A top nuclear power with a veto on the UNSC, Russia enjoys, almost at par with US super power, certain privileges and international prestige that Japan, a non nuclear and non veto power, does not. USA looks after Japan’s interests in the UNSC.
A close NATO ally of USA, Japan is currently a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, and its veto ambition in the UNSC is a very important topic for the country. However, since there are other more important veto claimants like Saudi Arabia and Turkey Americans hesitate to undertake steps to make Japan a veto member. Moreover, Strategic experts view Japan’s veto status would even be detrimental to US global interests.
Russo-Japanese relations have been strained for decades manly due to four islands that the mighty Soviet Union had annexed from Japan in the WW-II. The four Kuril Islands — Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai — have been administered by Russia since the end of World War II, but Japan still lays claim to them.
Ties between the two countries deteriorated two years ago after Tokyo announced that it would support Western economic sanctions imposed on Moscow over its alleged interference in Ukraine, but the lack of stable relations actually goes back decades.
Commenting on the background to the diplomatic good will visit in analysis Russian geopolitical analysts noted that at first glance, Russian Japanese relations are exceptional in their astonishing irrationality.
Relations between Russia and Japan are not on the positive side and they are a continuation of tensed Empire of Japan–Russian Empire relations, covering 1855-1917 and equally tensed Japan–Soviet Union relations covering 1917-1991. The two countries have been unable to sign a peace treaty after World War II due to the Kuril Islands dispute.
It appears Russia seeks to upgrade its relationship with Japan and on April 15, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived in Tokyo for a two-day official visit, discussing political and economic issues. Lavrov invited Prime Minister Abe to visit Russia.
Japanese PM Shinzo Abe left on May 01 for a weeklong visit to major European countries and Russia to lay the groundwork for the Group of Seven summit he will host this month and to address a decades-old territorial row with Moscow. Abe conferred with European leaders on how to support the world economy amid China’s economic slowdown. He visits Italy, France, Belgium, Germany and Britain before traveling on to Russia. He also plans to discuss counterterrorism measures and appeal to European members of the G-7 to emphatically denounce North Korea’s nuclear tests and missile launches at the summit.
On his way back from Europe, Abe is scheduled to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin for talks in the southern city of Sochi on issues including the long-standing dispute over four Russian-held islets off Hokkaido. “I hope to resolve the issue by patiently negotiating based on a policy of resolving the issue of the ownership of the islands and concluding a peace treaty,” Abe said at the airport. The government hopes Abe’s meeting with Putin in Sochi will pave the way for the Russian president to visit Japan, something once tentatively planned for 2014 but postponed due to tensions over Ukraine.
The specific character of the Japanese-US alliance shows that Tokyo, as a part of NATO, is occasionally forced to subordinate its interests to those of the Americans. For example, because of US pressure, the Japanese were forced to join in on the West’s anti-Russian sanctions, and cancel a number of high-level meetings between officials.
This, of course, is something Lavrov reminded his partners about in Tokyo.” “In order to find compromise, it is necessary to maintain a continuous, uninterrupted dialogue. But Japan made the decision to limit contacts with us at a certain point. In my opinion, this does not meet the interests of the Japanese government or the Japanese people,” Lavrov emphasized. At the same time, the minister noted that “despite pressure from its partners, and particularly the United States, our Japanese friends are nevertheless committed to maintaining these relationships.”
Moscow hopes that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s forthcoming visit to Russia will give impulse to the entire complex of Russian-Japanese relations. “We understand that contacts during this visit will allow for additional impulse in advancing the entire complex of our relations in line with the joint statement of the two leaders in 2012 and the following agreements,” Lavrov said during a joint press conference with Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo.
Next round of Russian-Japanese peace treaty talks will be held shortly after the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Russia.
Russia’s top diplomat Lavrov said in a positive tone that Russia-Japan peace treaty issue cannot be reduced to “territorial claims” at the very least because the only document that was signed and ratified by both sides — the joint declaration of 1956 — states that the sides have agreed to renounce all claims against each other, and the next task is to sign a peace treaty,” Lavrov said in an interview with Chinese, Japanese and Mongolian media.
Lavrov said Prime Minister Abe expressed interest in visiting Russia. As for a possible visit to Japan by Russian President Vladimir Putin, Lavrov stated that there are “absolutely no obstacles.” “In order for the visit to take place, we need for the invitation… to take the form of a specific date,” he added.
