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Indian effort to outsmart China, issues visa to Uyghur nationals

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In a way to showcase its regional super power status as the only economic giant of South Asia against all weak and failing nations around, including its arch nuclear rival Pakistan, India has made an effort to outsmart Asian super power China in a flash fashion by a visa action that would offend Beijing. New Delhi has issued visas to Chinese Uyghur nationals (Muslims) to visit India whom Beijing considers as ‘terrorists’ for seeking freedoms, in protest against China’s defense at UN of Masood Azhar, a supposed terrorist in Indian state list.

In a move that is certain to rile China, India has issued visas to at least four Uyghur nationals—all of them deemed dissidents and at least one ‘a terrorist’ by Beijing—to meet the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala, next week. The Indian move comes against the immediate backdrop of China putting a ‘technical hold’ on India’s efforts to get Pakistan-based Islamist militant leader Maulana Masood Azhar designated a terrorist by the United Nations (UN) last month.

The matter of fact is New Delhi is wary of the all-weather friendship between China and India’s arch rival Pakistan with which it has fought four wars, three of them over the Himalayan region of Kashmir, that both countries claim in full and administer in parts. Beijing is wary of India’s warming relations with the USA by promoting the Asia Pivot agenda of President Obama targeting both China and Russia, and the Washington’s efforts to draw New Delhi into future defense architecture of the Asian Pacific region.

Already, the Indian government is upset about Chinese plans to build a $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor announced last April making India, eager to see a weak and destabilized Pakistan, go nervous as China is making a ‘terrorist Pakistan’ strong. China shares a part of Kashmir that was “gifted” by Pakistan and in turn China assists Islamabad with economic projects. The corridor, a network of roads, railways and pipelines, will start in Kashgar in the troubled Chinese Xinjiang province and run through Pakistan-administered Kashmir before ending in Karachi.

India accuses Pakistan of sheltering ‘Islamist militants’ like Masood Azhar and New Delhi suspects that the ‘technical hold’ or block put on designating Azhar a ‘terrorist’ by the UN was done by China at Pakistan’s behest. Azhar’s Jaish-e-Mohammed militant group is blamed by for the 2 January ‘attack’ on the Pathankot airbase in Punjab, though it appears to be a purely Indian effort to demonize Islamabad and gain surplus help from USA.

India has raised the issues with China, but with seemingly very little effect. The Tibetan spiritual leader is to receive Isa and other Uyghur leaders in Dharamsala, the seat of the Tibetan government in exile in India. As China repeatedly justifies blocking New Delhi’s proposal at the UN to designate Pakistan-based Masood Azhar a terrorist, India has angered Beijing by granting visa to a prominent Chinese dissident leader it accuses of being a ‘terrorist’.

China has been battling Uyghur ‘Islamic extremism’ in the Xinjiang province since the 1990s. On its part, China has long been suspicious of India granting asylum and continuous support to the Dalai Lama, who fled Tibet in 1959 following a failed uprising. The India-China war of 1962 was sparked by Chinese anger towards India following the grant of asylum to the Tibetan spiritual leader. China has protested against the Dalai Lama’s activities in India but New Delhi says that it regards the Tibetan spiritual leader as an honored guest and does not encourage any ‘political activity’ by the Dalai Lama “that could affect relations” between India and China.

Dolkun Isa has been a German citizen since 2006, and has been in the forefront of the movement for democracy, often speaking out against the human rights abuse by Chinese authorities. He is the chairman of the World Uyghur Congress.

The Uyghurs are the largest Turkic ethnic group living in Xinjiang. Isa has denied the Chinese charges that declare him as a terrorist. According to Dolkun Isa, chairman of the executive committee of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) and the one branded as a ‘terrorist’ by China, India has kindly issued a “visa to four of us.” This was separately confirmed by a high official familiar with developments in New Delhi. Dolkun Isa is a Germany-based Uyghur activist. China accuses him of terror activities in the remote Xinjiang region where there is frequent violence between the local Uyghur population and government forces. Isa, who hails from the restive Chinese Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China, added on the phone from Germany that the delegation was travelling to India for a conference which was to be addressed by the Dalai Lama, who is viewed by China as a “violent separatist.”

