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Using the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

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The OSCE Ministerial Council elected Italy to chair the Organization in 2018. The consensus decision was taken on July 27 last by the current 57 members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). And there is nothing to prevent that – by changing the Statute – also “observer” countries may add to them, as currently happens for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Hence it would be appropriate to use this one-year OSCE Italian Presidency in a good and new way. It is worth recalling that the Secretary General of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly – with a five-year term which started on January 1, 2016 – is the Italian Roberto Montella, a conflict resolution expert who worked for years with the Organization in the Balkans.

Hence we must not think of a remake of the usual “European semester” to be served with bombastic statements, expensive conferences and zero facts, just to show off and publicize the national government.

The issue lies in thinking big, at last.

This is what Italy shall start to do if it wants to survive in the new international scenario.

Hence it shall make use of the largest organization for security in which as many as 57 countries operate, although it is an organization which has not yet full international personality.

However these are results to be reached on the field – not with official documents – as is the case with honor, respect, prestige and charisma.

So far we have seen the Vienna-based organization operating in the field of management and monitoring of elections. Nevertheless there is an extremely important functional factor for OSCE regarding – as by Statute – the settlement of international legal disputes. It is in this field that we must play our cards well.

We must not forget, however, the Warsaw-based office dealing with election observation missions.

In a phase in which there will be important elections – ranging from those scheduled in Somalia for next August to those in the Russian Federation on September 18, in Jordan on August 20, in Morocco on September 18, in the Palestinian West Bank and in Montenegro next October – the OSCE traditional monitoring activity projects the Vienna-based Organization onto the top of the current system of international relations.

This provided that it shifts from the observation of elections to a strategic project, which is not a mere “democratization”, but the redesign of international balances and alliances.

We hope that, with the Italian Presidency, the issue will not only be to monitor the formal regularity of the voting procedures, but to set a new mode of international political and strategic relations in the new global strategic scenario. This scenario has changed all the dreams of decision-makers following the end of the Cold War.

Certainly monitoring elections and, above all, making full use of the international legal affairs management system currently means having a flexible, wide, powerful, influential and universally recognized instrument.

This is designed to start to resolve some of the current global tensions and, in particular, to redesign the map of the balance of power, influence and stability.

Currently using the OSCE means being able to draw a new map of international balances outside the network of the old and now dead alliances: the Atlantic Alliance is increasingly a network à la carte, with Turkey playing its independent game in the Middle East and the United States which use the countries of the old Warsaw Pact to encircle Russia – not to mention the now countless NGOs only dealing with migration, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping or health, which are a direct expression of governments (over 54) or strictly regional organizations (at least 32 in this sector).

They are too small to be strategic and too weak to impose a new system of international relations, as well as too sectoral to solve even the problems they would like to solve.

They are all regional organizations and hence not very active: many of them are linked to the major governments of the various regional alliances, while others are still too specific in their scope to carry out strategic and geopolitical tasks and functions.

Therefore OSCE has the size, tradition and role to begin – with the Italian Presidency – to solve a series of problems that neither NATO, an organization which is currently experiencing weaknesses predicted as early as the end of the Cold War, nor the United Nations, too big and inhibited by cross vetoes, nor the EU, now Germany-centered and always deprived of a geopolitical project, nor other similar organizations can start to solve in a new and effective way.

Let us analyze the breaking points of the balance between Europe and the world’s great geopolitical areas which border on Europe or have traditional relations with it.

And let us examine how the OSCE could help us to solve them.

Meanwhile, we must still consider the Balkans.

Excessively fragmented, pending the end of the Cold War, to avoid the Slavonization of the region in relation to Russia, as well as the Serb hegemony, and to finally create independent, but not autonomous statelets, which would be EU members or small potentates.

Therefore the region is still unstable, dangerous, economically problematic and unable to be a rampart against the pressures exerted by the radical or non radical political Islam.

The Wahhabism imported from Saudi Arabia is still spreading like wildfire among the vast Muslim populations in the Balkans. In Bosnia the two different populations have never relinquished the separation project – either consensual or not – and the Republic of Srpska, namely the Serbian part of Bosnia, is threatening a referendum on independence to be held in 2018.

Moreover Kosovo is undergoing a deep economic crisis, but the local Serbs have recently gained the right to territorial autonomy, which has led to harsh demonstrations by the Albanian population that, with some naivety, the United States had promoted to the rank of hegemonic population in the region.

Just think that Kosovo is the “masterpiece” of the two Balkan wars between 1991 (Slovenia) and 1995 (the Croatian war of independence), then of the Bosnian war which began in 1992 and apparently ended in 1995, as well as of the actual Kosovo war, which began in 1991 and ended in 1999, followed by the insurgency in the Presevo valley from 1999 to 2001 and finally by the uprising in Macedonia in 2001.

