In August 2016, amidst anti-government protest, President Robert Gabriel Mugabe made it inescapably clear that there will be no Arab Spring in Zimbabwe. The 92-year-old president has ruled Zimbabwe since its independence in 1980, a time when he was told he had “ the jewel of Africa” in his hands by Presidents Machel and Nyerere of Mozambique, and Tanzania, respectively.
Thirty-six years later, Zimbabwe now resembles an ordinary rock rather than the much-coveted jewel it once was. There is no denying it, for better or worse, Zimbabwe’s politico-economic sphere has been dominated by Mugabe’s ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front) since independence. The party has led the country down the path of hyperinflation, laughable corruption and political insecurity due to a lack of good economic and political reforms.
Only after the sharp economic decline from 2000-08 did a strong opposition; The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) emerge. Consequently, the emergence of a strong opposition resulted in the country’s first-ever coalition government in 2009. And due to the coalition government, from 2009-13, there were improved economic policies resulting in a healthy growth for the country. Sadly and predictably, this was short-lived. The MDC were once again in opposition after the highly controversial elections of 2013 that saw ZANU increase its margins. With increased civil unrest, and protests, by any forecast, it would now seem that Zimbabwe is steering full steam ahead towards an iceberg with no signs of stopping, and at the helm is Mugabe. Compounded by internal power struggles within the party, the uncertain leadership succession is likely to result in an unpredictable and violent political transition. The question many political pundits are now asking is what Zimbabwe will look like during, and after this impending interregnum.
Much of the protest in Zimbabwe is against the bad economic policies of the regime which have resulted in egregiously high unemployment, unpaid civil and public servants, put simply, the government has no money. The portmanteau word: Mugabenomics, is not a celebration of his economic astuteness, but rather a clear warning against poor economic planning, corruption and over zealous monetary easing. Unlike Abenomics, which sought to stimulate the stagnant Japanese economy through fiscal stimulus, monetary easing (QE) and structural reform; Mugabenomics only had one policy, Quantitative Easing, which inevitably led to devaluation and hyperinflation. Controversially, the cash-strapped government is now in a process of printing yet again more money, but this time a surrogate currency: Bond Notes. These notes are said to hold a 1:1 value as the US dollar, however, this move has been unwelcomed by many zimbabweans as the Bond Notes are practically worthless outside Zimbabwe. Economics Professor, Steve Hanke (Johns Hopkins University) warned the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, explaining that “…bond notes would create chaos”.
We must note that Zimbabwe was not always in this economic state. After gaining independence, the Zimbabwe dollar was more valuable than the US dollar at the exchange rates. Throughout the 1980s, Zimbabwe enjoyed the positive economic growth of 5% GDP growth per year, in the 90s, 4.3%, however, the new millennium saw a decline in GDP. In 2000, there was a sharp decline of 5% in GDP, then 8% in 2001, 12% in 2002 and 18% in 2003. The Mugabe administration continued its policy of printing money in an attempt to revive the dying economy resulting in hyperinflation and mass unemployment. At the height of inflation (2008-09), the inflation rate was an estimated at 79.6 billion% in November, 2008. By 2009, the Zimbabwean dollar was quickly abandoned, and replaced by the US dollar. As a result of hyperinflation, there has not been any substantial Foreign Direct investment (FDI) in the country, only receiving $ 2billionin FDI, barely doing better than war-torn Somalia’s $1.7billion.
The causes of such economic degradation can be traced to three main factors; namely war, land reform and corruption. Firstly, in 1997, in an effort to buy political support from the Independence war veterans, the government announced that it would pay bonuses to the veterans equivalent to 3% of the GDP. This, of course, translated into an electoral victory in 2000 where Mugabe won with 48.6% of the votes, compared to MDCs 47%. Moreover, Zimbabwe’s unnecessary involvement in the Second Congo War from 1998 to 2002 badly drained the economy, further weakening an economy that was going through a drought. As a result, Zimbabwe could not pay off its debt to the IMF, World Bank, African Development Bank and other Western states, and thus defaulted on its debts. Secondly, Land Reform policy played a major role in destabilising Zimbabwe. In short, it was the effort to equality redistribute land between black farmers and white Zimbabweans, who at that time made up 5% of the population but owned 70% of the most fertile land. It’s crucial to note that the Land reform was part of the Lancaster House Agreement 1979 and that white farmers were being compensated for their land. The agreement stipulated a 10-year wait before Mugabe’s government could institute land reform, which it did. From 1979-1997 the principle of “willing buyer, willing seller” was applied with Britain providing £44 million to the government for land reform. However, Blair’s Minister for International Development, Ms Clare Short, stated that the “UK did not accept that Britain had a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe” thus the Blair administration ended all payments.
