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Legislative elections in South Korea

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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In the elections held on April 13, 2016 all the 300 seats of the Seoul National Assembly were renewed. 253 members of Parliament were elected with the typical British first-past-the-post system, the traditional mechanism by which the candidate winning 50% of votes + 1 or, alternatively, the candidate obtaining the majority of votes in a particular constituency, regardless of the percentage of his/her valid votes, is elected.

47 representatives were elected from proportional party lists, in accordance with Constitutional provisions. Against all odds, the elections were clearly won by the Minjoo Party of Korea.

The Minjoo Party, formally the New Politics Alliance for Democracy, is a political grouping of liberal-democratic culture, at least according to Western political science criteria.

It was created on March 26, 2014, as a merger of the Democratic Party with the preparatory committee of the New Political Vision Party. In fact, the old Democratic Party was fully absorbed in the New Politics Alliance for Democracy, while the preparatory committee was dissolved and has no relevant members in the new grouping.

The losing party is the liberal-conservative Saenuri Party, defeated by one single seat in the Assembly and in votes for party lists, while the Minjoo Party came third, in terms of total votes, behind the Saenuri Party in first place and the new centrist People’s Party in second.

The Saenuri Party, also known as the New Frontier Party, has a center-right political tradition and, until February 2012, it was known as the Grand National Party.

It was created in 2012 as a merger of the United Democratic Party and the New Korea Party. In fact, its earliest ancestor was the Democratic Republican Party under the authoritarian-Gaullist rule of Park Chung-Hee. In 1980, upon Park’s death, it was renamed Democratic Justice Party, under the rule of an equally authoritative leader, Chun Doo-Hwan. In 1993 it was officially called Democratic Liberal Party.

In 2002, this political group was reconstituted again and the already-created Saenur Party merged with the Advancement Unification Party.

Hence these elections mark a radical change of the South Korean institutional scene, with a hung Parliament which is no longer able to provide sound majorities, but is open to government bargaining.

A dangerous practice which comes after the South Korean Constitutional Court authoritatively dissolving the Progressive Party, a leftist grouping largely characterized by a Marxist-Leninist culture.

In 2012 the Saenur Party had won 152 seats out of the 300 available.

Nevertheless the candidate of this group, Ms. Park Geun-Hye, had won the presidential election despite the Saenur Party had recorded a decrease of its seats to 146 out of 292, exactly 50% of the Assembly votes.

Undoubtedly those elections had been affected by the decision of the Constitutional Court which, while noting that the electoral districts had led to an asymmetry of representation, reduced the size of most constituencies.

After 2013, when the Progressive Party was dissolved by decree, due to its alleged ties with North Korea, the decision of the Supreme Court led the Justice Party to be the only leftist organization on the South Korean political scene.

The Justice Party was later supported officially by the powerful union of trade unions, but its members were close to the left wing of the Minjoo Party in terms of programs and policies, while one of its leaders, Ahn Cheol Soo, walked out of the party and founded the new People’s Party in early 2016.

By constitutional law, the next presidential elections scheduled for 2017 are off limits for the current President Park Geun-Hye.

Let us see the possible candidates.

Firstly, there is Moon Jae-In, who had been defeated by the current President, who in mid-February was elected as leader of the main old opposition party, the aforementioned New Politics Alliance for Democracy.

His allies include the mayor of Seoul, Park Won-soon, who, at least according to the polls, is currently the most popular presidential candidate.

Moon can rely on the Left votes of the South-Western province of Jeolla but, however, he is also capable of winning over the conservative votes in the city of Busan, currently ruled by the Saenur Party.

Also the leader of the Saenur Party, Kim Moo-Sung, comes from Busan. He is an old acquaintance of the National Assembly since he was elected five times.

However, which are the real themes of the South Korean electoral campaign and policy?

First and foremost, there is the maintenance and transformation of the Welfare State.

The old government has always supported the line of “maintaining and expanding welfare without raising taxes”, especially corporate income ones.

However, specific taxes on tobacco and cars were introduced last September, with a further restructuring of the income tax which, in effect, increases the tax revenue.

Therefore the idea that South Korean voters had of the government is that it raised taxes for the middle class and workers without expanding the Welfare State, which is currently weak.

Conversely Moon wants to raise corporate income taxes, especially on the chaebol, the business conglomerates which have always characterized the South Korean production system.

