The Turkish Armed Forces are fighting both in the PKK Kurdish area and in the framework of the Inherent Resolve operation led by the United States against ISIS. This partially explains the scarce amount of ground forces available for the July coup against President Recep Tayyp Erdogan and his AKP. The “Justice and Development Party”, founded by Erdogan himself, resulted from the merger of various Islamist and conservatives parties in 2001.
Nevertheless the Turkish Constitutional Court started the procedure for the forced closure of the AKP as early as 2008, but the request for ceasing the Party’s activity was quashed by a single vote, although the Turkish constitutional judges continued to suspect the Party of “anti-secular activities” which, however, led to the 50% decrease of the public funding to the AKP.Hence President Erdogan’s Party is mainly linked to the Muslim Brotherhood which, in fact, with its web sites and propaganda, makes it an example of effective and “Muslim-oriented”, not “Islamist”, policy – the so-called “conservative democracy”, just to use its terminology.
However, with a view to better understanding the relationship between this Party, which is now a party-State, and the Armed Forces, reference must be made to the Ergenekon issue.
Ergenekon was the name of a clandestine network operating within the Turkish Armed Forces, which was destroyed by President Erdogan’s government in 2009.
As the mount of the Altai mountain range after which it is named, probably the organization still persists within the many military networks and it may also have spurred the recent coup.
In the Ergenekon case, the actions of the police – loyal to the AKP regime – were rather ambiguous.
As many as 194 military, sometimes high-ranking officers, were accused of plotting to overthrow the institutions and the Parliament, as well as stealing State secrets and organizing “terrorist” armed groups.
Probably the 2016 failed coup is exactly the result of old Ergenekon networks which, however, have no longer access to the intelligence services’ top leaders or to the still powerful judiciary, not yet loyal to the AKP rules.
The slapdash attitude with which some very recent actions have been carried out by the putschist Armed Forces, in their July attempt to take power, would suggest a misplaced trust in secret structures of the judiciary and the police forces, now full of AKP activists, as well as the National Intelligence Organization (MIT).
Hence let us analyze the coup sequence, which can also clarify the political sense of the military operations that took place in the night between July 15 and 16 last.
It is also highly likely that the military action has been stepped up by the fact that the rotation of the middle and top ranks of the Armed Forces would be implemented on August 1, 2016. Many of the members of these military ranks had already been involved in the coup of which there was talk in the international secretariats and NATO services for at least three months.
As stated by President Erdogan, the coup leaders included many officers linked to the movement of Fethullah Gulen, of whom we will analyze the role played in Turkey today. They included Akin Ozturk, the Air Force Chief of Staff, Colonel Muharrem Kose and other high-ranking military.
The coup had been announced on Friday night, with a document of the military that called for “a return to constitutional order, democracy, human rights and the rule of law”. The blockade of the “Ataturk” airport with tanks lasted approximately two hours, until the mass of “citizens” – or more probably AKP militants – forced the tanks to step aside.
No putschist can go against the will of the people they want to “liberate” and the mass of unarmed people is the best weapon to stop any kind of weapon system.
Hence a new countercoup by the mass and the rank-and-file organizations, probably already alerted, which invaded the streets and forced the tanks to retreat or stop, while the military perceived the use of the worst weapon against a coup, namely their isolation vis-à-vis the people.The Armed Forces commanders appeared on TV, dissociate themselves from the action still underway and ordered the troops to return back to their barracks.
However it is unthinkable that the commanders-in-chief did not know anything about the coup being prepared.
Clearly they let it go on, probably with a view to taking command and control at the right time, but the operation had been designed with a too small military shock mass to cover the sensitive targets, over and above other technical errors which are amazing for those dealing with military matters.
In fact, the intelligence headquarters were not hit severely. It is worth noting that the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) displays Ataturk’s profile on its coat of arms.
President Erdogan, who was on holiday in Bodrum, was not arrested, and possibly killed.
There was no effective bombing of the Parliament and the other government buildings, which had to be destroyed in the first phase of the coup.