What followed next was a reaction to the failures to uphold the commitments of Lancaster House, which was the introduction of the “Fast-track Land Reform Programme 2000”; a programme that gained notoriety due to the violent evictions of white Zimbabwean farmers. A referendum held in 2000 denied Mugabe increased powers to confiscate white-owned land, without compensation, by 54.7%, however, the Mugabe administration went on with the programme regardless. Instead of redistributing the land into the hands of black farmers, Mugabe gave most of the land to the top echelons of his government, top generals and war veterans, with some receiving as much as 5-10 farms. The international community (IMF, EU, US and the UK) responded with heavy sanctions on Mugabe’s government which had adverse consequences on the economic. The situation was further exacerbated due to the fact that these new “farmers” had no business or farming experience, thus leading to a sharp fall in food production (-45%) and manufacturing (-29%) resulting in price increase, and mass unemployment (-90%). Now these farms are once again being used as political tools to control those whose have fallen out of favour with the party, like Mr Temba Mliswa, whose farm is being confiscated by the state.
To continue, corruption played a huge role in Zimbabwe’s economic state. Like all African states, Zimbabwe is very resource rich i.e., resources like gold, platinum and diamonds are amongst its main exports. However, the revenues from most of those resources are unaccounted for. The Marange diamond fields produced 13% of the world’s rough diamond, an estimated £15 billion in revenues, however, these revenues never made it back to the exchequer instead lined the pockets of Mugabe and his cronies. The sad thing about this situation is that with this one haul alone, Zimbabwe could have paid off its foreign debt worth £6-8 billion, created jobs, reducing unemployment instead of adding to it by cutting a further 25 000 civil service jobs. Sadly enough, with one of the highest literacy rates, both in the world and in Africa, at 90%, the population is one of Zimbabweans greatest assets. However years of corruption and poor economic planning has seen scores of unemployed graduates and profession, further damaging the economy, and the upcoming leadership succession is unlikely to resolve this issue.
House of cards
The party’s dictatorial behaviour stems from its dominance in the political field, aided by the weaknesses of the opposition parties. However, with the vast majority of the public demanding a regime change, the impending interregnum will be the opportune time for Mugabe’s house of cards to fall. An interregnum is generally described as a period where leadership is either unclear or influx leaving the future unknown. In political terms, Mugabe will leave a massive power vacuum with various factions vying for power and control which, if we look at history, tends to end up violent. In a thinly veiled threat Mugabe warned that “our patience has limits” in reference to the dissatisfied protesters who took to the streets to protest, brandishing the Zimbabwean flag, against Mugabe’s failed economic policies, corruption and wanted a regime change. The Zimbabwe Flag Act has made it illegal for the citizenry to produce, sale and use of the national flag without official permission after activists from the #Thisflag movement turned it into a symbol of anti-government protests. In every sense of the word, Zimbabwe is becoming an Orwellian state.
Article 59 of the Zimbabwean Constitution explicitly states that “[E]very person has the right to demonstrate and to present petitions, but these rights must be exercised peacefully”, the government has met the peaceful protesters with brutality, arbitrary imprisonment and fines of up to $200 (when most people live on $2 per day). To make matters worse, when Mugabe recently opened parliament, he introduced a new cybersecurity bill designed to monitor the internet and social media in order to find and arrest “dissidents”, violating the Article 61 of the Constitution (freedom of expression). In an ironic twist and a bid to control the citizenry, Mugabe is both, constraining the freedoms he and the early ZANU-PF so valiantly fought for, and setting up the regime for a violent overthrow.
