“Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone” -Winston Churchill
[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] T [/yt_dropcap]here is a doctrine in classical geopolitics: “Who controls Eurasia, (Heartland) eventually, he will be able to run the world. In subsequent times, historical development resulted in the pivotal changes in the foreign policies, in particular, political interests of states. Hence, the doctrine was changed into a new dogma in terms of the historical and geopolitical changes in the contemporary world order. “Who possesses energy resources sooner or later he can put the world under his control.
In today’s globalized world, maintenance of energy security stands on the agenda of states. Ostensibly, states clearly comprehend the pivotal impact of energy on both national security and foreign policy. Therefore, they can be considered as an indispensable “triangle” within the policy of states. In order to realize the importance of energy security, it could be better to trace back to the historical period.
On the threshold of the World War I, First Lord of Admiralty, Winston Churchill made a historical move that he transferred the main power source of British Navy from Welsh coal to oil; because of the fact that he had in mind to make the Royal armada much faster than its German counterpart. This historical switch from coal to oil meant that not only did Royal navy not depend on Welsh coal, but also he clearly expressed the diversification of supply as a fundamental principle of energy security. This pivotal decision had formed the course of the war against counterparts. As a consequence of this historically important footstep, today national security, in particular, homeland security lies in the hands of energy factor. Afterward, since Churchill’s crucial answer, energy security has been the number one issue on the agenda of states that nowadays, they strive to answer these questions regarding what are the key principles of energy security and how they can preserve the energy resources within national security?! It is undeniable fact that the fervent interests of states over energy enhanced amid the World War II. As a result, the major powers and allies lacking meaningful resources strived to gain access to wealthy energy resources in particular areas; Middle East, Caspian Sea and Romania. Indeed, the main concerns on energy consisted of gaining broad access to energy-rich areas in order to not only did ensure their energy demands and preserve energy resources within their national security. Basically, if energy security puts the question on national strategy, first and foremost, national security and then foreign policy have to be taken into account in order to realize the key principles of energy security. Between the threshold of the two wars, energy was used as an effective response to military power.
The immense concerns over energy security began with the 1973-1974 Arab-Israel War and the foundation of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Throughout that period, OPEC using the energy factor as a strategic weapon imposed oil boycott against major energy-importing countries and suspended the export of oil to the West, mainly European countries and the U.S. Afterward, to a large extent, the West, in particular, the U.S realized the crucial power of energy and kicked off the maintenance and rational usage of energy supplies. In truth, the boycott was really arduously strategic lesson for the West and caused “energy syndrome” that they realized the major impact of energy factor and tried to adequately secure the energy supplies within their internal and external policy. The dependence on energy resources put the energy security as a major issue of national security on states and societies. Hence, to provide energy security means the preservation of national security and to ensure the security of both of them defines the rational implementation of foreign policy. In today’s world, large-scale access to energy resources at affordable costs, to ensure the upholding of energy security is one of the vital national interests of states (as a key example the U.S, Russia, China and etc).
Energy and national security have always been closely linked. As a key example, after the 1990s the homeland security of the U.S based on the providing energy security and diversification of energy supplies. During the presidency of Bill Clinton, he considered the energy security as a main issue of the U.S foreign policy. Today, the energy issue does not have to be restricted to oil, because of the fact that the diversification of energy supplies and large-scale access to alternative energy resources can lessen or prevent the future distortion of energy supplies. Nowadays, in order to prevent some social and economic turmoil over energy supplies, first and foremost, the world’s states has proved the gas as important energy resources as oil, and have to gain broad access to flexible liquefied natural gas resources (LNG), and clean coal technology at the same time, for the future development, states need to build the transparent global market to export their both oil and flexible gas resources across the energy-importing countries. Today, states should have to achieve the flexibility of natural gas, because it is undeniable fact that the positive development of LNG market will boost their security. States immensely realize the future development of LNG business, because the rational exporting of flexible natural gas resources can contribute to further diversification of energy supplies as well as resources. Hence, within the umbrella of energy security states can preserve not only their national security but also gain access to the renewable or alternative energy sources as well. For instance, for upcoming years, up to 2020, LNG could constitute 25 to 30 % of total gas spending of the US, compared to 3 % in the previous year, 2004.