Isa told the media said he had an electronic visa to come to India next week for a pro-democracy conference to be held in Dharamsala, which the Dalai Lama is also expected to attend. “I haven’t decided yet on whether to come to India.. The Chinese government is not happy, India should guarantee my security and free movement”, he said.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has referred to an Interpol red corner notice against Isa and said: “Bringing him to justice is a due obligation of relevant countries.” Isa said: “China has put me on Interpol list since 1997. Most countries have just ignored it. India is a democracy. I don’t think I’ll be arrested but I don’t want any difficulties either.” Isa was given asylum in Germany in the 1990s.

According to Isa, the conference he and others are to attend will start on 28 April. “But I still have to make up my mind about coming to India,” Isa said, adding this was because of an Interpol Red Corner notice against him. A Red Corner notice means an international alert against a person “to seek the location and arrest…with a view to extradition or similar lawful action”, according to the Interpol website. Isa said his caution stemmed from his detention in Seoul in 2009 at the instance of China due to the Red Corner notice. “I was sent back to Germany after three days,” he said, adding that he became a German citizen in 2006 after fleeing China in 1997, following repeated prison terms for his alleged ‘activism’.

India has been home to the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama, and the capital of the Tibetan government-in-exile. India has upped the ante with China by issuing visas to World Uyghur Congress leader Dolkun Isa and three others, and by allowing them to visit India for a conference in Dharamsala

Though the plan to allow the conference to be held with the Chinese dissidents was taken months before China’s refusal in the UN, this could be PM Narendra Modi’s muscular foreign policy in action. Although much has been made of the new aggressive foreign policy of the NDA government, the Prime Minister’s record in external relations so far has been good. He has shown no aggression, and has carried on the UPA policy, albeit with much more vigor and determination.

Not only RSS-BJP duo but even Congress party also enjoys the emerging duel. They want India to act as a strong power, notwithstanding the fact that New Delhi lacks both China’s economic clout and its defense, diplomatic capabilities. Many hawks in the Indian establishment have welcomed the government’s move. “China has for a long time got away scot-free – whether it is claiming Arunachal as its own, or the Masood Azhar case, where China twice bailed out Pakistan at the UN. If India continues to take all this then it creates the impression that China is strong, while we (India) swallow everything it throws at us,” said Cabinet Secretary Chandra, who was also India’s ambassador in Washington. He thinks that India should not be seen as docile towards China.

Whether Dolkun Isa eventually comes to India for the conference, or if he sends his colleagues instead is not the point. Beijing is angry with India’s move to grant them visas, thereby directly opposing the Chinese views.

In recent days, India has raised the issue of China’s stand on Masood Azhar at the highest levels. Having found no response, foreign minister Sushma Swaraj and defence minister Manohar Parrikar took it up directly with the Chinese leadership this week. “India does not consider Uyghurs terrorists,” said Kanwal Sibal, former foreign secretary, adding that he “would personally applaud the Indian government for its move” to grant visas to the Uyghur delegation. “If China views certain Uyghurs as ‘terrorists’, then that’s between them and China,” he said, pointing out that China had made a similar argument in Masood Azhar’s case. “China is not sensitive to our concerns on terrorism,” he said.

China stresses its right to defend its foreign policy and to work against Indo US pivot in Asia.

India has been successful against Pakistan and Kashmir, but continuously failing against formidable China with veto handle. The brief border war between India and China – when the PLA troops rolled into Arunachal as an ill prepared Indian army beat a hasty retreat, left a psychological blow on India. Suspicion of China is pervasive in the Indian establishment. The good news is that despite the irritants, both countries are pragmatic enough to ensure that the situation does not get out of hand. As officials on both sides keep pointing out that the border between the two countries continues to be peaceful, not a shot has been fired here.

Maybe another cold war is in the making in Asia which may have repercussion in other regions in Asian continent. Meanwhile, President Pranab Mukherjee is slated to visit China at the end of May. Hopefully, by then the two sides will get over this latest blip. The initial euphoria of improved ties between the two Asian giants, following President Xi Jinping’s visit to India and Prime Minister Modi’s subsequent return trip to China, will fade quickly and the relations will continue to be lukewarm at best.

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East Asia

The Demise of a French Sub Deal: Is China a Threat?

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The conflict between emerging and existing powers is almost as old as time.  Labeled the Thucydides Trap, it first recounted the 5th century BC Peloponesian war and its inevitability as Sparta, the dominant power, feared the rise of Athens.  Is something similar about to transpire between the US and China?

The latest war of words is about nuclear submarines.  When armed with ballistic missiles, they become a hidden mortal danger.  So the US also deploys nuclear attack submarines which shadow rival nuclear ballistic submarines … just in case.