Lavrov also said USA does not like any credible improvement in Russo-Japanese relations and that disapproving statements coming from Washington regarding high-level contacts between Russia and Japan are simply outrageous. “I think our Japanese colleagues understand this and assess it in a way such unacceptable manners should be assessed.”
The United States’ exerting pressure on Japan undermines Russian-Japanese bilateral relations. US pressure on Japan leads to narrowing of dialogue between Moscow and Tokyo, Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said responding to a request to comment on the Japanese media reports that US President Barack Obama called Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, asking him not to come to Russia. Japan narrowed Russian contacts and curtailed the work in bilateral direction, under the pressure and insistent recommendations of the United States.
Japan’s officials have been recommended not to pay or exchange visits to or with Russia in a rather harsh manner before. However, the official Washington spokesman has recently said that if one contact with Russian officials takes place, then it’s alright, thus giving the go-ahead.
Lavrov said that overall the upcoming Russian-Japanese summit agenda looks very dense both in terms of bilateral and international issues. “We would like to see Russia and Japan move from just exchanging opinions to coordinating approaches to urgent international issues”
Experts and diplomats acknowledge that they have been preparing this series of visits for several months. The main obstacle had been for Abe and Putin to voice at least a framework for a compromise. And given that the visits have been discussed, this seems to indicate that a formula for a compromise framework has finally been determined.
Nearly 71 years after the conclusion of the Second World War, Russia and Japan still have no peace treaty between them. However, they never fought a war since WW II. The dispute over the Russian-held islands, called the Northern Territories in Japan and the Southern Kurils in Russia, has prevented the two countries from peace treaty to officially end World War II.
Ties between two countries deteriorated after Tokyo announced support for certain Western economic sanctions against Russia imposed in 2014 over Moscow’s alleged interference in the eastern Ukrainian conflict. Russia has resolutely denied the accusations. The dispute over the Southern Kuril Islands deteriorated Russo-Japan relations when the Japanese government published a new guideline for school textbooks on July 16, 2008 to teach Japanese children that their country has sovereignty over the Kuril Islands. The Russian public was generally outraged by the action and demanded the government to counteract. The Foreign Minister of Russia announced on July 18, 2008 “these actions contribute neither to the development of positive cooperation between the two countries, nor to the settlement of the dispute,” and reaffirmed its sovereignty over the islands.
And the territorial issue is the key stumbling block. The two sides cannot agree on the territorial issue. The Japanese demand all four islands and will not agree to any compromise solution. Both countries discussed the issue for years but could not reach a credible solution. The two sides agreed to seek a resolution over the persistent Kuril Islands dispute, but the decision of the dispute is not expected in the near future. Despite the territorial dispute, Hata offered some financial support to Russian market-oriented economic reforms. In March 1994, then Japanese minister of foreign affairs Hata Tsutomu visited Moscow and met with Russian minister of foreign affairs Andrei Kozyrev and other senior officials.
Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as the first Russian President Boris Yeltsin took power in Russia in late 1991. Moscow took a stand in opposition to relinquishing the disputed territories to Japan. Although Japan joined with the Group of Seven industrialized nations in contributing some technical and financial assistance to Russia, relations between Tokyo and Moscow remained poor. Russian president Boris Yeltsin postponed a scheduled September 1992 visit to Japan to October 11, 1993. He made concessions on the Kuril Islands dispute over the four Kuril Islands (northeast of Hokkaido), a considerable obstacle to Japanese-Russian relations, but did agree to abide by the 1956 Soviet pledge to return two areas (Shikotan and the Habomai Islands) to Japan. Yeltsin apologized repeatedly for Soviet mistreatment of Japanese prisoners of war after World War II.
In 2010, President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev became the first Russian president to take a state trip to the Kuril Islands. Medvedev shortly ordered significant reinforcements to the Russian defenses on the Kuril Islands. Medvedev was replaced by Vladimir Putin in 2012. In November 2013, Japan held its first ever diplomatic talks with the Russian Federation, and the first with Moscow since 1973. Further talks are expected in 2014, with a formal peace treaty on the table as both sides seem willing to compromise
As of 2016 matters remain unresolved, and these disputes have effectively soured relations between the two countries. Since governments are not maintain good relations, peole in both countries do not have a positive view of each other. According to a 2012 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, 72% of Japanese people view Russia unfavorably, compared with 22% who viewed it favorably, making Japan the country with the most anti-Russian sentiment.
