Connect with us

Intelligence

The ISIS psychological warfare and the attack against the EgyptAir plane

Giancarlo Elia Valori

Published

on

So far Al Baghdadi’s Caliphate has been very successful in using the techniques of psychological warfare. From professional footage and commercials of its ferocious executions, all the more brutal precisely because fear had to be instilled among the Western countries’ public, to the sequence of repeated threats about the future invasion of Europe by the “sword jihad”, to the Russian aircraft shot down in the Sinai, to the very publicized “allegiance” of Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the many jihadist groups in North Africa and Yemen, up to the threats regarding the “dormant terrorist cells” in the West.

An escalation which is both strategic and informative, because it aims at blocking the enemy’s defences and making it blind to possible new areas and moments of attack.

As the Qur’an maintains, the art of deception, carried out by the Prophet himself, applies to three cases: reconciliation between two or more Muslim litigants, reconciliation with one’s own wife and during war.

In the holy book of the Islam Allah is described as “the best of deceivers” (3:54, 8:30, 10:21).

“And fight them until persecution is no more and religion is all for Allah” (8:39).

Hence, whatever the truth of the operational and strategic threat, nothing has been forgotten by the Syrian-Iraqi Caliphate.

And it is exactly the specific cultural and political structure of the current jihad to make effective this mix of ancient Koranic doctrine and very modern psywar doctrines, of postmodern and information warfare with the most innovative technologies and the ancient tradition of the Prophet’s Hadith.

Obviously, the fact of having – from the outset – the contribution of the Stay Behind structures of the Sunni Iraqi Baathist forces for Isis – after the mad US choice, following the second Gulf War, to “put an end” to the entire apparatus of Saddam’s regime – was not irrelevant to define the complexity and sophistication of the Caliphate’s psychological warfare.

During an operation of Saddam’s forces in the Second Gulf War, carried out with simultaneous bomb blasts at a very large distance between them, the former Italian President, Francesco Cossiga, made me open my eyes to the fact that it was very likely for the Stay Behind Iraqi and Baathist network to be still fully operational.

In fact, Saddam Hussein’s covert structures had been prepared by France during the Cold War, and had remained hidden also for most Soviet “advisers” during the long Saddam Hussein’s regime.

Probably they re-emerged later with the destabilization following the so-called Iraqi “democratization”, thus finally creating their own autonomy with the “Caliphate”.

It is also worth mentioning here the very ferocious actions perpetrated in Paris and in Belgium.

Operations which can certainly be defined as symbolic, but not only so.

They aim at a showdown of strength not affected and conditioned by the enemy which primarily means: 1) we members of the jihad are already fully operational within your countries and we do not fear you; 2) hence we can hit when and where we want, without you ever knowing it. You, the “infidel”, have no way to hit us – hence do not do so because the fault and the effects would only fall upon you.

Suffice to recall here the burst of rhetoric and exceptional ignorance of historical and political facts against Israel: the official and hidden jihad propagandists maintain that if there were no Jewish State, there would be no Islam resentment against us – hence we should annihilate it by ourselves.

I.e.: accept our conditioning, so as to become our agents and, hence, allies untouchable by our jihad.

Therefore Propaganda + Action managed by ISIS and its operational-information system at the same time, with a view to frightening and taming the great silent front of permanent jihad.

Furthermore, the Caliphate’s operational psyops emphasize the cultural autonomy of European Islam vis-à-vis the multiethnic and multicultural societies- a breeding ground which will be fully completed and easy to manipulate, when there are Islamist parties within the EU and Koranic union organizations.

As was the case with the Autonomia Operaia movement during Italy’s so-called “Years of Lead”, a period of political turmoil characterized by terrorist attacks, which was the revolving door, cover and training area for the Red Brigades.

By means of violent actions, the Caliphate threatens the Western information and cultural world, which has to be convinced a) that it is never possible to fight the jihad on its own territory, and b) that the European Union and the United States must give up supporting Israel.

And, most importantly, they have to surrender unconditionally to the jihad. Only after absolute surrender there will be peace.

Once again the Koranic criteria for war apply: .if they (the unbelievers) propose peace, accept it and trust in God. God is All-Hearing and All-Knowing (8:61).

The communication variable, vis-à-vis Osama Bin Laden’s jihad, is that – for Isis – the West must no longer withdraw its support for the “takfiri”, the “apostates” of the Gulf monarchies that, however, support almost officially the new Caliphate’s territorial and statist jihad.

Their operating logic is the one against the Iran of the Shi’ites “infidel”, of their supporters. Previously, with Bin Laden’s “solid base” (Al Qaeda al Sulbah), this variable was fully secondary.

Another aspect of propaganda for the second-generation Islamic young proletarians born in Europe is that the “new State” of the Syrian-Iraqi Islam is also a myth, a source of livelihood in the EU and US crisis, and especially a source of glory in fighting – in short a flag, a banner for which to live and die.

It is the myth that has always mobilized peoples.

Therefore it is a multi-layer propaganda, as is always the case in every old and modern psywar operation.

Nevertheless, as all psyops, it must never be repetitive.

Quite the reverse. It must always be very innovative and incorporate that clever and unexpected move which distorts the enemy’s communication, intoxicates it and leads the enemy to self-made defeat.

Here the lessons to be learnt from the Russian Federation and China are crucial: the former has materially and completely eliminated its jihad in Chechnya, without any restrictions – and this is the reason why, after breaking the operational arm of the proxy warriors on its territory or along its vital borders, it can afford a regional war in Syria against the jihadist allies of the petromonarchies.

Without obstacles whatsoever, except for Turkey, reduced to a proxy of Saudi Arabia despite the fact that President Erdogan’s AKP was born as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and that them, among the Saudis, are put to death.

It was a university professor of the Brotherhood, in Riyadh, to radicalize the young Osama Bin Laden.

It is also worth recalling that Russia’s power on oil and gas enables it to strike a geoeconomic blow against OPEC, maybe short but very hard, in terms of management of the oil and gas market – an option we obviously lack completely.