Robert Mugabe is most likely to hand-pick his next successor to continue his policies, though, admittedly, none will have his political astuteness. During this uncertain time, one of five events may happen;
1. Business as usual. ZANU-PF has been the only dominant political force in Zimbabwe for decades, winning elections by hook or crook. Also, in rural areas, there is still strong support for ZANU-PF, and considering the president’s age, people may prefer the devil they know as he is entering his twilight. Furthermore, factions within ZANU-PF (Generation 40) are attempting to make Mugabe president-for-life. This scenario will be much welcomed by Mugabe as it will save him from being called up to the Hague for the egregious human rights violations.
2.Infighting. The warring factions of ZANU-PF are sharpening their swords for battle. Already we have seen those who no longer agree with the party, like Mr Agrippah Mutambara, have his farms confiscated. Furthermore, the fiercely loyal War veterans have abandoned Mugabe accusing him of being a dictator, already setting the stage for messy leadership succession. On the other hand, The Zanu-PF Generation 40, (G40) are working hard to ensure Mugabe should be made President for life, and/or that dynastic politics continue with Grace Mugabe taking up the mantle. In direct competition with them, is the so-called Lacoste Faction (due to the T-shirts they wore to an event) whose goal is to crown the VP, Emmerson Mnangagwa, President as he is seen to be a stabilising figure and favourable to the Chinese. The infighting will serve one of two ends, the first being the disbandment of the party as opined by the political scientist, Ibbo Mandaza. The downside to this is that these factions were contained within the party, now have free, political violence is likely to ensue across the country. Second, it will serve to consolidate and concentrate power in the hands of ZANU-PF which will lead to a one party state, in all but name leading to further constraints on civil liberties and violent crackdowns on any opposition.
3.Civil War. Due to Southern Africa, as a whole, being relatively peaceful in comparison to its North or Western counterparts, this is highly unlikely to occur. Furthermore, Zimbabwe’s neighbours and trading partners in Southern African Development Community (SADC) will push for a peaceful political transition as, (a) the civil war will be bad for business for the whole region, (b) the resulting displacement of people will put major economic strains and increase xenophobic attacks as seen in South Africa , and (c) the spill from the civil war will result in neighbouring states being inadvertently dragged into the war and used as proxy bases. However, if we look at the Gukurahundi operation (1983-87) in which the army’s Fifth Brigade (answerable to the president only) identified and eliminated suspected anti-government elements among the Ndebele community resulting in up to 80 000 deaths, something like this is plausible.
4.Opposition landslide. The upcoming election of 2018, in which the ageing president is standing in, will allow the electorate to vent their frustration against the ruling party. This, in turn, will result in the lifting of some sanctions by the West and the IMF, perhaps debt forgiveness, allowing Zimbabwe to rebuild itself economically and politically. However, if history is anything but a teacher, Mugabe will employ the same tricks he used to win previous elections such as intimidation, electoral fraud and having the dead vote for him. Though this will be the most peaceful event, the election will be highly contested.
A mixture of poor economic planning, corruption and overzealous monetary easing has eroded trust in Zimbabwe’s political and financial systems, at this stage, people just want something new. Consequently, this internal power struggle will end up eating the country exposing deadly fissures, ostracizing old faithful retainers and dividing allegiances. If anything is to be taken way from this, dear reader, is that ZANU-PF is Robert Mugabe and Robert Mugabe is ZANU-PF. In his 36 years in power, he has not received any credible challenge from within the party proving that either (a), as long as the upper echelons of the party receive their cut, they will be quite and obedient, (b) none of them have the political astuteness to overthrow him and successfully run the country, and (c) if they do, they are too scared to challenge someone with seemingly endless power. Despite efforts by the opposition and the protesters, I have a feeling that the upcoming election in 2018 is most likely going to be rigged leading yet to another ZANU victory. Regardless of people’s own personal feeling towards Mr Mugabe, he has come to define and shape Zimbabwean politics for generations to come. The sad conclusion is that history will not absolve Mr Mugabe. History will remember him as a great liberator of a by-gone era, who, like many in his era, stayed in power for too long. An authoritarian dictator who drove the economy and the country into the ground, violated many human rights, and a leader who often mistook his own personal interest to that of the country. His song will not be that of a glorious revolutionary legacy but rather, one of absolute power corrupting, absolutely.
‘We want justice for these girls’: The Kenyan helpline for victims of gender violence
Around four million girls worldwide suffer female genital mutilation every year. Although it is forbidden in Kenya, COVID-19 has led some families to revive itthe traditional practice, and a UN-supported phone helpline for victims of gender-based violence in the country has seen a big rise in calls since the pandemic hit.