Energy security is utterly important for each state in terms of ensuring its national security. In this way, states strive to take strategic steps and involve far more investments in their countries in order to provide their national security necessities. Fundamentally, in order to provide energy security and self-sufficiency in terms of national security and foreign policy, each state should take crucially strategic prospects such as setting up new alliances, fortifying collective energy security, stating its interests with energy-exported countries, in particular, the rise of state power in energy.
It is ostensible fact that nation states should have to take into account the future threats to their national security that comes from the concentration of energy resources. Currently, we are observing different kinds of challenges to national security that prevent countries from taking major steps regarding energy resources. These challenges are not limited to terrorism, social and economic turmoil, political crisis, armed disputes, and piracy. For instance, natural disasters also engender huge damages and disruptions in the flows of energy resources as well. Hurricane namely Katrina and Rita caused far more damages and disruption of the flows of energy resources; oil, gas and electric power in 2005.
What does the energy security mean for the major states?! – To date, energy means “security of demand” for the energy-exporting countries and they try to maintain the sufficient demand within their policy. Energy security means varied interests and intentions among different countries, but on a whole, it has to be acclimatized to national security and foreign policy.
For the U.S, energy security means the ensuring of diversification of energy supplies and adequate access to a new global market in order to maintain homeland security. According to Russia, the main aim is to implement state control over energy resources, attain the prime role over the main energy pipelines and demonstrate its strategic role in the global market environment. China tries to controls access to what is basically the largest possible market for its energy products in terms of reaching the sufficient stage of economic development. From the standpoint of Japan, the prevention of scarcity of domestic resources through investment, trade and diversification of supply is the pivotal policy. The main aim of the Europe is how to reduce the reliance on gas resources and how to convert the gas resources into new coal technology as in previous times. Nowadays, the conception of energy security has to be extended to involve the defense of energy supply chain and energy infrastructure on the agenda of states. Because of the fact that the growing balance of energy interdependence and the energy trade put important duties in front of both energy-exporting and importing countries in order to secure the energy supply chain and global energy marketplace as well.
According to Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn’s standpoint, the energy security consists of key principles. The first principle subjects to the diversification of energy supplies that can be achieved by broad access to alternative energy sources and then the establishment of new-fangled energy platforms and infrastructures in order to develop them sufficiently. Therefore, diversification of energy resources is paramount both for energy security as well as for competitiveness The second crucial point premises on the creation of far more stable and well-functioning energy market in order to sell energy products at affordable prices. Hence, to provide the stability of global market can enhance the accessibility and affordability of energy products among consumers and exporters. In fact, for all consumers security dwells in the flexible and stable market. The third code rests on the “security margin”. That can create “a buffer zone” in order to prevent damages and disruption of flows of energy supplies and secure the energy infrastructures. The fourth principle mainly concerns on the essential role of high-quality information. The good-quality information can strengthen the well-functioning and flexible energy markets. For example, International Energy Agency (IEA) leads the way of delivering the well-organized flow of information between consumers and exporters within the international energy market. This information can provide the consumers as well as exporters regarding for instance, the flexibility of liquid natural gas (LNG) resources and the rational export and import of these resources in energy market satisfactorily. The fifth principle refers to the implementation of research-development (R&D) and innovative breakthroughs within energy spectrum in terms of the preserving of energy security. The next ones focus on the creation of supportive and transparent relations between energy-exported and imported countries, technologically-driven energy industry producing new generation of energy resources as a means of ensuring energy security and etc. These focal principles of energy security can be considered the main provider of national security and foreign policy. For this reason, according to some scholars, energy security, national security and foreign policy can be called the successful “triangle” in international political economy.
Briefly, in the contemporary world order, energy security is considered as a focal engine of national security and foreign policy. The immense demand for energy, basically, access to stable and flexible market with affordable prices creates a more competitive environment between energy importers and exporters. In a world of growing interdependence, energy security depends largely on the level of bilateral and multilateral relations among states at energy spectrum. Indeed, energy is defined as the lifeblood of states for not only their survival and well-being but also their national, regional and global security.
