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The current phase of conflict in Syria

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[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] W [/yt_dropcap] hile we are writing this article, much of South Aleppo has now been liberated by Bashar al-Assad’ Syrian Arab Army. Jaish Al Fatah, which cooperates with the Al Nusra Front, namely the “Syrian section” of Al Qaeda, has now been ousted from the Southern districts of Aleppo and from most of the city suburbs. But it still keeps Idlib.

Jaish al Fatah is an “umbrella” organization of jihadists who fight against the Shiites, but not necessarily against Isis.

Assad’ Syrian Arab Army has completely liberated sixteen suburbs of Aleppo, while the anti-jihadist forces still attack some districts, including Karam al-Tarab and Amiriyah, so as to make Aleppo definitively safe and then move forward towards Idlib, still held by the jihadists.

Obviously Bashar al-Assad’s forces must also harshly oppose the expansion of the Turkish military forces operating in Northern Syria.

Furthermore, the Russian Aerospace Forces keep on bombing the Hama Province.

Finally, Assad’ Syrian Arab Army also fights against Isis in the Eastern region of Homs.

Hence this is the picture of the current situation there.

Nevertheless, some pro-Turkish militants, backed by the Turkish army, have attacked the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Syrian Arab Army in the village of Azrak, near Aleppo.

Turkey and the Kurdish YPG have clashed also in Sheik Nazir, Qert Weran and Oshali.

In short, Turkey keeps on creating protection buffer zones also in favour of Isis, which can use the Turkish flank to defend itself from the Syrian Arab Army and the Kurdish YPG.

In essence this is the Turkish, Kurdish and jihadist military framework of Greater Syria.

It is worth recalling, however, that on December 1 last President Vladimir Putin adopted the new Russian strategic doctrine.

This changes many factors.

Let us see its main aspects: Russia does not accept NATO’s expansion eastwards; it supports the agreements for a balanced reduction of armaments and it does not accept the “global missile defence system” that the United States are supposed to perfect and finalize within 2020.

In short, it is a doctrine designed to make the global strategic balance increasingly multipolar.

Furthermore Russia does not accept any US attempt to put pressure on it and reserves its right to militarily respond to military actions deemed unfriendly.

With reference to Syria, Russia’s ultimate goal is to build a broad international coalition to be defined within the UN framework.

The explicit fight against the jihad and everybody’s acceptance of a united, independent and intact Syria should be at the basis of this coalition.

The very important aspects of the media policy will be studied separately in another article.

Hence, on the Syrian military ground, the Syrian Arab Army and its Russian and Iranian allies are recording successes in North Aleppo, while the Russian aircrafts are bombing the ISIS rear-lines and have significantly reduced the Isis operating mass and materials.

Hence if the Russian air forces continue to carry out their operations, Bashar al-Assad’ Syrian Arab Army will be in a position to press victoriously on Idlib northwards and on Raqqa eastwards.

After the breakup of the jihadist front in north-east Aleppo, the defences of the moderate “insurgents”, as the Americans call them, are supposed to collapse in the short term.

However, despite the many Turkish actions, Syria’s air responses – supported by Russia – have not allowed Turkey to reach its true goal in Syria, namely the creation of a Turkish enclave between Raqqa, Manbij and al Bab.

An emplacement that EU analysts consider “irrelevant”, as we will see later on.

Soon the jihadist pocket in Western Ghouta – the old oasis near which Damascus was founded, the area from which many jihadists will leave as “refugees” towards puerile Europe – will be eliminated.

And the fundamental political and strategic factor is that now the Egyptian forces are entering the Syrian region.

The reason is simple: President al-Sisi rightly believes that every jihadist success in Syria is a vital threat to Egypt.

The United States have always supported the Muslim Brotherhood – suffice to read the very detailed book by Ian Johnson, A Mosque in Munich, published in 2010.

Al-Sisi’s only other option was turn to Russia.

Hence the US strategy of negotiating with the Islamic fundamentalism and de facto relinquishing the US traditional friendship with the Maghreb countries and with Iraq, the country “liberated” a few years ago, was formidable in its inanity.

Hence now Egypt is entering the Syrian scene, siding with Russia and Bashar al-Assad’s alliance with Iran – an intra-Islamic religious paradox which has its own perfect strategic logicality.

Stressing Islam’s religious differences too much makes us forget the extreme pragmatism – not to say cynicism – of the Arab and Islamic political elites.