In fact the New Politics Alliance for Democracy focuses on the “Welfare State”, with Moon who wants free meals for all South Korean pupils and argues with the South Korean chaebol which, in his opinion, now epitomize a backward development model.

The Saenur Party has no clear position on these issues.

But the Party knows all too well that currently, in South Korea, the welfare cannot be expanded without raising taxes and, above all, without forcing the chaebol (such as Samsung) to pay higher taxes.

This could lead many businessmen to leave the country and set up factories in Vietnam or, even, in the North Korean Free Economic Zones, which have never taken off.

The latest polls show that South Koreans do not want a bigger Welfare State, but 52.8% of them want to directly increase the corporate tax, regardless of this new tax revenue being used for welfare purposes.

The problem lies in the fact that currently the South Korean economy and incomes are very polarized between the haves and the haves not, while the network of small and medium sized enterprises has not yet become the key to the new national economy.

In foreign policy, the Saenur Party is clearly conservative and has no intention of adhering to new negotiations, or even softening its position vis-à-vis North Korea’s actions.

On the contrary, President Park wanted a Summit with North Korea without preconditions, i.e. without Kim Jong Il giving up his “new militarist” line.

Paradoxically, but not too much, the South Korean conservatives have always been those having a more open-minded attitude towards their North Korean “brothers”, while the South Korean center-right leadership has always aimed at having a preferential relationship with China at economic, political and cultural levels.

Moon, however, is heir to the legacy of former President Roh Moo-Hyun, who has always advocated a compromise with the North Korean “brothers” at all costs.

China, however, does not like the correlation of forces between South Korea and the United States.

Hence we are witnessing a radical transformation of the South Korean political scene: for the first time in 16 years, the President’s party has lost the elections.

As we have already partially noted, this is due to the “hard line” against North Korea and the neo-liberal and free trade economic policy which for the Western political parties and alike is a one-way ticket in elections.

The Saenur Party won 122 seats out of 300 and, inter alia, many candidates have abandoned it during the campaign because they did not feel protected and safeguarded at organizational and electoral level.

As we have already seen, the Minjoo Party won 123 seats and, according to its leaders, the success of the opposition party results from South Korean slow growth.

Last year the GDP growth rate was a meager 2.6%, with youth unemployment which, last February, reached the “European” level of 12.5%.

The People’s Party won 36 seats, probably thanks to the positive effects of the mass demonstrations against the new particularly pro-business labour legislation which had been supported by President Park.

The Minjoo Party wants above all to create more jobs; it plans to increase the minimum wages and pensions and build affordable housing for young people.

As we have already noted, it is very likely for the issue of North Korea and its relations with South Korea to be the priority.

In terms of national security, the vast majority of South Koreans support President Park’s line, much in line with the US one, which would impose the immediate end of North Korea’s nuclear program and the end of its missile launches.

Nevertheless, all the opposition parties, including the center-right ones, emphasize the gap existing between President Park’s pro-American line and the pursuit of South Korean national interest, which coincides with an easing of tensions with North Korea.

However, while China does not want to undermine its relations with South Korea, certainly it cannot sever all its ties with North Korea, although it should be noted that the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, has not yet found the time to visit the North Korean “comrades”.

This adds to the internal situation prevailing in South Korea: first and foremost, the division and the infra-electoral controversy between the two democratic progressive parties, which has favored the conservative-liberal party, although not to the extent it was assumed.

Secondly there is an explosive youth issue, that a South Korean sociologist summed up with the “three no” slogan: no work, no house and no marriage.

During the 2008 crisis, which severely hit also the fourth Asian economy, the old parties’ choice was to maintain and protect the traditional system of chaebol, the Korean version of the Soviet kombinat, without preparing the structural reforms which were immediately needed.

As we have already noted, 12.5% of young people are unemployed, but the South Korean average unemployment rate is 4.9%.

Young voters blame the Saenur Party: only 17% of young people under 30 show a preference for this party.

Hence the “Korean dream” has been shuttered, namely the 1960s idea that, by working hard, everybody would anyway have a good job and a good income.

Obviously, today this is no longer the case in South Korea. And politics reflects this with its main feature in these cases, namely uncertainty.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

East Asia

BRI: Shared Future for Humanity

Sabah Aslam

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The terrestrial and maritime connectivity proposed by the Chinese government back in 2013 with six connectivity corridors reflects the vision of shared future for humanity. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an omen of modern transformation of the globe. The journey of transition from geo-politics to geo-economics is itself a huge achievement. As geo-economics brought in the partnership and collaboration for mutual gains whereas geo-politics reflects competition, for instance, arm race.