Everything happens just when Saudi Arabia, for the first time since 2015, has recorded a budget deficit and its entry onto the global market of public debt.

Therefore the Russian one is not a hidden challenge to be disregarded and set aside with conceit.

Hence elimination of the ways, means, intermediaries and areas of a future destabilizing proxy war for Moscow.

The aim is to subsequently negotiate, without limits, also with the countries supporting the jihad against the European Union, by having good cards to play and not just paying lip service to humanitarian principles.

Conversely, China’s following actions can be regarded as anti-jihadist: the geoeconomic equalization of all the forces on the field; the use of buffer areas for specific initiatives – just think of China’s aid to Pakistan, one of its long-standing friend in the region, for the Gwadar port; the opening to India with its recent entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

China does not even neglect sending as many as 5,000 units of its elite forces, such as the Siberian Tiger and assault troops that, after the “green light” to the specific law given by the People’s Congress on December 28, 2015, can operate abroad.

If Turkey wants to open its front after the clash in Syria, it will know what it will be heading for.

In particular, China wants to avoid the contagion between the Uighur Xinjiang and the Syrian jihad, considering that the region of Turkmen Muslims borders with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

It is not to be ruled out that some Chinese units are already positioned for a “hybrid war” and an operational psywar in the hottest areas of the Syrian-Iraqi region.

Hence Russia and China already have the strength to wage and fight an asymmetric warfare against another asymmetric warfare, without limits of territorial borders, “humanitarian” rules to be followed, agreements between countries with inattentive and fearful publics, numbed by self-destructive slogans such as Charlie c’est moi or insanely pacifist appeals just after the Paris attacks.

Each hybrid war is fought only with another hybrid war.

And it is worth recalling that it had been the Atlantic Alliance to invent, in 2014, the concept of hybrid war, by thinking of the Russian operations in Ukraine, thus defining the so-called “ambiguous warfare”.

Hence if a definition is sought, the ISIS jihad is precisely waging a hybrid war against us.

A conflict with no time and space limits, using legal forces and illegal structures, organized crime and official elite structures, information warfare and the official news networks.

The purpose of these specific psyops is to include an unpredictable mechanism in the enemy’s decision-making process, which makes it either unable to provide an adequate response or suitable for an equally dangerous oversized response going in the wrong direction.

Furthermore, the enemy has to be indirectly trained – thanks to the “hybrid” jihadist psyops, because also military actions are communication – not to be able to foresee or accuse anyone, or rather, to have to always accuse the wrong perpetrator of the jihad striking it.

And this is done in order to expand the front of its enemies and to make the area of its sensitive targets further unpredictable.

But, of course, the hitting subject is always the true “centre of operations”, the vertical core of the jihadist command structure, through any operational arm, always occasional or even unaware of who is really engaging it.

This mechanism holds true also for the Egyptian airplane flying from Paris to Cairo.

On the basis of the information available to us, the US intelligence services had already discovered an ISIS specialized team operating in Raqqa for weeks, which probably planned the attack against the EgyptAir airplane, hit 288 kilometres north of Alexandria.

Considering that these operations are never programmed alone and are planned long in advance, for obvious reasons of secrecy and compartmentalization, it is very likely that from now a swarm of terrorist or, more exactly jihadist, attacks will take place in the European Union and probably also in the United States.

This is exactly the reason why Paris and the other European capitals – as well as the Egyptian intelligence services that are still suffering from the ambiguous defamation of the Regeni affair – tend not confirm the terrorist nature of the attack against the Egyptian airplane.

Obviously if they confirm so, they will prove to be weak, while if they do not confirm so, they will be in a position to temporarily play down and defuse the ISIS jihad, not to mention the fact that, traditionally, each air strike entails a future ground operation.

This also implies that – as already happened – the Head of the US forces in the Middle East, General Votel, has recently travelled secretly to Syria to visit the YPG Kurdish base and the US special forces in their base of Ramelan, about 288 kilometres from Raqqa.

The AH-64 Apache combat helicopters can easily attack the Caliphate’s capital, while the Kurdish forces of the YPG unified command, which have not been invited to the negotiations in Geneva and Vienna, will operate on the ground, also with new weapons.

The relations between the United States and Egypt are still weak, but there is news of joint actions by the US Special Forces and the Egyptian operational Services against the ISIS areas in the region around the Tobruk port.

Therefore, the rules of asymmetric warfare are as follows: 1) hit secretly; 2) when the strike is successful, decide whether to spread the precise news or create “information intoxication”. The decision depends on whether you still want to cover the action base or whether, since already quickly shifted, you can make it public and then 3) create information ambiguity not only in the enemy’s data, but above all in its decision-making process.

This is the hybrid war of the ISIS territorial jihad and of its covert bases abroad. Hence this is the ground for implementing and testing the Western equal and opposite strategies (Opposing Force, OPFOR), without fear, without false moralism and, above all, without the old-fashioned idea – which was buried with the Cold War – that we should only “contain” the enemy.

The enemy must be eliminated, and above all be destabilized internally by demoralizing it, by spreading news intoxicating its decision-making process, by destroying the morale of its soldiers, by defaming it and thus undermining its relations with friendly States or its hidden covers.

It is the phase – new for the West – that in 1996 two Chinese Colonels, Quiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, defined “the unrestricted warfare” in a book published in the West two years later.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

Continue Reading
Comments

Intelligence

A new approach to information management

Sajad Abedi

Published

on

The American people, both directly and through their representatives, are more focused on organizing and conducting the work of intelligence agencies than ever before. Because of intelligence operations play an important role in life and security. From the September 11, 2001 incident, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are debates that are constantly being raised in American families.

Not surprisingly, there are suggestions for the transformation of organizations and the US intelligence system beyond the public awareness. Foreign countries are demanding this, and many people inside the country also need to understand such a change. Many of the organizational methods and structures that have proven successful over the years have failed in some cases, especially in the September 11 incident, and have provided enough information to the United States in dealing with Saddam Hussein’s weapons designs in Iraq. They did not set up the country.