Hence a few weeks ago a high-level Egyptian delegation had arrived in Syria to discuss the operations that the Egyptian forces should carry out under the Russian and Syrian command.

Some sources maintain that Egyptian aircrafts and helicopters are already deployed in the Hama base.

And it is worth recalling that Egypt has independent access to Syria by sea.

The two “Mistral” ships that France had built for Russia and that it could not sell to it, were later sold to Egypt.

Ironically, those two ships – not sold to Russia due to the current restrictions on trade with this country – will go to Syria to fight in favour of Russia and Assad, thanks to the EU stupidity and the inability of whole Europe to think strategically.

Each of the two French “command and power projection” frigates can accommodate a battalion of 900 soldiers with all their equipment.

Hence a situation would materialize in which a brigade – protected by the Russian air force – is fully autonomous and can operate freely on Syrian territory, being also equipped with Russian attack helicopters.

Therefore the Egyptian forces would be the real “game changer” in the Syrian war, because even the Hezbollah brigades and the Iranian “volunteers” need the Syrian support and logistics.

Hence Egypt can carry out its operations in Syria on its own, in close coordination with Russia and Bashar al-Assad’s forces.

Numerically the Iranian situation in Syria is as follows: 4,000 Iraqi units and 4,000 Shiite units sent directly from the Shiite republic, coordinated by 400 Pasdaran operational units in Iran.

Hezbollah has also sent 2,000 units of its special forces, namely “Ridwan” units, from the Lebanon.

In this particular situation, the 4,000 Egyptian units would be a significant increase of military and operational efficacy.

Obviously no one could prevent Egypt from taking part in the Syrian war, considering that forces and soldiers pass through the Suez Canal.

This is a real blackmail even for the countries which fund and support the jihad, since anyway their oil passes through the Egyptian waterway.

Hence this new complexion of anti-jihadist forces would allow a fast and powerful attack on Raqqa, which would be final and would close the game in Syria, except for some jihad “remnants” in the South.

Furthermore, President-Elect Donald Trump does no longer intend to support the “good” and “moderate” jihadists – hence the Turkish and Saudi game could soon be put to an end.

The era of President Obama – who only aimed at eliminating Assad and did not view the jihad as a real threat which, furthermore, strangely operated ever more often with “US-made” weapons – is over.

The European Union has published a new document on Syria, entitled “The First Trump Test: European Policy and the Siege of Aleppo”.

The EU analysts maintain that unfortunately President Assad is still there and so it is impossible not to accept his political presence.

Hence they think that we must swallow the bitter pill of accepting Assad still in power, as if they could send him away from there – which is not the case – and as if the jihad were an irrelevant operation.

Finally, EU analysts maintain that if Turkey remained interested in its Northern corridor, so as to counter the Kurds, it should no longer create many problems in putting in place a vague, bombastic and non-existent “transition”, which should be managed by the Europeans, who pretend to have powers and abilities they do not have and take actions for no reason or purpose.

We all know, however, that Turkey wants its corridor to trigger off a second fight against the Kurds and Assad – which is not harmless at all, as the EU strategy claims.

The winner does not need to sit at the negotiating table, which the losers need to reduce damage.

Hence it is not clear who should participate in the “transition” led – alas – by the Europeans.

Finally the EU analysts that drafted the Document on Syria believe that currently Europe should resume President Obama’s Syrian policy, namely to reach any bad deal so as to put an end to violence and help the Syrian people.

Nevertheless bad deals worsen the situation – and then, what about jihadists? Are they to be blamed for the Syrian disaster or rather the Russians and the “tyrant” Assad?

It seems that the EU still does not consider the holy war which, however, will certain not pay heed to the EU “humanitarian” requests.

Yet another proof of European inanity while, as President Putin maintains, it would be enough not to provide European aid to President Erdogan for three months and his regime would collapse.

