Connect with us

Intelligence

The Grand Cyber Spy Game: Russia, America, and China Stealing the World One Byte at a Time

Dr. Matthew Crosston

Published

on

Dr. Matthew Crosston & Anonymous(*)

Every month another story of cybertheft linked to China or Russia emerges. Recent data breaches at Target, United Airlines, Blue Cross Blue Shield, and OPM have been linked back to Russia, while theft of key technology across major Department of Defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin and US government laboratories have been linked to China.

Neither China nor Russia’s government formally admit to leveraging the internet to steal secrets from other countries but hacks have been linked directly to their intelligence services’ respective buildings or individuals known to be under governmental influence. International cyber incidents in Ukraine, Georgia, and Estonia have all been apparently linked back to Russia while the Canadian government recently set up domestic cyber-protection programs after several major corporations were hacked by Chinese intelligence. The US government struggles on how to approach these cyber intrusions. Should they be ignored so that other foreign policy initiatives can move forward? Are these initiatives acts of war or a new method of state gamesmanship? Do these collections of vast amounts of information count as high treason/espionage or simple economic theft? Environmental negotiations just about broke down several years ago when President Obama called out China for hacking several governmental systems during the negotiations. What does all of this signify as Russia and China become more important strategic world partners, while still at least semi-maintaining long-held intelligence and military adversarial attitudes toward the US? Welcome to the REAL cyber era, where multiple players try to steal the world one byte at a time while pretending to do nothing of the sort.

The Chinese, American, and Russian intelligence services have no issue launching clandestine internet attacks to pursue what they all consider to be legitimate national security and foreign policy objectives. Sometimes the information collected is economic, directed against or about important corporations; other times the information is military and political. In all cases the information is highly strategic. While it is true that the information the Russian and Chinese intelligence services are providing to their respective policymakers is much broader in scope than the CIA or US Department of Defense, and is arguably much more domestically invasive than the FBI or DEA, both Russia and China have successfully started campaigns questioning the ‘purity of purpose’ within American intelligence given the details of the Snowden scandal. All of which begs questions: should American intelligence maneuvers match Chinese and Russian cyber precedence? Is the American public aversion to cyber collection programs really just a front for a private philosophy that already rivals China and Russia? Is there something fundamentally important for states to consider in this style vs. substance cyber spy debate?

Crucial differences in intelligence organizational culture and mission make figuring these questions out quite difficult. While the United States has been quick to leverage open-source collection for its own programs, it has supposedly been hesitant to execute the power of its cyber abilities in invasive, offensive, global scenarios (although this consideration is now being heavily debated in the classified sector and some accuse it of already transpiring). This article will attempt to determine if Chinese and Russian intelligence services have gained a tactical advantage over the United States because of a political and bureaucratic blind spot, or if the United States intelligence collection culture is different only at the superficial level and is largely the same as its rivals in terms of true cyber substance.

The first important aspect in understanding the Grand Cyber Game is to understand how the Russian, Chinese, and US intelligence communities are structured. The United States is known for the ‘big brothers’ of its IC, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Security Agency (NSA). However, there are actually 17 members of the US Intelligence Community. Some of these include intelligence offices for each branch of the US military, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The first five use intelligence collection as part of a law enforcement mission, while the NSA, NRO, and NGA all harvest data and imagery collection. Traditionally, the CIA operates overseas and cultivates human sources while conducting clandestine operations. The FBI traditionally manages counterterrorism operations domestically, provides investigation support overseas when American citizens are involved, and acts under an enforcement jurisdiction to maintain the law. The NSA was established to provide cryptologic services and to protect US information systems and signals intelligence. It supports military customers, national policymakers, and counterterrorism and counter-intelligence communities under the Department of Defense. However, in a post-9/11 world, these explicitly defined roles have become more blurred and opaque as global travel and transnational collections are intensely complicated by the internet.