Should Turkey and Azerbaijan Be Worried About Killed Syrian Mercenaries?
Just a few weeks ago many analysts and observers were sceptical about reports of Turkey’s transferring units of its Syrian National Army (SNA) proxies to Nagorno Karabakh, even more so because Turkish officials denied any such claims. However, as evidence of massive casualties among the Syrian mercenaries continues to mount, there is little space left for doubt: SNA fighters have become cannon fodder in the Turkish operation in support of Azerbaijan.
The first batch of bodies of those Syrians who perished in Nagorno Karabakh counted over 50 people, according to messages and videos that went viral on opposition WhatsApp and Telegram channels. Among the dead who were delivered to Syria over Hiwar Kilis border crossing and were given a hasted burial were men from Aleppo, Idlib, Homs and other regions of Syria. Many of their relatives, like families of Muhammad Shaalan from Atareb and Kinan Ferzat from Maarat al-Nuuman, were shocked to learn about their death.
Just like the majority of the Syrians who travelled to Nagorno Karabakh, Muhammad and Firzat were primarily motivated by lucrative rewards of up to 2,000 dollars promised by Turkey. “I came here to make money and have a better life back in Syria where the living conditions are miserable. I consider this a job, nothing else,” a member of Liwa Sultan Murad, one of the first SNA factions to deploy its fighters to the contested region, told Guardian.
The reason behind heavy casualties of the Syrian mercenaries is that they are thrown into action where the clashes are the most violent, including Jabrayil, Terter, Fizulin and Talysh. This move allows Azerbaijan to keep its military, who mainly provide air support including operating Turkey-made Bayraktar TB2 UAVs and coordinate artillery and missile strikes of the Armenian positions, out of direct contact with the enemy.
The estimates of the numbers of the Syrian mercenaries present in Nagorno Karabakh are wildly different. While initial reports put their number at 500 men, it is currently believed that the actual number may be in thousands. This data indicates that at least 10 percent of the fighters were killed during the very first days of the escalation – a serious alarm for the mercenaries as well as their Turkish backers.
These developments must ring a bell for Azerbaijan as well. The longer the conflict protracts, the higher the risk of casualties among the Azeri servicemen becomes, who have already suffered losses in Armenian retaliation strikes. Baku has managed to avoid discontent among the military as well as the civilian populace – not least thanks to the Syrian mercenaries crushed as cannon fodder – but this can not continue for long.
Emerging Multipolarity and its consequences
“Make America great again” a slogan that formed the nucleus of trump’s electoral campaign vividly suggests that America is no more a great country. It is, in fact, an implicit admission that U.S is gradually losing its clout in international politics and hence, its image as a sole superpower of the world has virtually tarnished. Let me rephrase this connotation; it means that the era of unipolar world is over and the world has now transitioned to a multipolarirty.
Currently, new power centers are emerging in transnational political landscape. China, Russia, India and Turkey are excessively engaged to carve a niche for them in evolving international order. Most importantly, with China and Russia’s mushrooming proximity, balance of power is now shifting from west to east. Former United States (US) Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton at her state visit to New Zealand was one of the first to observe “a shifting balance of power to a more multi-polar world as opposed to the Cold War model of a bipolar world”. This conspicuous change in multi-national political setup was also realized by Ban ki Moon, the then secretary- General of United Nations who stated at Stanford University in 2013 that we have begun to “move increasingly and irreversibly to a multi-polar world”. Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, also declared at the Russia-China Conference 2016 that “international relations have entered into a conceptually new historical stage that consists in the emergence of a multi-polar world order and reflects the strengthening of new centers of economic development and power”.
These manifestations of political spin doctors have since then revealed a general acceptance of the idea of multi-polar world as a concept that is inescapable political reality in the contemporary international dynamics. However, when it comes to the transitions and inevitability of power structures, there is a little agreement among the international states.
