The main pressures of the various jihadist groups in Syria are now targeted to the North of the Aleppo province. If Aleppo collapses, also the non-jihadist Syria will collapse. Conversely, if the Salafists hold the city under control, no credible reconquest of Syria will be possible.
On April 13, 2016, negotiations No. 3 for “peace” in Syria have resumed in Geneva but, as Machiavelli used to say, “love peace and know how to wage war” is the first rule for the good Prince.
The goal of the US forces and, only partially, of the Turkish forces, as well as of the Coalition, is still to disrupt the Caliphate’s lines of communication between Ar-Raqqa and the Turkish-Syrian border.
Obviously, for Turkey, the aim of the war is to counter the successes of the YPG Kurds, while the United States support the People’s Protection Units (YPG) against Al Baghdadi.
Currently, however, the Kurds are also approaching and coming closer to Russia, and the YPG loyalty to the line of the Coalition, made up of 59 countries, is being called into question.
Hence it is likely that only Russia will be in a position to successfully ask President Assad for the Kurdish autonomy.
President Assad’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA) now operates from the Kuweires air base to penetrate the Caliphate’s area of the Aleppo Province, where also the Jabhat Al Nusra Front is gathering for its ultimate defence.
At strategic level, the many jihadist groups (the major ones are over 25) operating in Syria have these aims in mind: a) to make Assad’s SAA and Russian attacks diverge and make them useless; b) to act as a shield for Isis, the major group; c) to finally lay the conditions for a “Vietnamization” of the Syrian war and, hence, of the long defeat of the Russian and Iranian “invaders” and of the Western “infidel”.
Furthermore, the various jihadists directly serve the interest of their sponsors on a zone-by zone basis: Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
This is a function of the Syrian oil communication lines and of resources, the mining ones in particular, as we will see later on.
Moreover, the jihadist war fought by the various gangs is meant to delay as much as possible the reunification of the territory under the Syrian Ba’athist regime, thus forcing it in the future to a “cantonization” making it irrelevant to its Russian, Iranian and Chinese allies.
Hence Syria could become pervious to Saudi Arabia’s oil and political actions, in contrast with the Iranian and Russian designs on Assad’ Syria.
The Free Syrian Army (FSA), founded in August 2011 by a group of defected Syrian Armed forces officers hosted in Turkey, has about five open fronts: in the North (Aleppo and Idlib), in the East (Raqqa, Deir al Zour and Hassaka), in the Centre (Homs and Rastan) and finally in the South (Damascus, Deraa and Suwaida).
Supported by the now famous and invisible 59 countries of the anti-Isis Coalition, the FSA cooperates, in various areas, with the jihadists and with several subgroups, such as the Northern Storm Brigade, the Ahrar Souria Brigade, the Martyrs of Syria Brigade and Ahrar al-Sham.
All current FSA positions, however, are at the edges of the areas dominated by Assad’s SAA.
A situation of OPFOR, Opposing FORce.
The two opponents mime the same warfare techniques and the same lines of action so as to equalize their potentials with the hybrid war.
Obviously the FSA and the jihadists must force and close the Russians and the Syrians into their initial areas so as to enable the jihadist groups to cover the Isis positions.
The Islamic Front now has about 45,000 militants and results from the merger of seven jihadist groups.
As stated in its official documents, it is alien both to the Al Nusra Front and to ISIS. It operates mainly in Aleppo and its tactical line is intended to prevent Assad’ Syrian forces from entering and stabilizing in the Northern region between Latakia and Aleppo.
Harakat Ahrar Al Sham al-Islamiyya is a Salafi group established near Idlib and, before the Syrian Islamic Front dissolving in November 2013, it collaborated both with the Al-Nusra Front and the groups affiliated with the Free Syrian Army.
It is the jihadist brigade specialized mainly in cyber attacks, that also works as a network of humanitarian and social support for the peoples.
Jaysh Al Islam is a coalition of about 10,000 units resulting from the merger of 50 previous jihadist groups.
It operates mainly in the Ghouta area around Damascus.
The jihadist group Suqour Al Sham is still supposed to count about 10,000 militants and operates in the provinces of Aleppo and Damascus.
It is worth clarifying that all the data and statistics we report do not consider defections, targeted assassinations, passages from one group to another.
Liwa al Tawheed, another group counting between 8,000 and 10,000 units, is also active in the region of Aleppo and has good relations of cooperation with the Al Nusra Front, even though it theorizes a less radical Islamic government that the other Salafi movements.