Conversely, modern Chinese intelligence services have always had domestic and international missions intertwined. China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) was formed in 1954 as a domestic law enforcement agency. It managed criminal investigations, security protection, public information network security, traffic control, legal affairs, counter-terrorism, drug control, and other anti-smuggling and anti-corruption duties. In 1983, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) was established as the formal intelligence and security agency of China for non-military areas of interests. It has the same authority to arrest or detain people as the MPS with a nearly identical oversight mission by the courts, but it is also a separate, parallel network to the MPS. The MSS mission is to ensure “the security of the state through effective measures against enemy agents, spies, and counter-revolutionary activities designed to sabotage or overthrow China’s socialist system.” Similar to the CIA, the MSS gathers foreign intelligence from targets in various countries overseas while the MPS gathers information domestically to protect against domestic terrorism and political coups. Both heavily rely on cyber collection.

Russia operates with three principal intelligence services. The SVR focuses on foreign intelligence collection, but mainly with civilian affairs. It is formally responsible for intelligence and espionage activities outside the Russian Federation. The GRU is the main foreign military intelligence directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. It is Russia’s largest foreign intelligence agency, deploying at least six times as many agents as the formal KGB successor, the SVR. The FSB operates in theory only across the former Soviet Republics and domestically, but having had its operational portfolio increased in 2003 to include the Border Guard Service and the Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information. The three intelligence services often overlap and sometimes compete against one another in the recruitment and collection of intelligence sources. Russia also established an Anti-Terrorist Center that falls under full control of the FSB. The Center’s mandate was to create a database for intelligence sharing among the security services of all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Although the SVR has promised not to spy within CIS territories, the FSB has not. As such, it has become the de facto leading intelligence service for foreign collection activities for Russia. Interestingly, Russia has often turned a blind eye to Central Asian intelligence service activity within its borders, when Central Asian leaders are making moves against so-called political enemies (these moves are usually abductions back to Central Asia for detainment). These activities have included both the Chinese MSS and MSP. In 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, to work together against terrorism, separatism, and extremism. They established their own Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) that became the mechanism of choice for carrying out abductions across national boundaries, outside of standard judicial procedures. RATS operations have been compared to the CIA’s practice of extraordinary rendition and allow members to detain suspects in the six participating states outside of any rule of law. The members’ operators are not subject to criminal liability and they are immune from arrest and detention within the six states.

The reality is, on an international level, the intelligence services of all three nations operate with remarkably similar mission goals and objectives: they wish to protect the national interests of their respective states and garner advantages for said states via the acquisition of important information. While Hollywood has often focused on the political deviance and violence of intelligence missions around the world, the less exciting reality is that intelligence is more often utilized simply for political leverage. On the domestic level, the United States has long-held the moral superiority card against rivals like Russia and China, largely based on the democratic system in America supposedly being more altruistic and legally-minded than the so-called autocratic-type regimes in Beijing and Moscow. Snowden and other details in the past several years have started to make some at least wonder how much that moralism is built upon a foundation of sand and not stone. Finally, the stylistic aspect of intelligence public relations is significantly different between the three: the US decidedly tries to maintain an air of secrecy and deniability over just about everything its Intelligence Community does or needs to do. Russia and China, while revealing no secrets, tend to be a bit more unabashed about the role and necessity intelligence plays for the furthering of state power and do not fear making public statements to that effect anywhere, anytime. For them, therefore, the only difference between the three great players in the Grand Cyber Spy Game is the costuming and marketing of their respective goals, but NOT the ploys, initiatives, and overall desires. When it comes to winning, it seems all three are set and determined to virtually steal, that is, ‘obtain’ as much as possible. The Grand Cyber Spy Game demands no less.

(*) Anonymous is currently a graduate student in International Security and Intelligence Studies at Bellevue University and works within the US governmental system. The opinions expressed are strictly personal and do not reflect a formal endorsement of or by the United States’ government and/or Intelligence Community.

