Authors: Dr. Ian Anthony, Dr. Ian Davis(*)
At their Summit in Warsaw on 8–9 July, the heads of state and government of the NATO member countries will have a very full agenda of key topics for discussion. It seems unlikely that the leaders will seek to revise key guidance documents—the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept and the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review. However, it is widely recognized that both documents contain some language and ideas that are no longer in line with the way NATO members see current security problems.
For example, even if France did not invoke article 5 of the Washington Treaty, there is a consensus among member states that the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 were an act of armed aggression. Since 2010, the Islamic State (IS) group has joined al-Qaeda as an enemy of NATO. Moreover, NATO has now agreed that a cyberattack can, under certain conditions, be considered an act of aggression that would require an article 5 response. In addition, the current Strategic Concept describes the threat of a conventional attack against the NATO alliance as low and underlines the strategic importance of NATO-Russia cooperation. Today, while NATO stops short of describing Russia in its documents as an enemy, and continues to hold out the possibility of cooperation under certain conditions, it is equally clear that NATO no longer sees Moscow as a partner. How to deal with Russia is one of six broad interlinked agenda items that are likely to dominate the Warsaw Summit:
- the conflict in Ukraine and relations with Russia;
- strengthening collective defence;
- rethinking deterrence and the roles of nuclear weapons, missile defence and cybersecurity;
- addressing the ‘arc of crises’, especially armed Islamist extremism, while staying engaged in Afghanistan;
- the ‘open door’ and partnerships policies; and
- the ‘burden sharing’ debate.
These are discussed below.
1. The conflict in Ukraine and relations with Russia
The relationship between Russia and NATO—and the West more generally—has deteriorated, taking on a radically changed quality. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, NATO has suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia, while leaving some channels open for dialogue. In a televised interview in Poland in May, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that NATO would do its best to avoid escalations and promote an open dialogue with Moscow. The NATO-Russia Council met in April 2016, but Stoltenberg underlined that the meeting only reinforced the existence of what the he called profound and persistent disagreements.
2. Strengthening collective defence
A linked issue on the agenda will be to assess the implementation of the package of measures intended to strengthen collective defence that the leaders agreed at their previous Summit, in Wales in 2014. A number of so-called assurance measures were agreed at the Wales Summit, including establishing a continuous air, land and maritime presence and conducting meaningful military activities in the eastern part of the alliance. After 2014, plans have been developed to ensure that around 4000 troops from NATO countries will be present in the Baltic states and Poland on a rotational basis.
The small but rapid reaction force authorized in 2014 has been created to respond immediately, anywhere in the alliance, in case of need. In addition, the ‘follow-on’ NATO Response Force has been doubled in size to roughly 40,000 troops. The rotational forces and the NATO Response Force both include all the necessary air, maritime, logistic and other support.
The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act stated that, in the circumstances prevailing at the time, the permanent stationing of substantial combat forces in Central and Eastern Europe was not necessary. Some NATO members believe that the security environment has changed in ways that mean that any undertaking given to Russia need no longer be respected. However, recent arrangements have been designed by NATO in a way that all members of the organization believe to be consistent with the text of the 1997 Founding Act.
The Wales Summit also decided to increase the number of military exercises conducted each year, and to design exercises using scenarios closer to the collective defence mission. In 2016 at least 23 military exercises of different sizes are planned, using a range of scenarios and hosted by 20 different nations.
Potential areas of disagreement: The ‘frontline’ NATO states would have preferred further measures to exploit the flexibility offered by the NATO-Russia Founding Act to the fullest extent possible. In March 2014, for example, Poland urged NATO to station 10 000 troops on its territory on a permanent basis, but the organization has so far resisted doing so. The United States has already taken measures to bolster forces on NATO’s eastern flank, but sustaining significant rotational forces with wider participation among member states will be challenging, and from a practical perspective a permanent presence would be easier to manage. It is likely that the USA will contribute a significant share of the 4000 troops to be part of the rotation, but the exact composition is yet to be determined and the Warsaw Summit is expected to finalize exact numbers and the exact locations for the rotational presence.
3. Rethinking deterrence: the roles of nuclear weapons, missile defence and cybersecurity
A third important subject for discussion among NATO leaders will be deterrence: what it means and how it can be assured given deteriorating relations with Russia. This is closely tied to national perceptions of which security problems are the most pressing, and the sense of how far a military response is the most appropriate one.