The Kremlin considers all for islands as strategic territories. As Japan demands all the four islands, Russia’s leadership was willing, in 2004, to make a compromise along the lines of the 1956 proposal – to transfer two islands and sign the peace treaty after that. Moscow said two of the four islands is the compromise. Japan has held and continues to hold a different position: for them these two islands are just the start of negotiations in which a compromise can be found, which should include at least a third island.” Moreover, Tokyo has also suggested another option: that Russia gives up two islands now, launching strong bilateral relations and two more at a later point.
In fact Japan wants all four islands from Russia.
In any case, now Russia is not planning on giving anything up, as the Foreign Ministry’s statement shortly before Lavrov’s departure made perfectly clear. The statement clearly said that progress on any peace treaty would remain impossible without Japan’s recognition of post-war realities.
And Russia’s stubbornness can be explained not only by the fact that Moscow does not want to throw away its strategic territories, and not just because Japan needs the peace treaty and an improvement in relations more than Russia does but also because the Kremlin is not convinced in the reliability of any agreements with Japan.
New effort for Mutual benefits
The status of disputed islands and unstable bilateral relations continues to disturb any normal relations but the NATO of which Japan is an important financing member did not let the relations to take any positive plunge. However, Moscow says it wants to stabilize ties with Japan. Sergei Lavrov’s Tokyo visit was meant essentially to hold a comprehensive discussion on bilateral and international issues. His visit to Japan comes partly in preparations for Abe’s possible arrival in Russia to discuss the territorial issue. The visit aimed at laying the groundwork for improved relations between Moscow and Tokyo, and to iron out details on a future visit to Russia by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Russian business magazine experts mull the prospects for Russian-Japanese relations.
There are other options for solving the territorial dispute that do not involve Russia giving up its sovereignty over the Kuriles. This, for example, may include the creation of a special economic zone with preferences for Japanese investment. Such a scenario would bring a number of benefits for both Japan with Prime Minister Abe being able to say that he has returned partial control over the islands, and for Russia, since Japanese investments would help the islands’ economy. It appears this will be one of the topics to be discussed by Abe during his visit to Russia,” which could be held as soon as next month.
The Japanese prime minister is set on resolving the territorial issue and has said so more than once and is ready to discuss the various options personally with Vladimir Putin. These discussions would continue, most likely in Tokyo, where the Russian president would arrive with a return visit, a prospect which requires only the setting of a specific date, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry.
It would seem that both countries would benefit from almost a strategic partnership level of relations. Russia can offer Japan the energy it requires, as well as resources and a market for the expansion of Japanese capital. But more importantly, the Kremlin could become a geopolitical balance, helping Tokyo to find a formula to defend against an ever-strengthening China. After all, Russia is one of the few countries in the region that does not hold animosity for Tokyo over Japan’s war crimes in the first half of the 20th century.
In turn, Japan can provide Russia with technology, industrial goods, investment and innovations, and actively participate in the development of the Russian Far East.
The Kremlin, for its part, is ready to sign such a treaty immediately, and then begin to build a strategic partnership. Without effective cooperation with Japan, there can be no complete ‘eastern pivot’ in Russian foreign policy, but only a ‘Chinese tilt’.
However, Tokyo has one condition: the Japanese want the South Kuril Islands, which the USSR took from Japan after the Second World War. The problem of the peace treaty is directly linked to the issue of the northern territories, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said ahead of Lavrov’s visit, referring to the Kuriles.
The European Union and Russia: To talk or not to talk and about what?
The recent visit of the High Representative of the European Union Josep Borrell to Moscow was seen by those, who care about good-neighbourly relations between the EU and Russia, as a first step on the way of putting an end to their decline, since already for some time they were going from bad to worse. Why didn’t the expectations of these people of good will bear the fruit? Were they simply naïve? To an extent, it is true. But why was there such a negative reaction to Borrell’s visit in several European capitals, and also in the European Parliament, including the calls for his resignation? What led Sergei Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of Russia, to declare that his country must be ready to severing relations with the EU in case the latter adopts new sanctions against Moscow? What would this mean for Europe, for Russia and even for the wider world since notwithstanding the coronavirus the world remains interconnected and interdependent, even if a reverse tendency has also become visible?