Dr. Matthew Crosston is Executive Vice Chairman of ModernDiplomacy.eu and chief analytical strategist of I3, a strategic intelligence consulting company. All inquiries regarding speaking engagements and consulting needs can be referred to his website: https://profmatthewcrosston.academia.edu/

Continue Reading
Comments

Intelligence

The Failures of 737 Max: Political consequences in the making

Sisir Devkota

Published

on

Last month, as Boeing scaled new contracts for the 737 Max, horrific remains in Bishoftu, from the crashed Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, witnessed the Dubai Air show in despair; the plane manufacturer had sealed another 70 contracts for the future. Still, the dreaded MCAS software is looking for a resolution at last. Two of the fatal Max 8 crashes have been reportedly caused by censor failures, accounted to software malfunctions. Hundred and fifty-seven people died inside flight 302, only months after Lion Air 610 crashed into the Java Sea with 180 passengers on board.

Both accidents are predisposed towards the highly sophisticated Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), an algorithm that prevents 737 aircrafts from steep take offs; or de-escalates the vehicle at its own will. However, there is more to Boeing accidents than just a co-incidental MCAS failure. Largely, it is only a consequence of political and economic interests.

While Boeing’s European competitor, Airbus, relaunched its A320’s in 2010, there were fewer changes in the operating manual. Airbus 320 Neo, as it was re-named, had larger engines on the wings, primarily designed for fuel efficiency. The Neo models claimed a whopping 7% increment in the overall performance; inviting thousands of orders worldwide. Consequently, Boeing’s market share of more than 35% was immediately under threat after Lufthansa introduced it for the first time in 2016. Despite of major competition from the A320, 737’s lack of ground clearance space, hindered for a major engine configuration. Nevertheless, Boeing responded to the mechanical challenge and introduced the MCAS for flight safety. As bigger engines in 737 was increasing the take-off weight, the MCAS would automatically re-orient the aeroplane’s steepness to avoid stall. Boeing’s lust to stay afloat in the competitive market, led by a robotic intrusion in flight controls did not fare too long. Flight investigations claimed that although Lion Air 610 was gaining altitude in normal circumstances, the MCAS read it wrongly; hence, pulling the aircraftlower, beyond the control of physical pilots. It was a design flaw, motivated by the need to overcome dwindling sales profits.

Neither is Airbus enjoying smooth performances over the years; it however has not performed as miserly as the 737. Indigo, a major Indian airline is the largest importer of A320 Neo; despite new technologies, it has been warned of repeating problems like momentary engine vibration. Months back, an Indigo flight stalled on its way from Kolkata to Pune, before being forced to return to its departure. Unlike the Boeing 737, Airbus malfunctioning does not lead to a major disaster. There is an element of mechanical interference available to pilots flying the European prototypes. Still, it is not everything that separates the two giants.

The Ethiopian disaster, scrutinized Boeing’s leadership at home; a congressional hearing concluded that after repeated attempts to warn the airline manufacturer to present information as transparently as possible, deaf ears have persisted. As the statement read, Boeing was hiding significant information away from airline companies and pilots. While it plans to resume sales in 2020, progress has been waning, in terms of improving the knowledge behind operating the 737 Max. The investigative hearing concluded that Boeing was manufacturing flying coffins.

Unsurprisingly, there is little amusement towards the development of airline sales around the world. Visibly, there is a band of companies, preferring the American manufacturer to the other. The politics is simple; it is merely about technological superiority, but more related with subsidies and after sales services. Regardless of whether Boeing will scrap the 737 Max or improve the software configuration, doubts have presided over choosing to fly altogether with choosing to fly a specific model. Air travel could not be safer in 2020. That claim is in serious trouble.

Continue Reading

Intelligence

Digital Privacy vs. Cybersecurity: The Confusing Complexity of Information Security in 2020

