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What to do about the Euro

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[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] A [/yt_dropcap]fter the North American subprime crisis, European countries suffered two simultaneous shocks: the customers of those “toxic” assets – mainly European assets – discovered that most of their assets were completely presumed, while the US economic crisis made the substantial EU exports to that market decrease significantly.

As usual, recession leads to an increase in public deficit, because tax revenue decreases while, in time of crisis, public expenditure for subsidies and welfare cannot but increase.

Hence the global recession of 2007, caused by the United States, led to the first real crisis of the Euro.

When adjustments of exchange rates are no longer possible, in the Eurozone the mitigation of imbalances is entrusted to the EU structural funds for low-income regions – funds scarcely suitable for specific needs and too complex to be used by local governments.

Hence the Euro was born as an intrinsically deflationary currency and the only nation winning the single currency battle was Germany which, shortly before the start of the European single currency phase, had depressed wages severely and had created the well-known “mini-jobs”.

With an inflation rate and a labor cost already lower than those of the other future Euro members, it immediately created an optimal and stable differential as against the ”South’s Euro”.

Currently the Euro conceals, but not solves this asymmetry.

Hence very low inflation in Germany and a related very low interest rate, which have further increased German competitiveness compared to the South’s Euro area.

Therefore the EU Member States which had not prepared themselves for the single currency recorded inflation rates much higher than the German ones but, thanks to the single currency, recorded lower interest rates, thus financing the cost of crisis with debt.

The Euro was a good currency for incurring debt, but a bad currency for exporting.

Furthermore, this was the reason why the public debt increased also in Italy but, unlike the lira time, the Italian debt securities were held in the Eurozone surplus countries and not by the Italian customers of public debt securities.

At that juncture, the crisis broke out in Greece which, with the then Prime Minister Papandreou, had overtly and naively “cooked the books”.

Instead of funding Greece immediately at a low cost, so that it could overcome the crisis, and then allowing it to redress its accounts, the Sarkozy-Merkel axis imposed very harsh “austerity measures” on Greece which had to pay very high rates on the market. Hence, for international markets, the Greek default became a very concrete possibility.

If Strauss-Kahn had not been unfairly defamed by a special relationship between Sarkozy and Obama – who was afraid of a brave EU showing guts – the low-interest loan to Greece would have been a reality and there would not have been the first “Euro-branded” default. A default which paves the way for others.

It will be the project in progress for other “weak” economies, the rush towards bankruptcy and default.

International markets have got so accustomed to gain money quickly and easily from a national default of the Eurozone that they are rubbing their hands in view of the next country falling into that spiral.

Hence the Euro is a currency which amplifies internal crises between high rates and rising national deficits. It also signals to financial markets that there exists a great chance of short-term high profits – almost usurious ones, if usury were not a criminal offense also on international financial markets.

Hence while the Euro, as conceived today, is a sign of the end for the weakest countries of the single currency area, it is not true that over-spending by the countries already weakened by the Euro has worsened the crisis, as the current economic theories make us believe.

Data shows that, after 2007, the countries called PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) had a debt/GDP ratio fully comparable with the one preceding the Euro introduction. Hence we do not accept explanations on “immoral” countries which “spend beyond their means.”

The crisis broke out and expanded because a currency created for the monetarily strongest countries, with remarkable trade surpluses, was not suitable for nations having different productive configurations and very little surpluses.

Therefore the crisis of the single currency and its economies does not result from the “non-restrictive” and profligate policies of some PIIGS governments.

A that juncture, the quite unusual idea emerged among European bureaucracies that deficit spending of the public sector – the only known driver to stimulate the economies under crisis – had the immediate effect of increasing taxes, thus leading to an increase in savings and a reduction in consumption.

This is the expansionary austerity school of thought, which is currently the best known one in contemporary economic analysis.

It is generally based on subjective (and psychologically questionable) assessments which are transposed into the macroeconomic environment, where everything is very different from the people’s spending or saving attitudes.

You cannot infer the behavior of an entire organism from one single cell, as it is well-known that all organisms are not simply clusters of similar cells.

Again according to the expansionary austerity school of thought, it is believed that deficit reduction will be interpreted by taxpayers as a reduction in taxes to pay.

It is a shaman-style reasoning – however, without avoiding media influencing citizens or without thinking they save or not for reasons other than the irrational bet on the reduction in State deficit, which anyway depends on a political choice.