The role of nuclear weapons in European security has recently become a subject of discussion after many years in which it was relegated to the background. Statements by senior Russian leaders have focused attention on how Russia sees the use of nuclear weapons in its military doctrine, and nuclear-capable weapon delivery platforms regularly participate in Russian military exercises. While it is unlikely that NATO will make any significant modifications to its nuclear policies at the Warsaw Summit, it is re-evaluating the role of nuclear scenarios in its crisis-management exercises. In 2015 NATO Defence Ministers conducted a focused discussion around better integrating conventional and nuclear deterrence.
Russia already undertakes exercises in which nuclear and conventional forces are closely integrated, and NATO currently carries out nuclear exercises of its own—but not in an integrated way with conventional weapons. In 2016 nuclear-capable aircraft, such as the F‑15E Strike Eagles normally stationed at RAF Lakenheath in England, participated in Exercise INIOHOS in Greece, perhaps to remind Russia that the United States has nuclear capabilities in Europe. In addition, the strategic nuclear capabilities of France, the United Kingdom and the USA could also be available to NATO if required.
In 2010 NATO authorized the development of a missile defence architecture that would provide equal protection to European NATO states in case of attack by a small number of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The Warsaw Summit will review the implementation of the 2010 decisions. Until now the United States and NATO have defined their missile defence programmes as directed against exclusively non-Russian threats.
Cybersecurity and other multidimensional challenges
There is a new military environment at the periphery of NATO, and a growing sense that it faces a multidimensional challenge. Growing military capabilities are combining with new types of threat posed by dedicated tools for cyberwarfare, the sophisticated manipulation of information in both mainstream and social media, and the strategic use of energy policy. In this case NATO leaders will consider how to combine the military reassurance measures that they have already agreed with an effective, multifaceted response to the new challenges that they face.
In particular, the Summit is likely to designate cyberwar the fifth domain of warfare (the others being air, sea, land and space). The USA did so in 2011. The distinction is important because it suggests that NATO would have the option to treat certain cyberattacks as military attacks, and respond accordingly under article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
Potential areas of disagreement: The fact that Russia is a participant in the major conflicts that are taking place in countries bordering Europe means that NATO leaders will need to consider whether the reassurance measures already defined are sufficient, or, if not, what additional decisions might be needed.
4. Addressing the arc of crises: taking on armed Islamist extremist movements while staying engaged in Afghanistan
A fourth issue that will be discussed in Warsaw is the contribution that NATO can make to crisis management from an arc of crises perspective. The issues this raises are the most complicated and difficult, and the discussion of them may be the most contentious. This narrative was outlined by the previous NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and NATO’s former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Philip Breedlove, in the Wall Street Journal in August 2014: ‘Instability rages to the south, with an arc of crises spreading from North Africa to the Middle East. And Russia is resorting to a hybrid war, with snap exercises, secret commandos and smuggled missiles’. While it is unlikely that there will be support for any new combat operations outside the area of application of the Washington Treaty, whether NATO should initiate planning for such a contingency may be discussed.
There is strong support for additional efforts in the area of capacity building, and NATO Foreign Ministers have used the term ‘projecting stability’ to describe efforts to help partners strengthen their own forces and secure their own countries. The Summit will certainly be an opportunity to assess the impact of capacity building in Afghanistan.
Capacity building in Afghanistan
At the end of 2014 NATO terminated its combat mission in Afghanistan and transitioned into Operation Resolute Support. Since January 2015, the focus of NATO in Afghanistan has been supporting the emerging Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and other Afghan security institutions under the Ministry of Interior and the National Directorate of Security as they take full responsibility for ending conflict and building peace.
The number of NATO forces has been reduced and consolidated into locations where training, advisory and assistance roles can be provided for the essential functions set out in the mission support plan agreed between NATO and the Afghan Government. Assistance is being provided on budget planning and execution, reducing corruption, force generation (i.e. how to recruit, train and equip the armed forces and other security forces), logistics, the management of civil-military relations and public diplomacy, how to plan military operations (including how to provide the necessary resources), how to build strategic and tactical intelligence relevant to the overall mission of the ANSF and how to counter the Taliban’s information warfare.
In May the NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to extend the Afghan mission beyond 2016, so the Warsaw Summit will have to consider how to ensure the success of Operation Resolute Support in the difficult security environment that still exists in Afghanistan. In particular, given the presence of groups affiliated with IS, NATO will have to consider whether to provide more—and more direct—assistance to the ANSF and other Afghan security institutions, and perhaps even resume a combat role.