Dr. Matthew Crosston

Published

on

There is a small and potentially tumultuous revolution building on the horizon of 2020. Ironically, it’s a revolution very few people on the street are even aware of but literally every single corporation around the globe currently sits in finger-biting, hand-wringing anticipation: is it ready to meet the new challenge of the California Consumer Privacy Act, which comes into full effect on January 1, 2020. Interestingly, the CCPA is really nothing more than California trying to both piggy-back AND surpass the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) of the European Union, which was passed all the way back in 2016. In each case, these competing/coincident pieces of regulation aim to do something quite noble at first glance for all consumers: to enhance the privacy rights and data protection of all people from all digital threats, shenanigans, and malfeasance. While the EU legislation first of all focuses on the countries that make up the European Union and the California piece formally claims to be about the protection of California residents alone, the de facto reality is far more reaching. No one, literally no one, thinks these pieces can remain geographically contained or limited. Instead, they will either become governing pieces across a far greater transregional area (the EU case) or will become a driving spur for other states to develop their own set of client privacy regulations (the California case). Despite the fact that most people welcome the idea of formal legal repercussions for corporations that do not adequately protect consumer data/information privacy, there are multiple confusions and complexity hidden within this overly simple statement. As we head into 2020, what should be chief for corporations is not trying to just blindly satisfy both GDPR and CCPA. Rather, it should be about how to remedy these confusions first. However, that elimination is not nearly as easy to achieve as some might think.

First off, a not-so-simple question: what is privacy? It is a bit awe-inspiring to consider that there are many ways to define privacy. When considering GDPR and CCPA, it is essential to have precise and explicit definitions so that corporations can at least have a realistic chance to set goals that are manageable and achievable, let alone provide them with security against reckless litigation. Failure to define privacy explicitly carries radically ambiguous legal consequences in the coming CCPA atmosphere, something all corporations should rightly avoid like the plague. Perhaps worse, no matter how much time you spend defining consumer privacy beforehand, trying to create this improved consumer protection digitally becomes almost hopelessly complicated. The high-technology, instant-communication, constant-access, massively-diversified world we live in today makes some argue that ‘digital privacy’ in any real sense is dead and buried without the possibility for resurrection. If this is true, then how quixotic will it be for corporations to try to meet the regulation demands of legislative projects like GDPR and CCPA if they do not first try to establish both clarity and transparency of terms and goals?

This is not a nihilistic argument just trying to have every corporation around the world throw up its hands in despair and give up on improved consumer privacy and data protection. But note the word ‘improved.’ In order for corporations to realistically provide consumer data protection, the irony of ironies may be that the first successful step will be finally embracing transparency in admitting that ‘perfect digital privacy’ will not and cannot exist. Realistic cyber expectations mean admitting that external threats always have an upper hand over internal defenders. Not because they are more talented or more committed or more diligent. But because what it takes to successfully perpetrate a threat is far simpler, quicker, cheaper, and easier than what is necessary to successfully enact a comprehensive defense program that can answer those threats and remain agile, flexible, and adaptive far into the future.

The broken glass analogy helps illustrate this conundrum. I am in charge of protecting 100 windows from being broken. But I must protect them from 1000 people coming toward me with rocks. Ultimately, it is far easier for the 1000 to individually achieve a single success (breaking a window) than it is for me to achieve success in totality (keeping all 100 windows intact). The resolution, therefore, is transparency: there is greater chance of ‘success’ for the chief actors (namely, me as defender and the client as owner of the windows) if I can be liberated from the impossible futility of ‘perfect protection’ and set a more realistic definition of protection as ‘true success.’ As long as there are recovery/restitution processes in place (replacing/repairing a broken window), then ‘success’ should be legitimately defined as a percentage less than 100. This is the same for corporations dealing with clients/consumers in the new world of 2020 CCPA: if the idea is that these pieces of legislations finally make corporations commit to perfect digital privacy and such perfection is the only definition of success against which they can measure themselves, then 2020 will be nothing but a year of frustration and failure.

The funny thing in all of this is that the EU legislation somewhat admits the above. Consider the seven principles of data protection as laid out by GDPR:

  • Lawfulness, fairness, and transparency.
  • Purpose limitation.
  • Data minimization.
  • Accuracy.
  • Storage limitation.
  • Integrity and confidentiality.
  • Accountability.

Nothing in these seven principles would bring about the establishment of perfect digital privacy or sets the expectation that failures in consumer protection must never occur. But they do hint at a darker secret underlying the European concept of client privacy that sits in contradiction to the very essence of American economics.

