeline will diminish Moscow’s influence in the region and circumvent both Russia and Iran. This is why Moscow is heavily opposing the project.”
When it comes to the European front Russian strategy faces various burdens. On the eve of the opening of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, Russian-European relations are in a state of long-term crisis. The persecution and assassinations of political dissidents, the imprisonment of the head of the opposition movement Alexei Navalny, support for the authoritarian regimes of Lukashenko and Assad, as well as multiple attempts to interfere in elections within the EU, reduce the level of trust between the Kremlin and the West on energy security too. Furthermore, gas supply issues between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 that caused the European energy crisis, exacerbated the situation and gave a signal to the EU to diversify its gas supplies.
Nord Stream 2 is a controversial 9.5 billion euros worth gas pipeline that will annually supply the EU with 55 bcm. According to sceptics, the new pipeline not only endangers the energy security of the EU, putting it in a dependent position from Gazprom but also causes dissatisfaction in Eastern European countries (in particular Ukraine). Germany and the US have already issued a joint statement in July to support Ukraine, European energy security and climate protection. Azerbaijan, in turn, is ready to provide the diversification tool needed and security of natural gas delivery to the European market without polarizing the European community on geopolitical issues.
Opportunities for Azerbaijan in the new era in South Caucasus geopolitics
After the second Nagorno-Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the power constellations in South Caucasus have drastically changed in almost 44 days. Azerbaijan has restored its territorial integrity and opened up new opportunities for economic growth, and increased mobility via the development of transport hubs and infrastructure rehabilitation projects. At the same time, Russia has deployed its peacekeeping contingent in the region, ‘formally’ securing its status as a regional power. Despite this, Azerbaijan, after almost three decades being focused on resolution of devastating conflict, can now set new forign policy priorities to provide energy security and strengthen its cooperation with the EU.
With the EU Strategy on Central Asia adopted in May 2019 and the intensification of negotiations between the Central Asian countries with the EU and with the Western hemisphere as a whole, there is a need for such projects as the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. In these circumstances, Azerbaijan can play the role of a mediator both in the negotiation process and directly participate in the implementation of the project. Taking this into account, Russia fears the loss of its role as a hegemon both in its relations with Central Asia and within the South Caucasus. Also economically, it is in Russia’s interests to keep the monopoly in the hands of its state-owned companies to strengthen the leverage on the EU in cases of geopolitical collisions.
In any case, the growing competition on the EU energy market between the two former Soviet states could significantly diminish the sense of mutual reliability between them.
China’s Unorthodox Intervention in the Global Oil Market
Apparently, China has been the talk of the town for quite some time. While the entire yesteryear passed in a flurry of blame game over the pandemic, this year has been nothing short of a blessing for Xi’s regime. However, while China rapidly compensated for the drastic slump last year, the bustling economy has now cooled down – though a bit prematurely. Due to the expansive outbreak of the delta variant, China – like most countries around the world – now faces surging inflation and a crippling shortage of raw materials. However, while one might get a bolder vibe from China’s recent crackdown on industrial giants, the supposed ‘Second Cultural Revolution’ seems on a divergent path from the government’s latest aspirations for the domestic industry.
China seems to be on a path to harness growth that appears to be slowing down as the global economy battles uncertainty. However, while many expected China to take orthodox measures to prolong growth, hardly anyone expected a drastic change of strategy: intervening in a close-knitted global market like never before.
China recently posted its most robust trade surplus in history, with a record rise in exports jumping 25.6% from last year to stand at $294.3; $10 billion more than any previous month. However, while the glowing figures imply sturdiness, the underlying fragility of the Chinese economy is not disguised. In the past few months, China’s production engine has taken a toll as surging energy costs have inhibited production capacity. The factory-gate inflation stands at a 13-year-high which has forced factories to cut output. Amid declining domestic demand due to covid restrictions, manufacturing surveys show that China’s export orders are eroding as supply bottlenecks coupled with energy costs have weighed heavily on the production function. To counter the problem, China recently supplied its reserves into the domestic market; undercutting the surging global price tag dictated by the petroleum giants.
Last Thursday, China’s National Food and Strategic Reserves Administrator made a press release, confirming that the world’s second-largest economy tapped into its crude reserves – estimated at 220 million barrels – to “ease the pressure of rising raw material prices.” While China is known to intervene in commodity markets by using its strategic reserves, for example, Copper, Aluminium, or even grains.
Recently, China tapped into its national reserves to intervene in the global commodity market of industrial metals for the first time since 2010. The intervention was situated as a release to normalize surging metal prices and retain domestic manufacturers’ margins. However, it is a novelty that a national agency confirmed an active supply of petroleum buffer via an official press conference. And while no additional details were offered, it is presumed by global strategists that the press release referred to the 20-30 million barrels allegedly poured into the domestic industry around mid-July: when Xi’s government offered to supply crude to the OPEC.
Furthermore, China’s Stockpile Agency claimed that through open auctions, China’s reserve crude was intended to “better stabilize the domestic demand and supply.” It was apparent that as China ventured through a supply crunch when Brent Crude – Global Crude Index/Benchmark – breached the $76 bpd mark, the country instead resorted to utilizing its own stockpile instead of relying on expensive imported petroleum. Thus, it shapes a clear picture of how China managed to clock a phenomenal trade surplus despite not importing its usual crude quota.