In short, everything suggests that all the Turkish Armed Forces wanted to test the strength of the AKP regime so as to launch the final operation at a later stage.
Some press sources claim that the tension among the coup forces broke out when the government clearly gave the order to fight not against, but in favor, of ISIS in the future configuration of the Syrian region.If the US-Russian axis is strengthened – as appears from the latest statements made by both countries – Turkey, which wanted the Sunni part of Syria, will be marginalized.
Hence nothing better than starting again the old game of the more or less secret support to Daesh-Isis.
It is true that the putschists closed some social media, but not all of them and, after a short period of time, the TV started to broadcast again.
A coup is primarily a psychological warfare and communication operation.
Indeed, it is strange that the NATO troops and their officers were not trained to these techniques, which are now part and parcel of the basic training of any officer of the Alliance.
t is also strange that there was no reaction in the NATO centers, as the F-16 fighters of the putschists rose into the skies. There was no report, nor alarm.
The Incirlik base, which paradoxically hosts a powerful Command and Control centre of the Alliance, was also one of the points of the military rebellion, under the eyes of the United States and the other nations present.
It is worth recalling that, at the Incirlik base, the Turks cut the light off during the coup, while now the base hosts drones, A-10 aircraft, KC-135 tanker aircraft and part of the US elite units, along with the advanced weapons of other Member States of the Alliance participating in the Inherent Resolve operation.
Furthermore NATO did not even monitor President Erdogan’s jet, which was flying for at least five hours, and was not even attacked by the putschists’ air force that, at the time, was still in control of Istanbul skies.
Hence the Turkish President has his own intelligence network, made up of militants from his Party, who owe everything to him, as well as MIT officers and ordinary citizens capable of penetrating the Turkish “Kemalist” and secular networks, still very widespread among the population.
Another factor to be noted is Fethullah Gulen’s movement, upon which President Erdogan immediately laid the blame for the failed coup.
Gulen’s movement is certainly present, albeit secretly, in the Turkish society.
The Imam, who currently lives in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania, is the leader of a vast movement known as Hizmet.
It is a sort of Islamic sect (Gulen founded the AKP together with Erdogan) and a network of businesses, magazines and newspapers, schools and universities, while it is assumed that at least 10% of the Turkish population follows Gulen and his movement.
A movement which preaches peace with the Anatolian Alevis, the Kurds, the Christians and the Jews. It promotes a mystical Islam closely reminding of the Sufi sects which, together with the Italian Masonic lodges operating in Thessaloniki and Alexandria, covered up the development of the “Young Turks” movement.
Years ago, according to French sources, the Islamist leader Gulen began a vast operation to infiltrate his followers into the Turkish Armed Forces and even into the intelligence services, which have never been fully trusted by President Erdogan.
Hence probably Gulen’s involvement in the coup – as denounced by President Erdogan – is real, but it is completely irrational to connect Fethullah Gulen’s Islamist and pacifist preaching with the overtly Kemalist and secularist Armed Forces that carried out the failed coup. The link, if any, is to be find in the attitude of the United States, at first silent, then reluctant, and finally supporting the AKP “democracy”.
Turkey cannot be destabilized. The whole Alliance’s policy, and not just in the Middle East, is at stake.
If a coup must be carried out, it must be organized with almost all the Armed Forces, which have also been penetrated by the secret “Stasi” of the AKP and the Presidency that now do no longer trust anyone and aim at creating a great universal hub of the Middle East oil and gas, also thanks to the recent agreement with Israel and Russia.
A further source of enrichment for President Erdogan, who does not turn his nose up at any bakshish and is considered to be one of the richest men in the world.
Not to mention his family: his son Bilal is connected with the clandestine networks selling the ISIS oil, while his son-in-law, Berat Albayrak, former Energy Minister and current Prime Minister, is well-known for his oil operations off the record.
The real Turkish coup will take place when President Erdogan’s regime can no longer financially support its “militants” and when the people becomes aware of the immense wealth accumulated by the President behind the back of the much-proclaimed “Turkish people”.