Somewhere in Kenya, an early morning in July: A woman organizes a once-in-a-lifetime “ceremony” for her 11-year-old niece: The girl’s genitals will be cut off as part of her cultural transition into adulthood.
All schools in the country have been closed for months. No classmate will notice the girl’s absence, no teacher will be aware and report the case to the police. The school community cannot protect the girl now.
During the ceremony, the fresh wound starts bleeding heavily. The procedure was performed by a local “cutter,” and there is no anaesthesia and no painkillers. The bleeding doesn’t stop, and, eventually, the family has no choice but to take the girl to the nearest hospital.
‘I don’t want to see people suffering’
A few hours later, a telephone rings in an office in Nairobi. The phone is connected to the number 1195, the national helpline for gender-based violence. One of the girl’s relatives has called in to report the incident anonymously — she does not want to be considered as a family troublemaker.
“What we want is justice for these girls,” says “Steve,” one of 31 staff in the call centre. (Counsellors interviewed for this article use pseudonyms to protect their anonymity.) After receiving the call, Steve and his colleagues respond immediately. The police are dispatched to search for the mother and aunt, and a safe home is arranged for the girl once she is released from the hospital.
The helpline is staffed 24 hours a day by trained counsellors who stay on the line with callers until help arrives, whether in the form of the police, an ambulance, a village elder, a child protection officer. Counsellors arrange for health care, security, and legal aid. They also spend long hours on the phone, giving psychosocial support to callers in need.
Female genital mutilation or FGM is just one of the reasons people call the hotline. Others include assault, rape, child neglect and defilement, child marriage. The list goes on. “So many cases go unreported,” Steve says. Asked why he works at the call centre, he says simply, “I don’t want to see people suffering”.
Some calls will break your heart
COVID-19 has aggravated the situation: “Women have been violated like never before,” says Fanis Lisiagali, who heads the 1195 helpline. “We’ve seen women committing suicide, we have heard of women being killed. Both men and women are seriously depressed.”
Indeed, the number of cases handled by the hotline rose from 86 in February to over 1,100 in June of this year. Cases dropped in July, but the total number of calls is four times higher than during the same period last year. Not all of the callers are women. Around one third of the callers who report psychological violence from their spouses and families are men, saying they have been harassed or abused for failing to provide for the family.
Sitting at their desks, a half-dozen tele-counsellors are equipped with masks and gloves and are separated by acrylic glass walls. Aside from Swahili and English, they speak other local languages, from Kikuyu to Luhya to Kalenjin; the aim is for callers from everywhere in Kenya to have someone to talk to.
“You find that psychological problems come up during things people go through every day,” says another counsellor, “June.” In 2009 she became a caregiver with another organization for sexually abused girls and, five years later, she joined the helpline staff.
Some calls will break the heart of even the most experienced counsellor, says June. Earlier this year, she took a call from an 18-year-old woman who had been cast out by her father and then endured an abusive marriage. When she became pregnant and gave birth, her husband rejected her, claiming the baby was crying too much and that it couldn’t possibly be his. Having been disowned for a second time, the woman’s desperation became unbearable. She threw the baby into a pit latrine and ran away. The girl walked into a rescue centre and called the GBV helpline.
“At first the girl was too shocked to speak. When she finally opened up, what I heard made me completely numb,” says June. She sent the caller to a psychiatrist and his attestation prevented her from being imprisoned. June is still in contact with the young woman, and is helping her build a future. “My job gives me an opportunity to give back to society,” she says. “I cannot always help, but sometimes I have a chance to help in a little way.”
A beacon of hope
The helpline is a beacon especially now during the pandemic. Many rescue centres have to turn away survivors of gender-based violence, as they do not have the resources necessary to quarantine new arrivals for COVID-19.
The helpline was established in 2010 by an organization called Healthcare Assistance Kenya, with the support of UN Women, which is still the NGO’s main partner. It is now also supported by UNFPA, the UN Population Fund.
“COVID-19 exacerbates the already horrifying levels of sexual and gender-based violence in Kenya,” says Anna Mutavati, UN Women Country Representative. “But the helpline is saving lives. While services like 1195 are fundamental, we need to tackle society’s underlying causes that perpetuate these gross human rights violations and wider gender inequality.”