BRI a network of terrestrial and maritime passages encompassing (1) the New Eurasian Land Bridge connects Western China to Western Russia; (2) the China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor, from Northern China to Eastern Russia; (3)the China-Central Asia-Western Asia Corridor, links China to Turkey; (4) the Corridor from Southern China to the Indochinese peninsula up to Singapore; (5) the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; and (6) the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor. In other words BRI is one of the longest connectivity route from the Chinese coast to Singapore to Gwadar up to the Mediterranean. Among all the above mentioned projects, CPEC is a model project with so much in its credit.

CPEC is the flagship project of the Belt & Road Initiative. CPEC is a mutually agreed initiative including 4 key areas of cooperation i.e. energy projects, infrastructure development, Gwadar Port, and industrial cooperation. This cooperation has further strengthened the time tested friendship. China – Pakistan strategic cooperation is an essential ingredient for the South Asian peace recipe. CPEC, not merely focus on commerce and trade but also include social development projects as well. Pak-China Friendship Hospital, Pak-China School, Gwadar Airport, and many more are prominent examples of this initiative. The first phase of CPEC is almost complete and is all ready to enter into the second phase. The first phase was comprised of energy and road projects whereas the second phase might also entails agriculture, education, health, water and much more. Here in our case, when there is an atmosphere of non-kinetic threats, development is the only option. Internal harmony and peace can only be achieved when there is no sense of deprivation. In addition, inclusion of third party in CPEC project, and also connecting it with the Central Asian Republics and Russia is also a progressive move. Opening it for the private business sector and creating 80,000 jobs, all are signs of social uplifting and gradual development. CPEC is an inclusive project for Pakistan and for the region.

China is focusing on and playing a key role in connecting the continents. Being an emerging power, China, considers the role of regional connections vital for the global peace and prosperity. Hence, BRI is a positive-sum cooperation. It’s a platform for dialogue, and developing new paths of cooperation encompassing government to government, people to people, business to business and media to media relations. BRI is the, opening up and connectivity, with an aim on promoting global peace and cooperation, and building a global community with a bright future for mankind. Moreover, it promotes connectivity through passages of commerce and trade. There is also a shift in the international balance, leaning towards east from west, considering it a breath of fresh air. Belt and Road Initiative is turning the myth “21st Century is the Asian Century” into reality.

BRI is a network of exchange, exchange of happiness and prosperity, exchange of knowledge and technology, exchange of expertise to perform well for mutual interests. It is the beginning of the inclusive global future. Hence, it is the time for profound change and reforms. For growth, for being dynamic, change is normal. So, reforms, propel states to accomplish goals not only at national level but international level too. The way BRI brought countries and regions together, enhancing trade, developing state of the art infrastructure, boosting investment, strengthening cultural ties, and people to people exchanges, all making BRI, the Central Nervous System of the world.

The true essence of BRI is regional integration, a horizontal, non-vertical integration with no hegemonic designs with an aim to limit the world recession damage. Furthermore, as the second BRI forum is scheduled in late April this year, there is much more to come. As mentioned, BRI is a pie, having share for all; it’s not a debt trap. In order to win the confidence of all the partnering states, and to lessen the suspicion, China is trying to avoid the ‘debt traps’. Though, there is no such state in unsustainable Chinese government debt pressure. It basically provides equality based cooperation, and a green & sustainable development. Second BRI forum is the right time to kickstart the “Second Phase” of Belt & Road. Many foreign heads of state and government, and thousands of delegates will be attending the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, or BRF.  As mentioned by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, “it will include a series of events, such as leaders’ round table, high-level meeting, and thematic forum, CEO conference, under the theme of Belt and Road cooperation shaping a brighter shared future. There will also be more side events, including 12 thematic forums focusing on practical cooperation, and for the first time a conference organized specifically for the business community”.

The globe has already been struck by two major economic depressions. Asian continent also faced one in 1997 when East and Southeast Asia was crippled economically. The world direly needs a remedy in order to sustain the global economy which can only be done through economic and cultural interconnectivity.BRI aims to be a torch bearer in order to bring the financial benefits to the globe. The global prosperity is need of an hour in modern world order but this can be achieved through collective efforts.