At that juncture the masses will support the military. They will force the useless, silent and ridiculous EU to take a stance on the Turkish issue, without hiding behind the mirage of “fair elections” – indeed dubious. Probably the useless EU should wonder about the real use of the 3 billion euro per year it grants to Turkey to keep migrants on its territory.
US: No Restitution to Syria
On April 22nd, an anonymous U.S. “Senior Administration Official” told a press conference in Toronto, that the only possible circumstance under which the U.S. Government will agree to pay anything for the harms (bombings of infrastructure etc.) it’s doing to Syria, would be if Syria will agree to cede, to U.S. control, a portion of its land:
QUESTION: When you say no reconstruction money for areas that are under Assad’s control, there is some reconstruction money that’s currently frozen or under question for areas that are not under Assad’s control?
MODERATOR: That’s stabilization, which is different from reconstruction, just to clarify.
“Stabilization” is the solidification of control by the U.S. Government, via its proxies (‘rebels’ trained by U.S. and financed by the Sauds) who are fighting to overthrow Syria’s Government; and the U.S. won’t pay any reconstruction unless it’s “stabilizing” that particular part of Syria. If America’s 7-year-long effort at regime-change in Syria turns out to be a total failure (grabbing no part of its territory), then the U.S. won’t pay even a cent for restoration of Syria from its 7-year-long war to control that country via installing there rulers who will be doing the bidding of the royal Saud family, Saudi Arabia’s owners, who have been America’s direct agent all along in Syria to ultimately take over its Government. (America’s other main ally demanding regime-change in Syria is Israel, which is a Jewish theocracy; and, of course, no predominantly Muslim nation would accept being ruled by Jews of any sort — nor by any Christians. Consequently, the U.S. has been using the fundamentalist Sunni owners of Saudi Arabia — the Saud family (the world’s richest family) — as its agent to fund Syria’s ‘rebels’, and to select which of the ‘rebels’ constitute, at the U.N.-sponsored peace talks for Syria, the ‘opposition’ who are negotiating against Syria’s elected Government to rule the country.) The other participants, along with the Sauds who own Saudi Arabia, are the Thanis who own Qatar, and the six royal families who own United Arab Emirates — all likewise being fundamentalist Sunnis. Syria’s Government is committedly secularist and opposed to Sharia (Islamic) law. By installing a Sunni Sharia law government, the Sauds would take effective control over Syria — the U.S. would conquer that land.
On March 16th, the Washington Post bannered “Trump wants to get the U.S. out of Syria’s war, so he asked the Saudi king for $4 billion” and reported that “In a December phone call with Saudi Arabia’s King Salman, President Trump had an idea he thought could hasten a U.S. exit from Syria: Ask the king for $4 billion. By the end of the call, according to U.S. officials, the president believed he had a deal. The White House wants money from the kingdom and other nations to help rebuild and stabilize the parts of Syria that the U.S. military and its local allies have liberated from the Islamic State.” The U.S., in actual fact, had ignored ISIS in Syria until Russia on 30 September 2015, at Syria’s request, started bombing it and other jihadists there. After that, opposing ISIS became America’s excuse for its earlier and continuing demand that “Assad must go,” and America’s objective then became bombing and totally destroying ISIS’s Syrian headquarters in Raqqa so as for America and its allies to gain access to Syria’s oil-producing region. The U.S. had never bombed any of ISIS’s oil tanker trucks in Syria until it started doing that on 17 November 2015, after Russia had on September 30th begun its bombings in Syria. Ever since 1949, America’s real target in Syria has been to replace Syria’s Government, and this goes back long before ISIS even existed, anywhere; and Barack Obama had entered office in 2009 hoping to be the U.S. President who would achieve that decades-long U.S. and Saud and Israel objective. So, for the U.S. Government, Syria is to be conquered, never to be restituted unless and until, and only to the extent that, it is conquered.
