Connect with us

Europe

The strategic consequences of Brexit

Published

on

Though with a knife-edge majority, Great Britain has relinquished its economic and political relationship with the EU. Obviously account shall be taken of the many people who voted in favour of Bremain, since they will not disappear all of a sudden, but also the strategic, military and geopolitical effects of this new UK position shall be assessed.

A position which today seems to be mainly economic and commercial, but which will soon herald wider choices than the mere give-and-take between Great Britain and the European Union.

For sure the British people have never liked the European Union.

In 1975 Margaret Thatcher put strong pressures for the United Kingdom to adhere to the European Union, but the idea of the Iron Lady was to become member with a view to controlling a powerful entity, such as the EU, thus avoiding the creation of an axis between France and Germany to isolate Great Britain – as, indeed, later happened. Also from the commercial viewpoint.

Prime Minister Thatcher decided to adhere to the EU as some businessmen do with potentially dangerous companies of which they buy a significant shareholding so as to better manage them from inside.

It is worth recalling that there was still the Cold War that Great Britain was fighting with great care and intelligence wisdom.

At the time, both Prime Minister Thatcher and the other EU statesmen viewed the European bloc as an economic agreement preventing the USSR from extending its economic, if not military, influence over what the French philosopher, Raymond Aron, called “the great Central European plain.”

The plain that the Warsaw Pact planned to quickly conquer so as to reach the Atlantic and seal the UK into its North Sea.

Without Great Britain, there would be no European nuclear arsenal and the French one would fall immediately into Russian hands.

Furthermore, in her book of 2003, Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World, Margaret Thatcher did not dismiss the possibility of Brexit as “unthinkable”, but thought that the issue had to be analyzed very carefully.

It had to be assessed in terms of strategic and commercial routes and in terms of UK influence over the EU decision- making process, as well as for assessing the balance between the euro and the pound sterling.

These are the decisive factors of the EU-UK matrix, not others.

Currently the European framework is obviously much more complex than in the 1970s.

It is not true, however, that the Union rescued Europe from the fratricidal wars which scarred it as from Napoleon I onwards. The European Civil War, as the German historian and philosopher Ernst Nolte called it.

Conversely peace in Europe was preserved by the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The “economic basis of the war” between Germany and France, from Alsace-Lorraine to the Ruhr region, was an old strategic concept which had already been solved with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951.

Nevertheless, as from 1980 onwards, it was precisely Margaret Thatcher who put pressures on the EU to “get her money back,” by considering the agreements between the EU and the UK unnecessarily too burdensome for her country.

In her speech delivered in Bruges in 1988, the Conservative Prime Minister spoke clearly against “a European super-State exercising a new dominance from Brussels”.

This is the core of the issue: the British people have never wished to turn the economic “contract” among the European Member States into a specifically political contract. They wanted and still want to have a free hand in the global financial framework. Finally they intend to avoid the geopolitical effects of the economic and trade ties established in Brussels.

Great Britain is a State, a great nation, which needs overall global autonomy which, on the contrary, the EU manages according to covertly Franco-German interests that are potentially opposite to the UK ones.

It is not the British leaders’ perception, it is the truth and, however, in politics, perception counts as reality, if not even more.

As is in A Midsummer Night’s Dream by William Shakespeare.

With this choice, Great Britain, which still has the “imperial dominance spirit of Lawrence of Arabia” – as the former Italian President Francesco Cossiga who, however, was a close friend of Margaret Thatcher, called it – is trying to play some cards which, despite the “mists of tomorrow”, are potentially valid.

Firstly, the relationship with the United States, also at economic level, comes back to the fore.

When in 1976 the United States celebrated the bicentennial of their independence (from Great Britain, by the way), a British sailor arrived in the New York port holding a banner with the inscription: “Come back home, guys, we have forgiven you.”

Hence Great Britain still considers itself an empire – currently a British empire of finance and technology, but anyway still an empire.

With a view to becoming again “what it is” – along the lines of Friedrich Nietzsche’s journey of becoming a free spirit – Great Britain just needs to revive and revitalize its special relationship with the United States.

As early as 1958, a Mutual Defense Agreement was signed between the United States and Great Britain regarding the two nuclear arsenals while in 2010, thanks to a subsequent bilateral treaty with the United States, Great Britain had the opportunity of overcoming many of the controls and limits imposed by the Americans on its advanced defense technologies – limits imposed also on NATO members.