Hence as long as the governments’ interest rates to refinance their debt are set by unspecified “markets,” which are interested in increasing interest rates to enhance their gains, there is no way out.

So, what can be done? If the Euro countries were funded directly by the ECB, at rates similar to those used by the private banking system, financial resources equal to 5% of GDP would be released.

Even a uniform tax system among the Euro countries would be essential for this purpose.

However, neither the first nor the second option is possible in the current Euro regulatory framework. Hence what can be done?

This is the reason why the exit of some countries from the Eurozone and their return to national currencies must be considered without making an issue of it and overdramatizing.

By calculating the loss of competitiveness of a post-Euro lira or peseta, we record a comparative loss of approximately 14% – hence nothing very severe.

Provided, however, that the Bank of Italy has well-designed plans already available for the possible exit from the Euro – something in which we do not believe at all.

Unfortunately Guido Carli passed away.

Hence, it is worth reiterating that Euro crisis was generated by excessive private and public debt held by non-European hands.

Therefore, as from 2010, all the countries hit by the Euro crisis had accumulated current account deficits while, coincidentally,   those which had current account surpluses did not record financial crises.

In fact, the crisis materialized with a sudden stop of capital flows between the Eurozone countries.

A stop which took the form of a generalized increase in risk premiums.

The end of flows immediately raised doubts on the solvency of banks and governments which depended on foreign loans from abroad, for example those who were accumulating current account deficits.

Inevitably the crisis also increased the debt/GDP ratio.

The monetary union enabled global imbalances to expand rapidly without anyone noticing it, because the Euro “conceals” the differences between the countries using it.

Hence, also as a result of the inefficient European bureaucracy, the loss of trust vis-à-vis the countries recording deficits increased.

Hence, without a “lender of last resort”, each monetary shock tends to be amplified and the Euro is precisely a currency without a lender of last resort.

A currency in which no international investor believes, unless it represents the individual economies and the single public debt of the Eurozone countries.

Therefore the crisis is bound to get worse, considering that the increase in risk premiums and interest rates produces a budget deficit which, in turn, increases the risk premium and interest rates.

It is worth adding that the countries’ typical and natural response to this situation would be devaluation which, obviously, is not possible with the Euro.

Has a currency which cannot be devalued ever existed?

It is still the “Napoleonic myth” of the single currency for the whole Europe which, however, the French Emperor supported with bayonets, just as the US dollar is currently backed with the North American Armed Forces’ global rayonnement.

Therefore, the debt denominated in Euros is increasingly similar to a foreign currency debt, as in those sudden stop crises which often occurred in Third World countries.

Hence the link between banks and governments in the Eurozone has amplified the crisis.

The cost of financing the deficit increased and this made the deficit rise.

Only Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” at the end of July 2012 made the Euro a “safe haven currency”, because he made it clear that the “lender of last resort” existed and was the ECB Governor. In the meantime, however, the other major international currencies had been depreciated by 30%.

Furthermore, the proposals to solve the single currency crisis are often paradoxical.

They range from Joseph Stiglitz, who wants Germany to leave the Euro so as to enable the old remaining single currency to devalue.

With the same current rules? It is impossible.

Hence shall we wait for a courtesy by Germany, which would have no interest in leaving the single currency, which deprives it of European competition?

Naivety of the New World. Germany will never leave the Euro, which enables it to bring dangerous competitors for exports into line (such as Italy).

While President Ciampi – an extraordinary man who has recently passed away and whom I still regret – was visiting the Great Wall, the German Prime Minister, Schroeder, arrived in China to sign the agreements for the expansion of the German car-making industry in China.

Better and more autonomous intelligence would be needed to defend ourselves from competitors-allies.

According to Paolo Savona and Luigi Zingales, two Euros should be created, one for the “rich” North and the other for us poor countries of the South.

Furthermore, sometimes Zingales speaks of various Euros. Would they all have the same value?

Possibly becoming quasi-national currencies? Nevertheless also the countries in the South have significant budget and debt differences, as well as different production logics.

Certainly better than before, with the Euro, but not much better.

Conversely Basevi thinks of a European Debt Agency (EDA) purchasing – on the secondary market (where raiders have already made good profit) – up to 60% of debt in relation to each EU country’s GDP.

On the basis of these securities, it issues its own bonds, the blue bonds, while for the part exceeding their debt over the 60% acquired by EDA, the countries issue their red bonds autonomously.

