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Iran and Turkey’s energy game in the Gulf and the Caspian basin

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[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] T [/yt_dropcap]he two major non-Arab countries Iran and Turkey have the significant and most populated geographical locations in the region. From a historical perspective, it is clear that both of them have long shared similarities and differences regarding religion, national identity, populations, energy factor and etc.

Both of them have a strong sense of national identity and also were the homeland of different historical civilizations. The one of the major difference is that since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, “velayat e-faqih” as a prominent doctrine has been implemented in the government system of Iran. On the other hand, Iran is a predominantly Shia majority and Turkey is major Sunni-based country. Another major difference between them is based on energy factor. Today, the crucial aspect of Turkey and Iran relations is energy factor. Since the beginning of the relations in energy in the 1990s, the glaring differences between them in the energy sector have influenced their relations and resulted in the close cooperation between them. Apparently, the relations in the field of energy commenced in 1996 with the signing of the agreement on natural gas amid the Welfare Party Leader of Turkey Necmettin Erbakan’ visit to Tehran. The natural gas agreement envisaged the export of 4 bcm of natural gas in 2002 and of 10 bcm in 2007 from Iran to Turkey within the period of 25 years. However, this volume was never reached to the capacity of 10 bcm due to different kinds of reasons, especially the coercive diplomacy of the U.S, the economic sanctions lessened the export of natural gas to Turkey at the expected volume and only 6 bcm of natural gas was delivered to Turkey during the sanction period. To date, Iranian gas has been really important for Turkey in terms of economic development, its domestic needs, and energy demands. Because of the fact that Iran has sufficiently proven crude oil and gas resources in the Gulf region, in contrary, Turkey holds limited number of oil and gas reservoirs and these resources are not able to provide the both economic and domestic demands of Turkey adequately and thus, heavily depends on foreign supplies.* Therefore, Iranian gas is really meaningful for industry and for residential heating in Eastern Anatolia.

Apart from the oil and gas sectors, the electricity trade between them is really important. Iran and Turkey have agreed to develop their electricity generation sufficiently. For instance, in 2014, Iran exported 2,252 GWH electricity to Turkey that constituted 1,1% of that year’s total electricity source. Energy as a solid rock of economic relations between Turkey and Iran exhibits itself as the main provider of economic growth. The relations between Turkey and Iran can be characterized in some reasons:

1.The role of Turkey as a transit route between North and South, East and West. The main role of Turkey would be really important for the rational and secure transportation of Iran’s natural oil and gas resources to Europe via Turkey;*

2.The growing massive dependence of Europe on natural gas resources force the European countries to seek for new alternative energy supplies and countries and strives to decrease its natural gas dependency on Russia . In this case, the West has pivotal interests regarding Southern Gas Corridor which links the one side of Asia with Europe. Here, Iran is eager to export its energy resources to Europe at affordable prices and wants to acquire the Westward transportation of its natural gas. This is one of the main reasons why Iran holds close relations with Turkey;

3.Turkey is the main consumer of Iran’s oil and natural gas resources, although there have been some challenges regarding security, sanctions, and disagreement over high prices;

4.Despite having massive resources Iran is not a major player in the global gas market, it only exports gas to Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan and therefore, it is not ready to lose its reliable consumer like Turkey in international energy market;

5.The main aim of Iran is to gain broad access to flexible LNG export capability. However, Iran does not have terminals, technical expertise and required funds due to the sanctions. In fact, Turkey as an economic savior offers commercial and investment opportunities to Iran in order to build terminals and possess newly generated technologies to export LNG;

6.The one of the major reasons is the growing Turkish investments in the country. Turkey has long invested in Iran’s energy products in order to boost mutual trade between them in the energy sector.

Consequently, the emergence of cooperation between Turkey and Iran stems from the energy factor. The resources-rich Iran has an adequate capability to export its natural gas and oil products not only to Turkey but also the European market. Turkey as a stable consumer of its energy products try to diversify its energy supplies and source countries, at the same time, it is importantly in need to maintain its both domestic and foreign economic growth. As a result, it can be said that the continuing of a balanced relationship between Tehran and Ankara can be beneficial for the maintenance of the West’s energy security by diversifying its energy supplies and source countries.