The dates and number of wars show that the current solution is worse than the tensions which gave rise to the splitting and fragmentation of the Balkans, which has always been the greatest danger for the peace and stability of Europe (and also of its allies).

Here a great project of the OSCE Italian Presidency could be to follow again a great idea of an excellent Italian Foreign Affairs Minister, namely Gianni De Michelis.

Having already foreseen the silly indefinite fragmentation and splitting of the Balkan ethnic groups and micro-nations, in 1991 the Venetian Minister launched the so-called Pentagonal Initiative, later renamed the Hexagonal Initiative with the addition of Poland, which served to stabilize Central Europe, to allow its integrated development and to support the idea of a “united and democratic” Serbia, as well as to finally manage the large infrastructure aid which the Pentagonal Initiative could not fund on its own, but only through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

Furthermore, in Minister De Michelis’ mind, the problem was to remove the danger of triggering off more or less historically justified separatisms which would endanger Europe itself – as also happens today.

The issue is still pending and the OSCE could solve it – at least starting from the one-year Italian Presidency – by equipping itself with a series of financial and operational arms on the field, which are practicable considering its autonomy and legal specialization.

Moreover Macedonia is currently without a stable central government and the large Albanian minority is getting organized after some public demonstrations.

The OSCE solution could be a new alliance, a new wider “Pentagonal Initiative” supporting a network of alliances resulting from the crazy geopolitics of the Balkan splitting and fragmentation.

The issue still lies in linking economic aid and investment to a sound internal stability, to mutual military, strategic and commercial consultations between the countries in the region and finally to a new strategic stability pact between the EU and the whole system of micro-States resulting from the Balkan wars fought between the 1990s and 2002.

Here the issue does not lie in the usual and mere monitoring of the regularity of elections, as often happened in the OSCE brilliant history.

As the old saying goes, when the cat is away, the mice will play: once regular elections are over, the country destabilizes itself exactly as if they had not taken place.

The “daily referendum” – as the French historian Ernest Renan called the election process – only works if the political classes and the elites share relevant homogeneous traits.

Hence the real problem that the Italian Presidency shall solve is the “substantial legitimacy and lawfulness” of the micro-States’ actions, thus avoiding their coalescing towards the jihad exporting countries and the strategic porosity of the whole Balkan system which, as previously recalled, is the greatest threat to European stability.

This is the reason why a Pact among all 57 members of the Organization would be needed, ensuring the possibility of an interposition and stabilization intervention – also at military level – outside the NATO context and with the inevitable agreement of the other great country vitally interested in the Balkans, namely the Russian Federation.

Russia has been an OSCE Member State since June 1973.

Another point of tension that the organization could begin to solve is in the Greater Middle East. The Near East we knew in the past was an old design on the British map between London and the Indies: today it is the largest source of global instability and the point in which all the geopolitics threads converge, both eastwards and westwards.

Many of the smaller Islamic countries of the region are OSCE Member States: Turkmenistan (since 1992), Azerbaijan (since 1992), Uzbekistan (since 1992) and, more importantly, Turkey, which is an OSCE Member State since 1973.

At this juncture the issue lies in encompassing Israel, which is not a member of the Organization, along with some other countries in the region.

The Jewish State is even the key to the new OSCE which should start with the Italian Presidency: firstly, it would be the pivotal link between the Organization and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, the new “Silk Road” between East and West proposed by the Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Nevertheless China, too, is not an OSCE Member State – hence the quick and anti-bureaucratic role played by the Organization’s “observer members”.

Moreover, Israel could provide to the OSCE its great economic and technological potential, which is essential for the new foreign policy which is in the offing.

And in so doing Israel could also reconnect its foreign policy with a wide network of alliances and mutual balances which it currently lacks in the new Middle East devastated by the jihad.

Nothing prevents, however, that the entry of new countries in the region allows to implement less war-directed rules and regulations than the current ones, in a context of relaxation of tensions in the region in which Israel could also avoid the two-way relationship both with the Russian Federation, which has other interests in the region, and with some Iran’s Islamist enemies, with which Israel’s relations are bound to be written on water.

Hence to make Israel get out of the current strategic cul de sac and impose, at least on a part of the Arab world, new negotiations, outside the Cold War myths – for example, we can here consider the hypothesis, never relinquished by Saudi Arabia, of an exchange between territories and pan-Arab (Sunni) recognition.

Old stuff, which could be overcome if the OSCE proposed itself not only as an organization capable of managing elections, but also as an organization active in conflict resolution within a new context, by involving old and new regional and global players in the negotiations.

I am referring to Russia, China, as well as many Central Asian republics, and even to the United States which, in this case, would see their leadership within NATO be less burdensome for them.

