Turkey, formerly Ottoman Empire, is the only Muslim country in Europe, and hence facing problems of entry into EU as a legitimate European nation.Turkey in recent times is facing serious problems and domestic crisis with bombs being exploded in the capital Istanbul. Even presidency and government found themselves in logger heads possibly on disagreements over certain domestic and foreign policy issues.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whom western media accuse of authoritarian in outlook, believes a strong presidency can do away with the problems Turkey faces now.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan removed his trusted ally Ahmet Davutoglu as premier in a swift move essentially to strengthen his presidency and smoothen the government functioning without frictions within and to strike a balance on his own positions in domestic and foreign policy matters.
By replacing his increasingly powerful Prime minster Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish President Erdogan appointed on May 22, 2016 one of his most trusted allies Binali Yildirim, the transportation and communications minister to form Turkey’s new government, in a move seen to help consolidate his hold on power.
Binali Yildirim, a founding member of the ruling Justice and Development Party was tapped to replace Ahmet Davutoglu who stepped down amid growing differences with Erdogan, including his wish to overhaul the constitution to give the largely ceremonial presidency executive powers.
The appointment of the 60-year-old politician Binali came hours after the ruling AKP party confirmed him as party chairman, and he immediately expressed allegiance to the Turkish leader, vowing to follow his path. New premier Yildirim has said he would work to legalize the “de facto” presidential system by introducing a new constitution to that effect.
Supporters credit Yildirim for his role in developing major infrastructure projects which have helped buoy Turkey’s economy and boost the party’s popularity. But critics, including the leader of the main opposition party, have accused him of corruption. Yildirim has rejected the accusation.
Davutoglu, a former diplomat and foreign minister, is an intellectual and the author of books on Turkish foreign policy and political theory. Erdogan is a former mayor of Istanbul and semi-professional soccer player, and analysts say he is increasingly intent on securing his own enduring power in the state.
Davutoglu was considered the more pro-European of the two leaders.
Former foreign minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoglu who led the country’s foreign policy rather successfully has strong opinions on external affairs, especially on EU and Israel.
Regarded as a thoughtful and competent leader, Davutoglu replaced Erdogan as Prime Minister in 2014 more than a decade after the AKP came to power. Alongside Erdogan, Davutoglu was a key public face of the party when it won a comeback victory in the country’s November 2015 parliamentary election, five months after the AKP had shocked experts by losing its majority in a previous election.
Davutoglu, a one-time adviser to Erdogan and a former foreign minister, fell out with the president over several issues including the possibility of peace talks with Kurdish rebels, and the pre-trial detention of journalists accused of spying and academics accused of supporting terrorism. In his farewell speech, Davutoglu said resigning was not his wish but that he agreed to it to preserve the unity of the party.
Erdogan wants an executive presidency in Turkey to replace the current parliamentary system, a plan for which Davutoglu has offered only lukewarm support. His departure is likely to pave the way for a successor more willing to back Erdogan’s ambition of changing the constitution and strengthening the presidency, a move opponents say will herald growing authoritarianism.
Erdogan’s end goal is to consolidate enough popular support to switch to a presidential system. Davutoglu’s end goal is to consolidate his own power and be a successful prime minister.
Erdogan’s drive to tighten his grip on power has caused an increasingly open rift with Davutoglu, encompassing issues from relations with Europe to the pre-trial detention of government critics. As prime minister, the more moderate Davutoglu had been the formal head of government in Turkey, but he was widely regarded as governing under the long shadow of Erdogan, the more ambitious and ultimately the more powerful of the two. With the former prime minister sidelined, analysts say Erdogan has removed one of his only potential rivals for power within the state.
While the two politicians had been friends and allies for years, recent signs of tension between the two had become clear. The two had also publicly disagreed over whether to resume negotiations with Kurdish militants whom the Turkish military is fighting in the country’s southeast. Davutoglu himself wished to carve out an independent political space.
The two leaders cannot work together anymore. Erdogan is not satisfied with Davutolgu’s too soft and diplomatic style in the management of the country and in the management of certain issues between Turkey and Europe.
Regarded as a thoughtful and competent leader, Davutoglu replaced Erdogan as prime minister in 2014, more than a decade after the AKP came to power. Alongside Erdogan, he was a key public face of the party when it won a comeback victory in the country’s November 2015 parliamentary election, five months after the AKP had shocked experts by losing its majority in a previous election.