Certainly the European Union will do nothing of this sort. Simply it will take no action at all.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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UAE and the opportunity for an India-Pakistan “sporting war”

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The Dubai Cricket Council chief, Abdul Rahman Falaknaz recently said that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was willing to host a bilateral India-Pakistan cricket series, provided both countries agreed. Said Falaknaz:

 ‘The best thing would be to get India-Pakistan matches here. When Sharjah used to host India and Pakistan all those years ago, it was like a war. But it was a good war, it was a sporting war and it was fantastic’

UAE along with Oman had hosted the recent ICC (International Cricket Council) Men’s T20 World cup (won by Australia). The second half of the Indian Premier League (IPL) T20 2021 was also played in UAE (both the World cup and the second half of the IPL had to be shifted from India, because of the Covid19 pandemic). One of the most exciting matches in the Men’s T20 World Cup was the India-Pakistan clash on October 26, 2021 played at the Dubai International Cricket Stadium. In spite of political relations between both countries being strained, the match was played in a cordial atmosphere. Pakistan one the contest by 10 wickets, and it was for the first time that it had beaten India in a World Cup match.

While scores and statistics relating to the match will remain only on paper, the image of Indian Captain Virat Kohli hugging Pakistani batsman Mohammad Rizwan after the match, in a wonderful display of sportsmanship, will be etched in the minds not just of cricket fans, but countless Indians and Pakistanis who yearn for normalisation of ties between both countries. The Indian captain did draw criticism on social media from trolls, but his gesture was also lauded by many cricketing fans in India.

India and Pakistan have not played any bilateral series, since 2013 ever since bilateral tensions have risen but have been playing each other in international tournaments. Significantly, in the 1980’s and 1990’s, Sharjah was an important cricketing venue, which was witness to many gripping ODI cricket contests between India and Pakistan. After match fixing controversies in 2000, India stopped playing in Sharjah and as a result for some time, UAE’s importance as a cricketing venue declined significantly.

Ever since 2009 Abu Dhabi and Dubai have emerged as important cricketing centres, since Pakistan has been playing most of its home series (Tests and One Day Internationals) in UAE (after a terrorist attack on a Sri Lankan team bus in 2009, most countries have been reluctant to play cricket in Pakistan, though Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and West Indies have visited Pakistan)

Possibility of a cricket series in UAE

While it is always tough to hazard a guess with regard to India-Pakistan relations, there have been some positive developments in recent weeks; the re-opening of the Kartarpur Religious Corridor after 20 months, and Pakistan’s decision to allow a consignment of 50,000 tonnes of wheat and life saving drugs  from India for Afghanistan, to transit through its territory (the Pakistan government stated that it had made this exception, because this consignment was for humanitarian purposes). While there have been calls to revive people to people and trade linkages between both countries, especially between both Punjabs, playing a cricket series either in India and Pakistan seems unlikely at least in the imminent future.

The UAE as a neutral venue, for a bilateral series, has a number of advantages, which include not just the fact, that it is home to a large South Asian expat population (a large percentage of which consists of cricket enthusiasts), but also that matches would be played in a more relaxed atmosphere, with lesser pressure on players from both countries. UAE, an economic hub which has become increasingly cosmopolitan in recent years, has also been trying to promote local cricket and generate interest in the game amongst locals (other GCC countries like Oman and Saudi Arabia have also been trying to do the same, but UAE possesses a number of advantages vis-à-vis these countries). Hosting an India-Pakistan series will benefit the country immensely. Apart from this, if the UAE is able to convince both countries to play a cricketing series, it will also enhance not its diplomatic stock (it would be pertinent to point out, that UAE is supposed to have been one of the countries which played a part in the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan — across the Line of Control/LOC earlier this year).

  In conclusion, the revival of cricketing ties between India and Pakistan is no mean task, but it would be easier on a neutral territory like UAE, which also has a substantial South Asian expat population interested in cricket. Not only will hosting a bilateral series between India and Pakistan, help the UAE in achieving its objective of emerging as an important cricketing hub for South Asia, and enhance the country’s soft power considerably, but it will also be a big achievement in diplomatic terms. Soft power, including cricket has been one of the important components in the links between UAE and South Asia in the past, it remains to be seen if in the future, the role of soft power, via cricket, becomes more crucial in linkages between UAE-South Asia.

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Turkey’s Foreign Policy Balancing Act

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It is often claimed that Turkey made a definitive break with the West in the 2000s after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power. The argument is that by changing direction internally, Ankara turned away from what the West was hoping to achieve in terms of its relations with Turkey.

Since 2003, Turkey has indeed increased its influence in all the geopolitically important regions on its borders: the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and Syria-Iraq. A general concept explaining this development can be found by looking at the map. There is no single great power in Turkey’s neighborhood which opens the door for greater Turkish economic and military engagement along its borders. Even Russia, arguably the biggest power near Turkey, could not prevent Ankara from giving its decisive support to Azerbaijan during the recent Second Karabakh War. Turkish troops, albeit a limited number, are now stationed on Azerbaijani soil alongside Russian.