When people call CCPA the ‘almost GDPR,’ it is hinting at how the spirit of the two legislations are somewhat diametrically opposed to one another. The EU crafted GDPR under strong social democratic norms that encompass many of the core member governments. As such, it is most decidedly not legislation engineered to first protect the sacred right to free market business enterprise and a fundamental belief in the market to solve its own problems. Rather, GDPR has within it, implicitly, a questioning skepticism about the core priorities of major corporations and the belief that governance is the only way to make free-market economics work fairly. As such, GDPR is not just about protecting consumer data and information privacy from hackers, outside agents, and foreign actors: it is alsoabout protecting consumers from “untrustworthy corporations” themselves. This is something that should not infuse the CCPA (whether it does or not is yet to be determined and 2020 will therefore prove to be a very interesting judgment year). Because while California is staunchly to the left on the American political spectrum, it still operates as a constituent member of the US, the most fiercely protective country of its capitalist roots and belief in the sanctity of the free-market system. As such, government regulation in the EU that works for consumer privacy protection will not be looking at corporations as a willing or even necessarily helpful partner in a joint initiative. American government regulation should and must. As time progresses, if CCPA proves itself to be too close to GDPR, to European as opposed to American market norms, expect to see other states in the US create competing legislation. And even if those competing pieces aim to create a more ‘American’ conceptualization of consumer digital privacy as opposed to ‘European,’ what it means in real terms for corporations is yet more competing standards to try to synergize and make sense of. Thus, executive leaders in charge of information security in 2020 are going to need to have critical reasoning and analytical research skills far more than they ever have in the past.

In the end, protecting consumer privacy and providing client data protection is an essential, proper, and critical element for doing business in 2020. Legislation like GDPR and CCPA are meant to help provide an acknowledged framework for all actors to understand the expectations and consequences of the success/failure of that mission. Having such protocols is a good thing. But when protocols do not recognize reality, skip over crucial elements of clarity and transparency, hide some of the futility that likely cannot be overcome, and ignore their own competing contradictions, then those protocols might end up providing more problems than protection. What corporations must do, as they head into 2020, is not blindly follow CCPA. Nor should they facetiously do superficial work to achieve ‘CCPA compliance’ while not really providing ‘privacy.’ What is most crucial is innovative executive thinking, where new analytical minds are brought in to positions like CISO (Chief Information Security Officer) that are intellectually innovative, entrepreneurial, adaptive, and agile in how they approach the mission of privacy and security. Traditionally, these positions have often been hired from very rigid and orthodox backgrounds. The enactment of CCPA in 2020 means it might be time to throw that hiring rulebook out. In real terms, the injection of new thinking, new intellectualism, new concept agility, and new practical backgrounds will be crucial for all information security leadership positions. Failure to do so will not just be the death of privacy, but the crippling of corporate success in the client relationship experience.

Continue Reading

Intelligence

The priorities of cyber diplomacy in the Rouhani’s government

Sajad Abedi

Published

on

Technological growth and its breakthrough advances, along with their advantages, also have disadvantages, which are obvious examples of communication equipment. In fact, today, the Internet, telephones, cell phones and other communication devices can be described as a double-edged sword used to facilitate communications on the one hand and to spy on and monitor information.

The main pillar of cyber security – from the very beginning of this concept – is the implementation of technical and non-technical measures that ensure the security of information systems. But for these measures to be effective, they must cover all possible threats and vulnerabilities, as only a small flaw can provide the basis for a widespread attack.

The fact is that, contrary to what most people think, “cyberspace” is not a virtual space. In fact, the use of the word virtual has led astray people and ideas in this field. Cyber ​​space is a real space in a new arena for influence and consequence of friendship, cooperation, competition, hostility and even war between nations and other actors. It shows well that the Internet and cyberspace have opened a new field for politics, where individuals, groups, and governments are engaged in policymaking. Accordingly, “cyber-politics” and “cyber security” are spoken about in international relations and politics today. Cyber-politics is a two-part concept that refers to the interplay of two policy areas (friendship, cooperation, competition, conflict and the fight for values ​​and interests) and the Internet (a new space for acting).