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East Asia

China: Via Portugal into Africa and Latin America

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Portugal is a major geographical link in the European leg of China’s New Silk Road project (NSR). A visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Lisbon on December 4-5, 2018 produced seventeen cooperation agreements thereby reaffirming the two parties’ readiness to expand economic partnership.

China is Portugal’s top trading partner in Asia, with bilateral trade steadily on the rise amounting to $5.6 billion in 2017. The volume of Chinese investment in the Portuguese economy has reached $ 10.2 billion. Simultaneously, the influx of tourists from China to Portugal has gone up by 40% and from Portugal to China by 16%. The Chinese Embassy in Lisbon has described the current state of Sino-Portuguese relations as the best since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979.

The livening up of Sino-Portuguese relations is key to Beijing’s comprehensive strategy of boosting cooperation with Portuguese-speaking countries. Adopted fifteen years ago, this strategy has brought about an increase in the volume of trade between the PRC and the Portuguese-speaking nations by more than 19 times – from $ 6 billion in 2002 to $ 117.6 billion in 2017.

In this context, an economic union with Lisbon is designed to geographically complete the European sector of the New Silk Road project (NSR) given the location of Portugal as the western tip of the European continent. Also, such an alliance is set to project Chinese economic influence through Portugal to countries of Africa and Latin America.

China is number one trading partner of three Portuguese-speaking countries: Brazil (trade turnover in 2018 at $ 29.5 billion), Angola ($ 26 billion) and Mozambique ($ 168 million).

The port of Sines – Portugal’s sea gate to the Atlantic and Africa – carries a particular importance with its well-developed infrastructure and all the facilities to be used as a transit point for Chinese products bound for America and Africa. Another important point is the Azores, a part of Portuguese territory stretching deep into the Atlantic. Lisbon has consented to Beijing’s participation in the construction of scientific and logistics infrastructure in the archipelago, which is tantamount to a stronger Chinese economic presence in the region.

Lisbon favors joint participation with Beijing in investment projects in Portuguese-speaking Africa. African countries have expressed a similar intention. In January 2019, the Angolan Parliament ruled to abolish double taxation with Portugal, China and the United Arab Emirates.

Lisbon-mediated cooperation with Portuguese-speaking countries will enable Beijing to guarantee food security. According to UN reports, Angola is among the top five countries with the greatest agricultural potential (58 million hectares of arable land), Mozambique has 36 million hectares, of which less than six are cultivated, while Brazil is the main supplier of soybean, a popular food product for China (14 million tons in 2018).

In relation to China and within the NSR project, Portugal plays the role of an infrastructure and logistics counterweight to France, which is trying to shift the focus of French-Chinese cooperation in the direction of the Mediterranean and North Africa – to fight against terrorism in the Sahel region and provide investment support of the French-speaking Sahel “Five” (Chad, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali).

Beijing is interested in moving via the Atlantic westward. From the geographical point of view, Portugal is a good partner here – cooperation with it takes China beyond the Mediterranean. According to the Chinese leader, for Beijing, Lisbon is a point of linking the land and sea segments of the NSR and a promising partner in the development of the “sea wave economy”.

The position of Paris regarding the NSR project is characterized as cautiously positive, envisaged by the Franco-German Aachen agreement of January 22, 2019 and affected by competition with Italy (Italian Trieste and French Marseille compete for the main port of the NSR in the Mediterranean).

The Aachen agreement diplomatically outlines the geopolitical axis Paris-Berlin, endowing the French-German relations with a special status. Against export-oriented German economy (in 2018, exports went up 3% against 2017, reaching $ 1.318 billion), Beijing’s economic activity in Europe is seen as a challenge.

Negotiations between French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and European Commission Chairman Jean-Claude Juncker and China’s Xi Jinping on March 25-26 demonstrated the EU’s consolidated position and marked a successful attempt to secure common gains from building up cooperation between the EU (without Italy) and the PRC.

While France readily signed multibillion-dollar contracts with China and agreed to the opening of the Chinese market for French goods, it refrained from actively assisting the Chinese in pursuing transcontinental infrastructure projects as unwelcome for the economic health of the Franco-German duumvirate.

 First published in our partner International Affairs

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East Asia

North Korea’s future international relations

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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Rumors are rife in world diplomacy circles that the United States wanted to force the hand in the recent talks with North Korea held in Hanoi last March.

 The US side, in particular, tried to achieve a broader definition of “denuclearization”, a criterion capable of simultaneously eliminating the missile network, precisely the nuclear one, as well as the North Korean facilities for chemical warfare.