A much stronger resistance to forego unipolarity remains embedded in the Trump administration vision to “make America great again”. Political pundits such as Robert Kaplan continue to question, whether there is an overlap of unipolar and multi-polar world realities; where US continues to retain the supremacy in military realm of affairs and is anticipated to remain so for a considerable future time, whereby China leads in the economic realm. Additionally nations in the former Third World are acquiring status as rising powers, notably India who have over the years with smart diplomacy have acquired global outreach to shape international agenda.
Chronologically, After World War II, the U.S. became the undisputed and unchallenged global superpower. It was the only country, equipped with nuclear warheads and was one of the few countries involved in the war that came away from it relatively unscathed at home. The U.S. underwent a meager loss of approximately 400,000 soldiers and a fractional amount of civilians in the war. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, incurred a gigantic loss of around 11 million soldiers and some 7 million to 10 million civilians. While Soviet and European cities were undergoing the process of rehabilitation, American cities flourished. It seemed clear to all that the future belonged to the United States.
But it didn’t take long for the luster of unrivaled power to tarnish. The U.S. military machine relaxed as quickly as it had mobilized, and wartime unity gave way to peacetime political debates over government spending and entitlement programs. Within five years, a bipolar world emerged: The Soviets attained an atomic bomb, and the U.S. was caught flat-footed in a war on the Korean Peninsula that ended in a stalemate. Soon thereafter, the U.S. was withdrawing from Vietnam and rioting at home. In 1971, then-President Richard Nixon predicted a world that he said would soon emerge in which the U.S. was “no longer in the position of complete pre-eminence.” Within 26 years of the end of World War II, Nixon’s prediction saw the light of the day and the U.S. had to resign to its fate.
Theoretically, multipolarity refers to a distribution of power in which more than two states have nearly equal amounts of military, cultural, financial and economic influence.
If we look at the contemporary world, we find that with the rise of like China, India, Russia, Indonesia, Turkey and Brazil, global power will spread across a wider range of countries, hence, a new world order with multipolar outlook is likely to emerge .
Realistically speaking, several revisionist powers are and will shaking up their regions. For instance, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 – annexing Crimea, over which it has fought several wars throughout history (mainly with Turkey). In turn, Turkey is asserting its sovereignty over the eastern Mediterranean to the frustration of countries like Greece, Egypt, Cyprus and Israel. Meanwhile, India has upped its aggression in its border dispute with Pakistan as Modi began a process to revoke the autonomous status of the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir.
Notably, after the age of city-states and nation-states, we are now entering the age of continental politics. The most powerful countries of the 21st century (the U.S., China, Russia India, Indonesia, and Brazil) are the size of continents. They have broad economic bases and their digital economies potentially have hundreds of millions of users. Internationally, their scale requires them to seek broad spheres of influence in order to protect their security.
Here the question arises what will be the impact of growing multipolarity in the world? First of all, revisionist powers will increasingly ignite tensions. The growing assertiveness of countries like Russia, Turkey and India is the new normal. As they grow more powerful, these countries will seek to revise arrangements in order to reflect the new realities of power. Because these (continental) states seek broad spheres of influence, many places are at risk of destabilization.
Second, one of the biggest risks is the growing paranoia of the hegemon (the U.S.). The current trade war has shown how destabilizing the policy of the (financial) hegemon becomes as it feels threatened by the rise of a rival. Historically, this has been the most important source of violent conflicts. Indeed, the biggest source of uncertainty in the coming years is how the U.S. will react to the rise of China.
Third, the world order will become more ambiguous. Two developments deserve our attention. First, the growing use of shadow power will make conflict more unpredictable. With digital tools, states (and non-state actors) are manipulating each other in subtle ways. For example, Russian hackers posed as Iranians to hit dozens of countries and Americans blamed Russia for tampering with American elections. Second, alliances will also become more ambiguous. With ever changing dynamics of world economy, new alliances, motivated by the concept of triangulation (to keep balance in relation with the US and China, the trade warriors) will form and such alliances, as predicted by spin doctors; will be less stable than the blocs, formed in 20th century.
