Although some US military decision-makers have recently said that the air raids on Sirte are to be considered “purely tactical” – as also General Petraeus stated on August 4 last – the US operations in Libya which started on August 1 last have evident strategic importance.
Let us provide some data with a view to having a real perception of the situation: the US air actions are led by the Africa Command, AFRICOM, the US structure which since 2008 has been cooperating with all the African countries, except for Egypt, with which it has a separate agreement. Said structure has its headquarters at the Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart.
The AFRICOM ground unit, namely the United States Army Africa (USARAF), has its own autonomous base and command at the Caserma Ederle in Vicenza.
In short, with this air-naval operation in Libya, the North American African Command has three clear strategic goals: 1) excluding the NATO-Europe from its Southern region and forcedly directing it eastwards and south-eastwards, towards China, Russia and, shortly, India; 2) opposing the Chinese and Russian expansion to Africa at geoeconomic and military levels; 3) managing, in the future, the great pan-African unification process, precisely on the basis of the US model.
Moreover, the bombing of Sirte by US aircraft has a further obvious strategic significance: while the Russian Federation has now become the reference point of the Greater Middle East with the next stabilization of Syria, the United States want to mark the Maghreb territory a) with a view to avoiding a Russian action in Libya; b) supporting their regional Arab allies; c) closing down a space to their European allies, uncertain of everything except for the multiculturalist subjection to the “permanent jihad”.
The US operation called Odyssey Lightning consists in supporting only the Government of National Accord (GNA) installed in Tripoli, the only one recognized by the United Nations as opposed to the Tobruk one and its ground forces, which last month advanced against the ISIS positions in Sirte. They are only the Misrata Forces, not fully connected with al-Sarraj’s National Accord.
In spite of its international support, the government in Tripoli is linked to militias, such as the above stated Misrata Forces and the Al Bunyan Al Marsoos “the Solid Structure” – armies which, like all the other local politicians and numerous militias, are all paid only with the funds from the Central Bank of Libya.
And, despite this, al-Sarraj’s government really controls only the coast of Tripoli and two adjacent neighbourhoods.
Furthermore, according to the latest data available, the Central Bank of Libya manages a monetary base of over 115 billion Libyan dinars, but with a quasi-money which is worth approximately twice as much as that monetary base.
It is worth recalling that the “quasi-money” is the share of bank assets which are more easily convertible into cash.
Hence it is easy to imagine that if – as currently happens – the oil flow from the Libyan coast starts again (now that the oil sector analysts predict a rise in the oil price up to 70-80 US dollars a barrel since the second half of this year), the money available to the various Libyan military forces will increase, with obvious negative effects on the peace process and the reunification of the country.
Also the share of Turkish, Saudi, Qatari and even Egyptian aid to their proxies will increase, with a view to avoiding the expansion of the Libyan oil market and promoting their national direct and indirect exports.
Or maybe – as happened with Qatar at the beginning of the inauspicious insurgency against Gaddafi – the issue will be to trade the Libyan oil, possibly magically turning it into “national product.”
Let us revert, however, to the planned air military actions of the US Africa Command.
Five operations put in place on the first day of August and on the first day of the military action Odyssey Lightning, four ones on August 2-3, as well as some ground operations of the US Special Forces to agree with the various factions, while so far the US military activities from the sea have been defined as “precision strikes”, which are also very effective on the ISIS materials and depots in Sirte.
The first mission started from the US amphibious assault ship Wasp, off the Gulf of Sidra, while other aircraft departed from land bases in Italy and initially from Jordan.
The naval group of the USS Wasp also includes the transport dock ship USS San Antonio and the landing ship USS Whidbey Island, while the medium-range missile control system is based in Rota, Spain.
The three US ships host the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, which has also MV22 Osprey aircraft, along with other AV-BB units.
Osprey is a tiltrotor for the deployment of ground forces inside the Libyan territory, while the US Expeditionary Naval Corps also has Super Cobra helicopters, other UH-1Y Venom transport helicopters and the CH-53E Super Stallion ones for troop transport.
Two facts are clear: after the probable cleaning up of the Sirte area, the United States plan to land and typically place boots on the ground, thus betting on a new network of Libyan warlords determined – with the US coordination – to wipe out ISIS from Libya.
Incidentally, the United States have a clear strategic and political interest in avoiding the European allies’ support as much as possible.
This both to prevent terrorist attacks on the EU territory and, above all, to have full tactical and strategic autonomy in Libya.