The blue bonds would be “liquid” and safe (Why? Where is the EDA underlying fund?), while the red bonds would have a higher risk profile and thus would pay a higher interest rate.

However, the global market of financial securities is not made up of fools.

And it is not clear from where the premium for the blue bonds would come.

And where the red bonds would be sold, with such an interest as to rapidly recreate the old huge public debt.

Hence if we leave the Euro and a new lira is recreated, devaluation would be approximately 27% as against the European currency.

The price of raw materials could rise by the same rate, but we should consider the length of contracts and the specific role played by ENI for oil and energy.

Bank deposits could still be denominated in euros – the law permits to have bank deposits in foreign currencies – and the new lira could have legal tender as the old currency designed by Silvio Gesell which the more stood “still”, the greater value lost.

The drive towards exports would be important, but there would be enough euros available to buy technologies or other items abroad.

In short, we need to think rationally to an upcoming withdrawal from the Euro, without pro-European myths and with an accurate analysis of our national interest in the short and medium term.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Can The Lessons of 2008 Spare Emerging Europe’s Financial Sector From The COVID-19 Cliff?

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The more we know about the past, the better we can prepare for the future. The 2008 financial crisis provides important lessons for policymakers planning the COVID-19 recovery in 2021.

Over 10 years ago, the world stumbled into a financial crisis that changed the very fabric of our societies.

A cocktail of lax financial regulation and casual attitudes toward debt and leverage led to a global fallout that few countries in the world escaped. Despite a decade of recovery, the scars of that era are still very visible. This was particularly true for many parts of Europe. And as is often the case in major disasters, both natural and man-made, the most vulnerable were hardest hit.

Striking parallels

Today, as countries grapple with the economic impacts of Covid-19, policymakers in emerging Europe must strive to remember the hard-learned lessons from 2008. In financial terms, the parallels between now and then are striking.

Back then, countries in Central and Southeastern Europe were among the worst hit. In the run-up to the crisis, big euro area banks bought up local subsidiaries. Backed by these parent banks, credit started expanding rapidly from a very low base. The credit boom was accompanied by climbing real estate prices and mounting personal and corporate debt. Aspirations to replicate the living standards of the EU’s wealthiest member states led to citizens and businesses shouldering more than they could handle.

Suddenly, the global crisis stopped capital flows in the region and turned the boom to bust. Credit growth went into reverse, real estate prices nosedived, economic growth stalled, and non-performing loans (NPLs) spiraled up. Over the next decade, much of the region would be caught between weak economic growth and lackluster financial sector performance.

Familiar feedback loop

Covid-19 is a strong contender for the worst economic shock in our lifetimes. In its aftermath, a familiar feedback loop is on the horizon: high leverage and depressed growth will amplify financial sector vulnerabilities in the months ahead.

True, banks in emerging Europe entered Covid-19 with stronger liquidity and capital buffers than before the global financial crisis, but they are far from immune. The longer the pandemic lasts, the more businesses and consumers are likely to struggle. Next come the debt defaults. Before the domino-chain of NPLs gains momentum and countries spiral into widespread financial crisis, policymakers must act. This means taking four overarching measures.

First, rising NPLs require a proactive and coordinated policy response. If banks resist writing down bad loans and continue to lend to zombie firms, the resulting credit crunch becomes longer and more severe. Policymakers were slow off the mark in 2008. Once they realised a coordinated response was needed, much of the damage was already done. In NPL resolution, the mere passage of time makes a bad situation worse, and policymakers and bankers need to respond early on to prevent the problem from spinning out of control.

Second, supervisors should engage with highly exposed banks and ensure that they fully provision for credit losses. An important lesson of the global financial crisis is that building bank’s capital is a requirement for resilient recovery. In this pandemic, banks have been asked to play an unprecedented role in absorbing the shock by supplying vital credit to the corporate and household sector. Policymakers should resist pressure to dilute existing rules. Soft-touch supervision doesn’t address the underlying issues and only kicks problems down the road. To credibly stick to the rules, regulators can conduct stress tests to identify undercapitalised banks.

Resolve, fairness, and transparency

Third, a timely and orderly exit strategy from debt relief and repayment moratoriums should be prioritised. Countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe promptly introduced these plans when Covid-19 struck and to good effect. But prolonging such schemes comes with a hidden cost. It can weaken borrower repayment discipline, and give firms, that were already struggling before the pandemic, a fresh lease on life.