Another issue to be considered in the new OSCE set-up here proposed is Great Britain’s new economic and strategic integration after the Brexit.

Great Britain is now an autonomous country, but it cannot fully use its Commonwealth, in which many countries now have size and interests which are very different from the British ones. It is currently outside the EU political context, regardless of the date of its formal exit from the European Community.

Great Britain has been an OSCE Member State since June 1973 and the network we are planning for the new organization is such as to mostly replace the system of alliances that Great Britain had reached with the EU throughout its long membership.

Hence support on an equal footing and not monopolized by the European concert for the new British globalization.

We must be well aware that while the UK cannot do without the European strategic system, which is its natural bulwark for geopolitical security, not even the EU can do without Great Britain, a member of its military nuclear club and a country of great influence within the UN Security Council, as well as a globally strong and autonomous financial center.

The EU is blind without Great Britain, while the latter could become deaf without a network uniting the EU and the rest of the world, such as the OSCE.

Hence, with its integrated system of international relations and its legal expertise, which could be used both in trade negotiations and in more strictly strategic ones, the Organization could be a good way to recover Great Britain, which cannot leave the EU alone.

Therefore I am thinking, first and foremost, to a large OSCE Conference on the Greater Middle East, in which some basic points would be established: a) Israel’s universal recognition and the equivalent right to its autonomous self-defense; 2) an Israeli system of relations, through the OSCE, with all regional and global players without the dangerous burden of interactions with the United Nations and NATO; 3) the redesign – not imitating the Balkan follies – of the Arab areas in the region, with an OSCE interim protection for small countries and such a border protection as to finally prevent the Islamic globalization, namely the jihad.

Briefly a “Pentagonal Initiative” for the Middle East.

In the Balkan region which, as we all know, has always been the hotbed of European instability, we shall follow the heritage left by former Minister Gianni De Michelis: stabilization of the region; avoidance of the crazy virus of ethnic fragmentation and splitting; the network of intra-State aid which, in this new strategy, could be integrated with the Chinese aid of the Road and Belt initiative.

The great OSCE Conference should make Great Britain come back into play in the international system, precisely through the Organization, so as to recover it to a Grand Strategy without too many debts with the United States and suitable for what is still a major world power.

Once again, through the OSCE, Israel could establish its new network of international relations, thus quelling many Arab countries which, although not being members of the Organization, are too experienced to neglect it.

Hence the issue lies in shifting – by also making OSCE acquire autonomous international personality – from an Organization only monitoring elections to an Organization which, pending the structural crises of the others, plans and designs a new geopolitics in the most important points of tension: the Balkans, Northern and Eastern Europe and, above all, the Greater Middle East.

It is a major challenge to which the OSCE Italian Presidency should be able to rise up.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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An Underdeveloped Discipline: Open-Source Intelligence and How It Can Better Assist the U.S. Intelligence Community

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Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is defined by noted intelligence specialists Mark Lowenthal and Robert M. Clark as being, “information that is publicly available to anyone through legal means, including request, observation, or purchase, that is subsequently acquired, vetted, and analyzed in order to fulfill an intelligence requirement”. The U.S. Naval War College further defines OSINT as coming from, “print or electronic form including radio, television, newspapers, journals, the internet, and videos, graphics, and drawings”. Basically, OSINT is the collection of information from a variety of public sources, including social media profiles and accounts, television broadcasts, and internet searches.

Historically, OSINT has been utilized by the U.S. since the 1940s, when the United States created the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) which had the sole goal (until the 1990s) of, “primarily monitoring and translating foreign-press sources,” and contributing significantly during the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It was also during this time that the FBIS transformed itself from a purely interpretation agency into one that could adequately utilize the advances made by, “personal computing, large-capacity digital storage, capable search engines, and broadband communication networks”. In 2005, the FBIS was placed under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and renamed the Open Source Center, with control being given to the CIA.

OSINT compliments the other intelligence disciplines very well. Due to OSINT’s ability to be more in touch with public data (as opposed to information that is more gleaned from interrogations, interviews with defectors or captured enemies or from clandestine wiretaps and electronic intrusions), it allows policymakers and intelligence analysts the ability to see the wider picture of the information gleaned. In Lowenthal’s own book, he mentions how policymakers (including the Assistant Secretary of Defense and one of the former Directors of National Intelligence (DNI)) enjoyed looking at OSINT first and using it as a “starting point… [to fill] the outer edges of the jigsaw puzzle”.

Given the 21stcentury and the public’s increased reliance upon technology, there are also times when information can only be gleaned from open source intelligence methods. Because “Terrorist movements rely essentially on the use of open sources… to recruit and provide virtual training and conduct their operations using encryption techniques… OSINT can be valuable [in] providing fast coordination among officials at all levels without clearances”. Intelligence agencies could be able to outright avoid or, at a minimum, be able to prepare a defense or place forces and units on high alert for an imminent attack.