Information managers and many other people who are involved do not agree with such changes. They often prefer to deal with marginal issues because information is every day and it is time consuming to make such changes. In 1986, Casey, former head of the CIA, created a counterterrorism center. He believed that the center created the necessary coordination in design and operation, and analysts were working in the immediate vicinity of the operators, but many of the old members of the CIA and intelligence operations threatened their place and those under their control. They knew even years after the establishment of the anti-terrorist center, there has been tension between the function of the center and other elements of the organization.

The CIA, after receiving adequate guidance from the military, should provide an official mechanism for post-operative investigations. A review of human gathering about Iraq should include the history of that program, the selection of personnel for it, the targeting of Iraq and the recruitment of people and benchmarking it for deployment and operation.

Such a “post-operation” review should not undermine the level of shielding, accusing, defining or denigrating anyone. It should also be ensured that managers and leaders discuss important goals such as Iran and North Korea, systems for designing breakthroughs, tools for deploying a framework for spy operations based on accurate surveys and information to adjust the plan to maximize the quality and ensure optimal operations. Other human resources managers should have a summary of the methods that have been effective in reducing the failure rate. Really important operational information should not be compromised in this way.

Managers and information leaders should work on re-use of “post-operation” formal surveys, planning, recruiting, training, recruitment, assessment and promotion of their staff. In many cases, the development of such systems is not required by law. The system needs to be explicit, honest and accurate, and also requires a co-operative work force. This system examines the need for a foreign country in order to increase the success of a successful business person, not a business, policy or training consultant in a team. Such a foreign country has a new perspective and can ask questions that do not come to the minds of others.

A commitment to using the best results in these reviews is essential. The US government and politics are eager to face a crisis and failure to design new policies or seek quick solutions and examine the issue. In any organization, it’s difficult to transfer funds from steady plans to creative and new ones. Especially in the US government, the fundamentals of the country’s budget are old and weird. Every year the congress and executive branch decide on budgeting for personnel, logistics, operational programs and infrastructure – they decide to continue the same or increase it with a slight change. When the management of the organization, the budget and congress organization agrees with the operational plans, then they will be licensed and funded. It is difficult to compete for the new budget, but basically the competition between the initiatives takes place, not between the new plans and the fixed plans.

One of the hallmarks of CIA operations is the development of creativity. Creative leaders and officers will identify problems and provide solutions, But spending too much on new creativity, regardless of cutting or cutting out budgets. The “stirring up” of something in the database is hard and frustrating. But when all US intelligence facilities are under investigation and new threats, they must be shuffled.

Spying, human gathering and other programs will never be fully realized. Because of this is the nature of the world of information. The only thing they guarantee is that their performance in the context of informing policymakers and military and operational commanders emphasizes the quality, accuracy, accuracy and utilization of the best available technical and human-coordinated programs.

Continue Reading

Intelligence

Trends in the Spread of Radical Islam in Africa: The Case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Published

on

Authors: Galina Sidorova and Natalia Zerlitsina*

Islamic radicalism and extremism are perceived around the world as a major threat to international security. The Islamists started developing terrorism and took it to a global level. Today, perhaps, there is no continent where this problem would not be acute. This is the standpoint of scientist D. V. Trenin who presents his reasoning in the article Traditional and New Security Challenges in International Relations [Trenin 2015: 138]. Indeed, one could easily agree with him.

In recent times, intrusion and spread of radical Islam has become evident in African countries, where, as it is, the problems of national and continental security have not been solved due to the never-ending armed conflicts. The most prevalent Islamic groups in sub-Saharan Africa are the Wahhabis and the Muslim Brotherhood. Other widespread groups are the Sheikh Balala sect in Kenya with an active subdivision in Zimbabwe, the Sunni Muslim Association in Cote d’Ivoire, the People against Gangsterism and Drugs, and the Islamic Jihad in the Republic of South Africa (the RSA). In Nigeria, the greatest danger is posed by the Boko Haram extremist organization imposing the Shariah laws and extirpation of the Western lifestyle; in Senegal — the Al-Falah Movement for Salafi Islamic culture; in Burkina Faso, there is Jama’at Ahl al-Sunnah al-Muhammad; in Somalia — Al-Shabaab and Jihad al-Islamiyya, the radical wing of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (headed by Oumar Ould Hamaha); Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, that seized control over the northern territories of Mali and, in October 2012, was holding 9 European citizens as hostages, 6 of whom were French [Kemal 2015: 156].

The revivalists’ backbone is not only Islam coming from Arab countries of the East and the Maghreb. The African reality has seen some examples of religious extremism conceiving in the depths of the African society itself. These are various sects and groups primarily calling attention of disadvantaged population of the country, striving for a better life. They all differ in terms of dogmatic principles. Although the majority of them are constituted by Sunni Muslims, in a number of countries there is also the Shia minority (notable for bravery in combat, no fear of death, belief in afterlife), which is also influential due to the financial, organizational and moral support of Iran. The influence of Shia revivalists is apparent in Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and the RSA.