The other fact is that the United States intend to bet only on Fayez al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord while the forces – including the European ones – which support Haftar’s “Operation Dignity”, which are allied with the Saiqa of Benghazi, the militias from Zintan, the militias of the Warshefana and, above all, the guards who control the oil wells, depend weakly from Tobruk.
Not to mention France, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, supporting Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army. However, we have reason to believe that the “Operation Dignity” forces could be the real centre of gravity for a future Russian action in Libya – which is the greatest danger for the United States.
In other words, the United States have chosen to support only al-Sarraj’ small government and hence to accept a future splitting of the Libyan territory, at least into two parts.
This is supremely contrary to European interests. Finally the United States have decided to create a bridgehead, through the Tripoli government, which can expand the AFRICOM presence south and east of Libya.
These are all US legitimate intentions which, however, should have been discussed and analyzed together with the now irrelevant European partners, who only see the trees, namely immigration from the Libyan shores, but not the wood, namely the geopolitics which causes and exploits it, also at militarily level. And we will see it in the near future.
The naive automatic pro-American approach of the US European allies, which is a result of the now ceased Cold War, is a strategic danger in itself for the European Union and for the EU Mediterranean countries. The United States have diverging interests compared to Europe, both in Libya and in the rest of Africa.
And what if – instead of muttering multiculturalist myths – the EU had organized an operational Conference to create and deploy a Spanish-French-Italian military force, with the Russian approval, which could stabilize the coastal areas and wipe out – even with the US aid and support – the Caliphate from Sirte, without blocking the Libyan national reunification process?
Is it possible for a guerrilla army such as ISIS, living in underground shelters and in the maze of urban centres, to be considered a traditional military force “whose actions against the United States and its allies must be prevented”, as the motivation for the Africa Command action reads?
We doubt it, as indeed we doubt that totally abandoning the Tobruk government will be a rational strategic choice.
Certainly the Tobruk government members began to rule from a railway wagon and still have relations with the Muslim Brotherhood but, since last June, there have already been several meetings and negotiations between al-Sarraj’s GNA and some members of the Tobruk Parliament, which could be facilitated by us and supported explicitly by the international community.
Nobody, not even the United States, have anything to gain from a fragmented Libya, with or without the ISIS viper in their bosom.
What about Italy? In her question time at the Chamber of Deputies, the Defence Minister, Roberta Pinotti, said that “so far the US operations have not involved Italy, neither logistically nor for overflying the national territory, and they have developed consistently with the UN Resolution of 2015 and in response to a specific request for support made by the lawful and legitimate Libyan government”.
Hence, in the opinion of the Italian Defence Minister, al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord is the only lawful and legitimate one, even though it is clear to everyone that there exists no government in Libya.
In Italy there was no rational analysis of the protests made by Russia and the Tobruk Government, which could shift bag and baggage to the Islamist-jihadist front of the Libyan insurgency, while Russia asked that the US bombings could take place after a resolution of the UN Security Council.
As a clear result of the AFRICOM overflying operations, since August 4 there have been very harsh clashes between the Tripoli militias – mostly those in Misrata, faithful to al-Sarraj, but paid by others – and the Benghazi Defence Brigades (BDB).
During said clashes at Ajdabiya, in the “oil crescent”, Haftar’s military have accused the local fighters of having favoured the ISIS jihadists’ escape from Benghazi.
Is therefore possible, in such a complex region where “the friend of my enemy is my friend”, and only on a local basis, to consider only the Government of National Accord in the list of the good ones?
Have we already committed to the Tripoli government without al-Sarraj’s government having yet won the confidence vote of the Tobruk House of Representatives? And what will happen to us if the Tripoli Government of National Accord falls? We will be deprived of credible relations with all the other forces operating in Libya and be exposed to any retaliation, inside and outside our borders.
One of the possible players for us would be Khalifa Haftar’s “Operation Dignity” – supported by some members of the French and British intelligence services – which is expanding to Eastern Libya.
As already said, Haftar’s money comes from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France. Moreover, Russia has already shown its intention to appoint him as its point of reference in the Libyan chaos.
“Operation Dignity” is a real army and Haftar commands it with the iron fist of the true professional of weapons, while the United States are still pushing for a varied and unreliable alliance of Islamic militias to be led by Tripoli -– which is difficult in a situation in which Russia supports Cyrenaica, though still indirectly.