In a King’s College-London research paper discussing OSINT’s potential for the 21stcentury, the author notes, “OSINT sharing among intelligence services, non-government organizations and international organizations could shape timely and comprehensive responses [to international crises or regime changes in rogue states like Darfur or Burma],” as well as providing further information on a country’s new government or personnel in power. This has been exemplified best during the rise of Kim Jong-Un in North Korea and during the 2011 Arab Spring and 2010 earthquake that rocked Haiti. However, this does not mean that OSINT is a superior discipline than other forms such as SIGINT and HUMINT, as they are subject to limitations as well. According to the Federation of American Scientists, “Open source intelligence does have limitations. Often articles in military or scientific journals represent a theoretical or desired capability rather than an actual capability. Censorship may also limit the publication of key data needed to arrive at a full understanding of an adversary’s actions, or the press may be used as part of a conscious deception effort”.

There is also a limit to the effectiveness of OSINT within the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), not because it is technically limited, but limited by the desire of the IC to see OSINT as a full-fledged discipline. Robert Ashley and Neil Wiley, the former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and a former Principal Executive within the ODNI respectively, covered this in a July article for DefenseOne, stating “…the production of OSINT is not regarded as a unique intelligence discipline but as research incident to all-source analysis or as a media production service… OSINT, on the other hand, remains a distributed activity that functions more like a collection of cottage industries. While OSINT has pockets of excellence, intelligence community OSINT production is largely initiative based, minimally integrated, and has little in the way of common guidance, standards, and tradecraft… The intelligence community must make OSINT a true intelligence discipline on par with the traditional functional disciplines, replete with leadership and authority that enables the OSINT enterprise to govern itself and establish a brand that instills faith and trust in open source information”. This apprehensiveness by the IC to OSINT capabilities has been well documented by other journalists.

Some contributors, including one writing for The Hill, has commented that “the use of artificial intelligence and rapid data analytics can mitigate these risks by tipping expert analysts on changes in key information, enabling the rapid identification of apparent “outliers” and pattern anomalies. Such human-machine teaming exploits the strengths of both and offers a path to understanding and even protocols for how trusted open-source intelligence can be created by employing traditional tradecraft of verifying and validating sourcing prior to making the intelligence insights available for broad consumption”. Many knowledgeable and experienced persons within the Intelligence Community, either coming from the uniformed intelligence services or civilian foreign intelligence agencies, recognize the need for better OSINT capabilities as a whole and have also suggested ways in which potential security risks or flaws can be avoided in making this discipline an even more effective piece of the intelligence gathering framework.

OSINT is incredibly beneficial for gathering information that cannot always be gathered through more commonly thought of espionage methods (e.g., HUMINT, SIGINT). The discipline allows for information on previously unknown players or new and developing events to become known and allows policymakers to be briefed more competently on a topic as well as providing analysts and operators a preliminary understanding of the region, the culture, the politics, and current nature of a developing or changing state. However, the greatest hurdle in making use of OSINT is in changing the culture and the way in which the discipline is currently seen by the U.S. Intelligence Community. This remains the biggest struggle in effectively coordinating and utilizing the intelligence discipline within various national security organizations.

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Online Radicalization in India

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Radicalization, is a gradual process of developing extremist beliefs, emotions, and behaviours at individual, group or mass public levels. Besides varied groups, it enjoys patronization, covertly and even overtly from some states. To elicit change in behavior, beliefs, ideology, and willingness, from the target-group, even employment of violent means is justified. Despite recording a declination in terror casualties, the 2019 edition of the Global Terrorism Index claims an increase in the number of terrorism-affected countries. With internet assuming a pivotal role in simplifying and revolutionizing the communication network and process, the change in peoples’ lives is evident. Notably, out of EU’s 84 %, daily internet using population, 81%, access it from home (Eurostat, 2012, RAND Paper pg xi). It signifies important changes in society and extremists elements, being its integral part, internet’ role, as a tool of radicalization, cannot be gainsaid. Following disruption of physical and geographical barriers, the radicalized groups are using the advancement in digital technology:  to propagate their ideologies; solicit funding; collecting informations; planning/coordinating terror attacks; establishing inter/intra-group communication-networks; recruitment, training and media propaganda to attain global attention.  

               Indian Context

In recent times, India has witnessed an exponential growth in radicalization-linked Incidents, which apparently belies the official figures of approximate 80-100 cases. The radicalization threat to India is not only from homegrown groups but from cross-border groups of Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as global groups like IS. Significantly, Indian radicalized groups are exploiting domestic grievances and their success to an extent, can mainly be attributed to support from Pakistani state, Jihadist groups from Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Gulf-employment boom for Indian Muslims has also facilitated radicalization, including online, of Indian Muslims. A close look at the modus operandi of these attacks reveals the involvement of local or ‘homegrown’ terrorists. AQIS formed (2016) ‘Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind’ in Kashmir with a media wing ‘al-Hurr’.