Ahmet Davutoglu resigned as Turkish Prime Minister in May in a dramatic move that clears the path for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to further consolidate his already extensive power. Davutoglu’s departure comes as Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (known by its Turkish initials AKP) are preparing a campaign to replace Turkey’s parliamentary system of government with a presidential system, a shift that could cement Erdogan’s control of the Turkish state for years to come. “The fact that my term lasted far shorter than four years is not a decision of mine but a necessity,” he said, according to Turkey’s Hurriyet newspaper. He said he would continue his friendship with Erdogan “until my last breath.” He added, “The honor of our president is my honor. His family is my family.”
Davutoglu’s departure comes as Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) are preparing a campaign to replace Turkey’s parliamentary system of government with a presidential system, a shift that could cement Erdogan’s control of the Turkish state for years to come.
The Turkish country is switching at least to a de facto presidential system, and therefore the next government under the next prime minister will have an even smaller independent political space than the Davutoglu executive. The leaders of two key opposition parties denounced the move as a power grab. At a news conference in Ankara, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, leader of the secular Republican People’s Party, which holds the second largest number of seats in parliament, told reporters, “All democracy supporters must resist this palace coup.”
The change in the government and party leadership comes at a time when NATO member Turkey is facing an array of security threats including renewed conflict with Kurdish rebels in the southeast, a wave of suicide bombings linked to Kurdish and Islamic State militants, as well as growing blowback from the war in neighboring Syria. The transition also coincides with growing tensions with the European Union over a controversial deal to reduce the flow of illegal migrants from Turkey to Greece, which Davutoglu helped broker.
In addition to bitter parliamentary politics, Turkey is also grappling with a lethal conflict with Kurdish insurgents, a wave of attacks by ISIS militants, and the presence of more than 2.7 million refugees who fled the civil war in neighboring Syria. But the sense of growing instability and violence may have actually helped cement the AKP’s grip on power. After losing its majority in the parliament, called the Grand National Assembly, in an election in June 2015, coalition talks failed. In the meantime, fighting resumed in the Kurdish-majority southeast and ISIS carried out a series of lethal bombings in the country. When voters returned to the polls, they restored the AKP’s majority.
Following the election, the government intensified the military campaign on Kurdish militants and also expanded what opponents say is a broad effort to restrict freedom of expression, including arrests and prosecutions of dissident journalists and academics. Erdogan’s critics argue that those and other measures signal an embrace of an increasingly authoritarian form of governance.
Recently, a parliamentary committee approved a bill that would strip lawmakers of judicial immunity, a measure that would clear the way for prosecutions of opposition leaders. Before the vote, members of the AKP and the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) engaged in a physical brawl in the house of parliament.
When Davutoglu hinted in April at a possible willingness to resume of peace talks with Kurdish militants, Erdogan ruled out any negotiations, saying the government would continue battling the insurgents.
President Erdogan, frequently critical of the EU, has at times appeared to belittle Davutoglu’s progress, most notably efforts to win visa-free travel to Europe by June, the main prize in the eyes of many Turks. “During my time as prime minister it was announced this would come in October 2016
Erdogan, a political fighter hardened by a childhood in Istanbul’s rough Kasimpasa district, wants a robust presidential system as a guarantee against the fractious coalition politics that hampered Turkey in the 1990s. His opponents see a stronger presidency as a vehicle for his own ambition.
Such a system would have seen Davutoglu, a more mild-mannered academic and former diplomat who lacks Erdogan’s natural appeal to crowds, sidelined.
The two have governed in a strained alliance since Erdogan won the presidency in 2014 and Davutoglu replaced him as prime minister. Aides to Davutoglu had largely dismissed the tensions as matters of style rather than substance. But in the clearest sign yet of a power struggle, the authority to appoint provincial AKP officials was taken from Davutoglu last week. The move reduced Davutoglu’s hold over the party grassroots and cemented Erdogan’s influence.
On foreign relations, the two leaders have appeared at odds over the deal with the EU to stem the flow of illegal migrants from Turkish shores to the Greek islands, in return for which Ankara has been promised accelerated EU accession talks, visa liberalization and financial aid. The deal has been Davutoglu’s project, and its future may be less certain after his departure.