First of all, it has to be noted that there are those, both in Russia as well as in Europe, who are actively against any improvement of relations between Moscow and Brussels. In Russia these are not only, and even not so much, those ultra-nationalists (exemplified, say, by Alexander Prohkanov) for whom the Western influence in Russia is like a bat from the hell infected by coronavirus. These are also members of the radical pro-Western opposition to the Kremlin, exemplified by Alexei Navalny. For them any sign of reconciliation between the West and Russia is a cause for alarm since in such a case they may be soon out of job. And both of these Russian opponents of rapprochement between the EU and Russia have their counterparts in the West, including Europe. Significant parts of political elites, particularly in the Baltic countries and in Poland, for whom trans-Atlantic ties are much more important than European interests, hope that by supporting the radical opposition in Russia they could enforce there a regime change, a kind of ‘colour revolution’.
However, as the success of such scenarios is ‘highly unlikely’ and political pragmatism and economic self-interests usually prevail over vociferous extremism, be it political or religious, there is still hope at the end of the tunnel. Moreover, when Sergei Lavrov said that Russia should be ready to possible severing relations between EU and Russia, he didn’t mean at all that it would be Russia’s choice. It was said in the context of a response to a threat of new EU’s sanctions and Moscow’s countersanctions since all such unfriendly measures inevitably undermine relations between States and societies. And though it is impossible to realistically imagine a complete severance of relations between Brussels and Moscow, it may well be that at least for the nearest future political relations between them become a bit frozen. It maybe even advisable to take the time off and reflect for a while, instead of continuing with mutual recriminations. However, this would also mean that relations between Russia and individual member-States of the Union would necessarily rise in importance since there are areas and issues where cooperation between Russia and Europe is inevitable and unavoidable (be it the situation in the Middle East, the fate of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, responses to cyber-terrorism and even the conflict in Eastern Ukraine or the situation in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh, etc.). Moreover, Covid-19 is not only forcing States to impose stricter border controls, even within in the Schengen zone; the virus is also pushing them to cooperate in the distribution and use of effective vaccines, notwithstanding their ‘politically incorrect’ origin. This all means that the role and position of the EU in the world would further weaken.
The failure of Borrell’s mission was also predetermined by what the High Representative himself called ‘the DNA’ of the European Union – the concern for human rights, particularly in States that don’t belong to the Union. As the High Representative himself claimed, in justification of his visit and apologising before the MEPs for its meagre results, the primary purpose of his twofold mission was to convey to the Kremlin the Union’s concerns for human rights and political freedoms in Russia and particularly for the situation of Mr Navalny. He even demanded Navalny’s ‘immediate and unconditional release’. And only then came issues of bilateral cooperation between the EU and Russia. This was an absolutely wrong, even disastrous, way to start a dialogue. The European Union is not a human rights NGO, like the Amnesty International or the Human Rights Watch, and even if it has a human rights mandate, then only vis-à-vis its member-States. Moreover, the whole history of the human rights movement shows that inter-State relations (and relations between the EU and Russia are inter-State relations) are not the best forum for conducting a human rights discourse. For that there are specialised human rights bodies, both international and domestic, intergovernmental and non-governmental. When human rights diplomacy of States has had tangible positive effects, it has been achieved by unobtrusive approaches, never through public criticism in the face of mass media. Such criticism has always been counterproductive, even vis-à-vis smaller and weaker States, to say nothing about great powers.
Usually such public criticism doesn’t even have a purpose of improving the human rights situation in a target country. It may be a form of self-satisfaction – we are holding a moral high-ground, while you are outcasts (rogue or pariah States). It is nice to feel virtuous even if things on the grounds don’t change at all or even get worse. It may be also a part of regime-change tactics in parallel with undercover support for opposition forces in target States. Never have such public campaigns improved human rights situations. The opposite is true – human rights situations have improved as a result of fruitful cooperation between States. So, the reforms in China and the inclusion of China in the world-wide economic cooperation have lifted, according to the World Bank, 850 million Chinese out of extreme poverty, helping thereby the UN to achieve one of its Millennium Development Goals. However, such an unexpected success has not been to everybody’s liking and today Washington is trying to harness its allies to help contain Beijing’s rise, using for it, inter alia, human rights discourse that is not doing any good either for Uighurs in the North or Hongkongese in the South of the country. But such policy of containment is not at all about Uighurs or inhabitants of Hong Kong; it is about geopolitics in the disguise of human rights.