It should be noted that the term “Islamic revivalists,” which is most often associated with terrorism did not always bear this negative connotation. If we look back in history, we will see that it entered the political lexicon in the late 1970’s/early 1980’s, after rise of the anti-Shah regime in Iran. Russian diplomat and orientalist A. I. Vavilov asserts that “it is not always justifiable that Islamic revivalism is applied to fairly broad, vague and, in many respects, motley religious-political movement standing for return to the “original, radical values of Islam” (not incidentally, the Arabic word for “revivalists” means “radicalists”) [Vavilov 2009: 229]. Another scientist, Africanist A. D. Savateyev, maintains the position that Islamic revivalism is far from the national spirit, although it “incorporates a range of diverse outlooks from the spiritual and religious point of view, and reflects the interests of various social strata and sentiments of many categories of Muslims” [Savateyev 2006: 201]. He mentions the following classification of Islamists. The first category is focused on the intrinsic values of eternal order — justice, equality, and fair work in accordance with Koranic precepts. The second category does not follow the rules and regulations of the “true” Islam and appeals to the brothers of the religion with proposals to follow the prophetic directives. The third one goes beyond the “brothers” circle and seeks to impose its standards of behavior upon adherents of other confessions. The fourth category of the Muslims includes representatives of secular intellectuals, merchants; it stands for connecting Islam to the government, and, in fact, for the re-establishment of a theocratic state. Although, the views of the adherents are far from being identical in this case. The fifth category of the revivalists is the armed jihad, manifested as achieving the goal (creation of a unified Islamic religious and political entity) by any means including the fight against “expansion” of Christians and reprisal against infidels. The basic features of the moral portrait of the revivalists’ extremist wing are cynicism and resentment aimed at breach of native African values. According to the ideology of Islamic extremism, a Muslim is merely obliged to fight the non-Muslims, that is, to conduct armed jihad. [Savateyev 2006: 230].

Study of penetration of Islam and its implications to one of the Central African countries — the DROC — provides a visual representation of the topic addressed. In the DROC, Islam has been recognized relatively recently, though islamization of the country, advancing from the east of the DROC, had been known as early as before the arrival of the Portuguese to the continent (1482). In March 1972, the President of Zaire Mobutu Sese Seko issued Decree 72/194 on the foundation of the Islamic Community of the Republic of Zaire (COMIZA), which later transformed into the Islamic Community of the DROC (COMICO) [Cheik Ali Mwinyi…La Référence plus. Kinshasa 2014: P. 2]. This organization is officially recognized and unites only a part of the Muslim community in the DROC. Besides COMICO, there are other Islamic organizations acting “on a private basis”. In March 2014, from among 12 contenders for the post of the Head of the Islamic community Mufti Sheikh Ali Mwini Mkuu was elected to a 5-year term — a politically literate, well-educated person maintaining an active position in the subregional, continental and international organizations [Les musulmans de la RDC…L’Observateur. Kinshasa 2014: P.11]. Wide connections and communications with regional and international colleagues enable the Mufti to collect information, “keep his finger on the pulse”, and control the situation in the country.

In 2012, the Islamic Community of the DROC launched the programme “Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts, Administration and Efficient Governance,” with the view to train representatives in the provinces of the country. The initiative involved 48 regional committees and 288 Islamic centres, which employ about three thousand activists. According to the Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Community of the DROC M. Seto-Bagoni, who is in charge of legal issues, trained specialists will provide indispensable support to the DROC Government in establishing peace and supremacy of the statute law across the country. In the provinces, Congolese people are also provided with the necessary legal, expert, and advisory assistance to settle the internal political situation in the Republic. With the assistance of local, regional and international sponsors, about USD 130,000 were allocated for the implementation of the Islamic Community’s project.

It should be kept in mind that the role of religious denominations in the social and political life of the DROC, taking into account the deep piety inherent in the Africans, is extremely high. The dominant position is held by Catholicism, which is practiced here by more than 50% of the 80 million population, and by Protestantism as its branch — 20%. This data identifies the DROC as the largest Catholic country in Africa and draw special attention to Kinshasa from the Vatican. The National Episcopal Conference, declaring its position on key issues of domestic and foreign policy on a regular basis, demonstrates significant interest in this region. Catholic structures, traditionally involved in political processes, occupy senior positions in the government. For example, Abbot Apollinaire Malumalu has been elected as the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission twice — in 2006 and in 2013. Religious leaders mediate the processes of settlement of the Eastern crisis, coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and offer a wide network of higher and secondary educational institutions.

Afro-Christian syncretic sects (especially Kimbanguism) also have numerous congregations in a number of provinces, and, according to their postulates (chosenness of the Africans and etc.), are characterized by considerable political engagement, often of separatist or anti-European orientation (about 10%). There are many various religious sects. As a rule, they are fee-paying, but due to the preachers’ rhetoric skills and their ability to attract attention, the sects are very popular among the local population. Orthodox Christianity is represented thinly (five parishes). It is professed by about 3% of the population. According to 2015 estimates, 10% of the Congolese are Muslims.

The largest number of adherents of Islam is concentrated in the east of the country, in the Provinces of Orientale, Maniema, and in the north of Katanga. In the DROC, along with Christian buildings for public worship, there are 70 mosques belonging to different Muslim communities: Pakistani, Iranian, Lebanese, Indian and others.

Year by year, the percentage of the Congolese people professing Islam is growing. This is partly promoted by the presence of Muslim peacemakers in the country, who serve with the UN Stabilization Mission in the DROC, and by numerous Pakistani military units that provide financial support for the Islamic communities, in particular in construction of mosques. The severe internal political, economic and social situation in the country fosters the spread of the radical wing of Islam.

In one of the author’s conversations that took place in Kinshasa in 2013, Sheikh Abdalah Mangal told that the Islamic Community in the DROC has nothing to do with so-called radical, aggressive Islamists. The Community is thoroughly monitoring manifestations of proselytism with the purpose of nipping it in the bud; it aims at reconciling hostile ethnic groups, at settlement of conflict situations including those in the east of the country, and stands for consolidation of the peoples of various religious confessions. Muslims try to spread and introduce their culture, open schools and provide humanitarian assistance to the poverty-ridden Congolese population. However, according to the Mufti, in spite of the attractiveness of Islam, the Congolese authorities inhibit the spread of this religion in the “Catholic country”. He gave the following example. On April 18, 2013, the Minister of Justice and Human Rights of the DROC signed a decree on suspension of the activities of the Islamic Community for three months (the reasons are not disclosed). The decree was abolished after the Mufti had argued against it and appealed to the Congolese authorities.

As Congolese analysts assert, although within the period of 2011–2014 no radical Islamists’ organizations were detected in the country, still there are certain fears about penetration of jihadist ideas. According to the experts, the Muslim influence is, albeit slowly, but moving to the DROC. In the west the “Muslim wave” is coming from Mali and Nigeria; in the east — from Kenya through Uganda and Rwanda; in the south — from Tanzania and Zambia; and in the north — from the Central African Republic (the CAR), subsequent to the coup in March 2013.