To sum it up, before we reach a multipolar world order, we will see a period of growing uncertainty based on the rise of revisionist powers, the paranoia of the U.S. and growing ambiguity of conflict and cooperation. Moreover, the political pundits are divided in opinion that whether multi-polarity is unstable than unipolarity or bipolarity. Kenneth Waltz strongly was in favor of “bipolar order as stable”. On the other side, Karl Deutsch and David Singer saw multi-polarity as guaranteeing a greater degree of stability in an article published in 1964, “Multipolar Systems and International Stability”. Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow in “Goodbye Hegemony” (2014), question the belief whether a global system without a hegemon would be unstable and more war prone. However, whatever the system the world is likely to witness in the days to come, let’s hope that this should be in the best interest of humanity and it should make the lives of the inhabitants of this planet peaceful and prosperous.
The future of strategic intelligence
There are currently three types of intelligence transformations, namely conceptual, technological and operational.
In the first case, we are dealing with a new and original intelligence paradigm.
From a mechanism based on the identification of the need for information-research-processing and analysis-dissemination-feedback, we are shifting to what some people already call “position intelligence”.
In other words, we are coming to an information mechanism that continuously perceives data and processes it, and then spreads it permanently and continuously to those who have to use it.
While the old intelligence model was “positivist”, i.e it concerned single objective and empirical data to be included in a decision-making process that is not determined by intelligence, currently it is instead a matter of building acontinuous follow-up not of data, but of political behaviours, perceptions of reality by the enemy-opponent, as well as complex phenomena that constantly reach the intelligence matrix from different parts and areas.
While in the past intelligence was rhapsodic and temporary, à la carte of politicians, and sometimes even unsolicited and not requested, it currently becomes the stable core of political, strategic, economic and industrial decisions.
This obviously results in a new relationship between politicians and Intelligence Services.
While, in an era we have already defined as “positivist”, facts, news and the unknown novelties of the enemy-opponent counted, what currently matters is the ever more evident integration between the intelligence system and politicians.
There is obviously a danger not to be overlooked, i.e. the danger that – without even realizing it – the Intelligence Services take on responsibilities which must be typical of elective bodies only.
But certainly intelligence currently plays a much greater role than in the past.
Another key element of the conceptual transformation of intelligence is the use not only of highly advanced and powerful information technologies, but also of scientific paradigms which were unknown to us only a few years ago.
Just think about Artificial Intelligence, but also cloud computing, algorithm theory and Markov chains – and here we confine ourselves to the mathematics that sustains current IT and computing.
But there is also human ethology, an extraordinary evolution of Konrad Lorenz’s animal ethology, as well as social psychology, sociological analysis and scientific depth psychology.
A whole universe of theories that, in Kant’s words, have recently shifted from metaphysics to science.
It must certainly be used to analyse, for example, mass behaviours that seem unpredictable, as well as the psychological reactions of both the ruling classes and the crowds, and the interactions between the various group behaviours of a country.
Nothing to do with the old Habsburg Evidenzbureau, which informed the General Staff of enemy troops’ movements or of the various generals’ lovers.
We here witness a substantial union between intelligence and political decision-making or, rather, between the thought produced by intelligence and the foundations of political decision-making.
CIA has often tried to poison Fidel Castro’s beard.
Today, apart from the doubtful rationality of that operation, it would be a matter of using – for example – advertising, TV series, Hollywood movies, the sugar, tourist or tobacco market cycles, not to poison late Fidel’s beard, but to put the Cuban economy and decision-making system into structural crisis.
The typical idea of Anglo-Saxon political culture –whereby, once the “tyrant” is eliminated, everything can be fine and back in place – has been largely denied by facts.
All this obviously without being noticed, as far as the operations for disrupting a country are concerned.
Another factor of the conceptual transformation of intelligence is speed: currently the IT networks are such as to allow data collection in real time with respect to facts and hence favour wide-ranging decisions.
As far as technology is concerned, it is well known that both the AI networks, the new calculation structures, and the networks for listening and manipulating the enemy-opponent data are such as to allow operations which were previously not even imaginable.
At this juncture, however, there are two problems: everybody has all the same tools available and hence the danger of not “successfully completing” the operation is great, unlike when the Intelligence Services’ operations were based on the skills, role and dissimulation abilities of some operatives – or on confidential and restricted technologies.