Great Britain is the second largest economy of the English-speaking world and the sixth largest world economy. It is the largest US trading partner and a member of the UN Security Council. It hosts the highest number of US military bases abroad and, above all, it is the global financial hub which periodically rescues US banks from their insolvency crises.

Hence it is clear that Brexit can be seen as a major US strategic success and outlines the end of the “third pole” between East and West which sometimes the EU has dreamt of being.

The dollar zone has never liked the euro. Quite the reverse, it has fought it harshly.

For the United States, the European single currency was and still is a strong competitor, as well as a threat to their role as hegemonic global financial power – an insane “Napoleon’s dream”.

Moreover, the idea of bringing the euro to an often forced parity with the US dollar has undermined EU exports, by compelling them to be carried out with a currency having a too “high” value which has restricted the end-markets.

Not to mention the many temptations generated by the euro on world commodity markets: it is true that – among many other assessments and considerations – the United States attacked Saddam Hussein for his still secret choice of trading most of his oil and petroleum products in euros.

It is also true that, in the phases characterized by great international tensions, Iran traded part of its oil and petroleum products in euros, especially on the “stock exchanges” in Kish and in the other islands of the Persian Gulf.

The Brexit effects, however, increase the volatility of the pound sterling against the dollar, with a spread of approximately 15% compared to the pre-referendum values.

Financial analysts’ imbalances which, by now, are mainly trolls, namely IT automatisms.

Certainly Great Britain will not be granted a preferential treatment by the United States in the framework of the TTIP negotiations.

US President Obama has explicitly warned that the UK would be at the “back of the queue” in any trade deal with his country if it chose to leave the EU and would have the same treatment and the same barriers to entry as countries like China, Brazil or India.

Nevertheless Barack Obama is about to leave the US Presidency and, if Donald Trump were to be the next President, he will have every interest in dividing the European competitors and favoring them against the aggressive practices of countries like China and, in the future, India.

Also Hillary Clinton cannot avoid using this leverage offered by Great Britain for the TTIP negotiations.

The British TTIP is a bet on the future which, however, the UK could win by relying on its great financial strength.

Bilateral trade between the United States and the UK is very significant: America is the first destination of UK exports and the United States are the third generator of imports for the UK, after Germany and China.

North America and Great Britain are the largest mutual foreign investors.

A situation which cannot change all of a sudden, in spite of the US discontent and dissatisfaction with Brexit.

Furthermore the British government stated that TTIP could provide to the British economy a surplus of approximately 10 billion pounds a year.

There is the need to recover much of the Brexit cost and rebuild a strategic and military relationship with the United States which the UK sees as the only bulwark against two EU and NATO structural dangers: the EU decision-making weakness in the Middle East and the explicit German polemic against the Atlantic Alliance’s anti-Russian posture, which has been mounting in recent months.

Two dangers that the UK wants to avert: the recovery of German geopolitical autonomy tending to Eurasia and the EU structural weakness faced with Middle East tensions.

In Great Britain’s mind, Germany is always the country of the old definition by Lord Ismay, who was NATO Secretary General from 1952 to 1957: “The Atlantic Alliance’s purpose is to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down”.

Great Britain does not want the strategic and economic exchange between France and Germany, in which Germans buy French government bonds massively and, in return, are entitled to the “enhanced and extended protection” of the French military nuclear power.

Great Britain does not even want a euro which, as “a German mark in disguise”, penetrates the major British export expansion areas.

Moreover, considering the EU strategic inanity, Great Britain fears for its corridors to and fro its Asian Commonwealth.

With its operations in Crimea and Ukraine, the Russian Federation blocks and distorts the direct line between Great Britain and India, besides changing the balance of power in Central Asia, where the UK has still strong interests.

Since 2001 to date, Great Britain has deployed its military units in Afghanistan, in the framework of the US Enduring Freedom operation, not only for mere “Atlantic loyalty” as other countries (including Italy) have done, but to still afford the regional strategic viability and role which are essential for it to keep Northern India, the central Asian countries and the routes from Southern China.

Those who think globally, as the decision makers of what was once a great Empire, do not stop doing so all of a sudden.

Unfortunately the EU’s mistakes are known to everybody: an artificially overvalued currency – maybe to compete with the dollar; an insane disconnection between EU foreign and economic policy; the idea of simultaneously controlling 29 countries which are all competing one another, with different tax systems and public spending mechanisms, not to mention the autonomous and conflicting public debt securities markets.

The EU could certainly reform itself by establishing, within the ECB, a single market of government bonds, possibly managed (and not tiered and capped) with the issuance of “European debt securities”.