It is Mali — the “citadel” of Islamism in Africa — which is often named by the experts an “epicenter of the spread” of radical Islam. They do not exclude that the conflict between Salafists, who differ dogmatically, ideologically, politically and culturally, can be brought to the Republic Congo, similar to the conflict between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda in 1994, which was brought to the DROC from outside. In this regard, a large Malian community in the DROC, living by its own laws and having its own mosque, raises certain concerns. Another threat originates in Nigeria, where ethnic antagonisms between the “Christian south” and the “Muslim north” pose a real danger, up to division of the country into two states. Consequences of the conflict may well have an effect on the central region of Africa where the refugees of different faiths will rush into. As a result, “foreign” problems will affect the already existing ethnic and religious contradictions. A serious danger is also posed by crossing the “unconsolidated” border by militants-illegal aliens from South Sudan, who partially “settled down” in the DROC. This makes the Congolese society extremely vulnerable in the face of the permanent terrorist threat.

Another source of threat of the spread of Islam in the DROC is the neighboring Central African Republic (CAR) where, as already noted, a coup took place. According to MONUSCO Russian military observers, on December 5, 2013, near the residential community of Zongo in the Province of Équateur (the DROC), bordering the residential community of Bangun (the CAR), armed clashes broke out between the Muslim Seleka and the Christian Antibalaka organization. By the experts’ assumption, the ethnic conflict escalated as a result of mass activity of French troops, which deployed the “Sangaris” (which means “red butterfly” in Swahili) operation in the CAR. It was also reported that about 10 militaries of the Seleka movement oppositional to the CAR government entered the DROC territory. Streams of refugees from the CAR were crossing the border and “dissolving” in the forests of the DROC since they did not want to stay in the refugee camps because of the unstable situation in the region. The Congolese people, who lived in the areas bordering the CAR, also responded to the situation and fled from the country. Generally, the situation complicated because the civilian population of the DROC was extremely irritated by the aliens from the neighboring country who provoked conflicts and worsened the already disastrous conditions in the state. The incomers were not only “pressing” the local population in the Province of Équateur, but were also bringing with them Islamic culture alien to the Congolese Christians and to those, who adhere to the local faiths. According to the UNHCR, in May 2014 in the DROC, there were about 70 thousand refugees from the CAR and six thousand Congolese returnees. In addition to the arriving refugees, another problem arose in the country. The CAR militants started seizing the DROC territory. The risks of migration processes and the destabilization associated with them are addressed in details in analytical notes by Russian researchers K. Borishpolets and A. Babadzhanov [Borishpolets K., Babadzhanov A. 2007: 3-7].

The threat of radical Islam in the DROC and other African countries comes not only from the East and the Maghreb. After the investigations of the terrorist attack that was carried out in Nairobi on September 21, 2013 (67 people died), the non-governmental organization Red Cross came to the conclusion that the militants had also been recruited in Europe. Germans, Scandinavians, Americans were among them. According to the European Union Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove, “it is necessary to find out how people get there”. In Belgium, for example, there exists an organization for recruiting mercenaries, the so-called Sharia4Belgium Organization (L’Organisation de la Chariat pour la Belgique). European mercenaries were seen in Syria and Kenya [Les Shebabs…L’Observateur 2013: P. 11].

The eastern regions of the DROC are the most vulnerable and susceptible to jihadist influence. Considerable length and “unconsolidated” nature of borders with 9 neighbour countries, geological and climatic characteristics (mountainous terrain, multilayer equatorial forest, rainfall seasons) along with the absence of roads and traffic infrastructure precondition the inefficiency of the border safety system and create a “back door” not only for cross-border criminality, but also Islamic revivalists.

The growth of terrorism spread by armed groups on the African continent as a whole is the additional risk factor for the destabilization of situation. For more than a decade illegal armed groups, the members of which profess Islam, have been acting in the eastern part of the DROC (North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, Orientale and the northern part of Katanga) uncontrolled by central authorities. These were primarily the Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) groups. Consequently, flashpoints of conflict emerge and create opportunities for terrorist attacks. As a rule, the criminal activity of illegal armed groups is connected with illegal exploitation of valuable natural resources, being smuggled abroad, and with uncontrolled cash flow. Leaders of illegal armed groups quite often control the process of valuable minerals and metals extraction and selling on the black market, using locals as free labour in the mines. In remote areas civilians often become victims of robbery, lawlessness and violence inflicted by various military forces. Local population is tortured and humiliated, often killed, robbed of cattle; their houses are burned and their crops are destroyed. There are numerous cases of people being kidnapped into slavery. Some of them are used for service support of gunmen in the rear, others are forced to participate in combat operations. Recruiting of child soldiers deprived of education and prone to psychological traumas remains a painful problem. Gunmen use underage children as labour force under the threat of bodily harm. It provokes mass exodus of population into the frontier zones where new centres of tension emerge.

Authorities of the Republic are gravely concerned by such actions of militants as ransom kidnappings, including those of foreigners. Thus, in April 2010, in the province of Équateur the illegal armed group of Enyele rebels took a number of foreign citizens hostage to draw attention of the international community to their activity. At the same time they occupied the airport and municipal buildings of the provincial capital of Mbandaka.

The situation is aggravated by the catastrophic condition of social sphere, extreme poverty of population, non-payment of monetary allowances to the members of national army. Destitute population, largely comprised of young people, is the most susceptible to Islamist influence, which promises to improve their living conditions. They are the people who join armed groups and unwillingly become carriers of the ideas of Islam.