Hence we will have the probable reaction of the jihadist terrorism on our territory without any strategic gain in a country which is so vital for us, namely Libya.
Furthermore, the US air campaign authorized by President Barack Obama for a period of thirty days could not be fully effective against ISIS in Sirte and the militias of Misrata could distance themselves from the al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord.
While it is obvious that an intervention boots on the ground by a European force is not rational, also considering that the EU Member States have diverging interests in Libya, it would be at least useful not to be committed to one single – and not even the strongest – party concerned.
Strategic Instability in the Era of Information and Communication Technologies: Crisis or the New Norm?
Strategic stability is once again becoming a primary concern in international relations. The topic has received a great deal of attention of late, mainly because of the steady erosion of the reduction and limitation regime: the United States has now withdrawn from both the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), the New START treaty is set to expire soon, and no further talks on reduction and limitation of nuclear arms are being held. Another reason is the rapid development of information and communication technologies (ICTs), which are playing a growing role in the global military and political arena in the 21st century. With a new technological revolution under way, can we ensure a level of strategic security that is both necessary and sufficient? Or will instability become a new trend in global strategic security as well? It would be hard to argue that this is not a crisis.
Today there are two approaches — or rather a rift between the old understanding of “strategic stability,” which took shape during the bipolar era (when the term itself was coined), and a radically new understanding of the ways of ensuring strategic stability in the modern world and the challenges that this presents.
As is often the case, the truth probably lies somewhere in between. It would be a mistake to discard the experience of maintaining strategic stability that was accumulated throughout the Cold War period and which helped prevent a deep-seated confrontation from boiling over into a large-scale war — even though the political and technological changes that have taken place since then cannot be ignored.
As an example, during the bipolar era, “strategic stability” was defined as a state of relations that would remove incentives for a nuclear first strike.
Since nuclear arms still exist and their destructive capabilities are constantly improving, this understanding of strategic stability is as relevant today as it was during the Cold War, when it was only taking shape. But the situation has grown considerably more complicated over the last three decades, and the methods and mechanisms of preventing nuclear war that were envisaged during the bipolar era are no longer in line with the current geopolitical reality and the level of technological development. With these massive changes in international military and political relations, we need to consider other parameters in addition to the nuclear component, while at the same time preserving the essence of the idea. Furthermore, the bipolar era, when the world was split between two global opposing powers, has given way to a situation where strategic stability is determined by a greater number of players. This is why we need to assess the characteristics and capabilities of the military and political system as a whole.
Strategic stability of the military and political system is a state of the world (the lack of a large-scale war) within which the framework of this system is maintained even under continuous disturbance (destabilizing factors) for a certain (defined) period of time.
Therefore, on a professional level, not only should we be talking about “maintaining” and “strengthening” strategic stability, but we should also acknowledge the need to ensure strategic stability and devise new approaches to assessing its level based on our experience — which means we must develop common qualitative and especially quantitative assessments of this level. For that to be possible, we need to agree on common assessment criteria.
The bilateral discussion of such criteria between the United States and Russia came to a halt in the 1990s, as the U.S. no longer considered it necessary. This has given rise to a global problem, because the reduction of strategic stability to a level that is below what is needed and what is sufficient is dangerous for all states without exception. It is thus in the best interests of all countries to ensure this level, but the extent of their responsibility varies. The nuclear powers are still the most responsible.
What new features of this system, in which ensuring a necessary and sufficient level of stability is so crucial, have emerged over the past few decades?
An increase in the number of local wars and armed conflicts which break out and progress increasingly under the influence of ICTs.
The restructuring of international relations after a period of bipolarity followed by multipolarity dominated by the United States. This new transformation is, first of all, caused by changes in military and strategic relations between Russia and the United States, as well as by the appearance of a new global centre of power, namely China, which is not involved in the nuclear disarmament process.
The gradual erosion of the strategic arms limitation and reduction regime: the United States has now withdrawn both from the ABM Treaty and the INF Treaty, the New START treaty is set to expire soon, and no further talks on reduction and limitation of nuclear arms are being held.
Nuclear missile multipolarity, which consists in a growing number of states possessing nuclear weapons and the increasing probability of their proliferation.
The trend towards doctrinal changes among nuclear powers that are formally aimed at strengthening the deterrence regime but in fact lead to a reduction of the threshold for the use of nuclear arms; in particular, there is a growing possibility of a limited nuclear war.