Australia was in the process of acquiring 12 French conventional attack submarines (a deal worth $37 billion) when the US and UK stepped in with the AUKUS deal.  Intended to counter China, it offers Australia  advanced nuclear propulsion systems and an opportunity to construct nuclear subs of their own with the technology transfer.  Australia will then become the seventh country in the world to build and operate nuclear submarines.

The fear of the ‘yellow peril’ is ingrained in the Australian consciousness from the days when they were afraid of being swamped by Chinese immigrants.  It led to restrictive immigration policies for non-whites. 

Much of the concern with China is due to the forceful nature of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s policies.  In Xinjiang the Uyghur population is a minority in its home province due to the influx of Han Chinese.  Moreover, Uyghurs feel discriminated against, in jobs and the progress they can make.  Some have rebelled causing many to be put in re-education camps where there are tales of torture although denied by Chinese authorities.  Biden has declared it a genocide and introduced sanctions on leading Chinese officials there. 

China’s proactive foreign policy, renewed interest in Afghanistan, its warships patrolling all the way across the Indian Ocean to Africa are further evidence.

The new Afghan leaders, at least many of them, spent their exile in Pakistan giving the latter influence with the new government.  And Pakistan is effectively a Chinese client state.  The mineral wealth of Afghanistan, if it is to be developed, is thus likely to include Chinese help.

The UN General Assembly holds its first debate of the new session on the third Tuesday of each year; the session then runs through to the September following.  As leaders converge, one of the questions being asked of those involved in AUKUS is how they are going to pacify an angry France.  It has recalled its ambassadors from Australia and the US — in the latter case a move without precedent in almost 250 years of diplomacy.

If the French feel the Australians have been duplicitous, the Australians for their part claim they are obligated to do the best for the people who elected them.  The new deal brings jobs, technology and a greater role for Australia in dealing with an increasingly powerful China

It would be a great shame if the West in trying to shore up its interests in the Indo-Pacific region loses a crucial ally — France — at the very least in wholehearted support.  Is Mr. Xi smiling and quoting some ancient Chinese proverb, perhaps Lao Tzu, to his colleagues?   

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Japanese firms’ slow and steady exit is sounding alarm bells in Beijing

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Last year in March, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had indicated Japan would initiate measures to reduce the country heavily relying on China for factory production. Since July 2020, Japan has rolled out subsidies totaling over 400 billion Yen to move its enterprises out of China to Southeast Asia and beyond. It is yet to be seen if the scale of incentives has actually triggered a major change in where Japanese companies relocate production.  On the other hand, experts in China continue to wonder why would Japanese companies which are on average making 17% profit diversify into the ASEAN nations, where in 2019, their rate of return on direct investment was a mere 5%?

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In less than ten days, Japan is going to have a third prime minister within a short span of twelve months. On September 1 last year, when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe resigned on health grounds, Yoshihide Suga was chosen as Abe’s successor. At the time, China’s leadership did not show any worrying signs as the new Japanese leader was expected to continue with the foreign policy of the previous government. But one year later, Suga’s unexpected departure is leaving Japan’s diplomatic relations with China considerably strained over Taiwan. Yet the leadership in Beijing is not going to lose sleep over the next prime minister’s public stance on the Japan-Taiwan “alliance.” What China will be closely watching is how many more billions of Yen and for how long a new leader in Tokyo will carry on with rolling out subsidies to lure away Japanese businesses out of China?

Interestingly, on assuming office Prime Minister Suga had promised continuity in domestic policies and that he will respect Abe’s foreign policy. However, Suga’s promised commitment to further improve relations with China was viewed differently in the People’s Republic. Writing in an article on the day Yoshihide Suga took office in Tokyo, Zhou Yongsheng, professor of Japanese studies at Beijing’s China Foreign Affairs University, observed: “[Under Suga] Japan will continue to align with the US as far as international relations and security affairs are concerned, and continue to back the US policy of containing China It is under these preconditions that Japan will seek cooperation with China.”

In sharp contrast, reviewing Suga’s foreign policy performance after two months, NIKKEI Asia’s foreign affairs analyst Hiroyuki Akita wrote in November 2020: “Suga has not said much publicly about his views on diplomacy but he has urged his aids to continue Abe’s diplomacy as it is at least for one year.” Akita gave a thumbs up to this approach and recalled a Japanese saying to describe it: “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” However, not everyone agreed with Akita praising Suga’s brief record in diplomacy as flawless. Having spent seven years in the Abe cabinet as Chief Cabinet Secretary, Suga’s image was that of “a fixer, not a leader.” Suga did everything in diplomacy in his early phase as the prime minister what Abe had been espousing for the past seven years.