IS announced its foray into Kashmir in 2016 as part of its Khorasan branch. In December 2017 IS in its Telegram channel used hashtag ‘Wilayat Kashmir’ wherein Kashmiri militants stated their allegiance with IS. IS’ online English Magazine ‘Dabiq’ (Jan. 2016) claimed training of fighters in Bangladesh and Pakistan for attacks from western and Eastern borders into India.Though there are isolated cases of ISIS influence in India, the trend is on the rise. Presently, ISIS and its offshoots through online process are engaged in spreading bases in 12 Indian states. Apart from southern states like Telangana, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu — where the Iran and Syria-based terrorist outfit penetrated years ago — investigating agencies have found their links in states like Maharashtra, West Bengal, Rajasthan, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir as well. The Sunni jihadists’ group is now “most active” in these states across the country.

               Undermining Indian Threat

Significantly, undermining the radicalization issue, a section of intelligentsia citing lesser number of Indian Muslims joining al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and Islamic State (IS) in Iraq, Syria and Middle East, argue that Indian Muslim community does not support radicalism-linked violence unlike regional/Muslim countries, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Maldives. They underscore the negligible number of Indian Muslims, outside J&K, who supports separatist movements. Additionally, al- Qaeda and IS who follows the ‘Salafi-Wahabi’ ideological movement, vehemently oppose ‘Hanafi school’ of Sunni Islam, followed by Indian Muslims. Moreover, Indian Muslims follows a moderate version even being followers of the Sunni Ahle-Hadeeth (the broader ideology from which Salafi-Wahhabi movement emanates). This doctrinal difference led to the failure of Wahhabi groups online propaganda.  

               Radicalisation Strategies/methods: Indian vs global players

India is already confronting the online jihadist radicalization of global jihadist organisations, including al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), formed in September 2014 and Islamic State (IS). However, several indigenous and regional groups such as Indian Mujahideen (IM), JeM, LeT, the Taliban and other online vernacular publications, including Pakistan’s Urdu newspaper ‘Al-Qalam’, also play their role in online radicalisation.

Indian jihadist groups use a variety of social media apps, best suited for their goals. Separatists and extremists in Kashmir, for coordination and communication, simply create WhatsApp groups and communicate the date, time and place for carrying out mass protests or stone pelting. Pakistan-based terror groups instead of online learning of Islam consider it mandatory that a Muslim radical follows a revered religious cleric. They select people manually to verify their background instead of online correspondence. Only after their induction, they communicate online with him. However, the IS, in the backdrop of recent defeats, unlike Kashmiri separatist groups and Pak-based jihadist mercenaries, runs its global movement entirely online through magazines and pamphlets. The al-Qaeda’s you tube channels ‘Ansar AQIS’ and ‘Al Firdaws’, once having over 25,000 subscriptions, are now banned. Its online magazines are Nawai Afghan and Statements are in Urdu, English, Arabic, Bangla and Tamil. Its blocked Twitter accounts, ‘Ansarul Islam’ and ‘Abna_ul_Islam_media’, had a following of over 1,300 while its Telegram accounts are believed to have over 500 members.

               Adoption of online platforms and technology

Initially, Kashmir based ‘Jaish-E-Mohammad’ (JeM) distributed audio cassettes of Masood Azhar’s speeches across India but it joined Internet platform during the year 2003–04 and started circulating downloadable materials through anonymous links and emails. Subsequently, it started its weekly e-newspaper, Al-Qalam, followed by a chat group on Yahoo. Importantly, following enhanced international pressure on Pak government after 26/11, to act against terrorist groups, JeM gradually shifted from mainstream online platform to social media sites, blogs and forums.   

 Indian Mujahideen’s splinter group ‘Ansar-ul-Tawhid’ the first officially affiliated terror group to the ISIS tried to maintain its presence on ‘Skype’, ‘WeChat’ and ‘JustPaste’. IS and its affiliates emerged as the most tech-savvy jihadist group. They took several measures to generate new accounts after repeated suspension of their accounts by governments.  An account called as ‘Baqiya Shoutout’ was one such measure. It stressed upon efforts to re-establish their network of followers through ‘reverse shout-out’ instead of opening a new account easily.

Pakistan-backed terrorist groups in India are increasingly becoming  technology savvy. For instance, LeT before carrying out terrorist attacks in 2008 in Mumbai, used Google Earth to understand the targeted locations.

IS members have been following strict security measures like keeping off their Global Positioning System (GPS) locations and use virtual private network (VPN),  to maintain anonymity. Earlier they were downloading Hola VPN or a similar programme from a mobile device or Web browser to select an Internet Protocol (IP) address for a country outside the US, and bypass email or phone verification.