Creation of a large-scale U.S. missile defence system, which brings about serious changes in the strategic balance of power and increased uncertainty in strategic planning.
The growing role and power of non-nuclear (highly precise and highly intelligent) weapons in strategic planning. These new armaments create the hypothetical threat of a disarming strike against strategic nuclear forces. Developing these kinds of weapons complicates the global strategic landscape and makes crisis decision-making all the more difficult.
Deployment of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons on the same platforms, which may lead to the launch of ballistic or cruise missiles with conventional warheads being perceived as nuclear weapons use.
The appearance of low-yield nuclear weapons, which lowers the threshold for nuclear weapons use and, as a result, increases the probability of an armed conflict escalating to a nuclear war.
Development of ICT-based state-of-the-art anti-satellite weapons that allow countries to interfere with enemy satellites, including parts of the ballistic missile early warning system, and destroy them using ground-based anti-satellite systems. Such weapons can also disrupt the operation of satellites used for network-centric warfare, which is an approach being actively developed by militarily developed states. This is one of the most serious threats to strategic stability at this stage.
The militarization of space. In February 2019, President of the United States Donald Trump signed a Memorandum on the Establishment of the United States Space Force, which lists such purposes as protecting U.S. interests in space, “deterring aggression and defending the Nation,” as well as “projecting military power in, from and to space.”
In addition to technological developments, experts from various countries increasingly point to the role that psychology plays in influencing strategic stability in the modern world. Western society and its political elites no longer fear nuclear war, which may lead to a considerable reduction of the threshold for weapons use, including with regard to nuclear arms. And most alarming of all is not this confidence in the impossibility of nuclear war, but rather the belief that a “small,” local nuclear war can be fought and won. Such views have started to grow and spread partly due to progress in ICTs, which makes it possible to project informational and psychological influence on a huge audience in a relatively short amount of time and at minimal cost.
We can thus distinguish several key factors of the global influence of ICTs on strategic stability. First, ICTs can be used for destructive military and political purposes. Second, the exponential growth of technologies that force countries to acquire strategic advantages can make it tempting to try and win a large-scale war. Third, the boundaries between peace and war, defence and offence in military planning (including in the nuclear sphere) tend to become blurred. Furthermore, the logic of global confrontation is changing: the combined use of non-military tactics and harmful ICTs enables countries to achieve their war goals even without armed conflict. And one last notable factor of influence is the reduced path to the escalation of conflict, caused by the probability of ICT attacks on nuclear missile infrastructure.
When elaborating criteria for assessing the level of strategic stability and developing plans to ensure it, it is wise both to consider those factors that can be found in any historical period and those specific to the current age. The accelerated progress of ICTs falls into the latter category. Analysis shows that all the destabilizing factors in the modern strategic stability system are due to the development of ICTs. According to expert estimates, over 30 states possess so-called offensive cyber weapons; this is why this threat should really be singled out as a destabilizing factor of its own. Moreover, each of the other factors is enhanced by the destructive use of ICTs, the militarization of peaceful information technologies, and the ease of use, unexpectedness and speed of both IT and psychological weapons.
Additional risks are posed by so-called cyber electromagnetic activities, which are being actively developed by the United States. These include cyber operations, electronic warfare, electronic peacetime attacks, electromagnetic spectrum management operations, the suppression of targets by active and passive interference, as well as electromagnetic disinformation.
The potential use of ICTs to undermine the security of military facilities as part of a nation’s critical infrastructure is clearly a global threat. At the same time, estimating the possible damage from such threats and developing countermeasures is significantly complicated by the intangible nature of ICTs, as well as by the wide range of sources of possible malicious technologies: state and non-state actors, and even single hackers. All of this increases the level of uncertainty and instability. ICT threats may be attributed to various elements of military organization and infrastructure. But in the context of strategic stability, special attention should be paid to the security of nuclear missile weapons. All nuclear powers are modernizing their nuclear systems to keep up with the progress in computer technologies. The integration of network operations in military planning programmes began more than 30 years ago, and today we can already speak of an ICT revolution in military affairs. More and more components of the military nuclear infrastructure — from warheads and their delivery vehicles to control and guidance systems and command and control systems of strategic nuclear forces — depend on sophisticated software, which makes them potential targets for ICT attacks.