On April 16th, the Wall Street Journal headlined “U.S. Seeks Arab Force and Funding for Syria: Under plan, troops would replace American military contingent after ISIS defeat and help secure country’s north; proposal faces challenges.” This report said that, “The initiative comes as the administration has asked Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to contribute billions of dollars to help restore northern Syria. It wants Arab nations to send troops as well, officials said.” The article closed: “Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. have helped pay the stipends for the Syrian fighters the U.S. is supporting, American officials say. Administration officials are calculating Arab nations will respond more favorably to a request from Mr. Trump, who already has asked Saudi Arabia to contribute $4 billion to restore former Islamic State-held areas of Syria.”
America’s plan also includes taking control over the dams that supply water to the rest of Syria; so, the goal remains strangulation of Syria’s Government, even if outright conquest of it remains beyond reach.
On 10 June 2017, a meeting was held in Syria’s northeastern city of Qamishli, which borders Turkey, and where Syrian tribal leaders met with America’s allies and with U.S. Colonel John Dorrian (shown here holding a press briefing on a different occasion), at which, according to the Turkish newspaper reporting the event, “Representatives agreed on a pipeline route. Radical decisions were made regarding the extraction, processing and marketing of the underground wealth of the Haseke, Raqqah and Deir ez Zor regions, which hold 95 percent of Syrian oil and natural gas’ potential.” However, as of yet, Trump hasn’t been able to achieve the type of deal that he is aiming for. On April 18th, that same Turkish newspaper bannered “US to build Arab force in NE Syria as part of new ploy: The US is seeking to amass an Arab force in northeastern Syria comprised of funding and troops from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE.” So, perhaps there will be a portion of Syria that the U.S. will “stabilize” or even, just maybe, restitute for damages done in the effort to conquer it.
Whitney Webb has provided an excellent comprehensive view on which Syrian assets the U.S. Government is hoping to win.
Saudi engagement in Iraq: The exception that confirms the rule?
Stepped up Saudi efforts to forge close diplomatic, economic and cultural ties to Shia-majority Iraq in a bid to counter significant Iranian influence in the country appear to be paying off. The Saudi initiative demonstrates the kingdom’s ability to engage rather than exclusively pursue a muscular, assertive and confrontational policy towards the Islamic republic and its perceived allies. It raises the question whether it is a one-off or could become a model for Saudi policy elsewhere in the region.
The kingdom’s recent, far more sophisticated approach to Iraq is testimony to the fact that its multi-billion dollar, decades-long support for Sunni Muslim ultra-conservatism that at times involved funding of both violent and non-violent militants had failed in Iraq. It constitutes recognition that Saudi Arabia’s absence effectively gave Iran a free reign.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Iraqi charm offensive amounts to a far more concerted and successful effort than attempts more than a decade ago by then Saudi King Abdullah to reach out to Iraqi Shiite leaders, including firebrand Muqtada al-Sadr and involving the organization of a meeting in Mecca between Sunni and Shia Iraqi religious leaders. King Abdullah’s efforts did not at the time involve a crackdown on funding by Saudi sources of a devastating Sunni Muslim insurgency.
King Abdullah’s initiative notwithstanding, Saudi policy towards Iraq for more than a decade since Iraq’s Shiite majority emerged from the shadow of Saddam Hussein’s minority Sunni Muslim rule as a result of the 2003 US invasion was one of non-engagement, sectarianism, and support of the country’s Sunni minority.
It took the kingdom 11 years to open its first embassy in post-Saddam Iraq, the kingdom’s first diplomatic presence in the country since it broke off diplomatic relations in 1990 because of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. Even then, relations got off to a rocky start with Iraq demanding the replacement of the kingdom’s first ambassador, Thamer al-Sabhan, after he publicly criticised Iranian involvement in Iraqi affairs and the alleged persecution of Iraqi Sunni Muslims.
The emergence in 2014 of Iraqi prime minister Haider al-Abadi, who succeeded Nuri al-Maliki, seen by the Saudis as an Iranian pawn, coupled with the rise of Prince Mohammed and the Saudi charm offensive in the wake of the defeat of the Islamic state has produced a remarkable turnaround that holds out the prospect of the kingdom becoming an influential player in the reconstruction of war-ravaged Iraq.