That Germany does not want, and with good reason.

Moreover the Union could also make the various Member States develop an export plan, with a view to analytically protecting one commodity or the other, without dangerous generalizations (even for us).

From chocolate to wine, up to the hilarious theory of the ”Polish plumber” – popularized by Philippe de Villiers as a symbol of cheap labor coming from Central Europe as a result of the Directive on Services in the Internal Market during the EU Constitution referendum in France in 2005 – in the field of exports, so far Italy has lost and has hence paid for its mistakes related to its “scarce incisiveness” in Europe.

It is worth recalling that the Polish plumber. was supposed to come and work in the EU at the same rates he charged in Krakow. However, the cost of living in this Polish town is very different from the cost of living in the center of Munich.

Abstract free-trade and liberal theories, typical of a bad macroeconomics handbook, mixed with archaic protectionism – this is exactly what the EU has often been.

Hence, following the ideas of General de Gaulle, another great “Eurosceptic”, the issue lies in returning to a Europe of Nations and States where only what is already in common is decided jointly – and it could not be otherwise…

This means European protection from asymmetric shocks, selective penetration of new foreign markets and domestic liberalization of goods and services.

The idea of making the EU be the comptroller of the Member States’ public budgets, with abstract and binding rules, paves the way for a number of exceptions which inhibit the rule, or for a covert economic struggle between EU rich and poor countries.

We have already experienced it in Greece and this could also happen in Italy and Spain.

Furthermore, the EU has insisted on implementing a common “foreign, security and defense policy”, with the obligation to “make the Member States’ civilian and military capacities available to the EU”.

Shall this be done in agreement with NATO? Where is the chain of command of this 29-Member State army? Who develops its plans and sets its goals?

All this is for stabilization, humanitarian and conflict prevention missions, disarmament or military assistance and advice.

And what is the role played by the United Nations, despite all its limits?

In short, as from a certain phase onwards, which we could identify with the 2001 crisis, the European Union has believed to be what it was not and had not been conceived and meant to be.

After all, even the old anti-Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, was not entirely wrong when, from his new English homeland, equated the European Union with his old USSR.

Hence if the EU is able to reform itself not only at organizational, but also at domestic financial level, it will be in a position to keep on selling its merchandise: protection against asymmetric shocks, a strong currency widespread in the world, as well as a free internal market.

Conversely, if it continues to pursue its Napoleon’s dream of “uniting Europe”, it will have to face “one, a hundred, a thousand Brexit” – just to paraphrase Che Guevara’s words.

Furthermore, the issue does not lie in asking – as the Italian politicians do – for “greater budget flexibility” in exchange for abstract reforms which may be suitable for the Finnish people, but not for the Flemish population.

The problem is completely different: to have the possibility of drafting autonomous budgets so as to subsequently check their effects over a period of two years, without prior diktats.

Briefly, a more modest EU will survive very well – even after Brexit.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

Europe

French Senator Allizard: Mediterranean – Theatre for future Europe

Published

on

On the historic date of March 08th – International Women’s Day, a large number of international affairs specialists gathered for the second consecutive summit in Vienna, Austria. This leg of the Vienna Process titled: “Europe – Future – Neighbourhood at 75: Disruptions Recalibration Continuity”. The conference, jointly organized by the Modern Diplomacy, IFIMES and their partners, with the support of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, was aimed at discussing the future of Europe and its neighbourhood in the wake of its old and new challenges.[1]

Along with the two acting State Presidents, the event was endorsed by the keynote of the EU Commissioner for European Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Excellency OlivérVárhelyi. The first, of the three-panel conference, was brilliantly conducted by the OSCE Sec-General (2011-2017), current IFIMES Euro-Med Director, Amb. Lamberto Zannier. Among his speakers, the first to open the floor was French Senator Pascal Allizard, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Vice President (and its Special rapporteur for Mediterranean issues). Discussing regional issues of the southern Europe, its relations with the black sea and with North of Africa, this is what Senator outlined in his intervention:

As 2021 is the ten-year anniversary of the Arab spring, Senator Pascal highlights that a decade later, the events of the Arab Spring are crucial to the problems of today. Europe should reevaluate the region through European lens. Excellency Alizard criticizes Europe, due to the fact that it tends to take a step back from the region of the North African affected area of the Arab Spring conflict as there is an abundance of issues which are unlikely to be solved with ease. One must still do its duties difficult or not to question the region. Turning a blind eye to the problems there is something that Senator says Europe tends to do to elevate their consciousness.

