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Serbia: Parliamentary elections for the NATO/EU’s membership

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On April 24th, 2016 Serbia faced three-level elections: for the national parliament, local municipalities and Vojvodina’s autonomous provincial administration. The elections did not cover Kosovo province as current Serbia’s pro-NATO/EU’s government already two years ago de facto recognized in its negotiations with the EU and Pristina’s government that this province is not any more an integral part of the legal and administrative system of the Republic of Serbia. Nevertheless, these elections were in the real sense of the meaning the historical once as it had to be finally clarified which “empire” Serbia is going to join in the coming future: the NATO/EU’s one or the Russian.

Kosovo

Serbia’s PM Aleksandar Vučić (originally from municipality of Bosnian town of Bugojno) had informed the nation on December 17th, 2015 after the session of the General Board of his ruling (and dictatorial western-backed) Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) that Serbia will face in the spring 2016 all three-level elections at the same time: the extraordinary parliamentary, the local and Vojvodina’s provincial. The purpose of the extraordinary parliamentary elections, according to the PM, was to obtain a full mandate for his SPP until 2020 in order to finish all designed “progressive” reforms in the country which is on the “stable and safe road”. However, the fundamental question was and is: what is the stable and safe road of the present-day Serbia?

One can ask why A. Vučić opted for the extraordinary parliamentary elections if it is known that his party has controlling the parliament with an absolute majority in coalition with (Slobodan Milošević’s established) the Serbian Socialist Party (SSP) and there are no any serious tensions in the society or any significant opposition to his in fact personal and party’s authoritarian regime which is overwhelmingly supported by the west?

01NikolicThe answer can be only one and simple: it is de facto decision by the main sponsor and even establisher of the SPP – the US embassy in Belgrade. A decade ago, the party was suddenly established by two top ex-radicals: Aleksandar Vučić – a Secretary General and Tomislav Nikolić – a vice-president of the Serbian Radical Party (SRP) which was in the 1990s in governmental and parliamentary coalition with Slobodan Milošević’s SSP. From that time up to now the party’s main political course is the pro-western one, with the cardinal aim for Serbia (without Kosovo) to become a full Member State of the European Union (the EU) and of course of the NATO. The NATO’s membership is, however, not openly advocated for the only reason not to alienate the ethnic Serbs from Serbia (as a majority of population) from the western course of the party and now the government. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that these two memberships have to go together and even that Serbia, like the FYR of Macedonia or Montenegro, firstly has to join the NATO as the open doors for the EU’s membership. The practical problem for both the US and the EU administrations is that overwhelming majority of the ethnic Serbs from Serbia oppose Serbia’s membership to the NATO. According to many investigations of the public opinion during the last decade, it is clear that absolute majority of Serbia’s citizens do not want to see their country as a NATO’s member and even more, they will not support the EU’s membership if the NATO’s membership is a necessary condition. It is also clear that recognition of Kosovo’s independence has to be a crucial political condition for Serbia’s EU’s membership that is originally scheduled by Brussels to happen in 2020 or very soon after this year.

As the western client state of Serbia already started on December 14th, 2015 the final phase of the negotiations with the EU, the very practical problem for the western bosses of quasi Serbia’s independence is how to avoid national dissatisfaction and even possible revolution when Serbia will finally and de jure recognize Kosovo’s independence as a technical precondition for a full membership to the EU? Obviously, Washington decided to make as stronger as position of the SPP in the parliament after the new elections hoping that the party will form the government without making any parliamentary coalition. The hope was a real and realistic having in mind at least three fundamental facts:

All Serbia’s mass media (excluding only part of the internet that is not making any serious influence to the electorate) is under a full Vučić’s (i.e., the US) control.

The citizens of Serbia, including primarily the ethnic Serbs, are during the last 15 years of “democratic” regimes quite well bombed by the pro-western governmental and the NGO sector’s controlled media that the Uncle Sam could believe that their minds are already well prepared (washed) for the final decision to join the western (anti-Russian) train.

The Russian factor in Serbia, due to such media situation and governmental-NGO’s anti-Russian propaganda, is already not serious obstacle for the realization of the crucial western political plans with this Balkan country (likewise with the FYR of Macedonia and Montenegro).