 At the end of March, a report informed that the United States had asked North Korea to remove the whole stock of fissile material and relinquish all bacteriological warfare programmes.

 All this only in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. Too much, considering the level reached by the previous negotiations.

 Obviously, the North Korean delegation was certainly not very close to US requests, while North Korea’s deputy-Foreign Minister, Choe Son Hui, argued with Mike Pompeo and John Bolton because they created a strong “obstacle” to negotiations.

 North Korea’s representatives in the Hanoi negotiations, however, stopped the talks because they had not the qualifications nor the political mandate to treat the issue of denuclearization with the United States in this “global” way.

 Nevertheless, John Bolton, who is certainly not a great supporter of dialogue between the United States and North Korea, seized the opportunity of the block of negotiations. In the lack of a precise North Korean policy line, he asked for an overall, quick and absolute denuclearization, being well aware that this request could not be accepted by the North Korean delegation.

 Again following Bolton’s policy line, the United States  added to this request- which was hardly likely to be accepted – the total destruction of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

 It is strange that,in Hanoi, experienced and skillful mediators conducted so tough negotiations, even naïve in their harshness.

 Furthermore, the United States asked North Korea for news about a “secret base for uranium enrichment” near the Yongbyon facilities.

 Finally, the United States also asked for a “statement of all nuclear activities” in North Korea, as well as a clear roadmap for denuclearization.

 As if the matter were only in North Korean hands.

 A management of negotiations that may probably be fine for US internal political purposes, but certainly does not favour any positive evolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.

  In his last meeting with President Trump, however, Kim Jong-Un brought to Hanoi the sole promise of fully scrapping, in a short period of time, the Yongbyon nuclear research centre.

  The United States, however, did not well understand  whether the Yongbyon facilities to be closed regarded only the reactor that has been producing plutonium since 1980 or whether the closure offered by Kim Jong-Un regarded the whole plant, with its many centrifuges for uranium and reactors.

 Some US analysts think that the Yongbyon facilities are  still at the core of the whole North Korean nuclear system, while  other experts believe they are “obsolete” and, hence, Kim’s offer is not particularly interesting.

 Nevertheless, if there is nothing else besides the “obsolete” facilities, Kim Jong Un’s offer is meaningful and rational.

At the beginning of Hanoi talks, North Korea hoped that economic sanctions would soon be partly lifted, considering that all the UN Security Council Resolutions on the North Korean issue stated that it would be possible to re-examine the sanctions in exchange for clear progress on the nuclear issue.

 North Korea, however, has already imposed a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests. It has also closed its nuclear test sites and has even started to destroy its missile test sites.

 North Korea has even accepted a slow and progressive lifting of sanctions, in exchange for a step-by-step check of nuclear compliance.

 From this viewpoint, the United States thought that sanctions really benefited it and hence they did not try to reduce them. Quite the reverse.

 The United States must have thought that the more sanctions remain, the more North Korea is forced to negotiate.

 Moreover, the Russian and Chinese proposals on the subject, developed within the UN Security Council, have always been blocked by the US contrary vote.

 John Bolton’s and Mike Pompeo’s hard stance, however, was not matched by any immediate negative reactions from the North Korean side, as is customary in North Korea’s diplomacy. Nevertheless, three weeks after the crisis of Hanoi’s talks, the North Korean deputy-Foreign Minister, Choe Son-Hui, who enjoys Kim’s full confidence, said that his country “is not particularly interested in the current negotiations with the United States for denuclearization”.

 Later, after the unexpected end of talks in Hanoi, the United States launched a defamation campaign against North Korea claiming, for example, that North Korea was secretly continuing its missile tests and that this new fact had stopped the US efforts at the negotiating table.

 It is hard to understand how nuclear tests can be stopped “secretly”.

 North Korea, however, has never promised to stop anything else but missile tests alone.

 Hence, neither the uranium enrichment program nor the other biological and chemical activities have rightly ceased.

 Currently, however, the door of negotiations still remains half-open.

  Again in March, the pictures of the Sohae site, which is used for launching satellites, showed a significant pace of facilities’ reconstruction.

 In all likelihood, despite Kim Jong Un’s promise to dismantle the site soon, North Korea still plans to keep and develop it, with a view to maintaining also some diplomatic pressure on the United States, but above all to organizing a new round of talks in the future.