The Summit is also likely to review international financial support for the Afghan security forces. NATO officials will be hopeful they can get sufficient financial commitments locked in until 2020 as the previous round of pledges expires in 2017. However, finding the US$ 6 billion a year to continue to fund the Afghan security forces will be a major headache. Since toppling the Taliban in 2001, the USA alone has contributed nearly US$ 93 billion in assistance to Afghanistan, of which more than US$ 56 billion has been spent on training, equipping and supporting Afghan security forces.
Addressing conflict in the Middle East
The role of NATO in conflict-affected locations in the Middle East is also likely to be on the agenda of leaders in Warsaw. For those countries that request it, NATO is likely to offer capacity building and training in those functional areas where it has unique expertise. For example, in discussions with countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council that are trying to build closer military cooperation among themselves, NATO can offer unique insights into joint command systems and the management of collective defence.
NATO has already agreed to send an assessment team to Iraq to explore the possibility of in-country NATO training for Iraq’s military to help it better fight IS. NATO has already trained hundreds of Iraqi officers in Jordan. NATO is also considering aiding the US-led Coalition to Counter ISIL by supplying AWACS surveillance aircraft, while Libya’s new UN-brokered government is consulting NATO on how it might rebuild its defence and security institutions. Finally, NATO is also looking to do more in the Mediterranean Sea, in cooperation with the European Union (EU) and others. NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour is likely to become a broader maritime security operation, taking on new tasks such as upholding freedom of navigation, interdiction and support to maritime counterterrorism.
Potential areas of disagreement: To what extent have NATO member states moved beyond the ‘intervention fatigue’ associated with the large-scale Western military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan? Several NATO states and partners are likely to remain very cautious about the future use of force, and concerned about measures that could lead to a ‘step-by-step’ military engagement. However, reluctance to deploy military force is also now under review given the conflict in Ukraine and growing calls to combat IS in Iraq, Libya, Syria and elsewhere.
5. The ‘open door’ and partnerships policies
The Summit will also pay close attention to the the composition of NATO, now and in the future, and consider how to strengthen a range of different relationships and partnerships, first and foremost in close proximity to its borders to the East and South.
In May 2016 Montenegro signed an Accession Protocol, which is the penultimate step in joining NATO. Once that protocol has been ratified by all member states, Montenegro will become the 29th member of NATO. After Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia joined in 2004, and Albania and Croatia in 2009, the decision by Montenegro to seek membership is a further step in consolidating participation in south-east Europe. The decision is also a signal that NATO membership is not fixed, and that additional aspirant countries such as Georgia, Macedonia and Bosnia might join in the future. However, while future enlargement of NATO membership is not excluded, in practice there is widespread agreement that in the short term the prospects for expanding the alliance are limited.
The Summit will also address the issue of how NATO works with various different partners on issues of mutual interest. NATO has built a network of partnerships with more than 40 countries from all over the globe, including countries in North Africa and the Middle East, non-NATO members in Europe—such as Finland and Sweden, which are both so-called Enhanced Opportunity Partners of NATO—and countries further afield, such as Australia, Japan and South Korea. NATO is now looking at various ways to deepen and broaden those partnerships. It might, for example, intensify political consultations by making them more frequent and more focused; or it could engage certain interested partners on specific subjects of common concern by using established forums, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as smaller, more flexible formats.
There have been indications of increasingly positive cooperation between NATO and the EU. Federica Mogherini, the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, and the Foreign Ministers of Finland and Sweden participated in the May NATO ministerial meeting. This was interpreted as a signal that further NATO-EU cooperation could be expected, both on functional issues—such as cybersecurity and strategic communications to counteract information operations—and in operations such as the recent cooperation to address human trafficking.
6. Burden sharing
At the Wales Summit, NATO made a defence investment pledge that will be assessed in Warsaw. The alliance pledged to move progressively towards allocating 2 per cent of member states’ GDP to defence and, perhaps as important, allocate at least 20 per cent of their defence budgets to major equipment, including Research & Development. To give substance to this pledge, a number have stopped the successive reductions in military spending that took place in the years before the Wales summit, and in some cases have begun to increase military spending. It is too soon to say how the increased resources will be used.
Potential areas of disagreement: This debate is one of the longest running fault lines within NATO, with accusations that Europe spends too little on defence and is being protected at US taxpayers’ expense. While the USA does pick up a disproportionate share of the NATO tab, the imbalance is not as great as is sometimes suggested. At the Warsaw Summit, evidence that the military spending of European member states is no longer falling, and is beginning to increase, is likely to be highlighted as a successful outcome of the decisions taken in Wales in 2014. However, persuading Europe’s taxpayers to make further significant increases in defence spending remains an uphill challenge. Moreover, in the light of the complex security challenges that need to be addressed, whether increasing military spending is always the most appropriate response will continue to be contested.