Russia

Obviously, Russia was and is the only great global power which historically was and still is protecting the national interests of Serbia and the Serbs and for that reason for Washington, Berlin and Brussels is clear that the Russian influence in the region, but above all among the Orthodox Serbs, has to be as much as minimized in order to totally transform Serbia and the Republic of Srpska (still part of Bosnia-Herzegovina) into their classical 19th century oversea political, economic and financial colonies as it was already done with all ex-Socialist Central European nations who joined both the EU and the NATO. The western long-term designs with the Serbs are, as well as, clear: to dismiss the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to separate territories of Vojvodina and Raška (Sandžak in Turkish) from the rest of Serbia. In this case, Serbia will have state borders as it was already at the time between the Berlin Congress (1878) and the Balkan Wars (1912−1913). Nonetheless, with such post-2000 October Revolution Serbia’s governments and the Russian not proper political activity in the region such scenario is quite possible.

02serbiaeuThe Uncle Sam was realistically expecting that coming Serbia’s extraordinary parliamentary elections are going to be won (with absolute majority) by its client Vučić’s SPP due to expected absence of approximately half of Serbia’s electorate and already enough pro-western and anti-Russian washed brains of the majority of those who will vote. In this case the SPP will form extremely stable government in the parliament with an absolute majority of the seats. In fact, finally, it happened: Vučić’s SPP won 48,23% of the votes (electoral activity was 55%) and in a coalition with its traditional parliamentary collaborator Milošević’s SSP (10,98% of the votes) or even alone can continue with its authoritarian governmental practice for the next four years that is quite enough to irretrievably hook up Serbia’s wagon to the NATO/EU’s train composition.    

The consequences are going to be drastic and even catastrophic for Serbia’s territorial integrity and national interest of the ethnic Serbs but for Russia as well, as the Russian influence in the region is going to be totally eliminated.

Finally, a great part of guiltiness for such situation is on the Russian side itself as Russia simply left the Serbs on the western mercy in 2003 when the Russian peace-keeping troops left both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. It is not also understandable why Russia is not financing and politically supporting any serious pro-Russian political party or NGO in Serbia, or at least why such party and/or NGO (if exists) is not profoundly supported by Moscow as it is openly done by Washington, Brussels and Berlin with their own client political parties and NGO’s sector. Vučić’s SPP is currently the most successful western financed and sponsored story in Serbia and Moscow very well know that party’s official policy of “and Europe and Russia” is only a great bluff for the people’s masses especially at the time of electoral campaigns. The SPP’s “stable and safe road” is a road to the NATO and the EU.

But why Russia left Serbia to go on this road? The only reasonable and logical explanation seems to be that according to some secret deal between Washington and Moscow achieved even before Kosovo’s independence proclamation in February 2008, the Balkans is left to the western areal dominance at the exchange for the Transcaucasus and the part of East Europe (the East and South Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) which are included into Russia’s sphere of influence.

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Sanctions Policy: The ‘European Paradox’

Ivan Timofeev

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Since the end of the Cold War, economic sanctions have increasingly been used by big players as a tool of foreign policy. The initiators of sanctions use trade and financial restrictions to try to force the target countries to change course politically as well as to influence internal political processes. The United States has positioned itself as the largest sanctions initiator. Over the past hundred years, the US has used them more often than all other nations and the UN combined. The Americans remain second to none in terms of the number of developed state institutions involved in the policy of sanctions. The US sanctions apparatus far exceeds the capabilities of the UN and any other country in terms of financial, human and organisational resources.

The European Union is also showing increasing activity as an initiator of sanctions. There are several conditions for this. First, the EU is a powerful economy with huge human, financial and technological potential. Economic power is the most important condition, without which an effective policy of sanctions is simply impossible. After all, sanctions are effective when the initiator can inflict much greater harm on the target country than vice versa. Second, the European Union has not yet become an independent military-political force. Its foreign policy is based on soft power and economic instruments, so in conflict situations, sanctions are the best option. Third, the EU coordinates its sanctions policy with the actions of the United States, its main ally. The growing number of sanctions on the part of Washington has also led to the growth of sanctions initiated by Brussels.

At the same time, there are a number of distinguished features that define the EU approach. One of the key elements is the commitment of Brussels to multilateral diplomacy. The EU avoids being the sole initiator of sanctions. This is an important difference from the United States. The Americans often impose sanctions without any regard for others. They recognise the importance of coalition pressure on the target countries and strive to involve their allies and a wider range of countries in launching sanctions. However, their support for the United States is more instrumental – the more sizable the coalition, the greater its potential for taking a toll on the economies of sanctioned countries. However, for the EU, the multilateral use of sanctions remains an important normative issue and even means of conveying shared values. The European Union carefully implements UN Security Council resolutions, and EU countries which are members of the UN Security Council have often offered their own draft resolutions on sanctions.