Competition between Turkey and Iran

In XXI century, energy factor has caused to gain both a partner and a rivalry among states. In terms of a partnership, the nation-states try to show “win-win” position in order to meet their domestic demands and develop economic growth with mutual trade agreements. In contrary, in the position of rivalry, the states strive to acquire access to much more energy resources, and source- rich countries by imposing grand energy projects and sets of rules, at the same time, want to prevent the influence of rival states over energy-rich regions. It can be shown in the example of the relationship between Turkey and Iran. Currently, there are pivotal reasons why Iran does not have in mind to digest the geopolitical and economic positions of Turkey in energy-rich regions.

On the other hand, the rivalry in some cases, tensions can be observed in the ongoing process of Syrian Civil War. The severe civil war which caused loads of humanitarian crisis and calamity led to the misperceptions and different positions between major regional power including the U.S, Russia, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Since the beginning of the conflict, Russia and Iran has been the main supporter of Bashar-Al-Assad regime. In the contrary, Turkey is opposed to the Assad regime in the country. These different positions have caused the clash of interests between the two regional powers regarding Syrian Civil War.

Moreover, after the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran seeks alternative methods to export its natural gas products to European market via Turkey. However, Iran well understands that Turkey as a transit country is really significant for the multi-sided transportation of energy products, especially its natural gas resources. The anti-western position of Iran compels it to strengthen relations with Russia. Both of them are opposed to the Western-backed economic projects in the Caspian region.

To a large extent, after the completion of impressive projects in the South Caucasus, it is difficult to Iran to see Turkey will turn to be a grand power in the Southern Gas Corridor. In this case, Iran is afraid of being marginalized from the political and economic processes taking place in the Caspian region. The implementation of necessary energy-efficient projects in this region will lead to the dominant position of Turkey. Therefore, If Iran’s natural gas is transported to Europe via Turkey, this will give it a powerful bargaining chip against Iran. In fact, Iran never wants to give empowerment to Turkey against itself. Another reason is that Iran wants to keep the regional balance of power in energy. Therefore, the emergence of Turkey as an authoritative power will deprive Iran of the economic and political perks in the region. The transit role of Turkey in Southern Gas Corridor will lead to the realization of Turkish Stream. Because of the fact that the construction of Turkish Stream along with Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and the Iraq-Turkey gas pipeline, will give Turkey the powerful authorization over major pipelines in the future. As a result, Turkey as an energy hub will be able to control the flow of energy supplies from Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iraq. Today, Iran wants to provide its flexible LNG export. Therefore, in order to attain the goal, Iran tends to boost cooperation with China. In fact, China possesses novel energy infrastructure and technologies that will be able to help Iran to build LNG terminals.

However, it is undeniable fact that the emergence of terrorist organizations, (Islamic State, ISIS or ISIL, PKK), extremist movements, sectarian tensions, and the Kurdish problem put the major pipelines in jeopardy along with the Middle East region and Turkey. These arduous situations can be the favor of Iran because the construction of all major projects and an emergence of Turkey as energy commander will take a long time. The animosity and tensions in the Middle East region give the chance for the extremist and terrorist groups to take the major pipelines under their control as a source of revenue. (See annex No.5)

All in all, in any cases, the collaboration is much more beneficial than the competition. Collaboration stands on the “win-win” proposition and is inclined to the mutual perceptions of the parties. However, the competition mainly focuses on the success of only one party and does not give a chance to another one. Therefore, the relationship between Turkey and Iran should have to be characterized from the prism of the collaboration rather than competition, because both of them have a huge potential in order to participate in and get “win-win” position in the energy game.

Conclusions

The deep analysis of research revealed the following consequences:

1. As a result of the analysis, it was perceived that energy security forms a unity within the circle of national security and foreign policy. In today’s globalized world, the growing demands for energy, interests of nation states regarding alternative energy resources, in particular, the export of energy products at affordable prices to the international energy market create a competitive environment among states. Thus, it is undeniable fact that energy closely relates with the national power of states. The broad access to well-off energy resources, the secure transportation and rational utilization of them mainly depend on the relations between or within states. Therefore, energy as a guarantor of national security is important for states’ survival and well-being. However, it is clear that the acts of states sometimes evoke some problems and obstacles in global level, for example, the over- exploitation of energy resources causes the huge environmental problems, and today the climate change issue as a result of irrational overutilization of energy products should force all states to take active and accommodative actions in order to solve this problem at international level.