During the COVID-19 crisis, the helpline has proven its worth and needs to be strengthened, says Healthcare Assistance Kenya director Fanis Lisiagali. “In the coming years,” she says, “I would like to see the helpline known to all communities in all counties throughout Kenya, so that anybody who needs it has a place to turn to”.
The Repudiation Report: Guterres Reinforce Morocco’s position over Western Sahara
Same scenario and same dialogue when the Polisario Front (SADAR) adapted the populist approach in dealing with the Moroccan (Western) Sahara case, with the imminent release of the UN resolution at the end of this month, which is anticipated to be a continuation of the recommendations of the last report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Kingdom of Morocco determined to endorse a strategic approach in dealing with these circumstances through cooperation With the UN, due to overcoming any resentment with inconvenient consequences.
This was confirmed after a source from the Moroccan Ministry of Interior denied the authorization of any civil society or community initiative to march from Rabat capital to Guerguerat, commence from the 16th of this month. On the other hand, the Polisario Front (SADR) reacted to the current UN statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres, by assaulting the Kingdom of Morocco, and to a lesser extent, the United Nations, meanwhile seeking to win over the Security Council.
Over the years or so, the Kingdom of Morocco has sustained to deal with the Moroccan (Western) Sahara file as a National concern, considering the issue of Moroccan (Western) Sahara for the Kingdom and Moroccans is the reference national of their identity and loyalty to the Moroccan sovereignty and also dealing with it as a key issue in promoting economic, security, and stability of institutional development to the North African region as well Arab Maghreb region.
António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, has reiterated the groundwork of a political solution to the Moroccan Western Sahara file as suggested by the Security Council in all its resolutions issued since 2007.
In his statement to the Security Council on the Moroccan Western Sahara, Guterres noted that on October 30 of last year, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2494 under which it focused on the need to reach a “political, rational, practical, lasting and consent-based solution” to the case of the Moroccan (Western) Sahara.
In a response to the MINURSO mission, Guterres pointed out, through his report, to extend its mandate for one year until October 31, 2021, without needing to justify that “the key task of the mandate of MINURSO is to supervise the ceasefire.” This means eliminating the false accusation of Morocco’s opponents regarding the organization of the alleged referendum that the Security Council and the United Nations Secretary Council have approved for more than two decades.
Due to this, The Secretary-General of the United Nations mentioned to “the political impetus made by the process of meetings held by Horst Kohler, the former personal envoy, with the participation of all parties concerned with the Moroccan (Western) Sahara dispute, which creates the only way to pursue the exclusive political process of the United Nations.”
Yet, The Personal Envoy, Horst Kohler, was capable to reconstruct the necessary dynamism and steam to the political process, particularly through the spectrum of negotiation meetings that brought together involved parties the Kingdom of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania, in addition to the so-called” SADR” Polisario Front. Guterres emphasized that the need for the political process and final settlement shouldn’t be interrupted, and reiterated his “commitment to appoint a new personal envoy to build on the progress made in the round tables series.”
Additionally, The UN official pointed out that “the Kingdom’s position on the subject of the invented conflict over its southern provinces, as stated in the royal speech on the occasion of the celebration of the forty-fourth anniversary of the Green March.” Thus, the UN official also praised and appreciated Morocco’s cooperation with the MINURSO mission during the difficult period of the “Covid-19” epidemic, stating that: Let me say straight away, this is a time for solidarity “thanks to the measures taken by the Moroccan authorities, no Corona case was reported among the MINURSO mission.” Now it’s very important, that we need government solidarity and cooperation to share and to pool resources where they are most needed and to make sure MINURSO’s representatives get the help that they need from Morocco’s administration.
In light of this, Guterres’s report said, “The Moroccan government has provided support to MINURSO in many aspects by maintaining assistance and providing rapid results of the” Covid-19 “test for the benefit of aircraft staffs and by helping civil and military personnel to embark to and from the mission’s area of operations, not to mention enabling them to gain access. As Rabat reiterates that since the Kingdom of Morocco is a state that advocates returning the favor, the Moroccan side will never forget MINURSO’s help when it was hit by the epidemic.