However, one must look at the problems head-on. The biggest concern is that there is an explosive growth in population, a rise in radicalism and the Black Sea is what separates that northern conflict region of Africa and the Mediterranean coast of Europe.

The Mediterranean Sea is known to be one of the most crucial routes to transport illegal cargo such as drugs, hydrocarbon and human trafficking into Europe, specifically through Spain and Italy. It’s crucial for Europe to have a discussion and plan for this region as it is a necessity to keep Europe safe. The different countries along the Mediterranean must come together to create a cohesive, inclusive yet firm diplomatic strategy to answer all the challenges. The region along the Mediterranean Sea is a strategic area for Europe as there are many ships that come from around the world into those ports.

Senator Pascal proceeded by stating that the eastern Mediterranean region escalated after the discovery of significant oil and gas reserves. It is also the ongoing war in Syria, and the destabilization of the region with yet unsettled situation in Libya (with presence of multiple external players which generate instability).

Senator reminded the conference audience that Europe must also mention the actors in the Mediterranean on the European side;

‘’The European Union is a leading player, at least for the display of its normative ambitions, also for its diplomacy of the checkbook and its discourse on human rights. However, the EU is not a power in the state and sovereign sense of the term, and it systematically curbs the sovereign aspirations of its own member states. The EU does not yet project itself sufficiently as an international actor capable of implementing a foreign policy. The EU appears, I believe, seen from the Mediterranean at most as a soft power which, in word, watches over the balance of power in the region. And the hopes placed in EU policy dedicated to the Mediterranean have been in vain, to the extent that they do not seem effective, neither economically nor politically, at least from my point of view, insufficiently. And if on the northern shore a few countries are interested in the Mediterranean area, we can see that this is not the center of European concerns and that no common vision is really emerging.’’

Unification of that region is vital, because if the Mediterranean nations do not collaborate as a union and show their strength, control of that area could fall into the hands of Turkey, Russia and China. Turkey walks bold on the so-called Exclusive Economic Zone in Euro-Med, which would – if accepted – project its power in the Mediterranean, giving it a more prominent regional political role. Russia, which is once again becoming a key player in the Middle East, in the Black Sea area, in the Mediterranean and even in Africa walks bold too. Lastly, China which mainly projects itself through its trade, investments, and its bilateral agreements is pressing on maritime space too. Lately, Chinese military navy can be also seen.

The navies of the regions are preparing for a hardening of relations at sea in a strategic area where world trade flows, but also now, for the exploration, the exploitation of hydrocarbons. This is why questions of sovereignty are once again emerging, naturally in the sense of our concerns.

Hopefully the new US administration will also pay attention to the Mediterranean Sea and not just the Indo-Pacific. 

The only way to establish more of a grip in the Mediterranean theater is cooperation. This is also the key to success for all the European nations gathered around unified code of conduct and rule of law.

Concluding, Excellency Pascal stated that the European Union must recognize realities of unresolved conflicts that are interwoven, as well as to understand the new challenges that can threaten the very fabrics of the Union: security, demography, unregulated immigration. If not equal to these challenges, the universalist European model might lose its grounds beyond point of return – warned Senator.

*the above text is based on the informal French language transcript as per conference recordings, which may have no intentionally caused minor omittances or imprecisions in the reporting.


[1]This highly anticipated conference gathered over twenty high ranking speakers from three continents, and the viewers from Australia to Canada and from Chile to Far East. The day was filled by three panels focusing on the rethinking and revisiting Europe and its three equally important neighbourhoods: Euro-Med, Eastern and trans-Atlantic (or as the Romano Prodi’s EU Commission coined it back in 2000s – “from Morocco to Russia – everything but the institutions”); the socio-political and economic greening; as well as the legacy of WWII, Nuremberg Trials and Code, the European Human Rights Charter and their relevance in the 21st century.

Continue Reading

Europe

Vienna Process: Re-visiting and Re-thinking the Euro-MED

Published

on

On the historic date of March 08th – International Women’s Day, a large number of international affairs specialists gathered for the second consecutive summit in Vienna, Austria. This leg of the Vienna Process titled: “Europe – Future – Neighbourhood at 75: Disruptions Recalibration Continuity”. The conference, jointly organized by the Modern Diplomacy, IFIMES and their partners, with the support of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, was aimed at discussing the future of Europe and its neighbourhood in the wake of its old and new challenges.[1]

Along with the two acting State Presidents, the event was endorsed by the keynote of the EU Commissioner for European Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Excellency OlivérVárhelyi. The first, of the three-panel conference, was brilliantly conducted by the OSCE Sec-General (2011-2017), current IFIMES Euro-Med Director, Amb. Lamberto Zannier. Among his speakers were academics, government and IGO representatives of different yet complimentary backgrounds. Following is the brief, yet not conclusive, overview of the discussed. 