The EU, however, allows sanctions which bypass the decisions of the UN Security Council. Here the policy of Brussels differs from the positions of Moscow and Beijing, which consider the UN Security Council as the only legitimate source of sanctions. These countries also use unilateral measures, but so far they’ve done it much less often in comparison with the EU and especially the USA. However, by bypassing the UN, the EU is trying to combine efforts with the United States and other Western countries, that is, to provide a multilateral format. At the same time, the EU retains its own view on many problems and calibrates a set of restrictive measures at its sole discretion.

Another important distinction of EU policy is its extremely reserved attitude towards extraterritorial sanctions. The European Union authorities may well use secondary sanctions, that is, to punish certain companies or organisations for violating existing restrictions. However, Brussels uses such measures within its jurisdiction. The United States, on the contrary, is increasingly introducing secondary sanctions against foreigners, putting foreign companies on the SDN list or fining violators.

Interestingly, over the past ten years, most of the related fines were levied against European companies. This situation may well be called the “European paradox.” EU authorities support many US sanctions initiatives, but at the same time many Europeans are negatively affected by the secondary sanctions. They pay the most fines. According to the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), over the past 10 years, out of 201 US Treasury fines, 40 were levied against EU companies and 133 were paid by US companies. In just 10 years, the US Treasury has collected $ 5.6 billion in fines. Of these, the Europeans paid more than $ 4.6 billion (83%), and the Americans only paid 177.2 million (3%). This distribution resembles the “Pareto law”: most of the revenue is generated by a minority of players. And this minority is concentrated in Europe, whereas the smaller proportion was paid by the US-based majority. Of course, such a distribution can hardly be the result of the deliberate activity of American authorities. But the fact remains: Europeans pay the most.

At least since the 1990s, The European Union has tried to take measures to protect itself from secondary US sanctions. A serious incentive was the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme. Washington unilaterally resumed large-scale financial and sectoral sanctions against Iran. A significant number of companies operating in the Iranian market, including European ones, turned out to be facing the threat of secondary sanctions and subsequent penalties. The EU has resumed the so-called 1996 Blocking Statute, which should shield European companies from secondary sanctions. However, a significant number of big EU companies have already left Iran. Many large European companies which do business in Iran also conduct business in the US, and preferred to maintain their loyalty to American requirements, even though Brussels was critical of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and introduced protective measures. The threat of having problems with the US authorities in the form of fines and “weaning” from the US market and financial system outweighs possible profits in the Iranian market.

In Europe, some politicians proposed establishing their own payment system, in the interests of European sovereignty and financial independence. In January 2019, INSTEX SAS company was registered in France (with the participation of Germany and the United Kingdom). It was tasked with securing transactions between European companies and Iran, bypassing US sanctions. So far the fate of this initiative remains unclear. The big problem is its approval by other EU members. Also, the real functionality of INSTEX remains unclear. In the end, nothing is preventing the Americans from including INSTEX in their SDN list, making it “toxic”, or fining the company in proportion to the volume of its deals with Iran.

The prospects for INSTEX are becoming even more vague, against the background of diplomatic difficulties. After the US exit from the JCPOA, Washington found itself in diplomatic isolation on the Iran issue. However, this didn’t bother the Americans much. The situation began to heat up after the United States lifted the restriction exceptions on the purchase of Iranian oil, which they made for eight countries, including Italy and Greece. In May 2019, Tehran announced that it would refuse to fulfil certain obligations under the JCPOA. In response, Washington immediately introduced harsh, newer sanctions against Iran. The EU reacted coolly to the actions of Tehran. Now Iran could be considered isolated.

The diplomatic development of the situation around the JCPOA is likely to seriously undermine European ambitions to create an alternative payment system. If Iran once again becomes a pariah state (as the Americans would like to see), then the reason that gave rise to the discussion about it will disappear. As for fines against banks and companies, Brussels is likely to leave these risks to the discretion of the business community itself. Moreover, entrepreneurs haven’t demonstrated any serious, noticeable activity lobbying for alternatives. Apparently, the business sector feels comfortable in the dollar system, and the risks of secondary sanctions do not outweigh the benefits the system presents and the costs of its transformation. Moreover, outside of the Iranian problem, there is not a single issue that the sanctions policy presents that could seriously stimulate discussion about a European financial alternative. The commonality of the political positions of the United States and the EU will ensure the status quo.