2. The research showed that like other major states, both Turkey and Iran have their own goals and geostrategic interests in the energy spectrum. According to Turkey, the pivotal goal stands on the diversification of energy supplies in conjunction with source countries. At the same time, it strives to gain an authoritative power over major grand energy projects in the energy-based regions; the Caspian Basin and the Gulf region. For today, the South Caucasus gives a huge chance to Turkey to be a future energy hub in the region. The implementation of future grand energy projects is able to open a successful way with which Turkey as a key transit country will be able to import energy products at affordable prices. However, in the Gulf region, basically the Middle East, the emergence of extremist movements, the Kurdish problems, the risk of İSİS and PKK, ongoing severe Syrian crisis and other problems challenge the situation in the region that engender barriers in the face of Turkey.

3. It is obvious that similar to Turkey, Iran has also geo-energetic and political interests in the energy game in the following countries. Amid the period of sanctions, the West put many restrictions on Iran. Therefore, Iran was not able to export its products to the international energy market. Upon the lifting economic sanction, Iran strives to gain more access to foreign markets in order export its energy products adequately. At the same time, Iran offers reasonable prices for its products in order to gain access to European markets. Although Iran holds affluent energy deposits, it has a limited number of consumers importing its products and Iran would have never wanted to be isolated from the economic and political processes taking place in the Caspian Basin and the Gulf region. On behalf of a regional partnership, it tries to strengthen the energy-based cooperation with other countries including China, India, Brazil, and mainly, Russia.

4. The development of the relationship between Turkey and Iran chiefly related with energy. Today, Iran has adequate energy assets in order to export them to international energy markets. Turkey is a stable and reliable consumer of Iran’s energy products because of its scarce oil and gas deposits. Iran well realizes that Turkey would be a reliable provider for the transportation of its energy products to the European market. Therefore, Iran strives to be one of the main parts of Southern Gas Corridor in the South Caucasus region, in which Turkey as a pivotal trade bridge provides the secure shipment of Iran’s gas products directly to Europe. Iran’s such an approach toward Turkey gives both of them to benefit from the economic processes in the region that create “win-win” position between them. However, the situation in the Gulf region is not as the same as the Caspian region. The movements of radical Islamists, hostility, fear of proxy war regarding Syrian Civil War, force both Turkey and Iran to take another stance regarding the problems in the region.

5. The research emphasized that the relationship between Turkey and Iran can be characterized from the prism of both collaboration and competition. Both of them have varied goals and interests in the energy game and strive to keep their influences in the following regions. Turkey as a stable consumer of Iran’s products is a reliable partner, but when it comes to competitive relations, Iran sees Turkey as an important rival in the region. Since last decades, these have been many difficulties in the relations between them regarding the disagreement over prices, sanctions, and the various stances on Syrian Civil War. At the same time, today Iran can not digest the growing role of Turkey in the following regions. The main reason is that the future application of energy pipelines will give Turkey empowerment and bargaining chip against Iran. Therefore, Iran on the one side does not want to see as a winner in the energy game, on the other side, it does not have in mind to lose its trade partner in the energy field. However, it is difficult for Iran to take radical actions against Turkey and tries to set up accommodative approach toward Turkey. Hence, both of them realize that going into mutual bargaining is much more beneficial rather than competition.

Ms. Nargiz Hajiyeva is an independent researcher from Azerbaijan. She is an honored graduate student of Vytautas Magnus University and Institute D'etudes de Politique de Grenoble, Sciences PO. She got a Bachelor degree with the distinction diploma at Baku State University from International Relations and Diplomacy programme. Her main research fields concern on international security and foreign policy issues, energy security, cultural and political history, global political economy and international public law. She worked as an independent researcher at Corvinus University of Budapest, Cold War History Research Center. She is a successful participator of International Student Essay Contest, Stimson Institute, titled “how to prevent the proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons”, held by Harvard University, Harvard Kennedy School and an honored alumnus of European Academy of Diplomacy in Warsaw Poland. Between 2014 and 2015, she worked as a Chief Adviser and First Responsible Chairman in International and Legal Affairs at the Executive Power of Ganja. At that time, she was defined to the position of Chief Economist at the Heydar Aliyev Center. In 2017, Ms. Hajiyeva has worked as an independent diplomatic researcher at International Relations Institute of Prague under the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Czech Republic. Currently, she is pursuing her doctoral studies in Political Sciences and International Relations programme in Istanbul, Turkey.