The question of when and how to phase out the measures does not have a simple answer. Nevertheless, the general principle should be to unwind them as soon as conditions permit. This could be done by gradually narrowing down the range of borrowers eligible for support so that only the viable enterprises are supported.

Fourth, distressed but potentially viable firms will need loan restructuring. To restore the commercial viability of ailing companies entails restructuring of their liabilities, matching payment schedules with expected income flows. Loan restructuring of non-viable borrowers, by contrast, will only lead to delaying inevitable losses.

There will be uncertainty about who can and cannot survive. An assessment will be needed to separate the lost cases and viable ones and everything in between. This will help release capital from underperforming sectors and propel more dynamic firms to drive renewed economic momentum.

We live in difficult times that require resolve, fairness, and transparency in policymaking. But these qualities are not easy to live up to in times of great uncertainty, heightened anxiety, and lack of access to relevant information. Fortunately, we can look to the past to glean lessons for the future. Now, it’s time we put them into practice.

Originally posted at Emerging Europe via World Bank

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The strategic thinking behind the EU-China investment deal

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Washington was understandably perplexed that a China-EU investment agreement was concluded a few weeks before the Biden administration, especially a  president who has been advocating for multilateralism and the restoration of trust and an alliance with the EU.

Some analysts argue the agreement is a big win for China by breaching the transatlantic partnership, while some scholars contend that Beijing has made historical concessions to Brussels, indicating the future lucrativeness of European business in China. Both are valid to some extent, but the strategic thinking of Beijing and Brussels behind the pact may have been overlooked.

Beijing’s strategic thinking

The EU has always been the favoured target for Beijing. Despite numerous rebrandings, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the admittedly core economic, infrastructure and diplomatic policy proposed by President Xi in 2013, was initially intended to connect with the EU, facilitating Eurasian economic integration. According to Hellenic Institute of Transport, there was no regular direct freight service between China and Europe in 2008, whereas in 2019, 59 Chinese cities and 49 European cities in 15 countries have been linked by the BRI.

Also, although the EU is situated within Western democratic thought, the views of EU members regarding China are diverse and relatively different from the US and other English-speaking countries. Germany and France, the key pillars of the EU, still allow the usage of Huawei, whereas the US, Australia, Canada and the UK have variably banned it. Italy is the only one to endorse the BRI in the G7, a group of major Western democracies. The summit of China and Central and Eastern European Countries, known as “17+1”, has been held since 2012, gaining certain support from some EU members, in spite of Brussels’ aversion.

Probably, in the Chinese diplomats’ perceptions, the post-Brexit EU may become much more approachable and pragmatic to China, a mysterious rising land from the East, in that European continent nations with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds have been living together for millennial generations, leading to a more diverse and pragmatic approach to Beijing.

As for compromises Beijing has made, some of them, such as various reforms of state-owned-enterprises, would have been the essential component of the Chinese economic agenda, but the intriguing point is the timing and astonishing scope of concessions. After seven years of drawn-out negotiation, Beijing suddenly started pushing this pact at the beginning of 2020, when the Covid-19 broke out globally, and the Sino-American trade war further exacerbated, leading to China’s reputation plummeting in the West.

Through Sino-American relations, I doubt that Beijing may have noticed, as Professor Susan Shirk, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State during the Clinton administration, pointed out, that even the American business community, benefitting enormously from the Chinese market, has not really “stepped forward to defend US-China relations, much less defend China”, which is rare in bilateral history.

Recently, President Xi Jinping even wrote a letter to encourage Starbucks’ former chairman Howard Schultz to repair Sino-American relations. Having observed this, Beijing thus decided to show a high level of sincerity and openness to European business elites, not only by economic reforms but also by promising to work on labour rights. The latter may not be a priority in Beijing, but Beijing conspicuously notes the ideological concerns of EU politicians in order to win the hearts and minds of Brussels.

Brussels’ strategic thinking

As for the EU, China has unquestionably been an attractive market. Calculated by purchasing power, China’s GDP has been de facto the largest economy for years. As the only positive-growth nation in 2020 among G20 members, China has the largest middle class, signifying potent consuming ability. Recent Chinese economic reforms primarily aim to promote consumption, which is the icing on the Chinese market’s cake, and this is also embedded in European views of China and the US.

The Pew Research Center has shown that more countries in Europe viewed China rather than the US as the world’s leading economy in 2019 and 2020. Also, more residents in Germany and France regarded US power and influence as threatening than China in 2018. Even with the new Biden administration, EU leaders anticipate a renewed trans-atlantic partnership but do not expect a sudden revolution of EU-American trade war, as bilateral trade disputes are structural and beyond Trump’s presidency.

