The Temer government
Mr Temer’s interim government has been marked by aggressive contention measures, polemic decrees, an over homogeneous team of (arguably honest) ministers and an unexpected hesitation in choosing the political leaders in the parliament and planning its next moves.
When it first came to forming an economic team with their origins in the market, the interim president was highly praised and gathered a lot of experts led by Mr Henrique Meirelles, former president of the Central Bank of Brazil. Their first actions were sharp and oriented towards a solution for the economic scenario (or, at least, an insight into a situation of stability) – they redefined the budget bills, assuming a gap of 170 billion reais (Ms Rousseff’s staff had agreed on R$96 billion right before she was ousted) and determined that the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) would return R$100 billion for public debts, which should also generate savings of R$7 billion.
Nonetheless, there seemed to be still great confusion regarding the general directions and the ministers. So far, there were situations in which the president needed to publicly state a different opinion from his own staff: one can recall, for example, when the Health minister claimed that health could not be a facility to every Brazilian and the Finance minister seemed unsure about the return of the Provisional Contribution on Financial Transactions – CPMF, abolished in 2007, as an extra revenue to help cover the huge fiscal gap in the economy.
Taking out what is left(-wing)
The desperate measures of what had once been called a mandate to solve the financial crisis, in turn, were far more unpopular than that and fomented some extra tension in an already politically divided country.
First, a ministry composed only by white males seriously worried those who defend or represent minorities – and there is a legit reason for that. The interim president has alleged that no woman would accept his invitation for ruling the ministries, but it is the first time in 37 years, therefore, since the military dictatorship in Brazil, that minorities were not represented. Besides, local policies for those minorities are not strong nor effective (Brazil is one of the countries with the highest rates of crimes against homosexuals, for example) , so yes, even though some might argue that the ministers were chosen based on their competence (with which one can only partly agree, since many of the positions meant for a ‘government of notables’, as Mr Temer used to refer to a team that included congressmen investigated in Operation Car Wash, were promised to allies in a pre-impeachment scenario), there is the need for representation, as a matter of defining how minorities might properly be governed. Once more politicians from different origins take the power together, it becomes way easier for the government, centered in the person of the president, to approve or create accurate and meaningful policies for those groups.
What seems somehow aggressive to Dilma’s defenders and leftists in general is that most of the ‘new’ government’s measures are, at the same time, liberal and cost-oriented (which means that, at least for the spotlight, this will not be known as a government that prioritizes social policies, even though Temer said there weren’t going to be any cuts in Health and Education budgets).
The interim president is proud to compare his short, aggressive economic goals to Juscelino Kubitschek’s (Brazilian president from 1956-1961, whose economic targets were under the motto ‘50 years of development in 5’), but his foes would rather link him to our years of military dictatorship. If it is to say that his attitudes are authoritarian – which could be more accurately defined as precipitate and vague -, since they don’t follow the populist vein that 51,64% of the Brazilian voters chose in 2014, hopefully this will be a time for a ‘Brazilian miracle’. But that is hugely unlikely.
The Game of Brasilia
Among all those sensitive measures, one of the most memorable (and rejected) was the mergence of some ministries and the instauration of other two. Mr. Temer temporarily abolished the Ministry of Culture, placing it as a subpart of the Ministry of Education. He did the same to the Ministry of Women, Racial Equality and Human Rights, incorporated to the Ministry of Justice, under the argument that it would save money.
Indeed, it would, but the savings were not significant compared to the debt of the country and didn’t pay off the general burst of indignation caused in the artistic class, that occupied public buildings in many capitals in Brazil for more than one week, until the president finally stepped back and restructured the Ministry of Culture.
This first month of government has been marked by ethical incongruences, too. Besides the Car Wash investigated ministers, the leader of the government in the Lower House, André Moura, is facing lawsuits regarding corruption, embezzlement of public funds and even homicide attempts. Furthermore, as I previously wrote here, ministers Romero Jucá and Henrique Alves had audios leaked in which they expressed how convenient it was for the end of the Operation Car Wash that Dilma lost her mandate (the first had to resign, whereas the latter was kept by the president for the ‘lack of evidences’ to point him as an obstacle to the investigation).
The president’s attitudes aiming at strengthening alliances are also questionable. A summary raise of the public employees’ salaries was recently approved, which will cause debts to escalate up to 6.9 billion reais until 2019, due to the cascade effect (salaries that are calculated based on other salaries, causing the adjustments in the lawmakers’ paycheck to be followed by a raise to a whole lot of other public employees), and seems to be only justified, in times of contention, by another of the president’s attempt to monetize his support and stability. This is believed to be especially necessary in a moment when popular demonstrations, like the one that happened on June 10th in at least 24 states and the Federal District, show that not only does Mr Temer not have support from many voters, but he is also rejected by them.
Now, it is for us to wait and see how an already so unpopular government will, within 180 days (until it is decided whether president Dilma will permanently be impeached or not), create measures to improve a forecast of a 3,81% shrinking in the GDP, cause a contraction of SELIC (Special System for Settlement and Custody, a rate that nowadays reaches 14,25%, showing an effort from the Central Bank to control inflation and consumption) and fight to diminish the frightening unemployment rates of 11,2% (in the first trimester of this year) without confronting nor outraging specific and non-specific groups of Brazilians who eagerly await this economic and political turbulence to pass.