Cyberspace Interaction Space, or more properly the “cyber-politics” space, is the latest and most important field of interest for policy and international experts in theory and practice, neglecting which can cause serious harm. And unpredictable for countries as the most important actors in the field of international relations.

Today in the field of international relations and politics there is talk of “cyber-politics” and “cyber security”. Cyberspace is a real space in a new realm of influence and consequence of friendship, cooperation, competition, hostility, and even war between nations and other actors. These illustrate well that the Internet and cyberspace have opened a new field for politics, where individuals, groups, and governments are engaged in policymaking.

Cyber-politics is a two-pronged concept that refers to the interplay of two policy areas (friendship, cooperation, competition, conflict, and the fight for values ​​and interests) and the Internet (a new space for action). Some experts have gone even further and have spoken of cyber policies as “excellent policy” versus “low politics”.

In the field of international relations, influenced by the tradition of realism, international issues are divided into crucial issues such as security and less important issues such as economic issues. Some experts believe that due to the importance of the cyberspace, cyber-policy should be considered as one of the most important, critical and security issues or excellent policy. They point out that millions of people worldwide now have access to computers and the Internet, and that the number of users and the level and depth of Internet use are increasing every day, which provides a very important playing field for politics Is. The number of users is increasing daily as well as the level of technology. In such circumstances, cyberspace plays an important role in guiding public opinion, setting priorities and desires, public diplomacy, espionage, sabotage, war, conflict and everything that actually constitutes the real policy space. As a result, cyberspace should be considered a top policy.

The Theoretical Framework and the Most Important Impacts of Cyberspace on Politics and International Relations include three fundamental issues:

The first is to provide a “conceptual order” to explain the relationship between cyberspace and politics.

The second issue is identifying and believing in the broad relationship between cyberspace and politics.

The third issue is to explain the path and the important issues in this regard.

The “side pressure” theory is applicable to this field.

The purpose of lateral strain theory is to provide a new level of analysis beyond the three levels of Stephen Walt. He believes that cyberspace cannot be discussed based on past levels and approaches of people like Kenneth Boulding and Kenneth Waltz.

Cyber ​​space requires a different level in addition to the three levels of “human”, “states” and “international system”. At this new level, the “global level”, the impact of cyberspace is emphasized by emphasizing the separation between the “social system” and the “natural environment”.

At the global level, the emphasis is that the Internet space and its widespread effects on the world of politics cannot be debated with the old levels that emphasize the individual, the state or the international arena. The Internet is a space for simultaneous acting, nongovernmental actors such as terrorists and private companies in the economic, cultural, security and even military dimensions. Therefore, it should be emphasized at the global level that while combining the other levels, it creates a broad linkage between all levels and dimensions and is capable of analyzing other political space. Therefore, lateral pressure theory attempts to establish a link between the individual, state, and international levels as the old levels and the level of global analysis.

Based on the experience of the past few decades, the Internet and cyberspace have had an impact on the relations of countries, especially the US and Iran. In fact, serious competition between countries in this field is positively or negatively or positively or negatively. In this battle, major countries, including China and the United States, are trying to outperform others in technology, which has positive implications for the advancement of the Internet, but at the same time the Internet has created a new atmosphere of competition, hostility and war that some countries, including It has attracted America and Iran.

On the subject of Internet content and the role and policies of governments in controlling cyberspace, powerful countries are trying to influence the direction and overallity of the Internet space and determine its future direction. On the other hand, weaker countries in the field are trying to influence the Internet through content filtering, with a negative and defensive look. In such an environment, the serious competition that exists between Western countries and others is taking shape every day.

In the cyber-political space as an important new issue in the field of politics and international relations, as in other areas of politics, “values” and “interests” are played by various actors such as governments, organizations and government actors. And NGOs, and even people, are produced, distributed and consumed. As a matter of fact, cyber policies has put new players alongside governments as the most important international relations players, sometimes more powerful and successful than governments.