More realistically, what is one of the major external concerns EU members face today? Back in the Cold War, the western expansion of the Soviet Union deeply disturbed European security, necessitating their consistent alliance with the US.

However, as Jonathan E. Hillman, a senior fellow at Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote: “Russia has nuclear weapons but also a one-trick economy focused on energy exports, a rusting military, and a declining population.” In particular, Russia has been increasingly challenged to maintain traditional influence in Ukraine, Belarus and Central Asia, not to mention any comprehensive aggression to EU.

Furthermore, geographically, China is distant, and the EU does not have fundamental military interests in South China Sea but rather seeks to maintain peace and freedom of navigation for their shipping and trade, notwithstanding Brussels’ political friction with Beijing. But the large-scale uncontrolled migration from Africa and the Middle East may well be the EU’s main worry. However, regardless of some Western media ostensibly branding China as a neocolonialist in Africa, China has essentially supported the African economy via the BRI investment, creating local employment and purportedly discouraging the flow of a certain amount of immigrants to Europe. So, realistically, by signing the pact, the EU may keep the door open to cooperate with China in Africa.

On the flip side, if the EU sides with the US to the exclusion of China, what will happen to the EU? Certainly, Brussels will be praised by Washington politically, while the business sphere may be a different story. The recent Sino-Australian trade disputes indicate that “in the world of international commerce, democratic and strategic friends are often the fiercest rivals”, argued Professor James Laurenceson from the University of Technology Sydney, as Chinese tariffs against Australian goods have brought opportunities to businesses in America and New Zealand. So, US corporations in China must be delighted to see business space left by the EU companies because of possible EU-China trade skirmishes.

Sensibly, the EU is adopting an independent foreign policy to maintain autonomy between China and the US. More notably, as a third party during the Sino-American power competition, having signed a deal with Beijing, Brussels may possibly request Washington to offer more, thus maximizing its geopolitical and commercial interests.

Conclusion

To conclude, both sides made pragmatic decisions to sign the pact. Professor John Mearsheimer, at the University of Chicago, argued a few years ago that liberal dreams are great delusion facing international realities. China has executed a realist foreign policy since Deng Xiaoping’s reform, and this time, the EU may have woken up, because this deal signifies that geopolitical calculation has overtaken ideological divergence.

Author’s note: First published in johnmenadue.com

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The Silk Road passes also by the sea

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On December 30, 2020, China and the European Union signed an agreement on mutual investment.

After seven years of negotiations, during a conference call between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Ursula Von Der Leyen, President of the European Commission, with French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and European Council President Charles Michel, the “Comprehensive Agreement on Investment” (CAI) was adopted.

This is a historic agreement that opens a new ‘Silk Road’ between Europe and the huge Chinese market, with particular regard to the manufacturing and services sectors.

In these fields, China undertakes to remove the rules that have so far strongly discriminated against European companies, by ensuring legal certainty for those who intend to produce in China, as well as aligning European and Chinese companies at regulatory level and encouraging the establishment of joint ventures and the signing of trade and production agreements.

The agreement also envisages guarantees that make it easier for European companies to fulfil all administrative procedures and obtain legal authorisations, thus removing the bureaucratic obstacles that have traditionally made it difficult for European companies to operate in China.

This is the first time in its history that China has opened up so widely to foreign companies and investment.

In order to attract them, China is committed to aligning itself with Europe in terms of labour costs and environmental protection, by progressively aligning its standards with the European ones in terms of fight against pollution and trade union rights.

With a view to making this commitment concrete and visible, China adheres to both the Paris Climate Agreement and the European Convention on Labour Organisation.

China’s adherence to the Paris Agreement on climate and on limiting CO2 emissions into the atmosphere is also the result of a commitment by China that is not only formal and propagandistic. In fact, one of the basic objectives of the last five-year plan – i.e. the 13th five-year plan for the 2016-2020 period – was to “replace unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable growth… also with innovative, coordinated and environmentally friendly measures…”.

In the five-year period covered by the 13th five-year plan, China reduced its CO2 emissions by 12% – a result not achieved over the same period by any other advanced industrial country, which shows that the policy of “going green”, so much vaunted by European institutions, has actually begun in China, to the point of making it realistic to achieve “zero emissions” of greenhouse gases by 2030, thanks to the decision to completely relinquish the use of fossil fuels in energy production.