The real reason for Turkey’s increasing engagement remains the Soviet collapse, though that engagement occurred over a longer period than many analysts expected. It took decades for Turkey to build its regional position. In 2021, it can safely be argued that Ankara has made a success of this venture. It is close to having a direct land corridor to the Caspian Sea (through Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan) and increases its military posture in the Mediterranean, and views northern Syria and Iraq as territories that can potentially provide strategic depth for an Anatolian defense.

A revealing element in Ankara’s foreign policy is that geography still commands the country’s perception of itself and its place in the world, perhaps more so than for any other large country. Rather than being attached solely to the Western axis, over the past two decades, Turkey has pursued a multi-vector approach to foreign affairs.

The country is on the European periphery. Its experience is similar to Russia’s in that both have absorbed extensive western influence, whether in institutions, foreign policy, or culture. Both have been anchored for centuries on the geopolitics of the European continent. Because a multi-vector foreign policy model provides more room for maneuver, economic gains, and growth of geopolitical power, both countries wanted to break free of their single-axis approach to foreign policy.

But neither Turkey nor Russia has had an opportunity to break its dependence on the West entirely. The West has simply been too powerful. The world economy revolved solely around the European continent and the US.

Turkey and Russia have significant territories deep in Asia and the Middle East, as well as geopolitical schools of thought that consider Europe-oriented geopolitical thinking contrary to state interests, particularly as the collective West has never considered either Turkey or Russia to be fully European. The two states have always pursued alternate geopolitical anchors, but had difficulty implementing them. No Asian, African, or any other geopolitical pole has proven sufficient to enable either Turkey or Russia to balance their ties with the West.

No wonder, then, that over the past two decades Turkey has been actively searching for new geopolitical axes. For Ankara, close relations with Russia is a means to balance its historical dependence on European geopolitics. The same foreign policy model can explain Moscow’s geopolitical thinking since the late 2000s, when its ties with Asian states developed quickly as an alternative to a dependence on, and attachment to, Western geopolitics.

Thus we come to the first misconception of Turkish foreign policy: that Ankara is distancing itself from the West with the aim of eventually breaking those ties entirely. Breaking off relations with NATO is not an option for Turkey. Its goal is to balance its deep ties with the West, which for various reasons were no longer producing the benefits it was hoping for, with a more active policy in other regions. Hence Turkey’s resurgence in the Middle East.

Turkey’s Middle East pivot (championed by former FM Ahmet Davutoglu) is not an exceptional development in the country’s foreign policy. During the Cold War, when Turkey’s focus on the Western axis was strong, leftist PM Bulent Ecevit promoted the idea of a “region-centric” foreign policy. The main takeaway was that Ankara should pursue diversification of external affairs beyond its traditional Western fixation, meaning deeper involvement in the Middle East and the Balkans. In 1974-1975, then Turkish deputy PM Necmettin Erbakan tried to pivot Ankara toward the Arab world. There were even attempts to build closer ties with the Soviets.

But throughout this period of reorientation, no move was ever made to sever relations with the West. Turkish politicians at the time believed diversification of foreign ties would benefit the country’s position at the periphery of Europe overlooking the volatile Middle East. The diversification would not hurt the country’s Western axis but would in fact complement it.

Contrary to the belief that Atatürk was solely interested in Turkey’s Western axis, the country under his leadership had close ties with nearby Middle Eastern states, as was necessary considering the geopolitical weight of those states at the time. Thus he hosted Iran’s Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1934, and in 1937 signed a non-aggression pact with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

The pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy has been a hallmark of Turkish political thinking. Even during Ottoman times, when a Europe-centered foreign policy was inescapable, the sultans sought alternatives to their dependence on Great Britain and France. Following the disastrous 1877-1878 war with Russia, Sultan Abdul Hamid began a cautious balancing effort by building closer ties with Imperial Germany, a trend that contributed to the German-Turkish alliance forged during WWI.

Returning to the present day, the Chinese factor is causing a reconfiguration in Turkey-West relations. The Asian pivot brings economic promise and increases Ankara’s maneuverability vis-à-vis larger powers like Russia and the EU. This fits into the rise of Turkish “Eurasianism,” the aspirations of which are similar to those that have motivated Russia for the past decade or so.