However, apart from all the positive benefits and benefits of the Internet, the reality is that the Internet has provided a “new war space” that is referred to as “cyber warfare”. In this type of war, countries and other actors use the Internet to spy, sabotage, create riots, revolutions, and even destroy military and critical military facilities and centers.

Of course, the Internet has also created a new space for countries to “cooperate” and “interact”. In this context, the Internet has made it easy and cheap to build relationships between all actors, including governments, individuals, organizations, and institutions, with high speed and accuracy. As a result, the conditions for cooperation and interaction have become more important than ever. While countries and other actors are aware of the need for extensive international cooperation on the Internet, they are aware that the cyberspace has created a new field of international cooperation.

As for the wider impact of the Internet on all aspects of politics and international relations through the dissemination of awareness, the fact is that the Internet has greatly contributed to facilitating and expanding access to information and knowledge in the national and international arena. Individuals and human societies have become more aware and literate than ever before, and the world is confronted with a new phenomenon called “human awakening” in Islamic countries known as “Islamic awakening”. As a result, political demands such as respect for democracy and the need to respect the political independence of nations, respect for cultural and religious values, the right to decent socio-economic development, etc. and increased sensitivity to environmental issues. Accordingly, the Internet has affected the operating environment of countries and other actors.

Finally, a new space has emerged in the international arena that cannot be analyzed based on past theories, approaches, and levels. In fact, the content and philosophy of the new space, known as cyberspace, is very different from the past. In this new space, new and different kinds of friendship, cooperation, competition, hostility and war have been created alongside the patterns of the past. In addition, diverse and diverse actors have been added to traditional actors, which are highly ambiguous and unpredictable. As a result, new theories, approaches and perspectives that are much more flexible and open to the past need to be emphasized.

Cyber-politics and cyber security are nowadays considered as a major issue by international relations experts, along with older issues of war, economics, women and the environment, and even some consider it more important than others; Because cyberspace has some old-fashioned areas and themes.

It has come from the Rouhani’s government big cyber policies:

“Over the past 15 years, soft norms have become internationally binding norms, and this process has been going on without Iran’s presence and effective role play, the process and formation of norms and binding norms that may sometimes conflict with national and international interests. Being sovereign, it would severely damage Iran’s rights and interests and provide future grounds and excuses for pressure and sanctions from the cyber space.

With the proliferation of political and media reports and spaceships on Iran’s cyberattacks on the US and Saudi Arabia, highlighting and inducing Iranian government support for destructive and stealing information and “presenting Iran as a cyber-threat” accelerates the process. The sanctions could provide grounds for further pressure, cyber and non-cyber sanctions, and hostile countermeasures against our country, whose prospects could pose a threat to our country’s cyber interests. In the process, the country will see the imposition of a future “cyber crusade” that requires the necessary technical, political and diplomatic arrangements beforehand in cooperation with all actors in the field.

Establishment of normative grounds for joint action by US companies as a “front line of cyber warfare” against the Iranian government and Iranian companies under the pretext of conducting cyberattacks by Iran and joint collective action to combat filtering and support for national antitrust flows in space. Cyber ​​and external messengers with the slogan of protecting users and empowering them against government cyberattacks. “Tech companies are an important element in cyber warfare, and we’re the first responders to cyberattacks, and just as recognized by international law for sending medical facilities, technology companies must be neutral so they can be responsive to citizens,” says Brad Smith. And help them. ” They want to make filters-breakers equivalent to dispensing medicine and medical aid during wartime, thereby justifying their intervention in other countries’ affairs. But in fact, there is no resemblance between the humanitarian aims of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent with their inhuman and inhuman aims.”

For example, cyberspace has provided new conditions for countries to cooperate and compete, and of course other actors in the military and security, political, economic, environmental, women’s, children, health, education and more. Thus, the cyber space has created new conditions in which international relations issues are raised differently, resulting in a new form of cyber-policy that has particular implications for national and global security. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the clerical state at national level by thoroughly explaining and properly explaining cyber-politics and cyber security and its impact on all areas.

Continue Reading

Latest

Trending