Virtually all the neighbouring counties are involved in extraction and sales of valuable raw materials on foreign markets. According to experts, over 80% of the DROC economy remains shadow, and so far nobody sees the way out of this dramatic situation. Experts state that there are mafia formations in this field having direct access to offshore centres. Customs Administration of the Democratic Republic of the Congo intends to fight money laundering, illicit trade and cross-border criminality at large. On November 21, 2013, they signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the Judicial Police of the Public Prosecution Office. This document proposes a programme for enforcement of customs officers’ authority, which is aimed at criminal investigations. Article 2 of the Memorandum states that “the Judicial Police of Public Prosecution Office is obliged to provide education for customs officers within the prescribed time limits and create, with assistance of Interpol, the database of the Customs Administration aimed at combating theft”[ Lutte contre la criminalité transfrontalière…Le Potentiel. Kinshasa 2013: P. 10]. In their reports, based on facts and investigations, human rights nongovernmental organizations like Human Rights Watch draw special attention to correlation between income from sales of contraband goods on world market and illegal arms traffic in the eastern regions of the DROC. Considerable amounts of arms and uncontrolled cash flow enter combat operation zones. In the context of armed groups activity there arises a problem of illicit trade in small arms acquired in exchange for the so called “conflict diamonds” (compact and convenient form of mutual payments). Strengthening of control over illicit trade in small arms, which is detrimental to relations between the DROC, Rwanda and Uganda, is still one of the sensitive issues for the whole region.

Militants from illegal armed groups commit terrorist acts not only overland. From time to time, the mass media reports on piracy on Lake Tanganyika. According to witnesses, it is highly unadvisable for cargo vessels to appear on the lake after 6 PM (i. e. at nightfall). Thus, on the night of July 1, 2014, Mai-Mai Yakutumba rebels attacked a merchant vessel near the City of Uvira (South Kivu Province). Pirates forced the captain to give them two thousand dollars, defueled the vessel and stole the board instrument. According to the report, militants were well armed and trained [Des miliciens Maï-Maï arraisonnent…Le Potentiel 2014: P. 9]. A similar incident took place in 2011, when armed combatants hijacked “Maman Wundja” vessel (about 100 passengers and 40 tonnes of cargo were on board) sailing across Lake Tanganyika from Uvira (South Kivu Province) to Moba (Katanga Province), and made the captain change the course, virtually taking him hostage [Les Maï-Maï Yakutumba prennent…APA. Kinshasa 2011: P. 8].

National separatists fuel terrorism in the DROC. According to estimates by authorities, over the last decade the most active was the religious and political movement Bundu dia Kongo. During the transition period (from 2003 to 2005), this organization controlled the largest part of the Lower Congo Province, advocating its complete independence as historical successor of the Great Kingdom of Kongo. Although after conflicts between the followers of movement and law enforcement forces in spring of 2008 the activity of Bundu dia Kongo was officially banned, it has not lost its “audience” and continues to influence its followers. Formally, the slogans of Bundu dia Kongo seem quite democratic. For example, in the proclamation of October 8, 2012, representatives of this organization call for protection of the Bakongo people [Document de l’organisation réligieuse de la RD Congo «Bundu dia Kongo»…Kinshasa 2012: P. 3].

Bursts of separatist sentiment fostering national differences are constantly observed in the Katanga Province. In the middle of 2014, Kata Katanga illegal armed group militants announced that on June 11, on the anniversary of proclamation of the Republic of Katanga, which existed from 1960 to 1963 but was not recognized by the world community, they intended to seize its provincial capital, the City of Lubumbashi. The purpose of seizing the second most important city after the capital was to proclaim independence of Katanga once again and plant their flag at the strategic sites of the city. They considered the monument to Moise Tshombe, “the President” of the Republic of Katanga, as one of such sites. Although the announcement of Kata Katanga was not implemented and only frightened the civilians with gunfire, security agencies including military and police forces were prepared to meet the attack with a massive array of military equipment [Tensions à Lubumbashi…Agence Presse Associée. Kinshasa 2014: P. 1].

One of the ways for Islam to penetrate the DROC is trading with neighbouring countries. “Trust relations in business”, a Congolese diplomat said in a conversation, “create a fertile ground for discussing, among all, religious topics”. Besides, long distance drivers, for example, from Tanzania and Zambia, as bearers of Islamic culture are considered here to be spreading Islam in the eastern and western parts of Congo. As the diplomat emphasized, the National Committee for the Coordination of Anti-International Terrorism cooperates with regional and international organizations in this field, and “uses analytical potential of the CIA”. According to him, this organization traced the activity of Somalian radical Salafi Ash-Shabaab movement, which was founded in the DROC. It was created in 2000 (translated from Arabic as “youth”) and is the part of Al-Qaeda, which seeks to establish strong relations within the DROC. In 2011 Ash-Shabaab emissaries tried to contact Islamic organizations in the eastern regions of the country, primarily in South Kivu Province, where Pakistani subunits of MONUSCO were quartered. The Islamic group Ash-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack in the capital of neighbouring Uganda, the City of Kampala, on July 11, 2010. The Ugandan authorities stated that terrorists supposedly entered the country from the territory of the DROC. Military command of Uganda put forward a public assumption of Ash-Shabaab connection with Uganda rebel anti-government ADF group, based in the western regions of the DROC.

Ash-Shabaab counts 7 to 9 thousand militants from various illegal armed groups [Kongo 2013: P. 12]. The prospect of its penetrating the DROC poses an additional grave threat to both national security of the country and improvement of conditions in the central region of Africa as a whole. In the interview to the Potentiel magazine Congolese researcher of the problems of Islam Valentina Soria mentioned that Ash-Shabaab aims to adapt to the local African cultures, thus capturing political and economic space and establishing stable relations [Cinq questions…Le Potentiel. 10.10.2013: P. 4].

One of the documents, which was ostensibly left in the car of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed from Ash-Shabaab and later got into the Canadian newspaper The Toronto Star, contains information about special operation performed in Bombay in 2008, in Nairobi in 2013, and in The Ritz Hotel in London. In the same document it is also said that such countries as Uganda, Ethiopia and Burundi are considered to be “the enemies of Islam” and are to be fought against by all means. Arming of the adherents of Islam is also mentioned. They consider Kalashnikov rifle to be “a bulky weapon” and prefer to arm themselves with guns and hunting knives! [Cinq questions…Le Potentiel. 10.10.2013: P. 4].