But as Toshiya Takahashi, professor of IR at Shoin University in Japan had predicted within a few weeks of Suga becoming the top leader, “Abe’s shoes were too big for Suga to fill.” Why so? Mainly because unlike Abe, not only Suga was not ideological, he was also far less diplomacy driven. “Suga is not an ideologically driven revisionist — he is a conservative politician, but his attitude has no relation to ideology. He does not seem to hold any specific cherished foreign policy objectives that he is willing to push with all his political capital in the way that Abe did in 2015 with the passage of the security-related bills,” Takahashi had commented.   

To observers and experts in both Japan and China, Prime Minister Suga’s (he will relinquish office on September 30) non-enthusiastic approach to foreign policy might have much to do with the current state of strained relationship between Japan and China. Asahi Shimbun opinion poll last year claimed foreign policy and national security as among the two most popular elements of Abe’s legacy. No wonder, critics in Japan have been pointing out that Suga’s cabinet did not have the luxury and support Abe enjoyed in foreign affairs of having in the government someone like Shotaro Yachi – the former secretary general of the National Security Secretariat. In China too, reacting to Suga’s first policy speech after taking office, scholars such as Lü  Yaodong, Institute of Japanese Studies, CASS in Beijing had observed, “Suga seems not to be as enthusiastic about China-Japan ties as Abe. Compared with Abe’s administration, Suga may walk back China-Japan ties.” (Emphasis added)

Remember, as already mentioned, the LDP had succeeded in pursuing policy of (economic) cooperation and avoiding confrontationist diplomacy with China under Abe. But Suga government’s failure to effectively fight coronavirus pandemic and its perception that China was increasingly becoming aggressive in SCS, are being cited as reasons why Japan was compelled to take strong steps against China. It is too well-known by now how Tokyo angered Beijing by referring to the importance of Taiwan to regional security in the recently released 2021 Defense White Paper. In fact, a Chinese scholar had warned as early as within a month of Suga taking over as prime minister from Shinzo Abe, saying that “Japan will take a more offensive stance against China over maritime boundary disputes under the incitement of the US” (emphasis added).

Hence, it is of extreme import to mention here China’s top diplomat Wang Yi’s recent trip to four ASEAN nations. Apparently, the second visit by the Chinese foreign minister in quick succession in the neighborhood had aroused the global media attention as it was soon after the recent visit to the region by the US vice president Kamala Harris. However, according to a Chinese commentator, Wang Yi’s recent visit to ASEAN countries must be viewed in the context of the region turning into a “battle ground” for rising economic one-upmanship among big powers. “Just a day after Wang Yi’s departure, Vietnam reached an agreement on defense equipment and technology cooperation with Japan,” the commentary noted.   

Furthermore, whilst under the previous Abe government, Japan consistently increased its investments in the ASEAN nations, except in the year 2016, all through from 2014 until last year, Japan’s investment in the region far exceeded that of China’s. Contrary to his vows, since coming into office in September last year, especially following his meeting with President Biden in the White House in April this year, Prime Minister Suga’s quiet agenda has been to confront China in both political and economic arena. In Japan, the Suga agenda was interpreted by analysts as “rebuilding Japan-US industrial chain, decoupling economic ties with China.”    

A policy report released by Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) in March 2021, revealed three important facts: first, in the year 2019, total Japanese investment in ASEAN nations stood at USD 265.5 billion – 14% of the country’s overall overseas investment, i.e., USD 1,858.3 billion.; second, in 2000, Japanese investments in ASEAN totaled USD 25 billion as against its USD 8.7 billion investment in China – a gap of USD 16.3 billion. Whereas in 2019, Japan invested USD 135.2 billion more in ASEAN as compared with China. As pointed out by one Chinese analyst, this gap is hugely significant, especially as the overall size of the ASEAN economy is a little over one-fifth of China’s GDP; third, followingthegovernment’s new strategy last year to encourage Japanese businesses to move out of China to new locations in ASEAN nations, the new guidelines also entailed reducing investments into China. A large part of the investments was diversified into ASEAN markets.