‘Future NATO’ project
The conflict in Ukraine has forced NATO to go ‘back to basics’ and focus more on collective defence. However, it is unlikely to prevent the Warsaw Summit from continuing to advance a broader, ‘Future NATO’, project in which both capabilities and partnerships are strengthened.
NATO does not have, and will not acquire, all of the tools needed to address evolving 21st century security threats. However, the way in which NATO can consolidate and build on its partnerships is perhaps currently its least well defined area of work. As a result, the critical metric for success at the Warsaw Summit will be how the capacities available to NATO will be applied alongside those controlled by states and other international organizations.
(*) Dr Ian Davis is the Director of the SIPRI Editorial, Publications and Library Department.
First published in sipri.org
Negating Nuclear Bluff
The war of words between India and Pakistan’s militaries prove that both South Asian nuclear states are intertwined in a traditional security competition. Indian Army Chief Gen. Bipin Rawat, while delivering the annual Army dinner, stated:”We will call the (nuclear) bluff of Pakistan. If we will have to really confront the Pakistanis, and a task is given to us, we are not going to say we cannot cross the border because they have nuclear weapons. We will have to call their nuclear bluff.” Such statements of calling the ‘nuclear bluff’, ‘increased cross- border firing by Indian forces, which coupled with the proclamation of surgical strikes can lead to crisis instability in the region.
Director General Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Major General Asif Ghafoor responded to the Indian army chief’s ‘nuclear bluff’ assertion by saying that such statements are unbecoming from a person of a responsible stature. He further stated that “Well, it’s their choice. Should they wish to test our resolve they may try and see it for them..…Pakistan’s credible nuclear deterrence is the only thing stopping India from a war.” Such statements by the Indian military officials, and a quick calculated response from Pakistan, have raised the concerns of security analysts regarding the regional security and strategic dynamics.
It could be an appropriate tactic of General Bipin for securing finances for the modernization of the Army, but an absurd and destabilizing statement for the strategic stability in South Asia. According to the analysts, such statements by Indian military officials can lead to crisis instability and force the Pakistan to hasten its evolution towards war fighting nuclear doctrine. Another alarming reality is that General Bipin has failed to realize the repercussions of misreading Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capability and too much confidence in India’s Cold Start Doctrine. Hence, Pakistan’s successful test of the ‘submarine-launched cruise missile Babur (SLCM Babur)’ can be viewed as a befitting response to India.
According to Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), Babur is submarine-launched cruise missile with range of 450 km. It was fired “from an underwater dynamic platform” and “successfully engaged its target with precise accuracy; meeting all … flight parameters”. The development of Babur (SLCM) is a significant component of a “credible second-strike capability” and a step towards reinforcing Pakistan’s policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence through self-reliance and indigenization.
Previously, on January 9, 2017, Pakistan conducted its first successful test of indigenously developed submarine launched cruise missile Babur-III. Babur-III is also advanced, mature and indigenously developed series of cruise missiles. The First test of Babur-III was considered by Pakistan’ security planners as a major milestone and a right step in right direction towards reliable second strike capability. After the successful test of Babur-III, Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, while congratulating the nation and the military on the first successful test-fire of the Submarine Launched Cruise Missile stated: “The successful test of Babur-3 is a manifestation of Pakistan’s technological progress and self-reliance.” He added: “Pakistan always maintains policy of peaceful co-existence but this test is a step towards reinforcing policy of credible minimum deterrence.” Therefore successful test of Babur-III, submarine launched cruise missile finalized the triad of Pakistan’s nuclear forces and second test of Babar on March 9, 2018 has enhanced Pakistan’s deterrence based on Second Strike Capability.
Another significant factor which forced Pakistan to acquire Second Strike Capability is India’s doctrinal transformation as it is clearly transforming its Nuclear Doctrine. New trends are emerging in India’s nuclear strategy as it is moving towards a ‘first-use’ or even a ‘first-strike nuclear strategy’. India’s nuclear doctrine is based on the ‘strategic ambiguity’, therefore it has been anticipated that India is shifting its nuclear strategy towards ‘counterforce targets’ rather than ‘counter value targets’. The second emerging trend is that India is moving towards the strategy of “First Use” or “Preemptive strike” from the “No-First Use strategy”. The abandoning of no first-use, development of missiles defense shield, fake claims of surgical strikes and calling the nuclear bluff are developments that are perilous for the regional security. Indeed, such events have forced Pakistan to maintain deterrence through qualitative and quantitative developments in nuclear forces. In the strategic landscape of South Asia, the presence of Pakistan’s credible second-strike capability is imperative for the continuity of the strategic stability between/among strategic competitors: India and Pakistan.