Special attention needs to be paid to the protection of strategic weapons, the early warning system, air and missile defence systems, and the command and control system for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, in addition to, or instead of, the principle of deterrence by inevitable retaliation, there is now growing interest in deterrence by blocking the use of offensive means (a “left of launch” strategy) through the use of ICTs.
Decreased strategic stability is due to the fact that the development of malicious ICTs increases the probability of a number of adverse events, such as the erroneous authorized launch of ballistic missiles; the decision to use nuclear weapons; the receipt of a false alarm from the early warning system about the launch of ballistic missiles, which is possible on account of the growing sophistication of ICT attacks or the damage or destruction of communication channels; interference in the control system of the armed forces (including nuclear forces); and the decreased confidence of military decisionmakers in the performance of control and command systems. In addition, a critical issue is the impact that the increased probability of nuclear weapons being disabled or destroyed by means of ICTs will have on future nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation processes.
The possibility that decisions about the use of nuclear weapons will be influenced by information and communication technologies is therefore the most serious threat that exists today — not in theory but in fact. There is now a greater probability of an erroneous authorized launch of a ballistic missile as a result of false information or due to a lack of confidence in the proper operation of military systems and some actions being perceived as the first step to mutually assured destruction. This leads to a considerable reduction in strategic stability.
All of the above threats are further exacerbated by the growing use of remote-controlled robotic strike weapons, the development of artificial intelligence technologies for military purposes, machine learning, the autonomous operation capabilities of various systems and subsystems, automated decision-making systems and other elements that may be subject to ICT attacks.
What global steps can be taken today in response to these global threats to strategic stability, based on the experience gained in the bipolar era? First, all the parties involved (Russia, the United States and China) will have to find common ground in terms of what in their opinion constitutes strategic stability; develop and formalize a common understanding of the danger of ICT threats; and, of course, develop common approaches to assessing the probability of intentional and unintentional ICT attacks. Moreover, they will need to have a clear agreement on the probable response in the event that an ICT attack on strategic nuclear forces is detected. These steps may provide building blocks for an ICT deterrence policy, similar to what was done with regard to nuclear weapons in the bipolar era.
At the same time, it would be reasonable to start work on an ICT arms control regime (statements, commitments, agreements and treaties) that could include: a ban on ICT attacks against certain targets, primarily military facilities; the limitation and/or renouncement of offensive ICT capabilities; the introduction of ICT arms control measures; the establishment of international norms regulating the ways and means of preventing and stopping cyber conflicts; and the development of a convention on the prohibition of the harmful use of ICTs in the nuclear weapons sphere.
From our partner RIAC
“Let Russia Be Russia” (US debate on global security system)
The controversial decision by the current US administration to withdraw from the INF treaty, as well as its threat to suspend observance of the Open Skies Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), has been met with criticism and resistance even in the United States itself. However, opposition to President Trump’s moves is multi-pronged and pursues goals not necessarily aimed at preserving what has remained of the global security system as some of the “champions of peace” also happen to be the very same “liberal interventionists,” who are responsible for many of the armed conflicts happening today. It is imperative for us to distinguish between pragmatics, who really seek to reduce military threats, such as former US Defense Secretary William Perry, ex-US ambassador to the Soviet Union John Matlock, former presidential adviser Thomas Graham and some others, and experts and media personalities, whose criticism of the US withdrawal from these accords is merely an attempt to jump on the bandwagon of the ongoing anti-Trump campaign being waged by liberal “mainstream” media, which is often openly Russophobic too, faulting Trump for his “too polite” way of dealing with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.
The Wall Street Journal was among the first to break the news about Donald Trump’s plans to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty (OST). In an October 27, 2019 article, the newspaper wrote that President Trump had signed a document outlining the US administration’s intention to withdraw from the 1992 accord. The newspaper’s sources specified, however, that the decision was not final and consultations continued.
Earlier, however, in its October 20, 2019 issue, the WSJ reported that former Secretary of State George Schultz, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and former Senator Sam Nunn, all of them critical of the US withdrawal from the OST, had warned about Trump’s decision to exit the treaty. While paying homage to the customary tune about Russia’s “aggressiveness,” these three politicians, known for their participation in past disarmament programs, emphasized the need to keep in place existing defense agreements with Russia, reminding their readers, and above all, Donald Trump, that the great achievement of post-Cold War US diplomacy could soon be erased if some of the Trump administration officials have their say and the United States unilaterally withdraws from the Open Skies Treaty, which even during the current period of tense relations between Moscow and Washington helps to preserve transparency and trust. They argued that such a withdrawal from the treaty would be a big mistake, adding that it would undermine trust between the United States and Russia, and be detrimental to the US allies’ security.