Davutoglu’s departure looms as Turkey faces mounting security challenges, with a Kurdish insurgency in its southeast and the spillover of the war in Syria on its southern border. The European Union is counting on Turkey to help stop migrants streaming into the continent under a landmark accord brokered by Davutoglu, and Washington is drawing on NATO member Ankara’s support in fighting Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. The lira weakened more than 4 percent to 2.976 to the dollar, its weakest since the end of February, as investors balked at the prospect of more uncertainty.
Davutoglu’s early exit as party leader and PM constitutes another episode that show that Erdogan’s dominance over the AKP and the executive is absolute and unchallenged. The new premier Binali Yildirim is also an experienced politician who knows how to balance the president and nation.
There is no clarity if Davutoglu opposed Constitutional amendment to make the presidency stronger or if he opposed any move to make over with Israel or EU.
However, certain steps by president Erdoğan shows eh wanted a free hand in deciding all s aspects of governance both on domestic and foreign fronts
After being stubborn for months, Turkey’s president Erdoğan has now apologized to Vladimir Putin, his Russian counterpart, for the downing of a Russian fighter jet, opening a door to a detente between Moscow and Ankara after a bitter diplomatic row. Tayyip Erdogan said he hoped for a “quick” normalization in ties with Russia after he expressed regret over the downing of one of Moscow’s military jets. “I hope we can put behind us the current situation, which is detrimental to both countries, and advance towards a quick normalization,” he said in a dinner to break the Ramadan fast at his presidential palace in Ankara.
President Erdoğan also made positive gestures to appease Israel, forgetting what it did to the prestige of former Ottoman Empire by attacking its aidship bound for Gaza Strip with humanitarian aid and many peace workers on board on international waters. Turkey, under pressure from Israel and USA, announced the restoration of diplomatic ties with Israel after a six-year rupture and expressed regret to Russia over the downing of a warplane, seeking to mend strained alliances and ease a sense of tension and frustration.
With a possible rival now ejected from political life, Erdogan and his party are expected to continue with an existing plan to transform Turkey’s government into a presidential system. But Davutoglu’s resignation raises questions about the future of a controversial agreement between Turkey and the European Union to accept refugees denied entry to Greece in exchange for allowing some refugees to fly to Europe. Davutoglu was the architect of the agreement, which went into effect last month.
Iran Gives Russia Two and a Half Cheers
Iran’s rulers enthusiastically seek to destroy the liberal world order and therefore support Russia’s aggression. But they can’t manage full-throated support.
For Iran, the invasion of Ukraine is closely related to the very essence of the present world order. Much like Russia, Iran has been voicing its discontent at the way the international system has operated since the end of the Cold War. More broadly, Iran and Russia see the world through strikingly similar lenses. Both keenly anticipate the end of the multipolar world and the end of the West’s geopolitical preponderance.
Iran had its reasons to think this way. The US unipolar moment after 1991 provoked a deep fear of imminent encirclement, with American bases in Afghanistan and Iraq cited as evidence. Like Russia, the Islamic Republic views itself as a separate civilization that needs to be not only acknowledged by outside players, but also to be given ana suitable geopolitical space to project influence.
Both Russia and Iran are very clear about their respective spheres of influence. For Russia, it is the territories that once constituted the Soviet empire. For Iran, it is the contiguous states reaching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean — Iraq, Syria, Lebanon — plus Yemen. When the two former imperial powers have overlapping strategic interests such as, for instance, in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, they apply the concept of regionalism. This implies the blocking out of non-regional powers from exercising outsize economic and military influence, and mostly revolves around an order dominated by the powers which border on a region.
This largely explains why Iran sees the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity that, if successful, could hasten the end of the liberal world order. This is why it has largely toed the Russian line and explained what it describes as legitimate motives behind the invasion. Thus the expansion of NATO into eastern Europe was cited as having provoked Russian moves. “The root of the crisis in Ukraine is the US policies that create the crisis, and Ukraine is one victim of these policies,” argued Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei following the invasion.
To a certain degree, Iran’s approach to Ukraine has been also influenced by mishaps in bilateral relations which largely began with the accidental downing of a Ukrainian passenger jet by Iranian surface-to-air missiles in January 2020, killing 176 people. The regime first denied responsibility, and later blamed human error.
Iran, like several other of Russia’s friends and defenders, the ideal scenario would have been a quick war in which the Kremlin achieved its major goals.