In the aftermath of the failed attempts to promote democracy and human rights in the wider Middle East, the former British Prime Minister Theresa May promised that there is no ‘return to the failed policies of the past. The days of Britain and America intervening in sovereign countries in an attempt to remake the world in our own image are over.’She vowed never to repeat the ‘failed policies of the past’, breaking from the ’liberal intervention’ principle established and promoted by her predecessor Tony Blair. Hubert Védrine, the former French Foreign Minister, was right in emphasising that ‘democracy and human rights will progress in future much less through the prescriptions and interference from the outside by the West than depending on the internal dynamics of individual societies’. It is often, though not always, the case that the less States publicly criticise other States on human rights issues, the better would it be for human rights.
From our partner International Affairs
The Role of Ideology in Foreign Policy: Why Contemporary Russia Cannot Be Compared to the Soviet Union
Ideology is a crucial component in understanding the motivation behind any individual or group of people. Realism falsely presupposes that the motivation of actors can be understood purely through the lens of survival in a limited resources zero-sum domain. At face level, this sounds rational and economic, but it should be understood that in microeconomics, even though people are assumed to always act self-interestedly, it is also understood that what their self-interest is actually composed of is ultimately subjective. Therefore, a more realistic and analytical view of realpolitik allows us to understand that the self-interest of nations is also subjective, which means that the role of ideology cannot be discounted as it pertains to foreign policy.
Throughout human history, nearly every nation has been founded for the sake of itself, even expansionist empires. A glaring exemption to this rule was observed during the Cold War, a clash of two markedly ideological countries.
The United States is a country that was founded on the ideology of humanist enlightenment liberalism and is a country whose founding was assumed to be not for the sake of themselves, but for the sake of all mankind. This was seen as early as the settling of the American continent, with John Winthrop’s famous imagery in A Model of Christian Charity which portrayed the country as a moral paragon, a city on a hill for all the world to see. Likewise, this idea of liberal universalism was evident in the very founding documents of America. In the United States Declaration of Independence, the founding fathers wrote that their country was being incepted to secure the idea “that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”.
This founding ethos directly affected America’s foreign policy, as America has historically occupied a position as the world’s “policeman,” believing that they uniquely have an obligation to defend democratic values everywhere. This rhetoric can be found exhaustively in colloquial American media, but one noticeable concrete example of it is found in George Bush’s 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy, where the document states that “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world”.
In a similar vein, the Soviet Union was also founded upon an ideology that extended beyond its national borders. The USSR was the product of Marxist theory and was therefore not founded for the sake of national interest or nationalism, but for the sake of facilitating the international communist revolution, a sentiment captured in the final remarks of Marx’s Communist Manifesto: “the proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains…WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!”
This created an interesting vision for communist statehood, because in the USSR, the state was not the merely the final end, as it is in many governance structures, but both an end in itself and a means to a further end. This Proletarian internationalism manifested itself into an interventionist foreign policy, one that sought to propagate communist ideology across the world and facilitate revolution. In fact, it could even be said that this was the primary function of the USSR. Even Lenin once admitted that “from the beginning of the October Revolution, foreign policy and international relations have been the main questions facing us” (Jacobson, 1994) .
The clash between these two ideological superpowers became physically manifest during the Cold War through various “cold conflicts” such as the Vietnam War, conflict in Angola, and Cuban missile crisis, instances when the US and USSR sought to project their values onto other nations. As can be imagined, the war made tensions very high between the two countries, and in the West, a staunch fear-based perception of Russia developed. The Cold War was portrayed in America as a fight between good and evil, and Russia was portrayed as a relentless enemy that will never back down, a sentiment which had a lasting effect on the way that Russia is viewed in the contemporary West. This impact has been so salient, that even Russia today is still often characterized as if it was some great evil, waiting for “red dawn” to arrive.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the communist ideology that had influenced the behavior of the USSR fell with it. Without this ideological superstructure, Russia reverted back into a country that falls into a normal range of ideological behavior, determined primarily by a defined set of national interests. While the USSR and US fought for the ability to hegemonize a bipolar system into a unipolar one, contemporary Russia rejects the idea of unipolarity and seeks to coexist with other nations in a multipolar world. Russia certainly has defined geographical areas in which it has foreign interests, specifically the Eurasian sphere, but these interests are predicated on a shared history and mutual economic benefit, and not desires to imperialize.
Nevertheless, in the modern age, there are still fears about Russian imperialism and a “new cold war”. Such fears come from a misunderstanding about the role of ideology in foreign policy. These sentiments demonstrate both a failure to understand the determining factor behind Soviet foreign policy—the union’s ideology, and a failure to analyze a modern country independently of its ideological history. These feelings come from an assumption that Russia today has the same motivational foundation as the Soviet Union, and that is simply not true.
