The red web: the struggle between Russia’s digital dictators and the new online revolutionaries. By Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan. New York: Public Affairs. 2015.
This book is a valuable addition to the growing body of material on the most hidden parts of the history of the Soviet Union and modern Russia such as state surveillance, the control over informational flows, and the history of various technologies.
The authors, Soldatov and Borogan are professional journalists, who dedicated their lives to ensure citizens are well informed, despite pressure from Putin’s regime. Given that fact, they base the study predominantly on interviews that the authors conducted in the 2010 s. This makes the book unique because recorded personal stories provide plenty of crucial details, revealing inconvenient truths and ruining official well-established interpretations. In addition to this, nowadays few individuals in Russia are ready to share experiences that would jeopardize their own or their relatives’ future; we have to credit the authors who found these respondents and persuaded them to come out of hiding. Everybody, from history lovers to scholars, will find something interesting in this book due to its absence of difficult terms, the logical structure, many unknown historical details, etc.
Focusing on modern Russia and freedom of the Internet, the authors begin their study from the Soviet Union circa 1949 in order to explain the roots of contemporary pressure on informational flows and show its evolution. The first part provides a sketchy description of government spying in phone communication and Soviet radio service, as well as control over radio frequencies and any printed materials. The authors repeatedly underline that the Soviet authorities realized the immeasurable power of information. It made them relentless in hunting for individuals who tried to find alternative sources of information, and vicious in their punishment. In this regard, the stories of the Paritsky family and Kopelev, who was a Soviet dissident, provide a vivid picture of the situation. In addition, the authorities always kept an eye on technologies that could have a detrimental impact on the existing political order. Through the gloomy story of Vladimir Fridkin’s photocopy machine, the authors describe how political goals jeopardize and even undermine technological progress.
The part on the history of media in the 1990s is very intriguing, it connected many aspects of previous issues from the Soviet past. The 1990s became a period of relative freedom and choice in the informational field. Many previously impossible ideas became real and were fulfilled by enthusiasts. The authors highlight that media accumulated a great influence on public opinion and turned into a powerful socio-political tool. Even the government recognized media as a powerful agent. There are many interesting facts about the emergence of post-Soviet journalism and the most popular media outlets such as Segodnya, Kommersant, etc. Following the government’s disarray after the fall of the USSR, state control over informational flows stopped being crucial for a period of time. The authors depict how the new authorities gradually reestablished their control, underlining that the government has persistently lagged behind informational progress. For a long time, Putin’s administration did not realize drastic changes, provoked by the emergence and spread of the Internet, which became a real nightmare for the political elite. According to the authors, the Russian authorities, which cherished Soviet repressive principles, have not been able to catch up to modern technological development and control informational flows as they did during the Soviet period. In this regard, Putin’s administration has tried to persuade people that the government is almighty and acquires the most sophisticated technologies. The authors stress that the government simply uses talks about technologies that are allegedly in the government’s possession for spreading fear within the Russian society. This fear helps the government to control Russians without even having such technologies. State censorship is very weak and underdeveloped. For instance, the Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications, or Roskomnadzor has proved to be ineffective and even counterproductive in fighting ISIS’s Internet propaganda. Roskomnadzor cannot even eliminate multiple ISIS accounts on the popular Russian network Vkontakte, which is under control of the secret service. ISIS’s supporters are much more versatile and inventive than this state department. One of their widely practiced methods to outwit the state and avoid closing down terrorist accounts is to mention in every post that the Islamic State is banned in the Russian Federation. Despite the fact that this method Has been used for at least one year, government agents still have not figured it out. The authors emphasize the role of Russian authorities, who, following outdated Soviet principles, believe that full control over any Internet platform can be reached by placing a pro-government supervisor in charge. Nonetheless, this tactic is fallacious and even dangerous in light of the unprecedented growth of The online presence of terrorists. In general, Soldatov and Borogan do an excellent job of outlining Putin’s war against freedom of the Internet.
Overall, this study is a mine of information drawn from personal stories previously unknown, revealing stunning details from witnesses on Russian modern and Soviet history, which make this complicated topic more understandable and interesting. The book is a creation by professionals who know the topic inside out. In this regard, their opinion and vision are worth attention and discussion.