While it is common knowledge that economies like the US and Europe maintain strategic petroleum reserves, the buffers held by China were utilized to actively manipulate the price in a ‘normalized’ oil market instead of their designated usage in supply crunches or wars. The situation today is anything but critical for the oil market to warrant such an intervention. As OPEC+ has boosted its output by 400,000 bpd starting August, output has bloomed beyond its peak since the price war back in April 2020. While the oil market is still well below the output capacity, mutually curbed by the OPEC+ alliance, the demand is still shaky and an equilibrium seems set. Yet, when we observe China – the world’s largest oil importer – we extricate reason that despite a growing economy, China continues to experience massive shortages: primarily in terms of oil, gas, coal, and electricity.
Furthermore, with the ensue of Hurricane Ida, massive US crude reserves have been wiped which has majorly impacted China as well. The US and China rarely stand on the same page on any front. However, even the White House recently asked OPEC to pump more crude into the market due to the rising gasoline prices in America. The same scenario is panning in China as energy shortages have led to surging costs while domestic demand is diminishing. The brunt is thus falling on the national exchequer: something China is not willing to haggle. While it is highly unorthodox of China to explicitly announce its intervention, many economists believe that it was a deliberate move on part of China’s communist brass to amplify the impact on the market. The plan seemingly worked as Brent fell by $1.36 to stand at $71.24 on Thursday.
If China’s commitment to normalize domestic energy prices is this significant, it is highly likely that another intervention could be pegged later in the fourth quarter. Primarily to counteract the contraction in export orders by cutting imports further to maintain a healthy trade surplus. In my opinion, it is clear that both the US and China are not willing to let Brent (and WTI) breach the $70-$75 bracket as key industries are at stake. However, while one takes a passive approach, the other is touted to go as far as pouring another 10-15 million barrels of crude by the end of 2021. Yet revered global commodity strategists believe that the downturn in prices is “short-lived” just like any other Chinese intervention in a variety of other commodity markets globally. And thus, experts believe that the pump is simply “not enough physical supply” to quite strike a permanent dent in an inherently flawed market mechanism.
Energy Forum Seeks To Analyze Africa’s Energy Potentials And Utilization
African Energy Week (AEW) 2021 in Cape Town, fully endorsed by the Government of South Africa, is committed to accelerating Africa’s energy growth with the aim of establishing a secure and sustainable energy future for every individual on the continent. Accordingly, AEW 2021 firmly believes in the role that oil and gas will continue to play in Africa and will emphasise the continent’s upstream market through a collaborative, International Oil Company (IOC) forum. Led by IOC executives, as well as government representatives from notable energy markets in Africa, the IOC forum aims to address the upstream challenges faced in Africa, providing solutions and strategies to drive exploration and make Africa more competitive for investment.
With the discovery of sizeable oil and gas reserves across the continent in recent years, regional and international explorers are turning an eye to the world’s final frontier market – Africa. Nigeria’s 200 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of gas reserves and 37.2 billion barrels of oil (bbl); Mozambique’s 11 tcf of gas; Senegal’s 450 billion cubic meters of gas; Libya’s 48 billion bbl and 53.1 tcf; and Egypt’s 77.2 tcf of gas have all made Africa the ideal destination for hydrocarbon exploration. What’s more, with many African countries making significant steps to enhance their regulatory environments, implementing legislation to create an enabling environment for investment, the continent has become a highly competitive market for exploration and production. Nigeria’s recently implemented Petroleum Industry Bill, Gabon’s new Hydrocarbon Code, and Angola’s inclusive petroleum regulation, to name a few, have all ensured a competitive and highly attractive market.
With the world’s six oil ‘supermajors’ – BP, Chevron, Eni, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell and TotalEnergies – all actively present in mature and emerging markets across Africa, the continent has become an upstream hotspot. AEW 2021 aims to accelerate this trend, promoting new upstream opportunities and ensuring both National Oil Companies (NOC) and IOCs drive the continent into a new era of energy and economic success. Accordingly, Africa’s premier energy event will host an upstream-dedicated IOC forum in Cape Town, led by IOC executives and government representatives. The IOC forum aims to address key challenges in Africa’s upstream market, whereby the diverse speaker panel will offer up solutions to expand exploration and production, while ensuring the continent remains competitive for investment in a post-COVID-19, energy transition era.
In addition to the discussion on upstream activities, the forum aims to highlight the role of IOCs in enhancing capacity building, whereby emphasis will be placed on IOC-NOC collaboration. IOCs have a critical role to play in Africa, not only regarding resource development, but human capital and local business development. In order for the continent to become truly sustainable and competitive, NOCs require support from IOCs. Accordingly, the forum aims to identify strategies to enhance cooperation and partnerships, with IOCs taking the lead in Africa’s energy development.
“AEW 2021 in Cape Town will offer a real discussion on Africa. Oil and gas are critical in Africa’s development and the African Energy Chamber (AEC) will not succumb to the misguided narrative that Africa should abandon its potential. The IOCs in Africa have demonstrated the continent’s potential, and by sharing strategies to enhance growth, address challenges, and accelerate upstream activities, they will be key drivers in Africa’s energy future. The IOC forum will not only offer a description of African reserves, but will provide clear, attainable solutions to exploitation, exploration and production with the aim of using energy to enact stronger economic growth. By coming to Cape Town, attending the IOC forum, and interacting with African ministers from across the continent, you will be able to be a part of Africa’s energy transformation,” stated NJ Ayuk, Executive Chairman of the AEC.
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