Beyond the opening of the embassy, Saudi Arabia is slated to open a consulate in Basra as well as in Najaf, widely seen as Shia Islam’s third most holy city that rivals Iran’s Qom as a centre of Shiite learning. Unconfirmed reports suggest that Prince Mohammed may visit Najaf after Iraqi elections scheduled for May 12.
The two countries have reopened their Arar Border Crossing that was closed for 27 years and restored commercial air traffic for the first time in more than a quarter of a century. More than 60 Saudi companies participated earlier this year in the Baghdad International Fair.
A Saudi Arabia-Iraq Coordination Council, inaugurated last year aims to strengthen security ties as well as economic and cultural relations envisions student and cultural exchanges and Saudi investment in oil and gas, trade, transport, education, light industry, and agriculture. Saudi Arabia pledged $1.5 billion for Iraqi reconstruction at a donors’ conference in Kuwait in February.
Saudi Arabia garnered substantial brownie points in February by playing its first soccer match in Iraq in almost three decades, boosting Iraqi efforts to persuade world soccer body FIFA to lift its ban on Iraqi hosting of international matches. The kingdom subsequently promised to build a 100,000-seat football stadium in Baghdad.
In shifting gears in Iraq, Prince Mohammed appears to have broken with decades of Saudi efforts to primarily confront Iran in proxy and covert wars. It remains, however, unclear to what degree Prince Mohammed’s policy shift in Iraq is an indication of a broader move away from sectarianism and support for ultra-conservative militants and towards engagement.
The record is mixed. Saudi Shiite activists see little positive change and, if anything, assert that repression in their heartland in the kingdom’s Eastern Province has increased since Prince Mohammed’s rise.
“Bin Salman is already acting like he’s the king of Saudi Arabia. He keeps telling the West that he will reform Islam, but he keeps raiding the homes of Shia and stripping us of any political rights,” one activist said.
Nonetheless, a Saudi-funded Bangladeshi plan to build moderate mosques to counter militancy, the kingdom’s relinquishing of control of the Grand Mosque in Brussels, and the newly found propagation of tolerance and inter-faith dialogue by the government-controlled World Muslim League that for decades funded ultra-conservatism globally would suggest that Saudi money may be invested in attempting to curb the impact of the kingdom’s decades-long support of ultra-conservatism.
There are, however, also indications that Prince Mohammed is not averse to funding militants when it suits his geopolitical purpose. Saudi funds have flowed since his rise in 2015 to militant religious seminaries in the Pakistani province of Balochistan at a time that the kingdom was drafting plans to destabilize Iran by exploiting grievances and stirring unrest among Iran’s ethnic minorities, including the Baloch. Those plans have not left the drawing board and may never do so, but ultra-conservative militants figure prominently in them.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the shifting of gears in Saudi policy towards Iraq as well as other steps that Prince Mohammed has taken to curb, redirect, and reduce, if not halt, Saudi support for militant ultra-conservatism is highlighted by the conclusions of a 2002 study of funding of political violence conducted by the New York-based Council of Foreign Relations.
Coming in the wake of the 9/11 attacks when Saudi funding and counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States was put under the magnifying glass, the study suggested that the kingdom’s global support for ultra-conservatism was woven into its fabric.
“It may well be the case that if Saudi Arabia…were to move quickly to share sensitive financial information with the United States, regulate or close down Islamic banks, incarcerate prominent Saudi citizens or surrender them to international authorities, audit Islamic charities, and investigate the hawala system—just a few of the steps that nation would have to take—it would be putting its current system of governance at significant political risk,” the study warned.
In many ways, Saudi support for the Iraqi insurgency was a textbook example of the decades-long, $100 billion Saudi campaign to confront Iran globally by promoting ultra-conservatism and sectarianism and in a minority of countries – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Iraq and Syria – funding violence.
Nawaf Obaid, a Saudi scholar with close ties to the government, said Saudi options at the height of the Sunni Muslim insurgency included supplying the insurgents with the same type of funding, arms and logistical support that Iran was giving to Shiite armed groups. Another option, he said, was to create new Sunni brigades to combat the Iranian-backed militias.