Finally the Al Nusra Front is a Salafi group (representing Al Qaeda in Syria) counting approximately 7,000 units and operates, in dispersed ranks, in at least 11 of the 14 Syrian provinces.
Currently it controls especially the Northern parts of the Syrian territory.
Despite being the best known jihadist group in Syria, Isis/Daesh only counts approximately 5,000 men in arms.
It operates mainly in the North and East of Syria,
Isis is the junction point between the various Salafi souls of the Syrian jihad, and plays a role of “clearing house” between the various factions of the fundamentalist insurgency. And this is its strength.
Daesh/Isis is a sort of Komintern of the Syrian jihad, which often uses other Salafi groups as cover or bait for the Russian-Syrian actions.
When, at the beginning of hostilities, President Putin said that Russia would make no difference between the various jihadist movements, he hit the very heart of the political-military organization and activity of Daesh/Isis.
The Iranians sent the Saberin Special Forces Brigade, which in Farsi means “patients.”
Founded in 2000, the IRGC special forces brigade operates primarily as a multi-tasking group specialized in deep penetration into enemy’s territory and in sniping actions.
In February 2015, the Pasdaran and the Saberin Brigade were the largest military groups to launch an offensive against Aleppo so as to stop trade between Isis and Turkey. Currently the 2,500 Iranian military units operate mostly as “advisers” to Bashar al-Assad’ Syrian Arab Army.
Sometimes they even operate as pilots of the Sukhoi-24M aircrafts that Moscow assigned to Bashar al-Assad’s military forces.
As already mentioned, the YPG Kurds are in command of approximately 15,000 fighters.
They came to the fore when, in 2012, the Syrian army left the Kurdish areas and the two national parties (the PKK and the Democratic Union Party, namely the PYD) began to independently manage the Kurdish region in North-Western Syria.
They control various border towns between their region and the rest of Syria, as well as part of the city of Aleppo, which is clearly the strategic centre of the whole Syrian war.
The Russians now operate as instructors of Bashar el Assad’s forces and protect their bases of Tartus, Humaymin and Latakia, while there is much talk about a new Russian base under construction at the Turkish border, in Al-Qamishli, whereas the United States are supposed to be building a base in North-Eastern Syria, together with the Kurdish militants.
Russia, however, has maintained in Syria the Pantzir F and S-400 Triumph weapon systems.
The former is an advanced system of surface-to-air missiles with sensors and automatic fire direction.
The latter is also a particularly advanced anti-missile system, which is said to be even better than the traditional US-made Patriot.
Bashar el Assad’ Syrian Arab Army counts about 14,000 military men who today, after the Russian “tonic treatment” and the Iranian cooperation, have a good level of efficiency on the ground.
The SAA recent victory in Al Qaryatain is pivotal: it ensures the safety and security of pipelines in the region and enables Assad’s forces to disrupt the lines of communication between the desert of Al Badyia and al-Qalamoun, which are essential for Daesh- Isis’ supplies.
However, which is the link between the oil and gas transit and the civil war and jihad in Syria?
If we look at the map, we can see how the major currently operating pipelines have evident points of contact with the various Salafi Islamist groups: each oil or gas transport network is controlled in at least two points by the various jihadist groups.
It is precisely for this reason that the local Salafism, including Isis, never covers the whole territory of reference, but only the contours of the regions it conquered militarily, which intersect an existing pipeline in at least two points.
Nevertheless, let us better analyse the oil and gas issue, which is not Marxistically at the origin of the war in Syria, but certainly explains much of it.
In 1989, Iran and Qatar began to develop the largest natural gas deposit in the world, the South Pars-North Dome.
One third of the South Pars reserves are present in Iranian territorial waters and the rest in Qatar’s marine areas.
Nevertheless there are two competing exploitation projects, which regard the current civil war in Syria.
The former is the Qatari-Turkish pipeline: in 2009, the Emirate offered to Turkey the possibility of a pipeline passing through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria up to Turkey, so as to sell gas to European consumers and to the Turks, in particular.
There is also a second route proposed, stretching from Saudi Arabia to Kuwait up to Iraq and Turkey, but the PKK Kurds at the Iraqi border would prevent any arrival of natural gas along the Turkish coast.
This is the only project for the oil and gas transport which would make the operation of the Russian pipelines a factor of secondary importance, with geopolitical effects that can be easily imagined.
In 2001, however, Iran proposed an alternative route to the Qatari-Turkish one, namely the Iranian-Iraqi-Syrian route.