Rise of radicalization in southern India

Southern states of India have witnessed a rise in  radicalization activities during the past 1-2 years. A substantial number of Diaspora in the Gulf countries belongs to Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Several Indian Muslims in Gulf countries have fallen prey to radicalization due to the ultra-conservative forms of Islam or their remittances have been misused to spread radical thoughts. One Shafi Armar@ Yusuf-al-Hindi from Karnataka emerged as the main online IS recruiter for India.  It is evident in the number of raids and arrests made in the region particularly after the Easter bomb attacks (April, 21, 2019) in Sri Lanka. The perpetrators were suspected to have been indoctrinated, radicalised and trained in the Tamil Nadu. Further probe revealed that the mastermind of the attacks, Zahran Hashim had travelled to India and maintained virtual links with radicalised youth in South India. Importantly, IS, while claiming responsibility for the attacks, issued statements not only in English and Arabic but also in South Indian languages viz. Malayalam and Tamil. It proved the existence of individuals fluent in South Indian languages in IS linked groups in the region. Similarly, AQIS’ affiliate in South India ‘Base Movement’ issued several threatening letters to media publications for insulting Islam.

IS is trying to recruit people from rural India by circulating the online material in vernacular languages. It is distributing material in numerous languages, including Malayalam and Tamil, which Al Qaeda were previously ignoring in favour of Urdu. IS-linked Keralite followers in their propaganda, cited radical pro-Hindutva, organisations such as the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS) and other right-wing Hindu organisations to motivate youth for joining the IS.  Similarly, Anti-Muslim incidents such as the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 are still being used to fuel their propaganda. IS sympathisers also support the need to oppose Hindu Deities to gather support.

               Radicalization: Similarities/Distinctions in North and South

Despite few similarities, the radicalisation process in J&K is somewhat different from the states of Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Telangana and Gujarat. Both the regions have witnessed a planned radicalization process through Internet/social media for propagating extremist ideologies and subverting the vulnerable youth. Both the areas faced the hard-line Salafi/Wahhabi ideology, propagated by the extremist Islamic clerics and madrasas indulged in manipulating the religion of Islam. Hence, in this context it can be aptly claimed that terror activities in India have cooperation of elements from both the regions, despite their distinct means and objectives. Elements from both regions to an extent sympathise to the cause of bringing India under the Sharia Law. Hence, the possibility of cooperation in such elements cannot be ruled out particularly in facilitation of logistics, ammunitions and other requisite equipment.

It is pertinent to note that while radicalisation in Jammu and Kashmir is directly linked to the proxy-war, sponsored by the Pakistan state, the growth of radicalisation in West and South India owes its roots to the spread of IS ideology, promotion of Sharia rule and establishment of Caliphate. Precisely for this reason, while radicalised local Kashmiris unite to join Pakistan-backed terror groups to fight for ‘Azadi’ or other fabricated local issues, the locals in south rather remain isolated cases.

               Impact of Radicalisation

The impact of global jihad on radicalization is quite visible in West and South India. Majority of the radicalised people, arrested in West and South India, were in fact proceeding to to join IS in Syria and Iraq. It included the group of 22 people from a Kerala’s family, who travelled (June 2016) to Afghanistan via Iran. There obvious motivation was to migrate from Dar-ul-Harb (house of war) to Dar-ul-Islam (house of peace/Islam/Deen).

While comparing the ground impact of radicalization in terms of number of cases of local militants in J&K as well as IS sympathisers in West and South India, it becomes clear that radicalisation was spread more in J&K, owing to Pak-sponsored logistical and financial support. Significantly, despite hosting the third largest Muslim population, the number of Indian sympathisers to terror outfits, particularly in West and South India is very small as compared to the western countries. Main reasons attributed to this, include – religious and cultural pluralism; traditionally practice of moderate Islamic belief-systems; progressive educational and economic standards; and equal socio-economic and political safeguards for the Indian Muslims in the Indian Constitution.

               Challenges Ahead

Apart from varied challenges, including Pak-sponsored anti-India activities, regional, local and political challenges, media wings of global jihadi outfits continue to pose further challenges to Indian security agencies. While IS through its media wing, ‘Al Isabah’ has been circulating (through social media sites) Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s speeches and videos after translating them into Urdu, Hindi, and Tamil for Indian youth (Rajkumar 2015), AQIS too have been using its media wing for the very purpose through its offshoots in India.  Some of the challenges, inter alia include –

Islam/Cleric Factor Clerics continue to play a crucial role in influencing the minds of Muslim youth by exploiting the religion of Islam. A majority of 127 arrested IS sympathizers from across India recently revealed that they were following speeches of controversial Indian preacher Zakir Naik of Islamic Research Foundation (IRF). Zakir has taken refuge in Malaysia because of warrants against him by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) for alleged money laundering and inciting extremism through hate speeches. A Perpetrator of Dhaka bomb blasts in July 2016 that killed several people confessed that he was influenced by Naik’s messages. Earlier, IRF had organised ‘peace conferences’ in Mumbai between 2007 and 2011 in which Zakir attempted to convert people and incite terrorist acts. Thus, clerics and preachers who sbverts the Muslim minds towards extremism, remain a challenge for India.