The other problem is intelligence manipulation: a country that thinks to be a target can spread – in ad hoc networks – manipulated news, malware, data and information which are completely false, but plausible, and can modify the whole information system of the country under attack.
Another problem of current intelligence technologies is their distance from the “traditional” political decision-making centres.
A politician, a Minister, a Premier must know what comes out of the intelligence system. Nevertheless, it is so specialised and sectorial that the distance between technical data processing and the “natural language” of politics is likely to make data ambiguous or unclear and of little use.
Moreover, there is a purely conceptual factor to be noted: if we put together the analysis of financial cycles, of technology change, of public finance and of political and military systems, we must connect systems that operate relatively autonomously from each other.
In other words, there is no “science of the whole” that can significantly connect such different sectors.
Therefore, there is the danger of projecting the effects of one sector onto another that is only slightly influenced by it, or of believing that, possibly, if the economy goes well, also the public debt – for example -will go well.
The room for political decision-making is therefore much wider than modern intelligence analysts believe.
Political decision-making is still made up of history, political-cultural traditions and of perceptions of reality which are shaped by many years of psychological and conceptual training.
With specific reference to operativity, once again we are dealing with radical changes.
Years ago, there was the single “operative” who had to decide alone – or with very little support from the “Centre” – what to do on the spot and with whom to deal.
Today, obviously, there is still the individual operative, but he/she is connected to the “Centre” in a different way and, in any case, imagines his/her role differently.
On the level of political decision-making, intelligence is always operative, because reality is so complex and technically subtle that it no longer enables even the most experienced statesman to “follow their nose”.
The primary paradox of the issue, however, is that intelligence cannot take on political roles that imply a choice between equivalent options.
This is inevitably the sphere of politics.
Another factor of the operational transformation is the inevitable presence of intelligence operatives in finance, in the scientific world, in high-level business consulting, in advertising, communication and media.
Intelligence has therefore progressively demilitarised itself and is increasingly operating in sectors that we would have previously thought to be completely alien to Intelligence Services. Instead, they are currently the central ones.
Moreover, we are currently witnessing a particular mix of strategic intelligence, geopolitics and financial analysis.
Why finance? Because it is the most mobile and widespread economic function.
We are witnessing the birth of a new profession, namely currency geopolitics.
Hence we are also witnessing the evolution of two new types of intelligence, namely market intelligence (MARKINT) and financial intelligence (FININT).
An old and new problem is secrecy. The greater the extent to which old and new intelligence is used, the less it can keep secrecy, which is essential now as it was in the past.
What has always been the aim of strategic intelligence? To predict phenomena starting from a given context.
Contexts, however, change quickly and the interaction between sectors is such as to change the effect of forecasts.
The formalised techniques for analysis-decision making are manifold: intelligence data mining, “grid technologies”, knowledge creation and sharing, semantic analysis, key intelligence needs (KINS) and many others.
All operations which are often necessary, but currently we need to highlight two factors typical of the North American intelligence culture which, unfortunately, also negatively affects the models used by U.S. allies.
The first aspect is that, strangely enough, the same formal models are proposed for both companies and States.
A State does not have to maximize profits, while a corporation does, at least on a level playing field with its competitors.
A State is not a “competitor” of the others and ultimately a State has no specific “comparative advantage” but, on the contrary, some of its companies have, if this happens.
Therefore, the overlap between business intelligence, which is currently necessary, and States’ intelligence is a conceptual bias, typical of those who believe that a State is, as Von Mises said, “the joint stock company of those who pay taxes to it”.
For companies, it is obvious that all specific and original intelligence operations must be known to the State apparata, which may coordinate them or not, considering that they inevitably have additional data.
On the other hand, some business operations can become very useful for intelligence.
Hence a structure would be needed to put the two “lines” of operations together, and above all, a new intelligence concept is needed.
In the past, the Intelligence Services’ operations were largely defensive: to know something just before it happened, to avoid the adverse operations of a State hitting its own resources, but all with often minimal time limits.
Now we need expressly offensive intelligence which can hit the opponents’ (commercial, economic and strategic) networks before they move and in good time.
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