Radical Islam and terrorism are constantly in the focus of Congolese authorities’ attention. Article 52 of the Constitution serves as a ground for banning terrorist activities. It states: “No individual or group of individuals may use part of the national territory as a basis for subversive or terrorist activities against the Congolese State or any other state” [La Constitution de la Republique Démocratique du Congo 2006: P. 23]. The issues of antiterrorist and anti-criminal activities as well as of spreading revivalism are among priorities in the work of the DROC security agencies, as in the eastern regions of the country there constantly emerge flash points of military conflict, which are fertile ground for serious terrorist attacks. The National Committee for the Coordination of Anti-International Terrorism investigates these issues. This body was established by the Presidential Decree No. 070/2001 as of 26 December 2001. This regulatory act is, in fact, the only internal document regulating interdepartmental cooperation in this field.

The activity of the Committee is controlled directly by the Head of State, while the Special Adviser to the Head of State on Security is responsible for coordination. In accordance with the Decree, the tasks of the Committee include executive decision-making on all the issues in the field of fighting terrorism, coordination of application of the field-specific international conventions, development and conduct of national activities, provision of corresponding cooperation with foreign countries and international organizations. Among the members of the Committee there are Ministers of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (the post is currently divided in two), Minister of National Security (the post was abolished), Minister of Defence, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Justice, military, political and diplomatic advisers to the Head of State, and Special Adviser to the Head of State on security. The latter acts as the permanent Secretary of the Committee and controls the work of its technical secretariat.

Kinshasa is the member of several international and regional conventions in the field of antiterrorist protection, including the African Union. It supports similar initiatives in the network of subregional organizations. In May 2008, under the auspices of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism the decision was made about cooperation in the field within the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), brought back to life by efforts of the DROC.

As the present study has shown, the prospect of radical Islam spreading in the DROC poses a certain threat to both national security and improvement of conditions on the African continent as a whole. As of now, Congo still has not reached the so-called “red mark,” signifying the reign of terrorists. However, it may happen that tomorrow terrorists’ hegemonic ambitions will spread to this central African country as well [Des terrorists menacent…Le Phare.Kinshasa 2012. P.2]. “Vacuum” of governmental authorities in the provinces of the country creates favourable conditions for spread of terrorist attacks. Being weak, security agencies currently cannot ensure safety in these regions. Congolese politicians state that if the territory of the country is not controlled by the authorities, army and the republican police (taking into account geostrategic situation of the DROC on the African continent), nothing can constrain the surge of terrorists, who have already set foot in Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan and South Sudan. It may happen that the ideas of revivalists from the “Islamic State” (ISIL) group, formed in 2014, will also be promoted in the African countries. It will cause new flash points of religion-based conflicts, which, combined with the “traditional” conflicts, such as, for example, ethnic ones, will further complicate political and military situation in some African countries and will lead to armed conflicts.

Taking into consideration the important role of religious denominations in political life and shaping of public opinion in African countries, spread of Orthodoxy and its cultural values can act as a counter-force to aggressive Islam in Africa, as well as religious extremism at large. Greek communities, which, in addition to religious worship use religious institutes and local congregation to address their own political and economic issues, should play an important role in developing and supporting Orthodox culture.

*Natalia Zerlitsina, Institute of International Relations and Social and Political Sciences, Moscow State Linguistic University

References

  1. Borishpolets K., Babadzhanov A. Migration risks of the Central Asian countries. Analytical note [Migracionnye riski stran Central’noj Azii. Analiticheskaja zapiska. Moscow: Institute of International Research (MGIMO), 2007. 32 pp.
  2. Cheik Ali Mwinyi, un nouveau représentant à la tête de la communauté islamique du Congo [Sheikh Ali Mwinyi, a new leader of the Islamic community in Congo] La Référence plus, Kinshasa. 19.03.2014. P. 2.
  3. Des miliciens Maï-Maï arraisonnent un bateau sur le lac Tanganyika [“Mai-Mai” insurgents inspect the ship on the Lake Tanganyika]. Le Potentiel. 11.07.2014. P. 9.
  4. Des terrorists menacent les Grands Lacs [Fight against trans-border crimes: prosecuting police joins the debates]. Le Phare. Kinshasa. 03.07.2012. P. 2.
  5. Document de l’organisation réligieuse de la RD Congo «Bundu dia Kongo» – Message du Grand Maître. Le signal fort de la bonne volonté [The Document of the DROC religious organization Bundu dia Congo. The letter of the Master. The Powerful Sign of Good Will]. Kinshasa. 8.10. 2012. P. 4.
  6. Kemal A. ISIL. The Ominous Shadow of Caliphate [IGIL. Zloveshhaja ten’ halifata]. Moscow: Algorithm, 2015. P. 156.
  7. Kongo R. Terrorisme : Les Shebab préparaient des attaques à Londres [Terrorism. Ash-Shabaab prepares attacks in London] Le Potentiel. 01.10.2013. P. 12.
  8. La Constitution de la Republique Democratiquee du Congo [The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo]. Kinshasa. 18.02.2006. P. 23.
  9. Les Maï-Maï Yakutumba prennent en otage un bateau sur le lac Tanganyika [“Mai-Mai” Yakutumba insurgents attack the ship on the Lake Tanganyika] APA. Kinshasa. 28.09.2011. P. 8.
  10. Les musulmans de la RDC ont un nouveau représentent légal [Newly elected representative of Muslims in the Democratic Republic of Congo]. L’Observateur. Kinshasa. 14-16.03.2014. P.11.
  11. Les Shebabs recrutent-ils en Europe? [Does the radical Islamic group “Ash-Shabaab” recruit people from Europe?] L’Observateur. 03.10.2013. P. 11.
  12. Lutte contre la criminalité transfrontalière : la Police juridiciaire des parquets associé au débat [Fight against trans-border crimes: prosecuting police joins the debates]. Le Potentiel. Kinshasa. 22.10.2013. P. 10.
  13. Trenin D.I. Traditional and New Security Challenges in International Relations [Tradicionnye i novye vyzovy bezopasnosti v mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenijah]. Modern Science on International Relations Abroad. Vol. 2. Moscow: NP RIAC, 2015. pp. 136-141.
  14. Savateev A.D. The Islamic Civilization in Sub-Saharan Africa [Islamskaja civilizacija v Tropicheskoj Afrike]. Moscow: Institut Afriki RAN, 2006. pp. 190-270.
  15. Tensions à Lubumbashi pour l’aniversaire de la secession katangaise [Tensions in Lubumbashi during the anniversary of Katanga separation]. Agence Presse Associée. Kinshasa. 14.07.2014. P. 1.
  16. Cinq questions à Valentina Soria [5 questions to Valentina Soria]. Le Potentiel. 10.10.2013. P. 4.
  17. Vavilov A.I. The US Policy in the Muslim World on the Example of Arab countries [Politika SShA v musul’manskom mire na primere arabskih stran. M.: Biblos konsalting]. Moscow: Biblos Consulting, 2009. P. 229.
Continue Reading