“Saudi engagement in Iraq carries great risks — it could spark a regional war. So be it: The consequences of inaction are far worse,” Mr. Obaid said in 2006.
US and Iraqi officials at the time suspected Saudi Arabia of covertly supporting sectarian Sunni jihadist insurgents opposed to the US military presence in the country and the rise of a Shia-dominated government. While there was no evidence of government assistance, the lines between the actions of private citizens and authorities were and remain often blurred in the kingdom.
An Iraq Study Group report in 2006 at the height of the Sunni Muslim insurgency concluded that “funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals within Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.”
Without identifying them, Iraqi officials asserted that funds were also flowing from Saudi charities that often operated as governmental non-government organizations. They said some of the funds had been channelled through Saudi clerics who decided who the beneficiary would be.
Truck drivers at the time described transporting boxes of cash from Saudi Arabia that were destined for insurgents. The transports frequently coincided with pilgrimages to Mecca.
“They sent boxes full of dollars and asked me to deliver them to certain addresses in Iraq. I know it is being sent to the resistance, and if I don’t take it with me, they will kill me,” one driver said. He said he was instructed to hide the money from authorities at the Iraqi border.
One official said $25 million was sent by a Saudi religious scholar to a senior Iraqi Sunni cleric who bought Russian Strela shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles on the black market in Romania.
Baath Party loyalists claimed at the time that a US Air Force F-16 jet that crashed while flying in support of American soldiers fighting insurgents in Anbar province had been downed by a Strela. The US military denied the claim.
“We have stockpiles of Strelas and we are going to surprise them (the Americans),” a spokesman for the party, said.
The Iraqi cleric involved in the purchase of the missiles was suspected to be Sheikh Harith Sulaiman al-Dhari, a tribal chieftain dubbed “the Spiritual Leader of the Iraqi Resistance” with a lineage of opposition to foreign rule dating back to the killing in 1920 of a British colonel by his father and grandfather. Iraqi authorities issued an arrest warrant for Mr. Al-Dhari in late 2006, who has since passed away, on charges of inciting sectarian violence after he visited Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia’s approach to Iraq has come a long way since the days of the insurgency. The question is whether the kingdom will draw a lesson from its success in the way it manages its regional rivalry with Iran. So far, there is little indication that Iraq is more than the exception that confirms the rule.
Said political analyst Hussein Ibish in a just published study of Saudi-Iraqi relations: “Iraq is the only major regional battleground at present in which Saudi Arabia is relying almost entirely on carrots rather than sticks. Yet, arguably, more has been accomplished by Riyadh over the past year in Iraq than, for example, in either Yemen or Lebanon… Saudi Arabia’s outreach in Iraq, particularly in 2017, belies the stereotype of a rash, reckless, and uncontrolled new major regional actor, showing instead that Saudi Arabia can be deft and delicate when it wants to. That’s an important lesson for the rest of the world, but also for Saudi Arabia itself, to ponder.”
Many sources think that the most significant clashes in Syria are likely to end late this year.
Probably the small clashes between the various ethnic groups and hence among their external points of reference will not end yet. The bulk of armed actions, however, will certainly finish since now the areas of influence are stabilized.
The first fact that stands out is that, despite everything, Bashar al-Assad’s forces have won.
All the international actors operating on the ground -be they friends or foes – have no difficulty in recognizing it.
Certainly neither Assad nor Russia alone have the strength to rebuild the country, but Western countries – especially those that have participated in the fight against Assad – and the other less involved countries plan to participate in the reconstruction process, with a view to influencing Syria, although peacefully this time.
The military start of Assad’s victory was the Northwest campaign of the Syrian Arab Forces from October 2017 to February 2018.
Operations against what the United States calls “rebels” -namely, in that case, Isis and Tahrir al-Sham – focused at that time on the intersection between the provinces of Hama, Idlib and Aleppo.
It is extremely difficult for a regular army to conduct operations against guerrilla organizations, but Assad’ Syrian Arab Army has succeeded to do so.