The gas would come from South Pars via Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon.
If Russia regains its hegemony over Syria, this route could overlap with the Iranian and Syrian pipelines, thus avoiding Turkey and making Russia become the natural gas global leader.
The Iranian-Iraqi-Syrian route could also compete with the TANAP-TAP network, the Southern Corridor which, however, is about to be completed.
The TANAP-TAP pipeline, also created in 2011, stretches from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey, crossing the whole of Anatolia.
Hence, if the Russian Federation is still dominant in Syria, it will be in a position to thwart both projects, by controlling only the Damascus area.
On the one hand, it is very likely for Moscow to have regarded the Qatari-Turkish pipeline as a threat to Gazprom’s plans for the European market.
But also the Iranian project of the Iraqi-Syrian pipeline could damage the market share of the Russian gas companies, which are still essential for the Russian Federation’s whole economy.
Conversely, Russia could rather sponsor the Iranian-Iraqi-Syrian route only if it reached the ports of Latakia and Tartus – the old and well-known military headquarters of the Soviet Union, at first, and of Russia, later – on the Mediterranean, outside Turkey’s control.
If this happens, the Russian Federation will be the true pivot of the Middle East geopolitics and economy. On the contrary, if tensions in Syria mount or, worse, if the territory of Damascus falls prey to the jihadists and the powers that protect them, there will be no pipeline .
The projects which will by-pass the Syrian territory will be constantly threatened by the sword jihad, that will have no hesitation in hitting also the networks of the countries which so far have supported it in Syria.
Should Turkey and Azerbaijan Be Worried About Killed Syrian Mercenaries?
Just a few weeks ago many analysts and observers were sceptical about reports of Turkey’s transferring units of its Syrian National Army (SNA) proxies to Nagorno Karabakh, even more so because Turkish officials denied any such claims. However, as evidence of massive casualties among the Syrian mercenaries continues to mount, there is little space left for doubt: SNA fighters have become cannon fodder in the Turkish operation in support of Azerbaijan.
The first batch of bodies of those Syrians who perished in Nagorno Karabakh counted over 50 people, according to messages and videos that went viral on opposition WhatsApp and Telegram channels. Among the dead who were delivered to Syria over Hiwar Kilis border crossing and were given a hasted burial were men from Aleppo, Idlib, Homs and other regions of Syria. Many of their relatives, like families of Muhammad Shaalan from Atareb and Kinan Ferzat from Maarat al-Nuuman, were shocked to learn about their death.
Just like the majority of the Syrians who travelled to Nagorno Karabakh, Muhammad and Firzat were primarily motivated by lucrative rewards of up to 2,000 dollars promised by Turkey. “I came here to make money and have a better life back in Syria where the living conditions are miserable. I consider this a job, nothing else,” a member of Liwa Sultan Murad, one of the first SNA factions to deploy its fighters to the contested region, told Guardian.
The reason behind heavy casualties of the Syrian mercenaries is that they are thrown into action where the clashes are the most violent, including Jabrayil, Terter, Fizulin and Talysh. This move allows Azerbaijan to keep its military, who mainly provide air support including operating Turkey-made Bayraktar TB2 UAVs and coordinate artillery and missile strikes of the Armenian positions, out of direct contact with the enemy.
The estimates of the numbers of the Syrian mercenaries present in Nagorno Karabakh are wildly different. While initial reports put their number at 500 men, it is currently believed that the actual number may be in thousands. This data indicates that at least 10 percent of the fighters were killed during the very first days of the escalation – a serious alarm for the mercenaries as well as their Turkish backers.
These developments must ring a bell for Azerbaijan as well. The longer the conflict protracts, the higher the risk of casualties among the Azeri servicemen becomes, who have already suffered losses in Armenian retaliation strikes. Baku has managed to avoid discontent among the military as well as the civilian populace – not least thanks to the Syrian mercenaries crushed as cannon fodder – but this can not continue for long.
Emerging Multipolarity and its consequences
“Make America great again” a slogan that formed the nucleus of trump’s electoral campaign vividly suggests that America is no more a great country. It is, in fact, an implicit admission that U.S is gradually losing its clout in international politics and hence, its image as a sole superpower of the world has virtually tarnished. Let me rephrase this connotation; it means that the era of unipolar world is over and the world has now transitioned to a multipolarirty.