Although not new, the EURO-MED cooperation matter remains a distinguished area where the field of possibilities is immense, and where progress vis-à-vis this transregional collaboration would tremendously impact all involved parties’ crisis management abilities. Thus, re-discussing EURO-MED with, if necessary, a novel overall geometry is rightfully referred to as a both compelling and heat-on point of the agenda by the conference panellists.

Admittedly, the Barcelona Process of 1995 and PEM Convention having entered into force in early 2012 were remarkable initiatives aiming notably at introducing institutional frameworks and promoting deeper economic integration based on the “rules of origin” concept. However, the initiatives did not blossom as was hoped, and this is due to several reasons that keynote speaker Monika Wohlfeld (German Chair for Peace Studies & Conflict Prevention) and Ettore Greco (Vice-President of the Institute for International Affairs) have touched upon during the 8th March international event. Given that our awareness and understanding of the lack of prosperity having surrounded those first initiatives is key to re-thinking, re-calibrating and, in turn, re-engage in an auspicious direction, this piece will be taking you back to the salient message vehicled by Wohlfeld and Greco respectively.

First, Monika Wohlfeld took the floor and opened up by acknowledging the past attempts at reaching cooperation security agreements as well as their relative deficiency up until now. Equally as important to recognize are the causes of such failings: actually, little traction was brought on following the emergence of the first initiatives due to, notably, an absence of lasting peace climate and old relational patterns within the involved regions. The context having been set, she moves onto the juicy bit: the inherent inadequacy of the multilateral approach whose prints are all over the 90s and 2000s proposals. What is more, she brings to the table a counter-approach as the path to engage in: minilateralism.

The aforesaid concept offers an alternative cooperation modus that is more selective, flexible and mostly more conscious of, and focused on, the fact (or rather the reality) that States can participate in various ad-hoc frameworks with fluctuating membership. The latter would then be assessed through case-by-case interests, shared values and pertinent capabilities. In that sense, by contrast to a multilateralist angle, a minilateralist attitude would be oriented towards the sub-regional rather than the international; would be a voluntary undertaking rather than a binding one; would concern fragmented but specialized fields of application rather than general comprehensive ones; would tend to be multi-stakeholders rather than State-centric; and would proceed from a bottom-up thinking rather than top-down. Monika’s suggested shift in approach answers an important need, backed-up by local expert voices, which is that of the serious taking into account of sub-regional diversity in the process. By doing so, the odds of reaching cooperation agreements with MED countries – and moreover the chances of those agreements panning out – would be extremely favourable.

As a matter of fact, Ettore Greco endorsed a consubstantial view in his intervention during the conference. More specifically, he believes that a looser approach based on an empowered co-ownership and greater attention to actual regional dynamics and situational constraints ought to be adopted.

Drawing on the Barcelona Process experience, which rendered apparent its shortcomings and the recent state of deadlock having affected the EURO-MED coop, Greco equally provides alternate lines of thinking. What is clear to him is that the integrationist approach and the idea according to which cooperation should equate to structural convergence makes for an unworkable avenue. Indeed, he also pointed out that one main issue encountered with regard to earlier cooperation models (whether in the Barcelona Process or even in the ERANET Project of 2013) was the transfer and, by way of symmetry, the reception of Western policies in the Middle-East and North Africa. This cannot help but to ring an old bell; that of Watson’s concept of the ‘legal transplant’ and related limits. His famous metaphor of the mountain plant being uprooted and planted back in the desert, incurring changes to the plant’s nature remains particularly striking and timely. This goes to show, or rather to remind some, that purely transplanting policies that are specific to a certain ethos without adjusting to the new local particular context can often prove inefficient.

Consequently, is it well-advised that the EU places more emphasis on, and deploys more energy towards, stability and resilience as goals set out for the cooperation in lieu of democratization along with institutional reforms. That being said, Greco concedes that in the absence of profound transformation – and hence, reforms, to some extent – stability in itself is seldom achievable.