First published in our partner RIAC

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How Romania’s battles over corruption hamstrung economic progress

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When Romania took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in January, news coverage in Western Europe mostly focused on the tensions between Brussels and Bucharest over the latter’s judicial reforms. Jean-Claude Juncker publicly called Romania’s ability to fulfil its presidential duties into question; the European Commission, meanwhile, accused the ruling Social Democrats (PSD) of backsliding on corruption.

Since then, however, Romania has executed its presidential duties without a hitch, hosting European leaders for a major EU summit in Sibiu on May 10th that earned plaudits from top EU officials like Donald Tusk. In hindsight, has the overarching media narrative ignored important developments inside Romania? Does the Sibiu summit demonstrate that Romania has regained its footing as one of Europe’s most dynamic economies?

Economic growth no longer extraordinary

Romania’s economy, while still growing at an impressive rate, has slowed down from the remarkable rates the country was registering as recently as 2017— when its 7% expansion outpaced nearly all European peers. 2018 saw growth rates of 4%, while estimates point to 3.5% for 2019.

Since it joined the European Union in 2007, Romania’s per capita national output doubled to roughly 60 percent of the Eurozone average. Record lows in unemployment led to double-digit average wage growth over the last four years. But the recent downwards trend has left many wondering whether the Romanian economy will ever resume its previous rate of development.

Is the DNA’s aggressive prosecution scaring off foreign investors?

Bucharest’s economic slowdown is due to a variety of factors, from tightened global financial conditions to falling birth rates. Foreign investors, however, may also be skittish thanks to the long-running battle between Romania’s political establishment and its controversial anti-corruption agency, the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA). Under the leadership of agency head Laura Kövesi, the DNA undertook (by its own count) 2,396 investigations targeting Romanian magistrates between 2014 and 2018. Kövesi’s tenure saw over 1,000 figures from the country’s political and business circles convicted for corruption.

The DNA’s swathes of indictments targeting Romania’s leading political figures, with charges ranging from forgery to money laundering, have certainly played into the country’s reputation for corruption. That image has hamstrung Romania’s ability to attract foreign capital and investment, from Europe and beyond.

EU leaders, meanwhile, have heaped praise on the DNA’s stack of convictions, holding the anti-corruption agency up as a model for other European countries to emulate. Concerns have mounted, however, that the DNA is abusing its power and reverting to communist-era investigative practice.

Long lists of convictions—but at what cost?

Hiding behind the DNA’s unusually-high conviction rates were potential due process violations, including lengthy pre-trial detainment periods equivalent to imprisonment before having been sentenced by a court of law, or otherwise threatening suspects that a lack of cooperation could see their family members prosecuted. Increased scrutiny of these violations may help explain why the number of cases resulting in acquittals rose markedly, from 12.2% in 2017 to 36.3% in 2018.

Some of the DNA’s most prominent targets have drawn parallels between its behaviour and that of Romania’s Communist-era security services. Alina Bica, who formerly served as chief prosecutor for organised crime and was arrested in 2014, described her experience with the DNA as “like in the 1950s when the communists came. You get called an enemy of the state, you get put in the truck…they damage your family.” Kövesi reportedly made a personal visit to the Supreme Council of Magistrates to persuade them to sign off on Bica’s arrest, while Bica’s husband was targeted with charges of tax evasion and her lawyer was also detained.

Many of those singled out by the DNA accuse the body of pursuing political or personal vendettas. Bica, for example, claimed the charges against her stemmed from her 2012 investigation into Transgaz, where Kövesi’s brother served as a director. PSD spokespeople have suggested treasurer Mircea Drăghici, currently under investigation for embezzling party funds, is being targeted as part of the lead-up to this month’s European elections.

Troubling collaboration with the intelligence services

Recent revelations about the DNA’s investigative tactics have given new life to comparisons between today’s anti-corruption czars and the communist-era Securitate secret police. Earlier this year, Romania’s Constitutional Court ruled secret protocols between DNA prosecutors and the country’s domestic intelligence agency, the SRI, were unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court concluded that the SRI, successor to the Securitate, had signed agreements allowing the intelligence agency to circumvent the authority of prosecutors in criminal investigations, while simultaneously conducting over 20,000 wiretaps a year on behalf of the DNA—an excessive violation of privacy.