The ideology supporting modern Russia’s foreign policy had formed largely in response to the conclusion of the Cold War, when a bipolar system was turned into a unipolar one, dominated by the United States. In this condition, the world was severely influenced by American foreign policy, military interests, politics, culture, and media, and could be defined as what many scholars would call a global hegemon. Russia considers such a distribution of power to be undemocratic and an affront to the individual autonomy of nation-states.
In his 2007 Munich address on security policy, Vladimir Putin criticized the idea of an America controlled hegemonic order when he stated that in our world, “there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within”. Another comment by Putin from around the same time period attacks this model of governance was when he stated that “(the) people are always teaching us democracy but the people who teach us democracy don’t want to learn it themselves”.
It was in response to this new structural backdrop, as well as increasing levels of globalization, that an ideology of multilateralism and polycentrism became the underlying motivator behind contemporary Russia’s foreign policy. Russia’s ideology rejects a vision of an American led hegemonic order, but also does not seek to hegemonize the order for itself either, it merely beckons for the mutual coexistence and recognition of autonomy between the world’s global powers and regional subsystems.
This sentiment is captured in the words of Sergey Lavrov, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs for Russia in 2013. Lavrov stated that the world was undoubtedly moving towards a polycentric system of international relations, and that in order to ensure an equitable outcome during this transition, “fairer and more democratic systems where economic growth centers and new financial power centres should play a greater role in managing the world economy and political processes”. While the moves and actions of modern Russia are often framed in a realist lens by Western critics, the underlying ideology of the Russian Federation is actually quite liberal, as Russia accepts that a multipolar world should be brokered by polycentric or multilateral means, such as the United Nations.
It would be foolish to judge any country by its ideological history. It would be intellectually dishonest to evaluate a previously religious state in the context of religious ideology after secularization. Likewise, Russia today has largely, if not completely separated from its interventionist communist past and has embraced a new vision of both the world order and its foreign policy. When evaluating contempo
1. Jacobson, J. (1994). “The Ideological and Political Foundations of Soviet Foreign Policy.” In When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics. University of California Press. pp. 12.
From our partner RIAC
What Russia Wants In The Balkans
Popular narratives on Russia’s geopolitical interests in the Balkans point to two rather divergent directions. One of them, inherited from the 19th-century strategic thought, says that Russia, as a landlocked empire, must expand into the Balkans, so as to gain access to the Mediterranean Sea. According to this narrative, the Balkans is treated as an empty space, regardless of the ethno-religious identity of the inhabitant population. The other one, which can be traced back to 19th-century romanticist pan-Slavism, but which has been popularized in its present form after the publication of Samuel Huntington’s theory of „the clash of civilizations“, says that Russia conceives of its influence in the Balkans through the cultivation of fraternal relations with the region’s Orthodox Christians, using common religious identity to project its geopolitical ambitions.
Facts on the ground, however, do not support either. Russia’s influence in the region, from the early 19th century to the present day, could never compete with the influence of the Anglo-French axis, exercised through the channels of Serbian and Greek nationalisms, constructed on the anti-Ottoman/anti-Islamic and anti-Habsburg/anti-Catholic foundations, in accordance with strategic interests of the two West European powers to dismantle the declining empires and transform them into a number of weak nation-states. Although these nationalist movements used Orthodox Christianity and a popular folklore motif of fraternity with Orthodox Russia as effective tools for mobilizing the targeted populations on the anti-Islamic and anti-Catholic grounds, their elites always remained clearly detached from Russia, being continuously oriented towards their true patrons in London and Paris.