Finally, what is beginning to worry the Chinese authorities is the trend and direction of slow exodus of Japanese businesses out of China going back to Japan and towards Vietnam and Indonesia on one hand, and widening gap in Japanese investments between ASEAN and the PRC, on the other hand. At the same time, it was beyond anyone’s imagination in China that Japan would be acting foolish and risking “economic security” by diversifying businesses and investments into less profitable “barren” markets. But then who could anticipate what political and economic policy-rejigging coronavirus pandemic would bring about?

Overall, China’s more immediate and bigger concerns are firstly the sudden departure of Prime Minister Suga – in spite of Suga having made it clear he had no will to change or reverse “decoupling” policy he had been pursuing, and secondly, whoever emerges as the new leader of the four contenders by the month-end, analysts in Japan believe Tokyo is unlikely to change its “anti-China” political and economic policies.  

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How China Exacerbates Global Fragility and What Can be Done to Bolster Democratic Resilience to Confront It

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Authors: Caitlin Dearing Scott and Isabella Mekker

From its declared policy of noninterference and personnel contributions to United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Missions to its purported role in mediating conflicts, China has long sought to portray itself as a responsible global leader, pushing narratives about building a “community of common destiny” and promoting its model of governance and economic and political development as a path to stability. This narrative belies the reality. Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-style “stability,” whether to protect Belt and Road Investments (BRI) or regimes with favorable policies towards China, in practice facilitates authoritarianism and human rights violations, contributes to environmental degradation and corruption, and undermines democratic governance, all of which can fuel instability, intentionally or otherwise.

In pursuit of its true goal – “a world safe for the party” – China has leveraged its diplomatic and economic power to weaken  the international human rights system, bolstering support for illiberal regimes, contributing to democratic decline and exacerbating global fragility in the process. Nowhere is this more apparent than in conflict-affected contexts.

Conflict Resolution, CCP Style

Although China brands itself as a ‘promoter of stability, peace, and unity’, its very definition of stability is built on its authoritarian model of governance. This, plus its concerns about non-interference in its own domestic issues, informs its conflict resolution approach, which emphasizes host state consent and political settlement, two-ideas that can be laudable in theory, depending on the context. In practice, however, China’s conflict mediation efforts in some instances have provided support to incumbent regimes who are perpetuating violence and conflict, promoting a  ‘stability’ that disregards the voices of vulnerable populations and the need for inclusive governance. In the case of the Syrian civil war, China’s “political solution” meant maintaining China-friendly Bashar al-Assad’s grip on power, while blocking resolutions condemning the regime’s brutality against its citizens. 

“Stability” promoted by China can also come at the expense of human rights. China (and Russia) have previously pushed for cuts to human rights positions within peacekeeping missions, endangering the capacity of these missions to protect civilians in conflict.  In Myanmar, where the military is committing unprecedented human rights violations against its own citizens, China initially blocked a UN Security Council statement condemning the military coup and other international efforts to restore stability at a time when a strong international response was much needed. This was in line with China’s previous engagement in the country, working closely with the military regime to “mediate” conflict near the Chinese border in a way that preserved China’s interests and influence, but did little to actually address conflict. After a growing humanitarian crisis began to threaten its investments on the Myanmar side of the border, however, China changed rhetorical course, showing where human rights violations stand in its hierarchy of stability.

Advancing China’s Interests, Undermining Governance

China’s policies in fragile states mirror its unstated preference for expanding its economic and political interests, even if securing them sidelines the stated imperative of addressing fragility. In some instances, China has lobbied for UN policies in conflict-affected contexts that appear to support its own agenda rather than – or sometimes at the expense of – peace. According to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2020 report to Congress, “China has shown an apparent willingness to leverage its influence in the UN peacekeeping operations system to advance its economic interests in African countries, raising the possibility that Beijing is subverting UN norms and procedures in the process.” Per the report, the most notable example of this was in 2014 when China lobbied to expand the UN Mission in South Sudan to protect oil installations of which the China National Petroleum Corporation held a 40 percent stake.

Moreover, China’s pursuit of its interests sets up countries on unstable trajectories. China’s economic investment policies and initiatives exacerbates governance deficits and increases fragility by encouraging corruption, facilitating authoritarianism and human rights violations, and contributing to environmental degradation, all key drivers of conflict. Two cases from Nigeria and Pakistan highlight the point.