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All aboard, Iraq plans to steam into a new future

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Few countries in the Middle East have suffered more from conflict and worked harder for its end than Iraq.

Ravaged by war with Iran, the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, the US-led invasion of 2003 and then the grim experience of Daesh, the Iraqi nation knows the true meaning of suffering and resilience.

Earlier this year the anniversary of the Iraq war and the toppling of Saddam triggered a spurt of media coverage.

For the most part, the tone was of admiration for the Iraqi people’s capacity for endurance, speckled with pity and regret. That, and continuing concern about Iranian influence in Iraq’s national politics.

Successive governments in Baghdad have resisted pressures to confront their powerful neighbour and former foe and instead have sought to play a role of reconciliation with the Arab world. 

This has been Iraq’s policy for years and, while the credit for peace-making is shared with others, the fruits of that policy are now becoming visible.

For its part, Iraq has long planned the renewal of national infrastructure it clearly needs to reinvigorate its economy.

This ambition for Iraq to take its proper place in the economic networks of the region has been given fresh impetus by a new government led by Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia Al Sudani, who took office last autumn.

If it survives legal appeal, the recent judgement on oil exports from the Kurdish Autonomous Region being subject to national control should strengthen Iraq as a unitary state.

But Al Sudani’s most ambitious move is to promote the “Development Road” – a long-planned road and rail artery pumping new life into the economy. It would span the length of the country, from Rabia, on the northern border with Turkey, to the new commercial port of Al-Faw, on the Gulf, in the south.

With transport and logistics increasingly recognised as a key sector in the global economy, al-Sudani wants to make Iraq a transportation hub for goods and people linking the Gulf, Turkey and Europe. 

There is an echo here of China’s “Belt and Road” initiative, which aims to see 130 countries across Asia, Europe and Africa connected to China through new land and sea infrastructure. 

The 750-mile Development Road also evokes memories of the original Berlin-Baghdad railway, which started construction in 1903 and was only finished in 1940. The basis of that German imperial project was the Kaiser’s desire to connect directly with the Ottoman world, and beyond it Iran, with a line running through Turkey, Syria and Iraq.

At the outbreak of WW1 the railway was still 600 miles short of Baghdad, but had completed the branch running through Damascus to the Hejaz, serving the pilgrimage route to Medina.  By then imperial rivalries had embroiled the project, and the last stretch was only completed in the 1930s by an independent Iraq.

An updated concept of the original plan is now being pitched to investors.  Attending the recent launch of al-Sudani’s Development Road in Baghdad were the regional states which could most benefit from the new infrastructure – Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran and Turkey. 

It is too soon to expect pledges of co-investment in the project, which has a headline cost of $17bn. Though Qatar has indicated its potential support and is already a major investor in infrastructure in Turkey,

Planners and policy-makers will be thinking hard about the proposal. Economists will be examining the commercial case for a land route which seeks to avoid the shipping route through the Suez Canal. For shipments at scale, sea transport to and from the well-established facilities in northern Europe, or on to India and further East, will remain unbeatable on cost. 

Some reassurance has come from the World Bank which has spoken in support of the project and World Bank involvement in funding (and thus supervision) will also bring comfort to investors.

While Syria probably offers a less expensive route to a Mediterranean port, Iraq rightly sees Turkey as an important economic partner, with complementary strengths and opportunities for collaboration.

Relations have been bedevilled for years by Turkish encroachment on Iraqi sovereign territory in pursuit of its fight against Kurdish separatists – a problem Baghdad has been working patiently to resolve. 

But the creation of economic and communications infrastructure for the benefit of shared prosperity is a courageous and necessary step for both countries to take. 

Yes, there will be security concerns. Nothing can be taken for granted.  But the long game has to be played, and the prize is immeasurable for a country that has suffered so much.