The Russian motive in mobilizing Serbian nationalism in the 1990s was, of course, quite convenient for London and Paris, having concealed their continuous support to the Serbian military invasion of Bosnia and Croatia, which produced a gigantic campaign of ethnic cleansing of the non-Serb population in the occupied areas, with more than 100.000 dead and over one million expelled. That was one of the reasons why the British propaganda, both diplomatic and public, insisted on the alleged Russian support to Serbia and its military expansion as a reason why the Western powers could not intervene in the war in Bosnia and prevent further bloodshed. Another reason, much more important from a strategic point of view – indeed, the reason why the Serbian campaign of genocide and ethnic cleansing was supported by London and Paris in the first place – was the global promotion of Hungtington’s theory of „the clash of civilizations“ as „the next pattern of conflict“. According to that pattern, future geopolitical blocs would be formed on the basis of religious identities, acting as „civilizations“ in ineradicable conflicts. As a model of such conflicts at a micro-level was the one launched in Bosnia, in which Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox Christians were pushed to the point of mutual extermination, in an attempt to form „ethnically cleansed“ areas. This scheme was imposed on these communities’ self-appointed leaders (Izetbegović, Karadžić, Boban) by the European Community’s negotiator Lord Carrington at the conference held in Lisbon in 1992, several months before the war. The widely promoted narrative of the alleged Russian support of the Serbian aggression on Bosnia, and the alleged pan-Islamic support to Bosnia’s defenders (with the deliberate media characterisation of all Bosnians, whatever their religion, as „Muslims“) served the purpose of transforming the world into one of clashing „civilizations“. The ultimate goal was to generate an analogous conflict between Orthodox Christians and Muslims on the macro-level, which would eventually push Russia into a lasting armed conflict with the former Soviet republics populated by Muslims, and then into a global conflict with the rest of the Islamic world. Needless to say, such a development would have created a significant strategic advantage for the Anglo-American powers and a great strategic loss for both Russia and the Islamic countries.
Yeltsin’s foreign policy at the time did not show too much understanding of that geopolitical game, allowing for a public image of Russia as a promoter of pan-Orthodox ideology and a sponsor of the Serbian aggression in the Balkans. However, it must be noted that Russia was not drawn into any major conflict that would fit the pattern of Hungtington’s „clash of civilizations“, although the local conflicts in Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh, in which it was directly or indirectly involved, did possess some elements of that model. In contrast, Putin’s foreign policy was based on a much deeper understanding of global relations and geopolitical games at play, so that eventually the Anglo-American strategy of drawing Russia into inter-religious conflicts in Central Asia, in line with Huntington’s theory, did not bear much fruit. And so did the constructed image of Russia’s involvement on the Serbian side gradually wither away.
Yet, paradoxically, in the last couple of years Russia has played the role, previously insinuated by the Anglo-American propaganda, of a protector of Serbia’s efforts to create a Greater Serbia out of the territories of the neighbouring countries with a Serb ethnic minority population (Bosnia, Montenegro, Kosovo).It is difficult to imagine anything more destructive for a country, which is a home to more than 190 ethnic groups, than to adopt the principle of ethnic and religious homogeneity. However, contrary to the principles of ethnic diversity applied in its own territory and in the broader area of the former Soviet Union, Russia’s attitude in the Balkans has shown open support to the Greater Serbian programme of uniting all Serbs into a single, ethnically homogenous state. Russian foreign policy of open support for the Serbian efforts to cede the Serb-populated renegade province of Bosnia to Serbia is self-contradictory, to say the least. It is also self-defeating, if taken seriously and applied to Russia itself and the neighbouring countries with a Russian ethnic minority. Can anyone imagine today’s Russia in permanent efforts to cede parts of all post-Soviet republics populated with Russians, so as to unite them in some mythical Greater Russia? Or, can anyone imagine Russia attempting to ethnically cleanse its own territory, so as to expel or exterminate all those 190 ethnic communities, in the name of an ethnically homogenous Russian nation-state? Of course not. Yet, that is precisely the policy of Serbia towards its neighbours and towards its own population that Russia now openly supports on the international scene. Therefore, one has to rightfully ask, what is it that Russia wants in the Balkans?
In the first place, it is highly questionable how influential Russia really is in Serbia, despite its public support for it. For, the very existence of Serbia, from a semi-autonomous principality within the Ottoman territory in the 1830s to the creation of the Kingdom of Serbia in 1882 , to its expansion into other South Slavic territories in the form of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) at the Versailles Conference in 1919, always had explicit support by London and Paris. The dissolution of the communist Yugoslavia, which Serbia used as a convenient opportunity to implement the Greater Serbia programme, was also clearly backed by London and Paris, with no relevant participation by Moscow. Under these conditions, it is difficult to imagine a strategic shift from the centuries long Anglo-French influence to that of Russia. It is also difficult to identify Russian strategic interests in the Balkans, given that Russia’s foreign policy was not designed to exert control in the zones outside the territory of the former Soviet Union.