Protracted war, however, sends a bad signal. It signals that the liberal order was not in such steep decline after all, and that Russia’s calls for a new era in international relations have been far from realistic. The unsuccessful war also shows Iran that the collective West still has very significant power and — despite well-aired differences — an ability to rapidly coalesce to defend the existing rules-based order. Worse, for these countries, the sanctions imposed on Russia go further; demonstrating the West’s ability to make significant economic sacrifices to make its anger felt. In other words, Russia’s failure in Ukraine actually strengthened the West and made it more united than at any point since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US.
A reinvigorated liberal order is the last thing that Iran wants, given its own troubled relations with the collective West. The continuing negotiations on a revived nuclear deal will be heavily impacted by how Russia’s war proceeds, and how the US and EU continue to respond to the aggression. Iran fears that a defeated Russia might be so angered as to use its critical position to endanger the talks, vital to the lifting of the West’s crippling sanctions.
And despite rhetorical support for Russia, Iran has been careful not to overestimate Russia’s power. It is now far from clear that the Kremlin has achieved its long-term goal of “safeguarding” its western frontier. Indeed, the Putin regime may have done the opposite now that it has driven Finland and Sweden into the NATO fold. Western sanctions on Russia are likely to remain for a long time, threatening long-term Russian economic (and possible regime) stability.
Moreover, Russia’s fostering of separatist entities (following the recognition of the so called Luhansk and Donetsk “people’s republics” and other breakaway entities in Georgia and Moldova) is a highly polarizing subject in Iran. True there has been a shift toward embracing Russia’s position over Ukraine, but Iran remains deeply committed to the “Westphalian principles” of non-intervention in the affairs of other states and territorial integrity. This is hardly surprising given its own struggles against potential separatism in the peripheries of the country.
Many Iranians also sympathize with Ukraine’s plight, which for some evokes Iran’s defeats in the early 19th century wars when Qajars had to cede the eastern part of the South Caucasus to Russia. This forms part of a historically deeply rooted, anti-imperialist sentiment in Iran.
Iran is therefore likely to largely abstain from endorsing Russia’s separatist ambitions in Eastern Ukraine. It will also eschew, where possible, support for Russia in international forums. Emblematic of this policy was the March 2 meeting in the United Nations General Assembly when Iran, rather than siding with Russia, abstained from the vote which condemned the invasion.
Russia’s poor military performance, and the West’s ability to act unanimously, serve as a warning for the Islamic Republic that it may one day have to soak up even more Western pressure if Europe, the US, and other democracies act in union.
In the meantime, like China, Iran will hope to benefit from the magnetic pull of the Ukraine war. With so much governmental, military and diplomatic attention demanded by the conflict, it will for the time being serve as a distraction from Iran’s ambitions elsewhere.
Author’s note: first published in cepa
Ignoring the Middle East at one’s peril: Turkey plays games in NATO
Amid speculation about a reduced US military commitment to security in the Middle East, Turkey has spotlighted the region’s ability to act as a disruptive force if its interests are neglected.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan set off alarm bells this week, declaring that he was not “positive” about possible Finnish and Swedish applications for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
NATO membership is contingent on a unanimous vote in favour by the organisation’s 30 members. Turkey has NATO’s second-largest standing army.
The vast majority of NATO members appear to endorse Finnish and Swedish membership. NATO members hope to approve the applications at a summit next month.
A potential Turkish veto would complicate efforts to maintain trans-Atlantic unity in the face of the Russian invasion.
Mr. Erdogan’s pressure tactics mirror the maneuvers of his fellow strongman, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban. Mr. Orban threatens European Union unity by resisting a bloc-wide boycott of Russian energy.
Earlier, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia rejected US requests to raise oil production in an effort to lower prices and help Europe reduce its dependence on Russian energy.
The two Gulf states appear to have since sought to quietly backtrack on their refusal.
In late April, France’s TotalEnergies chartered a tanker to load Abu Dhabi crude in early May for Europe, the first such shipment in two years.
Saudi Arabia has quietly used its regional pricing mechanisms to redirect from Asia to Europe Arab “medium,” the Saudi crude that is the closest substitute for the main Russian export blend, Urals, for which European refineries are configured.
Mr. Erdogan linked his NATO objection to alleged Finnish and Swedish support for the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which has been designated a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the United States, and the EU.
The PKK has waged a decades-long insurgency in southeast Turkey in support of Kurds’ national, ethnic, and cultural rights. Kurds account for up to 20 per cent of the country’s 84 million population.
Turkey has recently pounded PKK positions in northern Iraq in a military operation named Operation Claw Lock.