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The role of Egypt in the Xi Jinping initiative of “democratization of international relations”

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Egypt and China play an effective role in enhancing cooperation on maintaining international peace and security, especially in the Middle East. Here, the Egyptian side adheres to the one-China policy, firmly supports China’s efforts to maintain its sovereignty, security and stability, and firmly supports China’s work to combat terrorism and religious extremism. The indicators show the growth of mutual international interests and the rise of China’s global role, which consolidates the system of multipolarity globally, with the increase in the extent of Chinese interdependence in international interests. These are developments that push for the strengthening and consolidation of cultural, political and economic ties between the Chinese and Egyptian sides in the medium and long term, especially with  China proposed and implemented the “Belt and Road” initiative, and Egypt inaugurated a political system with development orientations internally, and adopted a “Look East” policy at the external level, which contributes to establishing future Egyptian-Chinese relations that go beyond traditional political, economic, and commercial frameworks, and establishes a more comprehensive and expanding partnership.

  China encourages the implementation of global development initiatives, global security initiatives, and global civilization initiatives, enhances coordination and positive interaction between major countries, works to develop relations with neighboring countries, develop solidarity and cooperation with developing countries, maintain multilateralism, and participate in reforming and establishing global governance systems.  These are the same concepts and foundations on which President “El-Sisi” agrees with his Chinese counterpart “Xi Jinping” in all international forums. President “El-Sisi” launched of the “Decent Life project” to care for the poorest and most needy villages, as well as care for the poor citizen, comes as a launch of Egypt’s efforts to implementing international development initiatives, which comes in the same context as the Global Development Initiative of Chinese President “Xi Jinping”. Therefore, China, as a rising country, is trying to achieve many development goals, by proposing the Belt and Road Initiative and the long-term goals it contains that have repercussions on bringing about a shift in the structure of the international system from a unipolar system to a multipolar system or to reaching a state of non-polarity in the international system by following a number of political, economic, propaganda, and strategic mechanisms to achieve multi-polar competitiveness, which ultimately reaches and serves Chinese President Xi Jinping’s idea of ​​achieving global development.

  In this context, Egypt is trying to take advantage of all the opportunities and gains that China can achieve as a rising power in the international arena in the current century, through its introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative, and its many development and service projects in the axis of the Egyptian Suez Canal and the New Administrative Capital. In all his speeches, President “El-Sisi” emphasizes the concept of the new republic in Egypt, which is the same as what China refers to as the “new era”, which mostly refers to the multipolar world in which China, Egypt, and all African and developing countries are working together to establish it, as an alternative to the polar world.  the one.

 We find joint Chinese-Egyptian support for international efforts made to confront climate change, and support for initiatives aimed at promoting sustainable green development, including the (Egyptian Initiative for a Green Middle East) and China’s initiative on the (Green Silk Road), with their emphasis on the need for the Middle East region to be free of…  Weapons of mass destruction, strengthening efforts to combat terrorism, condemning terrorism in its various forms and motives, and drying up its sources.  The Chinese side is working with its Egyptian counterpart to adhere to the concept of a (community with a shared future for humanity), strengthen strategic partnership relations, and deepen cooperation in various fields between the two parties.

  The two presidents (El-Sisi and Xi Jinping) agree to reform the current world order and push strongly towards providing pluralism in the new world order, based on the mechanism of the United Nations, preserving its periodic system, strengthening the multilateral global trade system and international poles, and pushing developing countries from marginalized regions to central command areas on the global governance stage.  For this reason, both China and Egypt are committed to the concept of (global development) that is characterized by justice, inclusiveness and cooperation in an open, fully coordinated and innovative manner, to promote coordinated and sustainable economic, social and environmental development and the comprehensive development of humanity. Therefore, Egypt’s efforts to participate with the Chinese side in the “Third China-Africa Peace and Security Forum”, which was held from August 28 to September 2, 2023, came to enhance communication between the defense ministries in China and Africa, as part of Beijing’s efforts to protect its commercial and investment achievements on the African continent, and Egypt. Of course, first and foremost, given the importance of Chinese projects in Cairo.