Yet, if Russia has no real influence on Serbia, then the current Russian support of Serbia’s continuing hostile policy towards its neighbours may well be a simulation of influence. Even if such a simulation cannot deceive the foreign policy circles in London, which are quite familiar with the extent of their long-term control over Serbia, it may well deceive such circles in Washington, which are commonly persuaded that Moscow’s influence can be detected everywhere. For what purpose? If the Balkan region is of strategic importance for the US, not only as a link between the West and the Middle East, but also in terms of its natural resources (e.g. Kosovo), then the simulated Russian influence in the Balkans might serve as a leverage against the American influence in the zones of true strategic importance for Russia. What first comes to mind, of course, is Ukraine and its aspirations to join NATO: if a tactical simulation of Russian influence in the Balkans, as a zone of traditional strategic influence of the West, turns out to be successful, then it might be possible to push Washington to reduce its ambitions in Ukraine and leave it outside NATO structures.
There is also another purpose for which such a simulation might serve. Not so many analysts, diplomats or politicians are aware of the tacit strategic alliance between Russia and Turkey, which has elevated Turkey to the status of a great power. This alliance has already been tested in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. In Libya, Russia and Turkey simulated a possibility of mutual military confrontation, each supporting one of the warring parties, while in reality they agreed to divide the spheres of influence, using the Libyan warring parties as their respective proxies. In Syria, under the pretended confrontation, the new allies also divided the spheres of influence. Still, the most interesting game was played out in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Turkey openly supported Azerbaijan in its efforts to restore sovereignty over this region. On the other side, Armenia was persuaded by Western powers, namely France, to go into the war over Azerbaijan’s region under the pretext that Russian military support to Armenia was a geopolitical inevitability. However, Azerbaijan, with Turkish military support, took the region over, with no resistance on Russia’s part. Russia thus returned to the principle of inviolability of post-Soviet borders and finally abandoned the principle of ethnically homogenous greater states, advocated by Armenia and its patrons in Paris and London. Is there a possibility for Russia and Turkey to play a similar game in the Balkans? Is there a possibility that Russia and Turkey want to generate an illusion among the Serbian nationalist elites that Russia would unquestionably support their attempts to cede parts of Bosnia and Kosovo, at the same time leaving Turkey with a free hand to extend its military support to Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s efforts to prevent Serbia from questioning their sovereignty? Is there a will in Russia to return to the principle of inviolability of borders in the Balkans, too, thereby abandoning the principle of ethnic homogeneity advocated by Serbia and its sponsors in London and Paris, the most harmful principle for Russia’s own interests? Is there a will in Russia to follow its own geopolitical interests, in cooperation with Turkey, along the same lines and with the same implications as in Nagorno-Karabakh? Really, what is Russia doing in the Balkans?
Harnessing the Power of Culture and Creativity in Tourism Recovery
The shared values and close ties between tourism and culture stakeholders means both sectors can work together to ensure inclusive...
In Tajikistan, a Digital Future as an Alternative to Unemployment or Migration
The COVID-19 pandemic has amplified development challenges and sharpened the view on opportunities to overcome them. Evidently, policymakers were confronted...
Cease-Fire Review: A ray of hope
Pre-Negotiations are very much crucial to achieve the state of “Negociation Continuelle” (continuous negotiations) the only way due to which...
India – The US Promote National Defense – Security Cooperation
In recent years, the India-US bilateral relationship has been more closely bonded, especially defense-security cooperation in various fields including nuclear...
After steep drop in 2020, global carbon dioxide emissions have rebounded strongly
The Covid-19 crisis in 2020 triggered the largest annual drop in global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions since the Second World...
EU and Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement enters into force
On 1 March 2021, the European Union-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) will enter into force. It has now...
India-Pakistan LOC peace
India and Pakistan have both announced to “strictly observe” the truce along the Line of Control and all other sectors...
Middle East3 days ago
Back to Strategic Hedging and Mediation in Qatar Foreign Policy after the Gulf Reconciliation
Americas3 days ago
Transition 2021: How Biden is likely to approach the Middle East
South Asia3 days ago
Pakistan Day Celebrations: Civilian Participation
Europe2 days ago
Russia-EU break possible but unwanted
Human Rights3 days ago
UN Security Council demands COVID-19 vaccine ceasefires
Eastern Europe2 days ago
Crisis in Armenia Provides Fertile Ground for Russian Meddling
Middle East2 days ago
US intelligence report leaves Saudi Arabia with no good geopolitical choices
Defense2 days ago