On the other hand, the UN report pointed criticism regarding the “Polisario’s Front” movement and its continuous violations of the ceasefire agreement 1991, military accords, and Security Council decisions, especially in the Guerguerat region, calling strongly and explicitly for the Polisario Front (SADR) to “quickly pullover from Guarguate frontier zone and settle down these irresponsible violations of Military Agreement.
In a response to the increasing of human rights violation and harassment, the statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations reviewed the outcome of the significant transgressions of these rights in the Tindouf camps in Algeria by Polisario Front, predominately during the period of “Covid-19”, indicating that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights had received many reports highlighting the negative and unfavorable outcomes of the borders suspension and the stumbling access of Humanitarian aid and reducing economic activities in the Tindouf camps.
Here is self-evident to mention that Mr. Guterres also appreciated Morocco’s investments in its southern provinces, stating, in particular, the construction of a new port 70 km north of Dakhla. Thus, and as the Secretary-General of the United Nations reflects, the Kingdom’s investments in its Moroccan (Western) Sahara have continued and enhanced, mostly since His Majesty King Mohammed VI launched the new development model for the southern provinces in November 2015.
The Secretary-General demonstrates, since 2016, the efforts and sustainability for economic development and infrastructure projects that the Kingdom of Morocco is carrying out in its Moroccan (Western) Sahara. Many of these social projects were observed by the former Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, Horst Kohler, during his trip to the region in 2018 Yet, this economic development is escorted by the strengthening supremacy framework and legal dedication of the full Moroccan sovereignty over its southern provinces, through the adoption approach of two laws to ratify the borders of the territorial waters of the Kingdom, which include The coasts of the Moroccan (Western) Sahara.
To sum up, the United Nations Secretary-General report has strongly reinforced Morocco’s position through a sequence of development projects in Moroccan (Western) Sahara, which has been showing the awareness of the United Nations, MINURSO, and the Security Council through the seriousness of the Polisario Front ( SADR) violations of this well-known antagonist armed group. For its proven connections to terrorism and jihadism in the Sahel region. These measures also jeopardize regional stability and severely hinder the international process.
Why should we support Cabo Delgado?
As the adage goes, prevention is better than the cure. This wisdom applies as much to public health crises, and to security and development challenges, as it does to the prevention of violent conflict. Not only does prevention save lives and protect development gains, but it is also highly cost-effective. Last year, Mozambique signed a peace agreement to end its long-running conflict with RENAMO. While presenting a real opportunity for a durable and sustainable peace, this agreement also marked a shift in conflict dynamics in the country and focused attention on an emerging – and potentially more intractable – front in the Northern-most province of Cabo Delgado. The escalating insurgency there has claimed about 2,000 lives and displaced nearly 300,000 people since it began in 2017, and it risks spreading down the coast and into neighboring provinces, enabled by a north-south regional divide, perceptions of the capture of the state and its resources, and a sense of socioeconomic exclusion, particularly among the youth, who face a future with limited avenues for self-improvement or social mobility. Little is known about the perpetrators, their backers, or their intentions: however, what is clear is that the longer the conflict lasts, the more entrenched it risks becoming and the higher the costs will be in terms of destruction of human, social, and cultural capital; in terms of lives lost; in terms of young people who are hooked into extremist groups; and in terms of the loss of economic growth and development potential.
As has been seen in other countries, preventing the onset or escalation of violent conflict and managing crises is complicated by the confluence of multiple challenges that reinforce and amplify fragility. Fragility in turn reinforces poverty and limits efforts to level the playing field. The quest to end poverty and increase equality has suffered its worst setback globally this year since we started to track it consistently, with 88 to 115 million people worldwide expected to be pushed into extreme poverty, taking the total number of poor to 729 million. The arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic in Mozambique just as the country was beginning to recover from the destructive trail left by the twin cyclones of 2019, highlights the role of pre-existing vulnerabilities in determining the capacity and ability of formal and informal institutions to mitigate the impact of shocks. A recent review reveals that 37 fragile and conflict-affected countries have 10 percent of the world’s population, but 40 percent of the world’s poor. Internally displaced populations, vulnerable populations, youth, women, the elderly, and those who eke out a living on the margins or in the informal sector, are already struggling to access basic services, a source of livelihood, shelter, and food security. It is these groups who will have been most impacted by these consecutive shocks and who are most at risk now from the impacts of violent conflict in Cabo Delgado. Focusing on Cabo Delgado and the underlying causes of fragility and conflict in Mozambique is not only an economic imperative, but also a moral one.