Propaganda Machinery – The online uploading of young militant photographs, flaunting Kalashnikov rifles became the popular means of declaration of youth intent against government forces. Their narrative of “us versus them” narrative is clearly communicated, creating groundswell of support for terrorism.In its second edition (March 2020) of its propaganda magazine ‘Sawt al-Hind’ (Voice of Hind/India) IS, citing an old propaganda message from a deceased (2018) Kashmiri IS terrorist, Abu Hamza al-Kashmiri @ Abdul Rehman, called upon Taliban apostates and fighters to defect to IS.  In the first edition (Feb. 2020) the magazine, eulogized Huzaifa al-Bakistani (killed in 2019), asking Indian Muslims to rally to IS in the name of Islam in the aftermath of the 2020 Delhi riots. Meanwhile, a Muslim couple arrested by Delhi Police for inciting anti-CAA (Citizenship Amendment) Bill protests, were found very active on social media. They would call Indian Muslims to unite against the Indian government against the CAA legislation. During 2017 Kashmir unrest, National Investigation Agency (NIA) identified 79 WhatsApp groups (with administrators based in Pakistan), having 6,386 phone numbers, to crowd source boys for stone pelting. Of these, around 1,000 numbers were found active in Pakistan and Gulf nations and the remaining 5,386 numbers were found active in Kashmir Valley.

Deep fakes/Fake news – Another challenge for India is spread of misinformation and disinformation through deep fakes by Pakistan. Usage of deepfakes, in manipulating the speeches of local political leaders to spread hate among the youth and society was done to large extent.

India’s Counter Measures

To prevent youth straying towards extremism, India’s Ministry of Home Affairs has established a Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Radicalisation Division (CT-CR) to help states, security agencies and communities.

Various states, including Kerala, Maharashtra and Telangana have set up their own de-radicalisation programmes.  While in Maharashtra family and community plays an important role, in Kerala clerics cleanse the poisoned  minds of youth with a new narrative. A holistic programme for community outreach including healthcare, clergies and financial stability is being employed by the Indian armed forces. An operation in Kerala named Kerala state police’ ‘Operation Pigeon’ succeeded in thwarting radicalization of 350 youths to the propaganda of organizations such as Islamic State, Indian Mujahideen (IM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) via social media monitoring. In Telangana, outreach programs have been developed by local officers like Rema Rajeshwari to fight the menace of fake news in around 400 villages of the state.

In Kashmir the government resorts to internet curfews to control the e-jihad. While state-owned BNSL network, used by the administration and security forces, remains operational 3G and 4G networks and social media apps remain suspended during internet curfews.

Prognosis

India certainly needs a strong national counter- Radicalisation policy which would factor in a range of factors than jobs, poverty or education because radicalization in fact has affected even well educated, rich and prosperous families. Instead of focusing on IS returnees from abroad, the policy must take care of those who never travelled abroad but still remain a potential threat due to their vulnerability to radicalization.

Of course, India would be better served if deep fakes/fake news and online propaganda is effectively countered digitally as well as through social awakening measures and on ground action by the government agencies. It is imperative that the major stakeholders i.e. government, educational institutions, civil society organisations, media and intellectuals play a pro-active role in pushing their narrative amongst youth and society. The focus should apparently be on prevention rather than controlling the radicalisation narrative of the vested interests.

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Is Deterrence in Cyberspace Possible?

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Soon after the Internet was founded, half of the world’s population (16 million) in 1996 had been connected to Internet data traffic. Gradually, the Internet began to grow and with more users, it contributed to the 4 trillion global economies in 2016 (Nye, 2016). Today, high-speed Internet, cutting-edge technologies and gadgets, and increasing cross-border Internet data traffic are considered an element of globalization. Deterrence seems traditional and obsolete strategy, but the developed countries rely on cyberspace domains to remain in the global digitization. No matter how advanced they are, there still exist vulnerabilities. There are modern problems in the modern world. Such reliance on the Internet also threatens to blow up the dynamics of international insecurity. To understand and explore the topic it is a must for one to understand what cyberspace and deterrence are? According to Oxford dictionary;

 “Cyberspace is the internet considered as an imaginary space without a physical location in which communication over computer networks takes place (OXFORD University Press)”

For readers to understand the term ‘deterrence’; Collins dictionary has best explained it as;

“Deterrence is the prevention of something, especially war or crime, by having something such as weapons or punishment to use as a threat e.g. Nuclear Weapons (Deterrence Definition and Meaning | Collins English Dictionary).