Turkey is at odds with the United States over American support for Syrian Kurds in the fight against the Islamic State. Turkey asserts that America’s Syrian Kurdish allies are aligned with the PKK.
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu warned that Turkey opposes a US decision this week to exempt from sanctions against Syria regions controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
“This is a selective and discriminatory move,” Mr. Cavusoglu said, noting that the exemption did not include Kurdish areas of Syria controlled by Turkey and its Syrian proxies.
Referring to the NATO membership applications, Mr. Erdogan charged that “Scandinavian countries are like some kind of guest house for terrorist organisations. They’re even in parliament.”
Mr. Erdogan’s objections relate primarily to Sweden, with Finland risking becoming collateral damage.
Sweden is home to a significant Kurdish community and hosts Europe’s top Kurdish soccer team that empathises with the PKK and Turkish Kurdish aspirations. In addition, six Swedish members of parliament are ethnic Kurds.
Turkey scholar Howard Eissenstat suggested that Turkey’s NATO objection may be a turning point. “Much of Turkey’s strategic flexibility has come from the fact that its priorities are seen as peripheral issues for its most important Western allies. Finnish and Swedish entry into NATO, in the current context, absolutely not peripheral,” Mr. Eissenstat tweeted.
The Turkish objection demonstrates the Middle East’s potential to derail US and European policy in other parts of the world.
Middle Eastern states walk a fine line when using their potential to disrupt to achieve political goals of their own. The cautious backtracking on Ukraine-related oil supplies demonstrates the limits and/or risks of Middle Eastern brinkmanship.
So does the fact that Ukraine has moved NATO’s center of gravity to northern Europe and away from its southern flank, which Turkey anchors.
Moreover, Turkey risks endangering significant improvements in its long-strained relations with the United States.
Turkish mediation in the Ukraine crisis and military support for Ukraine prompted US President Joe Biden to move ahead with plans to upgrade Turkey’s fleet of F-16 fighter planes and discuss selling it newer, advanced F-16 models even though Turkey has neither condemned Russia nor imposed sanctions.
Some analysts suggest Turkey may use its objection to regain access to the United States’ F-35 fighter jet program. The US cancelled in 2019 a sale of the jet to Turkey after the NATO member acquired Russia’s S-400 anti-missile defence system.
Mr. Erdogan has “done this kind of tactic before. He will use it as leverage to get a good deal for Turkey,” said retired US Navy Admiral James Foggo, dean of the Center for Maritime Strategy.
A top aide to Mr. Erdogan, Ibrahim Kalin, appeared to confirm Mr. Foggo’s analysis.
“We are not closing the door. But we are basically raising this issue as a matter of national security for Turkey,” Mr. Kalin said, referring to the Turkish leader’s NATO remarks. “Of course, we want to have a discussion, a negotiation with Swedish counterparts.”
Spelling out Turkish demands, Mr. Kalin went on to say that “what needs to be done is clear: they have to stop allowing PKK outlets, activities, organisations, individuals and other types of presence to…exist in those countries.”
Mr. Erdogan’s brinkmanship may have its limits, but it illustrates that one ignores the Middle East at one’s peril.
However, engaging Middle Eastern autocrats does not necessarily mean ignoring their rampant violations of human rights and repression of freedoms.
For the United States and Europe, the trick will be developing a policy that balances accommodating autocrats’, at times, disruptive demands, often aimed at ensuring regime survival, with the need to remain loyal to democratic values amid a struggle over whose values will underwrite a 21st-century world order.
However, that would require a degree of creative policymaking and diplomacy that seems to be a rare commodity.
Health Silk Route: China and the Middle East
While China’s economic interests in the Middle East are well-known, China’s intrinsic involvement in the Middle East for increased political and cultural influence is a nascent development. For example, in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, China has attempted to increase its footprint in the Middle East through its new ‘Health Silk Route’ (HSR) project which should be viewed as an extension of the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) in the Middle East. Through the new HSR project, China is trying to gain diplomatic bandwidth in the Middle East by spreading its soft power influence in the region.
China has traditionally maintained a cautious approach in foreign policy towards the Middle East to ensure that its energy needs are consistently fulfilled by Middle Eastern states like Iran and Saudi Arabia. Simultaneously, it has opted for a strong economic relationship with most Middle Eastern states (Dorsey, 2017) as China views the Middle East as a lucrative market for its goods. (Shambaugh, 2014: 87) However, this non-interventionist approach of China towards the Middle East is now on its way out as a ‘rising China’ is approaching the Middle East with new found vigour with the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) making a mark across the region.