  Egypt’s official participation also took place in the Chinese capital, Beijing, on Sunday, July 9, 2023, to participate in (the first high-level conference of the International Action Forum for Common Development).  It is a conference in which high-level delegations from 27 countries participated, along with more than 20 United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations. The International Joint Development Conference in Beijing, with the participation of the Egyptian side, aimed to discuss strengthening joint action to implement the “Global Development Initiative” proposed by Chinese President “Xi Jinping” in 2021, with the aim of redirecting global development towards a new stage of balance and comprehensive coordination to confront global shocks. Promoting more equitable and balanced global development partnerships and achieving more multilateral cooperation to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

  Here we find coordination between the Chinese and Egyptian sides, regarding all international and regional issues, especially the Palestinian issue, by supporting international efforts aimed at reaching a permanent and just solution to the issue on the “basis of the two-state solution”, leading to an end to the Israeli occupation and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. On the 1967 borders, its capital is East Jerusalem.  Therefore, the Egyptian-Chinese insistence on the need to prevent a return to the Cold War mentality, and the common positions of the two presidents (El-Sisi and Xi Jinping) on ​​the need to abandon confrontation between the camps, that is, whether they are friends or enemies. Instead, China and Egypt agree on the need to advance international solidarity, advocate the concept of common, cooperative, comprehensive and sustainable security, while respecting and addressing the legitimate concerns of all parties, jointly rejecting the revival of the mentality of competing blocs and opposing attempts aimed at a new Cold War, with the aim of maintaining peace and the international stability.  

  Egyptian President “El-Sisi” also agrees with his Chinese counterpart “Xi Jinping” on the need for international cooperation and collective work to address global challenges, and that the only way to achieve sustainable development is a joint global effort, with access to a new global financial structure that guarantees equal opportunities and fair access to income.  Financing for developing countries. This is in light of strengthening efforts to implement the sustainable development goals in response to the (Global Development Initiative) proposed by Chinese President “Xi Jinping” in 2021.  Therefore, the joint vision of the leaders of the two countries, President “El-Sisi” and “Xi Jinping”, comes to agree on the importance of aligning global development strategies and development plans with the national priorities and needs of each country.  With President “El-Sisi” stressing in his foreign speeches the importance of working with the countries of the South, to emphasize the role of Chinese cooperation with developing and African countries, known as (South-South) cooperation to promote global development goals in parallel with the Chinese Comprehensive Development Initiative, and to promote economic recovery at the global level.  And creating development models based on already successful experiences in the countries of the South.             

On the other hand, Egypt affirms its permanent commitment to the one-China principle, its support for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory.  In addition to supporting the Chinese position regarding “Hong Kong” within the framework of the “one country, two systems” principle.  Taking into account Beijing’s efforts to spread international peace and development, through the two initiatives (Global Security and Global Development), which aim to encourage the international community to pay attention to development issues around the world, respect the rights of peoples to adopt their own approach to promoting democracy in a manner consistent with their national circumstances, and reject interference in  the Internal affairs of countries under the slogan of the (preserving democracy).

  Hence, we find that the (Global Development Initiative) proposed by China came at the right time, as it is a global development initiative centered around people by joining that initiative, Egypt can benefit from China’s successful experiences in coordinating and planning development, saving energy, reducing emissions, and ensuring  Food security, what drives the sustainable development plan in Egypt. The (Global Development Initiative) also aims to establish a new type of international relations based on (the rule of common interest and mutual benefit for countries and peoples), taking into account the objective circumstances of peoples, meeting their national priorities, and respecting their identity and culture, given that this global development initiative was proposed by Chinese President “Xi Jinping” comes and the world is in need more than ever of fruitful collective development and cooperation practices, in which efforts are combined and capabilities are integrated to address the problems facing countries, especially developing ones, which ultimately leads to achieving an advanced and appropriate form of “democratization of international relations”.

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Saudi-Israeli deal would be a gamechanger but not for the reasons discussed

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A Saudi-Israeli agreement to establish diplomatic relations involving enhanced US commitments to Gulf security could be a game-changer for great power rivalry in the Middle East.

To be sure, US President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu face formidable obstacles in paying the price tag Saudi Arabia puts on the normalisation of relations with Israel.

In return for relations, Saudi Arabia has demanded legally binding security commitments from the United States, support for its nuclear programme, and unfettered access to sophisticated weaponry – conditions that would be challenged in Congress.

The kingdom has also linked diplomatic relations to ambiguously defined progress in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – a demand Mr. Netanyahu will have difficulty meeting with his current coalition government, the most ultra-nationalist and ultra-conservative in his country’s history.