The authors added that the idea of the Open Skies Treaty, initially proposed by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1955, got a new lease on life in 1992, when Moscow agreed to open its territory for overflights to verify Russia’s compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). With the CFE Treaty now suspended, Russia is showing clear “defense generosity” by maintaining its “most verified country” status (the authors of the letter admit that Russia is a country most extensively covered by OST overflights).
Apparently trying to fend off standard accusations at home of “working for Moscow,” Schultz, Perry, and Nunn wrap up their letter with a customary admission about Republicans and Democrats having a shared view about “a serious challenge to international security” allegedly posed by Russia.” That being said, they still draw a pragmatic conclusion that instead of pulling out of previously signed international security agreements, Washington should redouble its commitment to the risk-reduction strategies consistently sought by previous US administrations.
This standpoint distinguishes pragmatic supporters of maintaining the security system – the priority, which Schultz, Perry, and Nunn confirmed in their April 10, 2019 article “The Threat of Nuclear War Is Still With Us” – from Trump’s professional debunkers from the Democratic Party.
Trump’s opponents also criticize him for breaking agreements, and not just defense ones, but trade and environmental as well (above all the Paris Agreement on climate change). However, while criticizing Trump, they still arrive at quite opposite conclusions by calling for ramping up pressure on Russia and filling the White House with “hawks” from the Pentagon and the State Department, etc. They also talk about the imaginary “friendship” between Putin and Trump, allegedly stemming from some Russian contribution to Trump’s victory in the 2016 election, and which they believe should be neutralized no matter what, including by initiating new conflicts with Russia.
Jeremy Kuzmarov, who writes for Counterpunch, points to an unprecedentedly high level of Russophobia in the ongoing debate among potential candidates for the 2020 presidential election from the Democratic Party.
Kuzmarov notes that it is impossible to explain this level of Russophobia by the election campaign alone. It is about ideology. Kuzmarov notes that former US President Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton both represent the “globalist project,” which is still alive and views Russia and China as obstacles on the way of human progress (hence Obama’s absurd decision not to include Russia in the Trans-Pacific Partnership project – as if Russia and China were not Pacific powers). At the same time, they see Trump’s victory in 2016 as an unfortunate “stab in the back” from US voters. Therefore, all proponents of this ideology, still dominant in the United States, are up in arms and out to fight Trump, whom they never tire of calling “a Kremlin puppet.” This is exactly the ideological “narrative” that makes the US Democrats incapable of compromise in the field of disarmament.
Therefore, any proposals of compromise made by independent experts are subjected to appropriate “modifications” before they are published in order to avoid accusations of being “helpful” to Moscow, just like in the case of historian Stephen Cohen. This explains the cautious tonality of the proposal made by Thomas Graham – a former assistant George W. Bush and a prominent expert on Russia. In a think piece titled “Let Russia Be Russia,” published in Foreign Affairs journal, he offered a rather strange “quid pro quo” whereby the US and Ukraine accept Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea (as if someone is going to discuss this with them!), and Russia withdraws its support for Donbass. Only then, Graham argues, can we discuss disarmament initiatives, joint efforts by Russia and the United States to prevent Iran from going nuclear, etc. Well, even if this rather unrealistic idea resonates with some in the US expert community, it hardly fits into the ultra-liberal ideology of “reformatting” the world, which is still espoused by US political elites. Therefore, it looks like Graham’s proposal will remain just a vain wish for a possible compromise. Meanwhile, the last pillars of the global security system are crumbling right before our eyes…
From our partner International Affairs
Joint military drills between Russia and Serbia
From 24 to 29 October in Serbia was held joint tactical live-fire exercise with air defence missile units of the Serbian Air Defence units and the Russian Aerospace Forces dubbed “Slavic Shield 2019”. The aim of the exercise was to educate and use the joint group of the Serbian Air Defence and the Russian Aerospace Forces in the air defence of the territory and military forces against reconnaissance and enemy activities from airspace, as well as to training and practicing of commands and units for the preparation and execution of an air defence operation.