China views the Middle East as a region that can aid its ‘peaceful rise’ as China attempts to ‘strive for achievement’ (fenfayouwei) and achieve great power status in keeping with the principles of Tienxia (All Under Heavens) (French, 2017) after ‘keeping a low profile’ (taoguangyanghui) for years. (Xuetong, 2014) This new found Chinese interest in the Middle East is in keeping with the tenets of Chinese conception of ‘Moral Realism’, President Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ project and his clarion call for national rejuvenation and declining American presence in the region. (Xuetong, 2014)
While the region was initially viewed as ‘politically inaccessible’ by Chinese diplomats (Fuhr, 2021) due to the region being ‘America’s strategic headlight’, the region has become important for China today. In fact, China has come out with its ‘Arab Policy Paper’ that documented China’s approach towards the Arab states where China endorsed a “win-win partnership” with all 22 Arab (Middle Eastern) states. This was the first such policy paper published by China in several years. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, 2021)
The Middle East is also an important region for growing Chinese investments. For example, in 2018, China invested $20 billion in infrastructure development alone and another $3 billion in loans for the banking sector in the region. These developments have brought China and the Middle East closer. (Elanggar, 2020)
COVID-19 & Mutual Reciprocity
The COVID-19 pandemic has further opened up the region for China. While China has opted for a more aggressive diplomatic line through the use of ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ in regions like Europe and the Americas, to defend itself amidst the raging COVID pandemic, the ‘Chinese Middle Eastern discourse during the pandemic has seen an outpouring of mutual support paired with deliveries of medical aid’ (Wilson Centre, 2020) In the early days of the pandemic, when the pandemic took its roots in Wuhan in the heart of China, Middle Eastern states like Kuwait sent medical equipment worth $3 billion to China. (Kuwait Today, 2020) Similarly, Saudi Arabia through the King Salman Humanitarian RelIef Fund (KSRelief) provided medical devices and protective suits and surgical masks to China. (Xinhua, 2020) For the Middle East, the pandemic transformed China from just a business partner to a scientific benefactor and collaborator. (Bodetti, 2021)
China reciprocated these gestures and offered medical assistance to Middle Eastern states firstly by offering medical supplies and extending lines of credit in the first phase and through the provisions of vaccines. It also suggested that these initiatives were taken to ‘advance global public health’ under the rubric of the HSR. Firstly, China assisted Iran and Turkey by providing essential medical supplies like medical masks, test devices and Personal Protective Equipments (PPEs) (Xinhua, 2020: Singh & Gupta, 2020) China sent sterile and antiseptic masks and other medical equipments to states in the Maghreb like Algeria and Mauritania as well. (Chachiza, 2021) It also sent 50 boxes of medical supplies with surgical supplies nad masks to Oman. (Hoffman & Yelinek, 2020) However, the primary focus of China’s pandemic diplomacy was related to China’s provision of vaccines to the region. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was the first country to approve the Sinopharm vaccine and stated that its efficacy stood at 86%. Once the prerequisite approvals were in place, Bahrain, Egypt and Morocco also agreed to use the China-manufactured vaccines. (El Kadi & Zinser, 2021)
Impact of Chinese Health Diplomacy on HSR
These healthcare initiatives have allowed the widening and deepening of ties between China and the Middle Eastern states. For China, the HSR is an opportunity to resurrect its image in the Post COVID-19 era, where China has been blamed for the onset of the pandemic. Through the HSR initiative, China wants to portray itself as ‘benevolent healthcare provider’ to increase its soft power. It wants to take the lead in ‘perfecting global public health governance’ across the world. (Lancaster, Ruben & Rap-Hooper, 2020)
As far as the Middle East is concerned, China wants to use the HSR to increase its soft power in the region. China has traditionally been viewed favourably by Middle Eastern states like Israel, Lebanon, Turkey and Tunisia (Silver, Devlin & Huang, 2019) and China wants to leverage these favourable ratings for its own benefit. While Chinese scholars have negated this line of argument and stated vociferously that the HSR is for “global public good” because the United States has abdicated global health leadership (Jiahan, 2021) It is certain that a diminishing U.S. presence in the Middle East will allow the rise of China in the region and initiatives like the HSR will aide this development.
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