This case study provides an analytical commentary on the article written by Prof. David Bukay in ‘Modern Diplomacy’ on the issue of why Islam hates the West. Prof. Bukay presents the issue that ‘the Western world is ignorant, unacquainted, and in fact stupid concerning Islam. For so many years and so many Islamic attacks, its leaders still reiterate the Pavlovian question: “why do they hate us?”” (Bukay, 2016, April 22). Prof. Bukay compares the West to a battered spouse that is the victim of domestic violence. Instead of seeing the situation clearly like a battered spouse, the West tries to rationalize Islamic violence against the West through examination of the actions the West did to invite the violence.
In essence, continually asking the question what has the West done wrong to invite this treatment from Islam. Instead Prof. Bukay argues that the West should view Islam as a culturally different threat based upon a political religion. Bukay’s presentation was supported with evidence taken directly from Islamic scripture which states: “the Qur’ān reiterates the commandment that it is forbidden to associate other gods with Allah, and Islam should be adhered to as the only legitimate religion on earth. It is followed by the swear-belief that Muhammad is his messenger” (Bukay, 2016, April 22). Contrary to the Western view, some critics feel Russia has chosen to view Islam as a political religion/security threat in an intensified way so as to off-set domestic flaws. Russia under Vladimir Putin has effectively maneuvered to utilize Islam as a political religion in order to retain power against potential oppositional forces within the home scene. The following explains this criticizing mentality.
The main critique goes thusly: Putin, faced with a failing economy, weakened military, and internal security issues, has managed to redirect attention for Russia’s troubles. Putin executed this plan of redirection through influence in the transnational weapons market throughout the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Putin has solidified his power at home by embarking on a war with Islamic extremism. Putin has financed his ambitions in the war with Islamic extremists through selling military hardware, assisting nations that are in pursuit of nuclear ambitions, and making alliances with Iran and Syria. Putin masked his actions by using the Russian security issues posed by Islamic extremists. Putin has been on a clear mission to regain new world legitimacy both at home and abroad while combating the threat to Russia’s security posed by Islam.
Putin, in maintaining his power base at home, understands he needs to “blame either unpopular minorities within the country or foreign governments for all Russia’s problems. The politics of hatred has a long and, electorally speaking, pretty successful pedigree” (Collier, 2009, September 30). Putin understands that action must be taken to keep power and inaction can lead to destruction of the state. One key to execute this plan is to influence the transnational weapons market to ease economic pressure at home while ensuring Russia’s stability by fighting Islam.
As part of Putin’s plan to curb the threat from Islamic extremists, Russia opened Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan in October 2003. This base provided Russia a forward operating base to enforce interests and a security zone in Central Asia. As detailed:
Security remains the first driver shaping Russia’s involvement in Central Asia. The challenges are multiple, as any [destabilization] in the weakest (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), or the most unpredictable (Uzbekistan), of the countries could have immediate repercussions in Russia. This could include an Islamist infiltration; an increase in the inflow of drugs reaching the Russian population, which is already widely targeted by drug traffickers; a loss of control over the export networks of hydrocarbons, uranium mines, strategic sites in the military industrial complex and electrical power stations; a drop in trade… (Peyrouse, Boonstra, and Laruelle, 2012, May, p. 8)
Putin’s actions in Kyrgyzstan fit into his plan to blame unpopular Islamic extremist movements to justify military expansion to protect transnational trade routes while ensuring security at home. For Putin the “Russian-Central Asian multilateral framework, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), makes provisions for the sale of military materiel to member countries at Russian domestic market prices, and has revived cooperation between the Russian and Central Asian military-industrial complexes” (Peyrouse, Boonstra, and Laruelle, 2012, May, p. 8). In addition to security agreements to quell any potential extremist threats and to support the transnational arms trade; Putin is willing to become involved in questionable military alliances in the Middle East under the guise of fighting Islamic extremists.
Iran gives Putin a unique religious partner in the Caucasus and gateway to influence Middle East policy and weapons markets. Under Putin’s direction, Russia has assisted Iran’s nuclear ambitions through technology coupled with military hardware and advisors. The relationship with Iran is even more dangerous to the international community when in “late July [2015] Quds Force command Major General Qasem Soleimani flew to Moscow aboard a commercial Iranian airliner for a weekend visit filled with meetings mixed with R&R—in clear violation of a U.N.-imposed travel ban” (Weiss, 2015, September 1). Shortly after the meeting Putin expanded Russia’s relationship with Iran to direct military action in Syria. Putin has used Russian animosity to Islamic extremism, which is quite intense at home, to justify military adventurism. Putin really entered Syria to reassert itself to the top of the world stage and protect his transnational weapons markets.
This examination of a very strident criticism of Russian foreign policy intended to expand upon Prof. Bukay’s theory to demonstrate that Islam is a political religion based on a warrior cult from the seventh century. Contrary to the Western view as a victim with Islam, Russia has chosen to view Islam as a political religion/security threat that can be manipulated for power interests. Russia under Vladimir Putin has effectively maneuvered to utilize the threat from Islam as tool to protect transnational weapons markets and to retain power, ostensibly intensifying domestic society’s innate fear of the ‘other’ in order to push certain power angles important to the Presidential administration. While some of this criticism is purposely given to hyperbole, to exacerbate tense relations between Russia and the West (this criticism is born and fostered from within anti-Russian Western think tanks), the atrocities and transgressions that occurred on both sides of the Chechen conflicts make Russian animus to radical Islam very real and well-founded. While Russia is not blameless or pure when it comes to its initiatives toward the Islamic world, it is not possible to argue that Western approaches have been vastly superior. At the very least, Putin’s honesty in staking a brazen position against Islam as a political force and radicalist movement is refreshingly fascinating for analysts around the world.