The human and economic costs of conflict require all those concerned to work more collaboratively through targeted, flexible, and sustained approaches to support national and regional prevention agendas. In the three months since I assumed the role of Country Director for Mozambique, I have had the opportunity to meet with and hear the perspectives of a wide range of stakeholders. These conversations have reinforced that as partners of the Government of Mozambique, and of the people of Mozambique, and the country’s development actors, the World Bank has a key role to play in supporting the efforts of the Government to address the core development issues that underpin Mozambique’s fragility challenges. In light of the heightened fragility risks in Mozambique, and in a bid to align the efforts of the Government with those of the development community to mitigate the danger of an escalation in violent conflict, Mozambique is eligible to secure USD$700 million additional funding from the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA), specifically to address the underlying causes of fragility and conflict.
Global experience highlights a number of key lessons for successful prevention: that effective prevention is a collective undertaking – led domestically by the government, as the key actor in shaping a pathway towards sustainable development and peace, and building on existing strengths – with support from local and international partners across the political, humanitarian, security, and peace spectrum, to facilitate timely action. The most successful examples of prevention, including from Indonesia, Burkina Faso, Kenya, and Sierra Leone, have involved extensive consultation with, and mobilization of, a coalition of domestic actors to leverage the comparative advantages of civil society, including women’s groups, youth, religious actors, and the private sector, while drawing on support from the international community. In response to subnational instability in Cameroon, Ukraine, and Nigeria, multilateral vehicles such as Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments have supported governments through technical capacity and policy dialogue to chart an inclusive post-conflict trajectory and development plan to address core socioeconomic grievances. These vehicles have also proved powerful at aligning domestic and international finance for a more effective recovery effort.
The most effective way to prevent societies from descending into chaos is to strengthen their resilience by investing in people through inclusive and sustainable development. Experiences from contexts as varied as Tunisia and Niger, Northern Ireland and Nepal, demonstrate that the often-fraught and uncomfortable process of strengthening and reforming institutions to foster greater inclusion is key to maintaining peace and stability, despite it being a long-term endeavor, sometimes taking generations. Similarly, opening spaces for contestation and for voice is neither easy and nor is it devoid of risk, but it is crucial for increased representation and for alleviating grievances related to perceptions of exclusion, particularly among the youth. In tandem, efforts to address inequalities and exclusion, addressing the legacy of past abuses, and redistributing resources, are all key avenues by which to preserve the social fabric, build social cohesion, and boost the capacities of individuals, communities, and society at large to mitigate impacts of crises and shocks.
For our part, as a friend and partner of Mozambique, the World Bank commits to accompanying the Government and people on the path towards building a more inclusive, transparent, and equitable society. We will support efforts towards peace and stability in Mozambique by leveraging global experiences, using policy dialogue and strong partnerships, and through the application of our technical capacity. The World Bank has in place and will ramp up interventions to address the causes of fragility, conflict, and violence, in Cabo Delgado, but also across the country. These include interventions designed to create opportunities for employment and training, particularly for the youth; delivery of quality services in a transparent and inclusive fashion; support to governance reform efforts and the devolution of power to subnational levels; provision of global best practices in relation to the management and governance of extractives industries and natural resources; support to building resilience to natural hazards and the impacts of climate change; and efforts to boost the capacity of civil society actors and NGOs to build grassroots representation and increases spaces for dialogue and contestation. We are also pushing to meet the needs of the most vulnerable, particularly those impacted by COVID-19, by expanding social protection and safety nets, supporting efforts to increase access to quality education and health services, and boosting efforts to address institutional weakness and policy gaps.
We believe we have a role to act as part of a collective to work with the Government to address these core challenges that underpin fragility in Mozambique. We note with satisfaction the government strategy to address the socioeconomic grievances that feed the insurgency in the North, under the umbrella of the Integrated Northern Development Agency (ADIN). We are committed to working with the Government to ensure that every Mozambican, regardless of who they are and where they live, has the opportunity to live a life of dignity and hope and has the chance to realize their full potential as a contributing member of society.
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