The investigation by the Constitutional Court culminated in Kövesi’s removal from her position in 2018. Kövesi herself has been indicted on charges of corruption and abuse of office, relating to allegations by Romanian businessman Sebastian Ghita that Kövesi strongarmed him into paying for the repatriation of a fugitive from Indonesia. Romanian police claim they footed the bill, but criminal proceedings are ongoing. The former prosecutor nevertheless retains many fans in Brussels. Allies in the European Parliament want to name her to the new position of EU Chief Prosecutor despite the ongoing investigation in Romania.

Increased transparency

With the steady release of DNA documents to the newly formed Special Section for the Investigation of Crimes Committed by Magistrates and the National Union of Judges in Romania, which both operate independently of the DNA, efforts to increase transparency in Romanian governance may soon move beyond the bitter political rivalries that undermined Romania’s political stability and global reputation.

While the Sibiu summit was a political success, the economy is also regaining its footing. Consumer confidence is recovering, with better prospects for future savings. Wage growth remains impressive while lending activity continues to expand. And CFA Romania, an association of investment professionals, released a report predicting Romanian economic activity will improve over the next 12 months. It seems that, despite the corruption battles of the past several years, both Romanian businesses and consumers remain optimistic about their future prospects.

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Any signs of a chill between France and Germany?

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The past few months have seen many signs of growing friction and divisions between the two European superpowers, Germany and France. Before the February vote on changes to the EU Third Energy Package, meant to expand the European Commission’s power to regulate Europe’s electricity and natural gas market, France opposed, until the very last moment, Germany’s position on the issue. In April, Paris and Berlin failed to agree on how much more time Britain should be given to decide on its withdrawal from the EU. During the recent presidential elections in Ukraine, France and Germany supported various candidates. Moreover, they are equally divided on who will be the new head of the European Commission. What is happening in relations between members of the “European tandem”?

During the latter half of 2018, it looked as if relations between the EU’s two powerhouses were reaching a new strategic level. In a joint statement made in Meseberg in June, Berlin and Paris outlined their shared vision of the European Union’s future development. In late August, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas simultaneously spoke out about a new role for Europe to make it “sovereign and strong.” During their informal meeting in Marseille in September, Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel agreed on a coordinated response to the main challenges facing Europe and on concerted work on shaping the “agenda for Europe.”

In November, the two leaders spoke in favor of creating a “European army,” “real Pan-European armed forces” capable of defending Europe. And in January of this year, they inked a broader cooperation accord in Aachen, which commentators described as a “new big step” in bringing the two countries closer together. The Treaty of Aachen covers new areas of political cooperation, including common projects and commitments in the fields of defense and international relations.

Just a month later, however, the Franco-German rapprochement hit a snag over two strategic projects worth billions of euros, namely the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and trade relations with the United States. Here the interests of Paris and Berlin differ the most. Underscoring the seriousness of the rift, Emmanuel Macron canceled a planned trip to a security conference in Munich in what many commentators described as a “demonstrative” move. As for the issue of completing the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, the compromise reached by France and Germany and approved by the European Parliament, imposed on Berlin “a formula that the German government wanted to avoid.”

Regarding the issue of trade relations with the United States, it wasn’t until mid-April that Brussels collectively managed to prevail over France, which had been blocking the start of pertinent negotiations with Washington.  Any delay may cost the German automakers multi-billion dollar fines from the United States. If the French succeed in delaying the start of negotiations, Germany, which is already experiencing a sharp slowdown in economic growth, may end up the loser again.

France’s sudden move left the German media guessing whether Macron’s actions were dictated by his displeasure about Berlin’s “slow response” to his initiatives, or by Donald Trump’s threat to sanction companies involved in the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, including the French concern Engie. Or maybe Macron had resorted to this “show of force” in a bid to strengthen his hand amid the conflict with the “yellow jackets” and growing tensions with Italy?

Indeed, the statement made in Meseberg and the treaty signed in Aachen could have proved too much of a compromise for Macron, if not a serious blow to his ambitions. According to critics, “the Treaty of Aachen dodges the most sensitive topics characteristic of modern Europe.” Including migration and political unification of Europe – something Macron is so eager to accomplish. The treaty makes no mention of a common EU tax and financial policy, while the issue of creating a single economic space is spelled out declaratively at best. Angela Merkel essentially emasculated virtually all of Macron’s initiatives pertaining to the financial and economic reform of the EU and the Eurozone. Emmanuel Macron has been out to become one of the EU’s leaders, or even its sole leader, ever since he became president in 2017. All the more so following Britain’s exit from the bloc and amid the ebbing political authority and the planned resignation by 2021 of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, once the informal leader of a united Europe.