The subsequent destruction of Isis-Daesh pockets south of Damascus, in Eastern Ghouta and Idlib was decisive to later establish stable and undisputed hegemony of the Syrian forces throughout the Syrian territory – and above all in traditionally Sunni areas.
There is also the issue of Al-Rastan, the ancient town of Arethusa on the Orontes river, located on the side of the bridge uniting Hama and Homs. From the beginning of hostilities, it has been a basis for the jihadism of the so-called “rebels”.
Another military problem is the opening of the bridge and the commercial passage on the border between Syria and the Lebanon, namely Al-Nasib, which is essential for Syria’s trade with Jordan and the Gulf countries.
Conquering the Al-Nasib pass means conquering also the road between Deraa and Damascus, as well as the Syrian side of the Djebel Druze.
Between the Deraa-Damascus road and the Golan, the situation is still largely frozen thanks to the agreement reached by the Russian Federation with the United States and Israel, in which the former guaranteed to the Jewish State that Iran and Hezb’ollah would not get close – up to the limit of 25 miles (40 kilometers) – to the old ceasefire line established in 1973.
Moreover, even though the representatives of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, commonly known as Rojava, were never accepted in the negotiations between the parties in conflict, the Kurds – already abandoned by the United States – know that the territories they freed from Isis-Daesh will be returned precisely to the Sunni Arabs, but in exchange for the autonomy of the traditionally Kurdish districts of Afrin, Kobane and Qamishli.
Furthermore, since the Sochi Conference on the Congress of Syrian National Dialogue held at the end of January 2018, Russia has convinced the 1,500 participants from the various parts of Syria to accept the fact that every ethnic and religious area and every group of Syrian society must be respected and protected by the new Constitution. A break with the old Ba’athist and centralist tradition of the Syrian regime, but without reaching the Lebanese paradox, i.e. permanent civil war.
The political process envisaged by Russia is a process in which the Westerners still present in the Syrian territory had no say in the matter.
Nor will they have it in the future.
The going will be really tough when the time of reconstruction comes.
Reconstruction is the most important future lever for external influence on the long-suffering Syrian Arab Republic, where conflict has been going on for seven years.
The World Bank estimates the cost of reconstruction at 250 billion dollars.
Other less optimistic, but more realistic estimates point to a cost for Syrian national reconstruction up to 400 and even 600 billion US dollars.
Syria does not even dream of having all these capital resources, which even the Russian Federation cannot deploy on its own.
Six years after the outbreak of the conflict, in 2011, the great diaspora of Syrian businessmen met in Germany in late February 2017.
Hence the creation of the Syrian International Business Association (SIBA).
With specific reference to the great Syrian reconstruction, the Russian, Iranian and Chinese governments are already active and have already secured the largest contracts in the oil and gas, minerals, telecommunications, real estate and electricity sectors.
As far as we know, there is no similar investment by Western countries, which will still leave the economic power they planned to acquire in the hands of other countries, after having caused the ill-advised but failed “Arab Spring” in Syria.
Also the BRICS and countries such as the Lebanon, Armenia, Belarus and Serbia invest in Syria, or at least in the regions where peace has been restored and the “Caliphate” does no longer exist.
Usually collaboration takes place through the purchase of pre-existing companies in Syria – something which now happens every day- or through bilateral collaborations with Syrian companies.
With specific reference to regulations, Syria is continuously changing the rules regarding the structure of operating companies, work permits, imports and currency transfers.
State hegemony, in the old Ba’athist tradition – the old Syrian (but also Egyptian) national Socialism which, however, adapts itself to the structure of current markets.
It is estimated that Syrian companies can already provide 50% of the 300 billion US dollars estimated by the World Bank as cost for Syria’s reconstruction.
An estimate that many still think to be rather optimistic.
Nevertheless, it will take at least thirty years to bring Syrian back to the conditions in which it was before hostilities began.
With rare effrontery and temerity, the United States and the European Union are already putting pressure on the Syrian government to be granted economic and political concessions, but Assad has no intention of giving room to its old enemies.