The purpose of referring to the definition is to make it easy to discern and distinguish between deterrence in International Relations (IR) and International Cyber Security (ICS). Deterrence in cyberspace is different and difficult than that of during the Cold War. The topic of deterrence was important during Cold Wat for both politicians and academia. The context in both dimensions (IR and ICS) is similar and aims to prevent from happening something. Cyberspace deterrence refers to preventing crime and I completely agree with the fact that deterrence is possible in Cyberspace. Fischer (2019) quotes the study of (Quinlan, 2004) that there is no state that can be undeterrable.

To begin with, cyber threats are looming in different sectors inclusive of espionage, disruption of the democratic process and sabotaging the political arena, and war. Whereas international law is still unclear about these sectors as to which category they fall in. I would validate my affirmation (that deterrence is possible in Cyberspace) with the given network attacks listed by Pentagon (Fung, 2013). Millions of cyber-attacks are reported on a daily basis. The Pentagon reported 10 million cyberspace intrusions, most of which are disruptive, costly, and annoying. The level of severity rises to such a critical level that it is considered a threat to national security, so professional strategic assistance is needed to deal with it[1]. The past events show a perpetual threat that has the ability to interrupt societies, economies, and government functioning.

The cyberspace attacks were administered and portrayal of deterrence had been publicized as follows (Fung, 2013);

  1. The internet service was in a continuous disruption for several weeks after a dispute with Russia in 2007.
  2. Georgian defense communications were interrupted in 2008 after the Russian invasion of Georgia.   
  3. More than 1000 centrifuges in Iran were destroyed via the STUXNET virus in 2010. The attacks were attributed to Israel and the United States of America.
  4. In response to STUXNET virus attacks, Iran also launched a retaliatory attack on U.S financial institutions in 2012 and 2013.
  5. Similarly in 2012, some 30,000 computers had been destroyed with a virus called SHAMOON in Saudi Aramco Corporation. Iran was held responsible for these attacks.
  6. North Korea was accused of penetrating South Korean data and machines in 2014, thus interrupting their networks in 2014.
  7. A hybrid war was reported between Russia and Ukraine in 2015 that left Ukraine without electricity for almost six hours.
  8. Most critical scandal, which is still in the limelight call WikiLeaks released distressing and humiliating emails by Russian Intelligence at the time of the U.S presidential campaigns in 2016.

While such incidents may be considered a failure of deterrence, this does not mean that deterrence is impossible. Every system has some flaws that are exposed at some point. At this point, in some cases a relatively low level of deterrence was used to threaten national security, however, the attacks were quite minor in fulfilling the theme affecting national security. Nye (2016:51) in his study talks about the audience whose attribution could facilitate deterrence. (I). intelligence agencies should make sure highest safeguarding against escalation by third parties, and governments can also be certain and count on intelligence agencies’ sources. (II). the deterring party should not be taken easy, as I stated (above) about the lingering loopholes and flaws in the systems, hence, governments shall not perceive the intelligence forsaken.  (III). lastly, it is a political matter whether international and domestic audiences need to be persuaded or not, and what chunk of information should be disclosed.

The mechanisms which are used and helpful against cyberspace adversary actions are as follows (Fischer, 2019);

  1. Deterrence by denial means, the actions by the adversary are denied that they failed to succeed in their goals and objectives. It is more like retaliating a cyberattack.
  2. Threat of punishment offers severe outcomes in form of penalties and inflicting high costs on the attacker that would outweigh the anticipated benefits if the attack takes place.
  3. Deterrence by Entanglement has the features and works on a principle of shared, interconnected, and dependent vulnerabilities. The purpose of entanglement is to embolden and reassure the behavior as a responsible state with mutual interests.
  4. Normative taboos function with strong values and norms, wherein the reputation of an aggressor is at stake besides having a soft image in the eyes of the international community (this phenomenon includes rational factors because hard power is used against the weaker state). The deterrence of the international system works even without having any credible resilience.

Apparently, the mechanisms of deterrence are also effective in cyber realms. These realms are self-explaining the comprehensive understanding and the possibility of deterrence in cyberspace. The four mechanisms (denial, punishment, entanglement, and normative taboos) are also feasible to apply deterrence in the cyber world. Factually, of many security strategies, cyber deterrence by using four domains could be a versatile possibility. Conclusively, as far as the world is advancing in technological innovations, cyberspace intrusions would not stop alike the topic of deterrence in the digital world.


[1] An updated list of cyberspace intrusions from 2003 till 2021 is available at (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).

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