Speaking to Fox News, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman described the Palestinian issue as “very important” and one that “we need to solve.”

Mr. Bin Salman shied away from spelling out what a solution would entail beyond saying he hoped it “will ease the life of the Palestinians.”

Within days of the interview, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan told the United Nations General Assembly and a webinar normalising relations with Israel would require a plan to establish an independent Palestinian state.

On the first visit to the West Bank by a senior Saudi official since the creation of the Palestine Authority in 1994, Ambassador Nayef al-Sudairi, the kingdom’s first envoy to the Palestinian entity, said Saudi Arabia was “working towards establishing a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.”

Palestinian officials told their Saudi counterparts that as part of the kingdom’s agreement to recognise the Jewish state, Israel would have to stop building new settlements, expand Palestinian control over security and construction in the West Bank, accept full Palestinian membership of the United Nations, and consent to the opening of a Palestine Liberation Organisation office in Washington and a US consulate in East Jerusalem.

Nevertheless, senior Israeli officials asserted that Saudi Arabia was merely paying lip service to the Palestinian issue in talks about Israel.

A senior Palestinian official conceded “that what is being discussed includes elements that are less than statehood. We’re talking about a pathway to getting there.”

The obstacles haven’t prevented Messrs. Bin Salman and Netanyahu from raising heightened expectations recently by suggesting significant progress in agreeing on the terms of a US-Saudi-Israeli deal.

Speaking to Fox News, Mr. Bin Salman said his country and Israel were getting “closer” daily to establish formal relations. Mr. Netanyahu was equally ebullient at the UN General Assembly.

Largely overlooked in public discussions about a possible Saudi-Israeli normalisation of relations is the fact that the Saudi demands signal that the kingdom, like the United Arab Emirates, which is requesting an “ironclad” security arrangement with the United States, prefers the US rather than China to be its security partner for the foreseeable future.

“Isn’t it interesting? When you look at MbS’ asks from us, they start with he wants a defense treaty with us… What that tells you is that at the end of the day, they don’t think there is anybody else they can rely upon if they really stranded,” said Dennis Ross, a former US Middle East peace negotiator. Mr. Ross was referring to Mr. Bin Salman by his initials.

Former US National Security Council official Kirsten Fontenrose argued that Mr. Bin Salman had created a situation where he could forcefully argue for a binding security arrangement even if efforts to forge a deal with Israel failed.

“MbS looks at this and says, ‘Right now, it looks like the sticking point is Israeli politics. So, even if I don’t get this, I look like the good guy’,” Ms. Fontenrose said.

I expect there will be pressure from the Saudis moving forward, even if we don’t get normalisation, to follow through… (saying), ‘Well, we have arrived so closely on some of these ideas on a US security pact, we’ve done so much work on civilian nuclear cooperation, why don’t we just continue this?” Ms. Fontenrose added.

Even so, it is hard to believe that Saudi Arabia and the UAE think they can retain the freedom to hedge their bets and expand relations with China, as well as Russia, particularly regarding the Ukraine war and Western sanctions, in ways that the United States would see as threatening its national security and undermining its policies.

While the United States would likely not disrupt the Gulf states’ economic and trade ties with China, the Gulf’s largest trading partner, it would limit Saudi and UAE cooperation with China on geopolitical issues, nuclear development, technology collaboration, and arms acquisition.

“The administration is asking for some things from the Saudis. They want them to continue to peg oil to the dollar, there was some talk that they may allow the Chinese to buy oil with the Chinese currency… What is being asked here is not to stop their commercial relationship but to create boundaries in some of the high-tech areas… It’s a two-way street,” Mr. Ross, the former US negotiator, said.

The kingdom “cannot have it both ways. If it wants that kind of commitment from the United States, it has to line up with the United States… If our security relationship with Saudi Arabia is to be deepened because the Saudis want it, then there are certain obligations that come with that,” said former US diplomat and prominent analyst Martin Indyk.

Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia and the UAE will test how far they can push the envelope if they come to a security understanding with the United States.

Ultimately, however, they are likely also to find that a security arrangement would, at least in the Middle East, shift the geopolitical US-China power balance in the United States’ favour.

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