Currently, new power centers are emerging in transnational political landscape. China, Russia, India and Turkey are excessively engaged to carve a niche for them in evolving international order. Most importantly, with China and Russia’s mushrooming proximity, balance of power is now shifting from west to east. Former United States (US) Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton at her state visit to New Zealand was one of the first to observe “a shifting balance of power to a more multi-polar world as opposed to the Cold War model of a bipolar world”. This conspicuous change in multi-national political setup was also realized by Ban ki Moon, the then secretary- General of United Nations who stated at Stanford University in 2013 that we have begun to “move increasingly and irreversibly to a multi-polar world”. Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, also declared at the Russia-China Conference 2016 that “international relations have entered into a conceptually new historical stage that consists in the emergence of a multi-polar world order and reflects the strengthening of new centers of economic development and power”.
These manifestations of political spin doctors have since then revealed a general acceptance of the idea of multi-polar world as a concept that is inescapable political reality in the contemporary international dynamics. However, when it comes to the transitions and inevitability of power structures, there is a little agreement among the international states.
A much stronger resistance to forego unipolarity remains embedded in the Trump administration vision to “make America great again”. Political pundits such as Robert Kaplan continue to question, whether there is an overlap of unipolar and multi-polar world realities; where US continues to retain the supremacy in military realm of affairs and is anticipated to remain so for a considerable future time, whereby China leads in the economic realm. Additionally nations in the former Third World are acquiring status as rising powers, notably India who have over the years with smart diplomacy have acquired global outreach to shape international agenda.
Chronologically, After World War II, the U.S. became the undisputed and unchallenged global superpower. It was the only country, equipped with nuclear warheads and was one of the few countries involved in the war that came away from it relatively unscathed at home. The U.S. underwent a meager loss of approximately 400,000 soldiers and a fractional amount of civilians in the war. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, incurred a gigantic loss of around 11 million soldiers and some 7 million to 10 million civilians. While Soviet and European cities were undergoing the process of rehabilitation, American cities flourished. It seemed clear to all that the future belonged to the United States.
But it didn’t take long for the luster of unrivaled power to tarnish. The U.S. military machine relaxed as quickly as it had mobilized, and wartime unity gave way to peacetime political debates over government spending and entitlement programs. Within five years, a bipolar world emerged: The Soviets attained an atomic bomb, and the U.S. was caught flat-footed in a war on the Korean Peninsula that ended in a stalemate. Soon thereafter, the U.S. was withdrawing from Vietnam and rioting at home. In 1971, then-President Richard Nixon predicted a world that he said would soon emerge in which the U.S. was “no longer in the position of complete pre-eminence.” Within 26 years of the end of World War II, Nixon’s prediction saw the light of the day and the U.S. had to resign to its fate.
Theoretically, multipolarity refers to a distribution of power in which more than two states have nearly equal amounts of military, cultural, financial and economic influence.
If we look at the contemporary world, we find that with the rise of like China, India, Russia, Indonesia, Turkey and Brazil, global power will spread across a wider range of countries, hence, a new world order with multipolar outlook is likely to emerge .
Realistically speaking, several revisionist powers are and will shaking up their regions. For instance, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 – annexing Crimea, over which it has fought several wars throughout history (mainly with Turkey). In turn, Turkey is asserting its sovereignty over the eastern Mediterranean to the frustration of countries like Greece, Egypt, Cyprus and Israel. Meanwhile, India has upped its aggression in its border dispute with Pakistan as Modi began a process to revoke the autonomous status of the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir.
Notably, after the age of city-states and nation-states, we are now entering the age of continental politics. The most powerful countries of the 21st century (the U.S., China, Russia India, Indonesia, and Brazil) are the size of continents. They have broad economic bases and their digital economies potentially have hundreds of millions of users. Internationally, their scale requires them to seek broad spheres of influence in order to protect their security.
Here the question arises what will be the impact of growing multipolarity in the world? First of all, revisionist powers will increasingly ignite tensions. The growing assertiveness of countries like Russia, Turkey and India is the new normal. As they grow more powerful, these countries will seek to revise arrangements in order to reflect the new realities of power. Because these (continental) states seek broad spheres of influence, many places are at risk of destabilization.
Second, one of the biggest risks is the growing paranoia of the hegemon (the U.S.). The current trade war has shown how destabilizing the policy of the (financial) hegemon becomes as it feels threatened by the rise of a rival. Historically, this has been the most important source of violent conflicts. Indeed, the biggest source of uncertainty in the coming years is how the U.S. will react to the rise of China.