In Nigeria, China’s investment projects have exacerbated corruption and fueled distrust in local government – key drivers of conflict and intercommunal violence in the country. China has exploited poor regulatory environments and worked within illegal and corrupt frameworks, often tied to armed groups and criminal networks. In one illustrative example, China state-owned timber trading companies  offered bribes to local officials to illegally harvest endangered rosewood. Members of local communities have cited feelings of exploitation by officials accepting bribes from Chinese businessmen, further stressing fragile ties between local government and citizens. Such business practices also demonstrate a blatant disregard for the environmental consequences of illegally harvesting endangered flora and fauna. Moreover, the inherently opaque nature of these projects that are tied to CCP interests makes it difficult to demand accountability.

Similarly in Pakistan, a 62-billion-dollar project known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) aimed at linking Xinjiang to the Arabian sea, has exacerbated tension in conflict-affected provinces. The project plans to build infrastructure and extract resources from several less developed regions, while overwhelmingly benefitting industrial and political hubs such as Punjab. Many provinces, including Balochistan and Sindh, have accused political elites of altering the route of the corridor in their own interests, thus further marginalizing their communities. Separatist groups have launched several attacks throughout the country, not only fueling conflict between Pakistani ethnic groups but also leading to attacks against Chinese expatriates. Recently, prominent voices from within China have called for a military intervention in Pakistan. CPEC has increased military presence throughout small villages, sparked an uptick in violent conflict along the route, and further eroded trust in local government institutions.

These cases may of course signal more opportunism and indifference by China to the impact of its engagement on stability in any given country, as opposed to an explicit attempt to undermine democratic governance (as it has done elsewhere in support of pro-China interests). Regardless of the intent, however, the impact is the same. China’s focus on political leverage and profits first and foremost undermines stability – and China likewise can benefit from instability in states with corrupt politicians interested in trading local resources for short-term political gains.

What Can be Done: Bolstering Democratic Resilience to Address Fragility and Foreign Influence

Foreign authoritarian influence has a compounding impact in conflict-affected contexts, further undermining governance structures, institutions, and processes that can mitigate or exacerbate fragility.  Good governance, on the contrary, can not only help countries prevent and manage conflict, but can also help countries address the myriad challenges associated with foreign authoritarian influence. Strong democratic institutions help societies respond positively and productively to threats both domestic and foreign.

Targeted investment in democracy in conflict-affected contexts vulnerable to foreign authoritarian influence offers an important opportunity for utilizing the Global Fragility Strategy in support of US foreign policy initiatives and advancing the Biden Administration’s policy priorities to tackle climate change, prevent authoritarian resurgence, confront corruption, and prevail in strategic competition with China.  An investment in support of democracy and good governance to address any one of these issues will reap dividends across each of these issues – engaging in conflict prevention and stabilization programming will both advance global democracy and advance US goals vis-à-vis China and other authoritarian rivals. Such investments, which must be long-term to account for the compounding impact of foreign authoritarian influence in already fragile environments, should include:

  • Supporting governments, civil society, and citizens to better understand, expose and counter foreign authoritarian influence, particularly in conflict-affected contexts where data and research efforts can be challenging. An understanding of China’s playbook is critical to countering CCP influence operations;
  • Helping independent media to investigate and expose foreign authoritarian influence and how it fuels conflict, whether through training, financial support, or other protections of the civic and information space, to raise public awareness of the impact of such engagement on conflict dynamics and promote transparency and accountability in dealings with foreign actors;  
  • Developing evidenced-based tools to prevent and mitigate foreign authoritarian influence in fragile contexts;
  • Strengthening electoral institutions, political parties, legislative bodies, and judiciaries to uproot elite capture and mitigate malign influence;
  • Leveraging diplomacy to build political will and incentives for government officials to resist foreign malign influences. Such diplomatic efforts can include increased outreach and contact with countries previously neglected by the US – but prioritized by China – and public diplomacy to both expose the CCP’s misleading narrative and advance narratives about what democracy can deliver;  and
  • Coordinating with similarly-minded donors such as the European Union, Japan, and Australia, to implement a unified approach to match the scale of Chinese investment and maximize the impact of any intervention.

Only democracy can help countries navigate the nexus of domestic and foreign threats to their stability. In the era of COVID-19, authoritarian resurgence, and climate crisis, supporting countries to develop these “resilience” fundamentals is a sound – and necessary – investment.

*Isabella Mekker is a Program Associate with IRI’s Center for Global Impact, working on countering foreign authoritarian influence and conflict prevention and stabilization programming.

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