President Xi Jinping has entrusted China’s policy of “turning green” to the Chinese government’s “rising star”, Lu Hao, i.e. the young Minister of Natural Resources aged 47, who has been chosen as the political decision-maker and operational driving force behind a major project to modernise the country.

Lu Hao has an impressive professional and political record: an economist by training, he was initially appointed First Secretary of the “Communist Youth League”, and later served as deputy mayor of Beijing from 2003 to 2008. Governor of the Hejlongjiang Province (where 37 million people live),he has been serving as Minister of Natural Resources since March 2018.

He is the youngest Minister in the Chinese government and the youngest member of the Party’s Central Committee.

While entrusting Lu Hao with his Ministerial tasks, President Xi Jinping stressed, “we want green waters and green mountains… we do not just want much GDP, but above all a strong and stable green GDP.”

A “green GDP” is also one of the objectives of the “Recovery Plan” drawn up by the European Union to help its Member States emerge from the economic crisis caused by the Covid 19 pandemic through measures and investment in the field of renewable energy.

“Going green” may represent the new centre of gravity of relations between Europe and China, according to the operational guidelines outlined in the “Comprehensive Agreement on Investment” signed on December 30 last.

China’s commitment to renewables is concrete and decisive: in 2020 solar energy production stood at five times the level of the United States while, thanks to Lu Hao’s activism, in 2019 China climbed up the U.N. ranking of nations proactively committed to controlling climate change, rising from the 41st to the 33rd place in world rankings.

On January 15, Minister Lu Hao published an article in the People’s Daily outlining his proposals for the upcoming 14th Five-Year Plan.

During the five-year period, China shall “promote and develop the harmonious coexistence between man and nature, through the all-round improvement of resource use efficiency…through a proper balance between protection and development”.

In Lu Hao’s strategy – approved by the entire Chinese government – this search for a balance between environmental protection and economic development can be found in the production of electricity from sea wave motion.

Generating electricity using wave motion can be a key asset in producing clean energy without any environmental impact.

Europe has been the first continent to develop marine energy production technologies, which have spread to the United States, Australia and, above all, China.

Currently 40% of world’s population lives within 100 kilometres of the sea, thus making marine energy easily accessible and transportable.

Using the mathematical model known as SWAN (Simulating Waves Nearshore), we can see that along the South Pacific coasts there are energy hotspots every five kilometres from the shore, at a depth of no more than 22 metres. In other words, thanks to currents, waves and tides, the Pacific has a stable surplus of energy that can be obtained from the sea motion.

Today, energy is mainly obtained from water using a device known as “Penguin”, which is about 30 metres long and, when placed in the sea at a maximum depth of 50 metres, produces energy without any negative impact on marine fauna and flora.

Another key technology is called ISWEC (Inertial Sea Waves Energy Converter). This is a device placed inside a 15-metre-long floating hull which, thanks to a system of gyroscopes and sensors, is able to produce 250 MWh of electricity per year. It occupies a marine area of just 150 square metres and hence it allows to reduce CO2 emissions by a total of 68 tonnes per year.

ISWEC is an Italian-made product, resulting from research by the Turin Polytechnic Institute and developed thanks to a synergy between ENI, CDP, Fincantieri and Terna.

Italy is at the forefront in the research and production of technology that can be used for converting wave motion into ‘green’ energy. This explains the attention with which Chinese Minister Lu Hao looks to our country as a source of renewable energy development in China, as well as the commitment that the young Minister, urged by President Xi Jinping, has made to promote an extremely important cooperation agreement in the field of renewable energy between the Rome-based International World Group (IWG) and the National Ocean Technology Centre (NOTC), a Chinese research and development centre that reports directly to the Ministry of Natural Resources in Beijing.

The cooperation agreement envisages, inter alia, the development of Euro-Chinese synergies in the research and development of essential technologies in the production of “clean” energy from sea water, as part of a broad Euro-Chinese cooperation strategy that can support not only the Chinese government’s concrete and verifiable efforts to seriously implement the strategic project to reduce greenhouse gases and pollution from fossil fuels, but also support Italy in the production of “green” energy according to the guidelines of the European Recovery Plan, which commits EU Member States to using its resources while giving priority to environmental protection.

The agreement between IWG and NOTC marks a significant step forward in scientific and productive cooperation between China and Europe and adds another mile in the construction of a new Silk Road, i.e. a sea mile.

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