Third, the world order will become more ambiguous. Two developments deserve our attention. First, the growing use of shadow power will make conflict more unpredictable. With digital tools, states (and non-state actors) are manipulating each other in subtle ways. For example, Russian hackers posed as Iranians to hit dozens of countries and Americans blamed Russia for tampering with American elections. Second, alliances will also become more ambiguous. With ever changing dynamics of world economy, new alliances, motivated by the concept of triangulation (to keep balance in relation with the US and China, the trade warriors) will form and such alliances, as predicted by spin doctors; will be less stable than the blocs, formed in 20th century.
To sum it up, before we reach a multipolar world order, we will see a period of growing uncertainty based on the rise of revisionist powers, the paranoia of the U.S. and growing ambiguity of conflict and cooperation. Moreover, the political pundits are divided in opinion that whether multi-polarity is unstable than unipolarity or bipolarity. Kenneth Waltz strongly was in favor of “bipolar order as stable”. On the other side, Karl Deutsch and David Singer saw multi-polarity as guaranteeing a greater degree of stability in an article published in 1964, “Multipolar Systems and International Stability”. Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow in “Goodbye Hegemony” (2014), question the belief whether a global system without a hegemon would be unstable and more war prone. However, whatever the system the world is likely to witness in the days to come, let’s hope that this should be in the best interest of humanity and it should make the lives of the inhabitants of this planet peaceful and prosperous.
The future of strategic intelligence
There are currently three types of intelligence transformations, namely conceptual, technological and operational.
In the first case, we are dealing with a new and original intelligence paradigm.
From a mechanism based on the identification of the need for information-research-processing and analysis-dissemination-feedback, we are shifting to what some people already call “position intelligence”.
In other words, we are coming to an information mechanism that continuously perceives data and processes it, and then spreads it permanently and continuously to those who have to use it.
While the old intelligence model was “positivist”, i.e it concerned single objective and empirical data to be included in a decision-making process that is not determined by intelligence, currently it is instead a matter of building acontinuous follow-up not of data, but of political behaviours, perceptions of reality by the enemy-opponent, as well as complex phenomena that constantly reach the intelligence matrix from different parts and areas.
While in the past intelligence was rhapsodic and temporary, à la carte of politicians, and sometimes even unsolicited and not requested, it currently becomes the stable core of political, strategic, economic and industrial decisions.
This obviously results in a new relationship between politicians and Intelligence Services.
While, in an era we have already defined as “positivist”, facts, news and the unknown novelties of the enemy-opponent counted, what currently matters is the ever more evident integration between the intelligence system and politicians.
There is obviously a danger not to be overlooked, i.e. the danger that – without even realizing it – the Intelligence Services take on responsibilities which must be typical of elective bodies only.
But certainly intelligence currently plays a much greater role than in the past.
Another key element of the conceptual transformation of intelligence is the use not only of highly advanced and powerful information technologies, but also of scientific paradigms which were unknown to us only a few years ago.
Just think about Artificial Intelligence, but also cloud computing, algorithm theory and Markov chains – and here we confine ourselves to the mathematics that sustains current IT and computing.
But there is also human ethology, an extraordinary evolution of Konrad Lorenz’s animal ethology, as well as social psychology, sociological analysis and scientific depth psychology.
A whole universe of theories that, in Kant’s words, have recently shifted from metaphysics to science.
It must certainly be used to analyse, for example, mass behaviours that seem unpredictable, as well as the psychological reactions of both the ruling classes and the crowds, and the interactions between the various group behaviours of a country.
Nothing to do with the old Habsburg Evidenzbureau, which informed the General Staff of enemy troops’ movements or of the various generals’ lovers.
We here witness a substantial union between intelligence and political decision-making or, rather, between the thought produced by intelligence and the foundations of political decision-making.
CIA has often tried to poison Fidel Castro’s beard.
Today, apart from the doubtful rationality of that operation, it would be a matter of using – for example – advertising, TV series, Hollywood movies, the sugar, tourist or tobacco market cycles, not to poison late Fidel’s beard, but to put the Cuban economy and decision-making system into structural crisis.
The typical idea of Anglo-Saxon political culture –whereby, once the “tyrant” is eliminated, everything can be fine and back in place – has been largely denied by facts.
All this obviously without being noticed, as far as the operations for disrupting a country are concerned.
Another factor of the conceptual transformation of intelligence is speed: currently the IT networks are such as to allow data collection in real time with respect to facts and hence favour wide-ranging decisions.