Turkey’s policies toward the West and the ongoing troubles in bilateral ties can best be described as intra-alliance opposition. It is true that in recent years, Turkey’s opposition to the West within the alliance has intensified markedly, but it has not passed the point of no return. Ankara is well aware that it remains a valuable ally to the collective West.

Author’s note: first published in Georgia today

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Yemen recovery possible if war stops now

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Devastation caused by protracted conflict in Yemen. Photo: UNDP Yemen

War-torn Yemen is among the poorest countries in the world, but recovery is possible if the conflict ends now, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) said in a report published on Tuesday. 

Yemen has been mired in seven years of fighting between a pro-Government Saudi-led coalition and Houthi rebels, generating the world’s worst humanitarian and development crisis and leaving the country teetering on the brink of famine. 

The report sends a hopeful message that all is not lost, arguing that its extreme poverty could be eradicated within a generation, or by 2047, if the fighting ceases.  

A brighter future 

“The study presents a clear picture of what the future could look like with a lasting peace including new, sustainable opportunities for people”, said UNDP Administrator Achim Steiner. 

“To help to get there, the entire UN family continues to work with communities throughout the country to shape a peaceful, inclusive and prosperous future for all Yemenis”.  

The brutal war in Yemen has already caused the country to miss out on $126 billion of potential economic growth, according to UNDP. 

Inclusive, holistic recovery 

The UN humanitarian affairs office, OCHA, has estimated 80 per cent of the population, or 24 million people, rely on aid and protection assistance, including 14.3 million who are in acute need.  

Through statistical modeling analyzing future scenarios, the report reveals how securing peace by January 2022, coupled with an inclusive and holistic recovery process, can help to reverse deep trends of impoverishment and see Yemen reaching middle-income status by 2050. 

Furthermore, malnutrition could be halved by 2025, and the country could achieve $450 billion of economic growth by the middle of the century.  

While underlining the primacy of a peace deal, the report emphasizes the need for an inclusive and holistic recovery process that crosses all sectors of Yemeni society and puts people at the centre. 

Women’s empowerment critical 

Investment must be focused on areas such as agriculture, inclusive governance, and women’s empowerment. 

Auke Lootsma, UNDP Resident Representative in Yemen, stressed the importance of addressing what he called “the deep development deficits” in the country, such as gender inequality. 

“I think it’s fair to say that Yemen, whatever gender index you look at, it’s always at the bottom,” he told UN News ahead of the report’s launch. 

“So, bringing women into the fold, making them part of the labour force, and really empowering women also to contribute to the recovery and reconstruction of Yemen is going to be incredibly important”.  

Act now 

The report was carried out by the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures at the University of Denver, located in the United States, and is the third in a series launched in 2019. 

While outlining potential peace dividends, it also provides grim future trajectories should the conflict continue into 2022 and beyond.  

For example, the authors project that 1.3 million lives will be lost if the war continues through 2030.  Moreover, a growing proportion of those deaths will not be due to fighting, but to the impacts on livelihoods, food prices and the deterioration of health, education and basic services. 

UNDP said there is no time to waste, and plans to support recovery must be continuously developed even as the fighting rages on.  

“The people of Yemen are eager to move forward into a recovery of sustainable and inclusive development,” said Khalida Bouzar, Director of its Regional Bureau for Arab States.  

“UNDP stands ready to further strengthen our support to them on this journey to leave no one behind, so that the potential of Yemen and the region can be fully realized – and so that once peace is secured, it can be sustained”. 

Grave concerns in Marib

Meanwhile, UN humanitarians are extremely concerned about the safety of civilians in Yemen’s northern Marib governorate, which is home to some one million displaced people. 

The UN refugee agency, UNHCR, warned that as the frontlines of conflict shift closer to heavily populated areas in the oil-rich region, those lives are in danger. 

Access to humanitarian aid is also becoming harder, said UNHCR Spokesperson Shabia Mantoo. 

Rocket strikes close to the sites hosting the displaced are causing fear and panic. The latest incident was reported on 17 November when an artillery shell exploded, without casualties, near a site close to Marib City. UNHCR teams report that there is heavy fighting in the mountains surrounding the city and the sound of explosions and planes can be heard day and night”, she elaborated.

UNHCR is warning that further escalation of the conflict will only increase the vulnerability of people in Marib, and is calling for an immediate ceasefire in Yemen. 

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