Subsequently, harsh statements by Indian military, its shifting nuclear doctrines and maturing sea based/ballistic missile defense developments capabilities are threatening for Pakistan. Such developments by India have been countered by Pakistan by carrying out two tests of nuclear-capable missiles, ‘Babur-3’ submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) and ‘Babar’. Pakistan’s tests of SLCM has further reinforced the debate on South Asian maritime security, second-strike capability and missile defense technologies in the regional landscape. To conclude, it’s impossible for the Indians to alter the strategic equilibrium between India and Pakistan. Though Islamabad is not matching the Indian conventional military buildup, yet it is gradually advancing its nuclear arsenal. Hence, Pakistan’s successful test of indigenous Submarine Launched Cruise (SLC) Missile ‘Babur’ has negated India’s desire to call Pakistan’s ‘nuclear bluff’ and has augmented the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence strategy. Addition of ‘Babur’ in Pakistan’s military inventory confirms that Pakistan armed forces are prepared to thwart any kind of Indian armed forces military adventurism.
A Likely Path to Nuclear Annihilation
U.S. President Donald Trump asserted on the morning of April 12th, “Never said when an attack on Syria would take place. Could be very soon or not so soon at all!” This statement from him is interpreted here as constituting a public promise from him to start the overt phase of America’s invasion of sovereign Syrian territory, no longer just continue the prior phase, which has relied instead upon America’s proxy forces, which originally were the ones that were led by (U.S.-Saudi-Qatari-UAE supplied and armed) Al Qaeda in Syria, but increasingly now are Syria’s Kurds, which have taken control over a third of Syrian territory, in Syria’s northeast. This area includes the oil-producing region, from Deir Ezzor northward, and the conquest would cripple Syria’s economic future, so that U.S-Saudi control of the entire country would be only a matter of time.
On April 4th, Emily Burchfield, a program assistant at the Atlantic Council — NATO’s leading PR agency — headlined the following, in order to explain the U.S. military’s (i.e., NATO’s) objectives in Syria (and the whole headline-bloc is quoted here, because it succinctly states the article itself): Analysis: Washington Still Has Work to Do in Former ISIS Territories
Before the U.S. pulls out of Syria, Washington needs to address a governance gap left in some former ISIS territories. Otherwise, marginalized Arab communities will likely ally with the Syrian government or extremist forces, writes Emily Burchfield of the Atlantic Council.
The U.S. military, in other words, cannot accept that “marginalized Arab communities” will “ally with the Syrian government.” Analogous within the United States itself would be if some foreign power refused to accept that “marginalized White communities” will “ally with the U.S. government.” In other words: this is clearly a military demand (a demand that came to be expressed here by a paid employee of NATO’s top PR agency, the Atlantic Council) to break up the country.
Whereas the prior U.S. President, Barack Obama, had tried everything short of all-out direct military invasion — as contrasted to indirect invasion by U.S. proxy armies of jihadist mercenaries — in order to conquer or at least to break up Syria, the current U.S. President, Trump, is resorting now to the direct military invasion route: he’s taking the path that Obama had declined to take.
Syria’s allies are Iran and Russia. These allies have enabled Syria to survive this long, and they all would be capitulating to the U.S. if they accepted the U.S. military invasion of Syria. For them to do that, would be for them to display, to the entire world, that the United States is their master. The U.S. Empire would, in effect, be official, no longer merely aspirational.
In the case of Russia, since it is the other nuclear super-power, this would be not just a surrender to the other nuclear super-power, but also Russia’s doing that without even waging a conventional-forces war against the U.S. Empire. That is extremely unlikely.
Consequently, Russia is probably now (on April 12th) coordinating with Iran, and with its allies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, a conventional-forces war against the invaders.
If that conventional-forces war inflicts more damage to U.S.-and-allied forces than they inflict against Syria, that would, in military terms, constitute a “military defeat” for the U.S.