Setting aside the MED inner conflict dynamics over which the EU has very little if no control over, new forms of partnerships should be relentlessly explored and promoted in a world where the concurring, mutually-reinforcing challenges can only be optimally addressed through wider pan-regional operative frameworks. In that spirit, Ettore Greco, as emissary for the IAI, lays out some ground requirements we need to achieve as a roadmap to making successful advances. These are:

  • The promotion of a comprehensive concept of security. That is, one more inclusive and of broader scope – and thereby more realistic.[2]
  • The creation of better synergies between the different cooperation frameworks (NATO-MED dialogue, OSCE MED partnership, Union of the MED) and clarification of each initiative’s own added-value.
  • The involvement of valuable non-EU actors such as Russia or the United States of America.

Those guidelines, whether proposed by Monika Wohlfeld or by Ettore Greco, prove that the re-thinking of the EURO-MED cooperation is a breeding ground already being cultured. Besides, this political activation or mobilization towards re-shaping a functional and tighter cooperation scheme can be observed across the board of regional and sub-regional players directly affected by the issue. But mostly, there is one common thread in the discourses of those airing opinions to lead the best way: acknowledgement of the omnipresent diversity and pluralism at play. Only by factoring in the diversity of the partners and their sub-regions can there be beneficial arrangements and progress be made. This, of course, has to be understood as a central remark directed to the European side of the table. All and any relic of hegemony need be completely done away with, so as to fully respect and integrate the diverse identities in the process. And in fact, this shouldn’t be hard to comprehend and assimilate from a EU perspective considering the various cultural bundles interacting within the EU block itself. What is more, the European Court of Human Rights is King as revering and upholding the national particularism of its Member States – it makes it a point of honour in the crushing majority of its judgements whenever harmony flirts too close with a homogeneity requirement that comes short of negating a region’s tradition.


[1]This highly anticipated conference gathered over twenty high ranking speakers from three continents, and the viewers from Australia to Canada and from Chile to Far East. The day was filled by three panels focusing on the rethinking and revisiting Europe and its three equally important neighbourhoods: Euro-Med, Eastern and trans-Atlantic (or as the Romano Prodi’s EU Commission coined it back in 2000s – “from Morocco to Russia – everything but the institutions”); the socio-political and economic greening; as well as the legacy of WWII, Nuremberg Trials and Code, the European Human Rights Charter and their relevance in the 21st century.

[2] On that, see the OSCE model proposal

Continue Reading

Europe

U.S government’s own negative impacts in eroding human rights and media freedom in Bulgaria

Published

on

The US State Department’s annual human rights report is out and just like every March, critical voices and activists around the world rush to their own country’s section to see what’s included and what they can use openly, with the stamp of criticism by the US government.

This year, the State Department’s report on human rights violations in Bulgaria covers the usual ground and what’s publicly known. There were no surprises. The section on Bulgaria includes very prominently violence against media and journalists, and excessive use of force by law enforcement.

What the US government does not include in the Bulgaria section is the US government’s own role in the erosion of human rights and media freedom in Bulgaria through US government agencies such as the FBI, the CIA and even the US State Department. This is not something that US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, is willing to admit – at least not yet.

Ever since the US Ambassador to Bulgaria, Hero Mustafa, stepped into office back in 2019, the US Embassy in Sofia has maintained media freedom as a main theme. And what was not to like about that? Many of us over here cheered. But not so fast.

The US government construes media freedom only in the narrow sense that only speech praising the US government and going after US enemies should be free and protected. “Direct your freedom of speech against them, not us” is not freedom of speech. That’s not a rights-based approach; it’s authoritarianism. This was my first-hand experience with the US government when I was a top finalist for UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of speech in 2020. This is also my experience with the US government, as I try to spearhead the debate on the joint European position on China, and as I criticize the new US confrontational policy on China in pumping a new unnecessary Cold War with China, while expecting Europe to follow blindly. When the US is provoking China into a military and defense race at China’s own door step, while pointing to the Chinese reaction as “aggression”, hoping to draw Europe also into this, European voices have to speak up and warn about what’s coming on the horizon.

The FBI and the CIA operating under the hat of the US Embassy in Sofia make sure that independent, politically critical voices are kept under check through a variety of illegal means that the US government somehow believes it can allow itself to use on EU soil. The US State Department is happy to tag and sing along with the US intelligence agencies, here in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian authorities are also happy to help the US government in the US government’s repression against progressive, politically critical voices in Bulgaria.

The key take-away for the US government in Bulgaria has to be that the history of US human rights infringements in Europe shows that things like that only drive the transatlantic bond further away, and don’t bring it closer. This is also something that US President Joe Biden is about to learn very soon.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Trending