 The next important events will be the meeting between Donald J. Trump and the South Korean leader – already scheduled for April 11 – designed to break the ice between North and South Korea on the denuclearization issue and, on April 15, the North Korea’s great celebrations for the 107thbirth anniversary of Kim Il Sung, namely the “Day of the Sun”.

 As some US analysts claim, should we go back to the strict and effective style of the old Six Party Talks?

 Instead of a team that – at least in the US case – knows the complex issue of relations between the United States and North Korea only superficially, a new negotiation would be useful, with a traditional preliminary document and clear purposes.

  A new negotiation that – as was the case with the Six Party Talks – makes the North Korean deputy-Foreign Minister and the deputy-Secretary of State, as well as many US experts of the academic and intelligence worlds sit around the negotiating table.

Certainly, we need to imagine that the negotiation is and will be long and complex.

 Simple negotiations are those that do not succeed in reaching the goal.

 Hence it will be useful to imagine multiple and different trade-off and mutual satisfaction factors, compared to a harsh and brutal negotiation on nuclear potential alone.

 Kim Jong-Un knows all too well that what is at stake here is the future of his country, not only nuclear and bacteriological-chemical disarmament.

 His nuclear and bacteriological-chemical network has led North Korea to be a member of the world decision-making system.

 If this happens even in a shift from the nuclear threat to a major economic role, Kim Jong-Un will have won his bet.

 If this does not happen, the United States shall not believe that North Korea will consume itself on its own. Quite the reverse.

 In any case, it will be necessary to clarify that, as usual, the North Korean issue cannot be resolved with a mere bilateral negotiation mechanism.

 The North Korean strategic role is a vital problem for Japan, for South Korea, but also for China and the Russian Federation.

 Without a project that is good for all these actors, and not only for the United States, no peace nor disarmament will be possible. Not even for the United States alone.

 China does not certainly want a nuclear, bacteriological and chemical system on its border that is, however, completely out of its control.

 This is the real reason for the initial tensions between Kim Jong-Un and Xi Jinping.

 Any increase in military tension in North Korea also spreads suspicions in China.

  Nevertheless, it is a factor that the United States – in agreement with China – could use to reach North Korea’s denuclearization.

 In particular, however, China wants neither a new war on the Korean peninsula – an interest obviously shared with South Korea – nor the US Armed Forces on its border, if North Korea’s complete nuclear demilitarization is achieved.

 And if the United States and South Korea are still able to quickly reach the nuclear threshold in an initially conventional conflict with North Korea.

 Hence, for China, high conventional and credible militarization for North Korea, but also with a non-negligible anti-US nuclear deterrent, albeit certainly not capable of setting fire to the whole Southeast Asia.

  The same strategic paradigm largely applies to the Russian Federation.

 It is not in favour of a demilitarized North Korea, which would be easy prey to the US-South Korea axis, and would not serve as a military buffer for Russia. However, it is even against a North Korea capable of threatening South Korea, and hence even the countries on its Northern border.

 Therefore, considering the scenario of the negotiations between North Korea and the United States, the current stalemate will serve – after the Hanoi talks – to select the rational requests of the two actors and to shape the possible responses.

 For example, the spreading of nuclear technology from North Korea to other States is a new topic to be included in the negotiation agenda.

As well as the decrease in conventional North Korean forces, to be linked to a rational decrease in the US and South Korean Armed Forces.

 The five sanctions that North Korea wants to be lifted concern only the civilian economy and the well-being of the North Korean people, while we need to note that also Kim Jong-Un is put under pressure by the North Korean people and, even more,  by his ruling class.

 The North Korean Foreign Minister, Ri Yong Ho, said so explicitly: in fact, he has clarified that the North Korean power is aimed – in a rational negotiation – “at the complete  dismantling of the Yongbyon site”.

 Ri Yong Ho also added that the dismantling of Yongbyon facilities would take place “with the presence of US experts”.

 Clearly Kim Jong Un has now China’s full protection.

 Certainly China does not want to have the huge mass of migrants from North Korea within its borders and, above all, is not interested in a “sister” country which, besides threatening the United States and South Korea, forces even the great China to follow its policy.

 This could lead the North Korean leadership to seek economic compensation at any time of the denuclearization talks.

 Hence will the US leadership be able to finalise negotiations with North Korea without too many mistakes and wrong moves?

 Will the US leadership be capable of actively involving China, Japan, Russia and South Korea in a radical dismantling of the North Korean nuclear capacity?

 We do not know it yet.

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