This would leave the U.S. only two options:
Either accept that Russia is another nuclear super-power (which the U.S. Deep State has refused to accept), and end the previously subterranian war to conquer it that was started by George Herbert Walker Bush on the night of 24 February 1990, or else blitz-attack Russia itself in order to eliminate enough of Russia’s retaliatory weapons so as to ‘win’ the nuclear war — i.e., inflict even more destruction upon Russia than Russia would still possess and control the surviving weaponry to inflict against America in response.
Optical Missile Tracking Systems and Minimum Credible Deterrence
There was a time in human history when nuclear technology was the “it” technology; no one could imagine anything beyond it. The destruction and wrath it brought was not only terrifying but mesmerizing. It was fascinating for ordinary people, leaders, scientists and states that the smallest particle of matter upon breaking can release energy which could burn down a whole city in seconds. Thus, invention of nuclear weapons changed the way of thinking of nations, states and leaders. Mastering the fission of radioactive atom to enable it to release energy is not a child’s play; states invest billions in currency to make nuclear weapons.
At the operational level, a nuclear weapon requires delivery systems. In this regard, strategic bombers, ships, submarines and missiles are commonly used delivery vehicles by the states. But, one of the most significant and reliable delivery systems is missiles, With missiles, states can launch nuclear pay load from their own territory or from any other place without risking its human resource, in case of sending bombers. Missile technology all around the world is growing by leaps and bounds. After nuclearization, both Indian and Pakistan pursued missile technologies including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, ballistic missile defences, Multiple Independently re-entry targetable vehicles and inter-continental ballistic missiles as well. States invest in nuclear weapons because it helps them achieve deterrence which stops states from using nuclear option due to fear of unacceptable damages to one’s vital interests. However, to endorse credibility of nuclear weapons, states invest in military modernization.
The main objective behind nuclearization of Pakistan was to create deterrence against India but without indulging into arms race. Thus, policy of minimum credible deterrence was developed by Pakistan. Later on, after India’s attempt to exploit the levels beneath nuclear threshold, Pakistan resorted to the policy of full spectrum deterrence without going for arms race. So, to create credible but minimum deterrence at the start of year 2017, Pakistan tested multiple independently reentry targetable vehicle (MIRV), which can deliver multiple nuclear war heads in one go.
Development of MIRV by Pakistan is neither consequence of ambitious national objectives nor is it meant to initiate an arms race in the region. But, it is to make nuclear deterrence viable against India’s BMDs which can intercept incoming ballistic missiles through interceptors and destruct them in the air.
Pakistan, due to its economic restraints could not go for BMD in response to India; as it is an expensive technology that has yet to achieve 100% success rate. So, considering its options, MIRVs came out as the most rational choice. However, MIRVs are one of the most complex technologies in which missile can carry more than one warhead in a single launch and with the capability to hit multiple individual targets. They require technological sophistication in not only sending so many vehicles in one launch but also in yield and most importantly in accuracy. With enough yield and accuracy MIRVs provide states the capability to go for pre-emptive strikes. Thus, MIRV have the capability to overwhelm the BMD system and resultantly eliminate the false sense of security under which India could go for first strike.
To increase the accuracy of MIRV missiles, Pakistan bought highly sophisticated, large scale optical tracking and measurement system from China. According to national news agency, Pakistan has deployed this sophisticated technology in battlefield. Before Chinese system, Pakistan was utilizing indigenous systems. Nonetheless, it will help Pakistan record high-resolution images of a missile’s departure from its launcher, stage separation, tail flame and, after the missile re-enters atmosphere, the trajectory of the warheads it releases. These functions will be possible because the system bought by Pakistan comes with a pair of high-performance telescopes equipped with a laser ranger, high-speed camera, infrared detector and a centralised computer system that automatically captures and follows moving targets. However, what makes this system unique is its ability to detect missile up to range of several hundred kilometers through the help of its telescopes. The timing of these telescopes are precisely synchronized with the atomic clock. Thus, now Pakistan can track different warheads going in different directions simultaneously. Moreover, through visual imagery, the missile developers can improve the accuracy and design of missile in much better way.
So, with this technological uplift, Pakistan will soon add Ababeel (MIRV) into its operational missile inventory. But, these actions by Pakistan are not to give rise to arms race rather they are the reactions to the actions taken by India. BMDs by India never strengthened nuclear deterrence or stability rather they eliminated the deterrence by nulling the credibility of ballistic missiles. As a result, to maintain credibility of its deterrence though minimum means, Pakistan opted for MIRV, as missile tracking systems are essential in improving the accuracy and designs of missiles. If anything indicates arms race in the region, it is India’s ICBMs, naval nuclear fleets and space weaponization.
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