In any case, the Syrian reconstruction will need at least 30 million tons of goods per year from sea lines, while the Latakia and Tartus airports can – at most – allow loads of 15 million tons/year.
From this viewpoint, the Lebanon is organizing a Special Economic Zone around the port of Tripoli, already adapted by China to the international transport of vast flows of goods in cargoes and containers.
Obviously the companies going to work in Syria must also take the physical safety of their workers and their offices into account, as well as the need to have constant, careful and close relations with local authorities.
Furthermore, the US sanction regime also favours President Trump’s plan to topple the Syrian regime through economic pressure, which would make also the work of European companies in Syria very difficult or even impossible.
However what is the need for destroying Syria economically? For pure sadism? The current US foreign policy is not unpredictable, it is sometimes crazy.
The US sanctions, however, concern the new investment of US citizens in Syria; the re-exporting or exporting of goods and services to Syria; the importing of Syrian oil or gas into the United States;the transactions of Syrian goods and services carried out by non-US citizens also involving a US citizen.
Other sanctions will soon be imposed by President Trump on the Russian Federation due to its “tolerance” for the increasingly alleged factories of nerve gas and materials.
Obviously the fact that the Syrian regime is the winner of military confrontation, along with Russia and Iran, is now a certainty.
Nevertheless, loyalist Syrians are still badly supplied, both at military and civilian levels, and they are severely dependent on external aid, which is decisive also for their survival and for preserving their strategic and military superiority.
Without Russia and Iran, Bashar al-Assad would have collapsed within two months since the beginning of the “Syrian spring”, when the Muslim Brotherhood organized by the United States was demonstrating in the streets violently.
Hence, in the current stability of the Syrian regime, nothing must be taken for granted: the end or decrease of Russian support and the fast return back home of the Iranian Pasdaran and Afghan Shiites organized by Iran would bring Assad’s military and civilian power back to the 2011 level.
Nevertheless Syria does no longer exist as a Soviet-style centralized State.
In Assad-led Syria the centralized economy does no longer exist, for the excellent reason that four primary military powers operate in the country, namely Russia, Iran, Turkey and the United States.
They collectively control all the Syrian resources on which the Syrian national government no longer has any power.
As can be easily imagined, the United States holds oil reserves by means of their occupation – through the Kurds – of Raqqa and the Northeastern region.
Turkey holds a nominally Syrian region of approximately 2,400 square kilometers between Aleppo and Idlib, in the area of the “Euphrates Shield” operations.
Russia and Iran already hold the majority of reconstruction contracts, while they will acquire most of the public sector to repay the military expenses they incurred to keep Bashar al-Assad’s regime in power.
Hence if no agreements are reached between Russia and the United States, each area of influence will have different reconstruction and development plans.
As early as the 1945-1958 period, Syria had been the target of expansionist designs that were anyway bound to fragment its territory.
The two Hashemite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan thought they could together take control of the whole Syrian State, while their eternal rivals, namely the Saudi-Egyptian axis, thwarted their designs.
Great Britain and France, still powerful in Syria, operated through their Arab points of reference.
CIA collaborated with the Syrian dictator, Husni Zaim.
Zaim was of Kurdish origin and had taken power in 1949. He had organized a regime not disliked by the Ba’ath Party – a Westernizing and vaguely “Socialist” dictatorship.
After Husni Zaim’s fall, Syria was divided as usual: the collective leadership was held by the Sunni urban elite who had fought harshly against France.
Nevertheless, the unity of the nation – which was decisive for the Sunnis themselves – found it hard to bring together the Alawites, the Druze, the Shiites and the thousands of religious and ethnic factions that characterized Syria at that time as in current times.
The nationalist union between Syria and Egypt created in 1958 and soon undermined by Syria’s defection in 1961, experienced its Ba’athist-nationalist coup in 1963, with a military take-over.
Hafez El Assad – the father of the current Syrian leader, who ruled Syria from 1963 to 2000, the year of his death – immediately emerged among the military.
Long-term instability, medium-term political stability. That is Syria, from the end of the French domination to current times.
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