As far as technology is concerned, it is well known that both the AI networks, the new calculation structures, and the networks for listening and manipulating the enemy-opponent data are such as to allow operations which were previously not even imaginable.
At this juncture, however, there are two problems: everybody has all the same tools available and hence the danger of not “successfully completing” the operation is great, unlike when the Intelligence Services’ operations were based on the skills, role and dissimulation abilities of some operatives – or on confidential and restricted technologies.
The other problem is intelligence manipulation: a country that thinks to be a target can spread – in ad hoc networks – manipulated news, malware, data and information which are completely false, but plausible, and can modify the whole information system of the country under attack.
Another problem of current intelligence technologies is their distance from the “traditional” political decision-making centres.
A politician, a Minister, a Premier must know what comes out of the intelligence system. Nevertheless, it is so specialised and sectorial that the distance between technical data processing and the “natural language” of politics is likely to make data ambiguous or unclear and of little use.
Moreover, there is a purely conceptual factor to be noted: if we put together the analysis of financial cycles, of technology change, of public finance and of political and military systems, we must connect systems that operate relatively autonomously from each other.
In other words, there is no “science of the whole” that can significantly connect such different sectors.
Therefore, there is the danger of projecting the effects of one sector onto another that is only slightly influenced by it, or of believing that, possibly, if the economy goes well, also the public debt – for example -will go well.
The room for political decision-making is therefore much wider than modern intelligence analysts believe.
Political decision-making is still made up of history, political-cultural traditions and of perceptions of reality which are shaped by many years of psychological and conceptual training.
With specific reference to operativity, once again we are dealing with radical changes.
Years ago, there was the single “operative” who had to decide alone – or with very little support from the “Centre” – what to do on the spot and with whom to deal.
Today, obviously, there is still the individual operative, but he/she is connected to the “Centre” in a different way and, in any case, imagines his/her role differently.
On the level of political decision-making, intelligence is always operative, because reality is so complex and technically subtle that it no longer enables even the most experienced statesman to “follow their nose”.
The primary paradox of the issue, however, is that intelligence cannot take on political roles that imply a choice between equivalent options.
This is inevitably the sphere of politics.
Another factor of the operational transformation is the inevitable presence of intelligence operatives in finance, in the scientific world, in high-level business consulting, in advertising, communication and media.
Intelligence has therefore progressively demilitarised itself and is increasingly operating in sectors that we would have previously thought to be completely alien to Intelligence Services. Instead, they are currently the central ones.
Moreover, we are currently witnessing a particular mix of strategic intelligence, geopolitics and financial analysis.
Why finance? Because it is the most mobile and widespread economic function.
We are witnessing the birth of a new profession, namely currency geopolitics.
Hence we are also witnessing the evolution of two new types of intelligence, namely market intelligence (MARKINT) and financial intelligence (FININT).
An old and new problem is secrecy. The greater the extent to which old and new intelligence is used, the less it can keep secrecy, which is essential now as it was in the past.
What has always been the aim of strategic intelligence? To predict phenomena starting from a given context.
Contexts, however, change quickly and the interaction between sectors is such as to change the effect of forecasts.
The formalised techniques for analysis-decision making are manifold: intelligence data mining, “grid technologies”, knowledge creation and sharing, semantic analysis, key intelligence needs (KINS) and many others.
All operations which are often necessary, but currently we need to highlight two factors typical of the North American intelligence culture which, unfortunately, also negatively affects the models used by U.S. allies.
The first aspect is that, strangely enough, the same formal models are proposed for both companies and States.
A State does not have to maximize profits, while a corporation does, at least on a level playing field with its competitors.
A State is not a “competitor” of the others and ultimately a State has no specific “comparative advantage” but, on the contrary, some of its companies have, if this happens.
Therefore, the overlap between business intelligence, which is currently necessary, and States’ intelligence is a conceptual bias, typical of those who believe that a State is, as Von Mises said, “the joint stock company of those who pay taxes to it”.
For companies, it is obvious that all specific and original intelligence operations must be known to the State apparata, which may coordinate them or not, considering that they inevitably have additional data.
On the other hand, some business operations can become very useful for intelligence.
Hence a structure would be needed to put the two “lines” of operations together, and above all, a new intelligence concept is needed.
In the past, the Intelligence Services’ operations were largely defensive: to know something just before it happened, to avoid the adverse operations of a State hitting its own resources, but all with often minimal time limits.
Now we need expressly offensive intelligence which can hit the opponents’ (commercial, economic and strategic) networks before they move and in good time.
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