The current political situation in France is also calling for more decisive actions by President Macron. To ensure at least a relative success in the upcoming European elections, he needs to enlist the support not only of the traditional left-and right-centrists, but possibly of some representatives of the new European right too. Whether or not Angela Merkel stands down in 2021, or after the elections to the European Parliament (as has been rumored since April), Emmanuel Macron essentially remains the only top-level proponent of greater European integration. (Unless Merkel ultimately moves to the head of the European Commission, of course). With Macron eyeing a second presidential term in 2022, the advancement of the modernization model for France depends directly on the success of the European project. And here any significant changes in the European Union “mainly depend on the position of France’s privileged partner – Germany.”

All this means that Macron needs a breakthrough now that Berlin is going through a “complicated power transit” with Merkel having resigned as the head of the CDU and preparing to hand her post as Federal Chancellor over to a successor. Therefore, she is now taking her time and, according to her successor as CDU leader, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, is holding out for a new vector in the development of the European project as “the common denominator of the distribution of political forces after the elections.” Does this mean that Berlin’s is staking on the success of its candidate in the ongoing struggle for the next president of the European Commission? For the first time ever, the CDU and the CSU have managed to nominate a common candidate who has “good chances” of heading the EU’s executive body.

Meanwhile, Berlin is facing an intractable dilemma. Since 1949, “avoiding by all means situations necessitating a hard choice between France and the United States has been a key principle of German foreign policy.” This approach “survived all governments and coalitions, and was maintained after the reunification of Germany.” Under the present circumstances, however, remaining firmly committed to the transatlantic relationship threatens to further destabilize the European integration project, which is now seen as being key to Germany’s future. Simultaneously, a course aimed at minimizing damage from the policy of external powers that threatens the fundamental German interests might necessitate radical and ambitious geopolitical maneuvers that would almost inevitably revive the Europeans’ and Americans’ historical fears of “German instincts.”

US and British analysts already worry that “the

[geopolitical]

shackles that are voluntarily accepted [by Germany] can be thrown off.” They also wonder how long it will take before new generations of Germans want to restore their country’ full state sovereignty.

In Germany itself, promotion of such slogans have already given the Alternative for Germany party (AfD) the third largest fraction in the Bundestag. A major paradox of the current European and German policy is that Berlin’s activity or passivity is equally detrimental to the Pan-European project and could eventually lead to the EU’s fragmentation and even disintegration.

However, the Franco-German “tandem” is already being dogged with contradictions and compromises, which are highly unpopular among many in the German establishment. The cautious response by many EU members to the latest joint geopolitical initiatives of Berlin and Paris, gave Germany more reasons to fear that Macron’s global ambitions could exacerbate the differences that already exist in the EU. Many in Germany have long suspected Macron of wishing to make the EU instrumental in his foreign policy aspirations.

Some experts still believe that at the end of the day the current chill between Germany and France may turn out to be just a sign of the traditional “propensity for taking independent political decisions.” The sides are sizing each other up to see “who will be setting the rules of the roadmap in the future.”  Also, Paris’s tougher stance towards Berlin may be a tactical ploy, a pre-election maneuver to “hijack” part of the agenda from the “national populists” of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe where many people are not happy about the German “diktat.”

Emmanuel Macron has proved once and again his ability to ride the wave of public discontent with certain issues. His Plan for Europe, published in early March, carefully avoids any mention of France’ and Germany’s leading role in advancing EU reforms.

On the other hand, the foreign policy of the leading European powers has a long history, and long-term geopolitical considerations continue to play a significant role. Germany, for one, has traditionally been looking for a counterweight to the Anglo-Saxons, while France – to German dominance in Europe. As a result, the search by Paris and Berlin for common points of political contact is now turning into intense efforts to find the “lowest common denominator.” The overall impression is that we will only be able to see a greater deal of certainty in relations between the two countries after the results of elections to the European Parliament have been summed up.  The distribution of roles both within the “European tandem” and in the EU as a whole depends on which political forces – pro-Macron or pro-Merkel, the Europeans will vote for.

 First published in our partner International Affairs

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