Russian-Serbian air defense exercise “Slavic shield 2019“ is held for the first time in September this year in the Astrakhan region, on the basis of the Centre for Combat Training and Combat Use of the Aerospace Forces. The exercise consisted of two stages. The first stage of the Russian – Serian air defense exercise “Slavic shield 2019“ was held in Russia and involved the crews of anti-aircraft missile and radio-technical troops of the Russian Air Force and Air Defence of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Serbia, S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems, Pantsir-S anti-aircraft missile and gun systems, and radar stations. During the exercise, the issues of interaction and joint combat use of air defense units of the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation and the air force of the air defense of the Republic of Serbia were being worked out.
The second stage of “Slavic shield 2019” was held from 24 to 29 October 2019 in the territory of the Republic of Serbia. The S-400 division units with anti-aircraft missile systems S-400 and aircraft missile and gun system „Pantsir-S“ were transfered by military transport aircraft of the Russian Air Force to the territory of Serbia to participate in the second stage of the joint Russian-Serbian air defense exercise „Slavic shild – 2019“.
As part of the exercise, the Russian S-400 division and the Pantsir-S battery were deployed on the territory of a Serbian air base and were the most important systems in the joint Russian – Serbian air defense exercise „Slavic shield 2019“.
“Today we had a unique opportunity to see how the S-400 battalion works and to see how Pantsir-S works. As you know, we have purchased, ordered one Pantsir-S system, and we are expecting it in our country soon. This is a fantastic system that targets all flying objects, especially drones and cruise missiles at the distances up to 80 kilometers, tracks everything and it is very difficult to jam their radar, because they have many different codes and many different approaches. Our people are overjoyed, they are training, and I expect that in the next month or two, they will be able to show their lethal effect on an exercise in Serbia also on such cruise missiles and small drones, which are very dangerous for anti-aircraft systems. As for S-400 – if we had two S-400 battalions, no one would ever dare to overfly Serbia – president of the Republic of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic said, accompanied by Serbian Minister of defence Aleksandar Vulin and chief of General Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Milan Mojsilovic. According to him, Serbia is drastically boosting its military capabilities and although is a small country, it`s still not strong enough, but it is many times stronger than earlier.
“With Pantsir coming, these are big things for us. Please look at the Serb soldiers, to see their smiling faces and how happy they are because of everything they saw. And about the S-400 when we got into the cabin – that is where you defend the whole country from. This is incredible power, incredible strength and I congratulate once again our Russian friends for creating such systems and we learn a lot from them, we have learned a lot. I am happy that today we were able to see Brigadier General Tiosav Jankovic, who was there training, who knows a lot and is very important for the establishment of these systems and their operation here on the territory of the Republic of Serbia” – president Vucic said, emphasizing that he had never seen such a thing in his life, even though he was at strategic military airports not far from Moscow.
After that, Serbian President Vucic visited the positions of the Pantsir-S1 air defence missile-gun system and S-400 air defence missile-gun system, where the crews demonstrated the operation of the system in a real situation, as part of a joint live fire tactical exercise of air defence missile units of Serbian Air Defence and Russian Aerospace Forces dubbed “Slavic Shield 2019”, involving the weapons of the Serbian Armed Forces and the mentioned air defence missile systems from the composition of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Deputy commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces, lieutenant general Yuri Nikolayevich Grehov, handed Serbian President Vucic a model of the Pantsir-S1 system at the end of the tour, on the occasion of conducting a joint exercise.
Also, a Russian-Serbian tactical flight exercise “BARS-2019” began on October 30 in Russia. In the Astrakhan region the crews of MiG-29SMT fighter jets destroyed more than ten air targets. During the flights, the joint crews carried out practical launches of air-to-air missiles at targets dropped by the target-setting aircraft. In addition, the flight crew of fighter aircraft participating in the exercise, worked out the launches of unguided missiles and firing from at ground targets, indicating the objects of the mock enemy. A day earlier, in the framework of the exercise “BARS-2019”, the crews of Mi-8AMTSH helicopters fulfilled the tasks of search and rescue support of flights and evacuation of the conditionally injured crew. The crews of MiG-29SMT aircraft practiced offensive and defensive actions, as well as interception of air targets. The exercise involves joint crews of two countries on MiG-29SMT airplanes and Mi-8ATMSh helicopters. The drills involved over 10 aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces.
The possibility for the Serbian army to train with the Russian army on such drills is very important, because the Serbian army has gained valuable experience. Also, the arrival of the S-400 system in Serbia is a clear message from Russia, that Russia is interested for the Balkans and to protect its main ally in the region – Serbia.
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