Intelligence

Cybercrime attacks and identification of actors

Sajad Abedi

Published

on

Given the nature of the cyber space, although the allocation of a set of malicious acts to a particular actor appears to be quite complex, there are many elements that allow cybercriminals to run.

Geo-strategic texture and technical texture can facilitate the assignment of hostile acts to responsible actors: for example, in a cybercrime attack on Estonia, although the official Russian services did not directly operate to neutralize the servers of the country, but consider It appears that Russia has played a significant role in the attack. Of course, it can not be said that this is the only decisive factor in identifying an actor, since in some cases many actors may be suspected of carrying out an attack, or that even actors may be attacked and try to act as a third party actor. Accused It may even be possible for a government to take responsibility for cyberattacks against its rival to increase its containment position.

In some circumstances, a state that has used the infrastructure and equipment used to commit malicious acts is also responsible for and charged. Thus, in countries where there are no judicial authorities to identify prosecution of cybercrime or cybercriminals, some actions cause them to be identified as responsible or collaborators of a cyber invasion. In this way, governments, as well as groups providing hacker refuge services or facilitating their operations in an attack, can be held responsible.

Also, governments refusing to cooperate in carrying out criminal investigations on their territory are also partly responsible for the attack. In fact, in some cyber attacks, we find that some malicious acts do not occur without participation, support, tacit consent, or even lack of corrective / preventive measures by governments.

In some cases, even if there are many indications regarding the participation of actors in an attack, it is difficult to provide documentary evidence to accuse them; and this uncertainty makes the adoption of preventive countermeasures extremely sensitive.

But by expanding the concept of “multinational response”, this problem can be addressed. This concept is:

– Increase the capabilities of the analysis and investigation of the attack, through the synergy between state-owned technical equipment and the expansion of judicial and military cooperation.

– Achieving a common right to condemn a hostile act and its possible writer – governments and non-governmental groups – through the creation of a unified vote, which is based on unprocessed joint evidence.

Governments and member organizations of this multinational system can rely on this solution to a certain level of cyber-deterrence. In addition, if the participants in this system define the necessity of imposing compulsory or punitive measures, its deterrence will increase sharply.

Joseph Snee in his book, Cyber Power, cited this special dimension of cybercrime: “Since false flags are not complete, rumors of the source of cyber attacks seem to be valid.” (Although it is not measurable in a court of law), the damage done to the soft power of a cyber attacker can contribute to deterring attacks. ”

The actor’s reputation in cyberspace is particularly valuable in comparison to other environments. Many online actors are known by their internet users because of their reputation (honesty, competence, access to reliable information, independence, etc.) and have many followers. The opinions expressed, the analyses provided and the information provided by these actors, are relatively reliable given their positive or negative reputation.

In fact, the reputation of governments, real people and legal people on the Internet creates a real cyber identity, which is achieved through the familiarity of classical interactions. Cyberspace cybercrime is more cumbersome and more volatile than virtual space.

Companies, for example, are placed against actors who are often not well-known, who can publish them on the Internet using simple materials related to their products, products or partners.

In fact, it is a serious challenge to be charged with casting cybercrime. In the same vein, blow to credit can be a means of deterring them from participating in a malicious act.

Continue Reading

Latest

Terrorism2 hours ago

Pulwama Attacks: Pakistan takes on India again

The attacks by Jaish-e-Muhammed on Indian security forces has come at a tricky time; Modi led government’s reaction to the...

EU Politics4 hours ago

Disaster management: Boosting the EU’s emergency response

MEPs have approved plans to improve disaster response by updating the EU’s civil defence mechanism and creating additional reserve capacity....

Reports6 hours ago

Portugal can use its economic recovery to build up resilience

Portugal’s economic recovery is now well established, with GDP back to pre-crisis levels, a substantially lower unemployment rate and renewed...

Urban Development8 hours ago

RASAI: The car-sharing tool seeking to breathe life into Pakistan’s congested cities

When Hassam Ud-din started studying in Islamabad in Pakistan, he had a three-hour round-trip commute from his home in Rawalpindi....

Terrorism10 hours ago

ISIS Smuggler: Sleeper Cells and ‘Undead’ Suicide Bombers Have Infiltrated Europe

Authors: Anne Speckhard, Ardian Shajkovci & Hamid Sebaly Europe is bracing for a new wave of jihadist attacks by terrorists...

South Asia12 hours ago

What Can the Afghan Government and Taliban Learn from Colombia’s Peace Deal with FARC?

The experience of Colombia’s peace with FARC has always been the subject of Western experts working on the war in...

Middle East14 hours ago

Iran: How to Avoid a War

Upon closer inspection, it appears that the Islamic Republic of Iran has a relative near dearth of human rights organizations...

Trending

Copyright © 2019 Modern Diplomacy