Connect with us

Russia

Contemporary Russian foreign policy: Moscow turns to East to coerce West resume ties

Published

on

Development of modern Russian foreign policy could be divided into two eras or phases: the post Soviet policy after Michael Gorbachev and the Putin era policy. Both are philosophically and politically different from one another.

The post Soviet era policy was based entirely on the Gorbachevian ideology of ‘Perestroika and Glasnost’ (Restructuring and Openness) in post Communist milieu when new Russia’s first president Boris Yelstsin put in place a new non-communist foreign policy abandoning the Soviet socialist ideology completely in order to advance the national interest of an essentially first ever anti-communist government in modern Russia.

While Yelstsin pursued a pro-west policy so as to get Russia closer to so-called western civilizational values– and of course he failed in achieving his key objective of promoting democracy as far as possible in Russia backed by the anti-communist Western regimes – his successor Vladimir Putin, now fully comprehending petrified western attitude towards even new Russia, began pursuing an assertive, at times what looked like anti-West policies.

In order to continue ‘dialog’ with USA and Europe, Russia gradually developed an approach of ‘confrontation cum cooperation’ but Russo-NATO tensions do reveal the hard truth that Cold War the former super powers fought had not indeed ended even after the collapse of Berlin Wall plus collapse of communist system world wide – the prime target of USA since World war Two.

The Western world is impressed by the ‘democratic’ efforts of new Russia, especially under president Putin. Russia remained globally isolated.

Today Russia, focusing on a retrieving super power status, lost in the Cold War, is seen making strenuous efforts to impress upon USA and Europe the need to take it seriously and as an equal partner if the West wants to advance their collective interests globally. Russia has made the point to especially USA loud and clear by forcefully entering Ukraine and Syria while Washington responded only in rhetoric.

Since it became a new non-communist nation in 1985 following the collapse of Soviet Union, for the first time Russia is now under such huge sanction that has weakened its economy and slashed its western contacts. Of course, the sanctions on account of its annexation of Crimea from Ukraine could not cripple Russian economy to the extent the West thought their cumulative sanctions would do primarily because of its super power wealth from arms and oil.

Among primary factors that will impact Russian foreign policy today and in the coming years the key one is to effectively fight the potential for a new direction in US foreign policy that is more aggressive towards Russia in recent times, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

The USA and its allies continue their policy of international isolation in respect to Russia, a policy that once again started to bear some fruit in 2014. However, it should be kept in mind that there is limitation for the USA in applying pressure on the Kremlin, for, Russia is not North Korea, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, or even Iran. It is hard to ensure international stability and prosperity while at the same time driving one of the big nuclear powers into a corner.

Russia’s uncertainty of its own fate makes Russian policies, both domestic and foreign complicated as western powers have pushed Russia’s rulers from one extreme to another. Russia’s perennial inclination to shake the world’s capitalist-imperialist foundations to their core stems from its geopolitical weight it assumes as a Eurasian civilization. Although other international players, led by USA, keep talking about “rootless” claim of Russia as being a Eurasian civilization, have never been able to properly balance Russian strength.

Assertive diplomacy

Recent move by the Kremlin to turn to East is meant essentially to force the USA and allies to take Russia very seriously, end efforts to isolate Russia, roll back all sanctions and resume ties with Putin’s Russia by considering the assertive nature of his policy.

Russia suffers from a phenomenon of strong Russian character and great power and after the collapse of mighty Soviet Union President Putin is seen by most Russians as displaying that powerful character. Russian success in finding a strong president in Putin is not insignificant as the West is still to come over the impact Soviet system made on the USA-UK controlled world.

For a century Russia in its varied formats of governance from capitalist empire, to communism back to crony capitalism, has conducted an assertive foreign policy and elaborate diplomatic discourse to put forward its ideas for a new multipolar world order if not for a new society.

Soviet assertive politics disfigured the global colonialist and capitalist structures and threatened to remove them from the face of the world. The impact that the Soviet state had made on the global security, political and economic systems was so profound and strong that USA and its western allies sought to dismantle the formidable USSR and they succeeded.

Some of the punitive actions by USA and its European allies have further strengthened the character of Putin presidency. Western sanctions against Russian role in Ukraine including annexation of Crimea have not made Russian policy less assertive, though the country has become more vulnerable to economic upsets. However, in order offset the impact of western sanctions, Russia has pursued a very cautious foreign policy, though it had to curtail human rights in the country in order to contain the opposition leaders from resorting to any possible uprising against the Putin regime for the large scale sanctions.

America is therefore responsible for human right violation of Russian state.

It is not the first time that Russia, as a global power, has changed the international status quo through its aggressive military actions in Ukraine, either by heightening the level of confrontation, such as prior to the outbreak of World War II and throughout the Cold War, or defusing it, as a result of its victories over Napoleon and Hitler and Gorbachev’s “new thinking” in the 1980s. Putin represents the strong willed Russian mindset, reflected in his policies, both domestic and foreign.

Russia said it can attack any nation even without any real threats to its territory. When Putin announced Russian willingness to use its nukes as Russia’s military policy, even when there is no serious threat perception from enemy sties, many eyebrow were raised in the West.

Obviously USA and EU do take Russia and its warnings very seriously

Multi-polar world

Since Gorbachev era, Moscow has pursued a double strategy of seeking to establish a multipolar world while at the same time dutifully pursued a policy against open confrontations with the West.

Putin is often characterized as an autocrat by the Western media and some politicians, but his relationship with former US Presidents like Obama and George W. Bush, among others is reported to be personally friendly. Putin’s relationship with Germany’s new Chancellor, Angela Merkel, is reported to be “cooler” and “business-like”.

Western policy is wrongheaded. Today’s “globalised world is based on an unprecedented interconnection between countries, and so it’s impossible to develop relations between Russia and the EU as if they remained at the core of global politics as during the Cold War.” The so-called “historical West” no longer is “the master of the human race’s destinies” – the role it assumed “for almost five centuries.” Transition “to a new international system” changed things.

Today’s world is increasingly multi-polar. One dominant center no longer applies. US interventionism is hugely destructive, one nation after another raped and destroyed. US-led Western efforts to ensure “global leadership” produces confrontation, not mutual cooperation, the unthinkable possibility of another global war. “There is virtually no state in Libya; Iraq is balancing on the brink of disintegrations, and so on and so forth,” Lavrov explained. “A reliable solution to the problems of the modern world can only be achieved through serious and honest cooperation between the leading states and their associations in order to address common challenges.”

In a January 2007 interview Putin said Russia is in favour of a democratic multipolar world and of strengthening the system of international law. Putin also proposed certain initiatives such as establishing international centres for the enrichment of uranium and prevention of deploying weapons in outer space.

Russia’s view of the modern world, as well as its goals and objectives are reflected in the Foreign Policy Concept adopted in 2013. It evaluates the global situation and analyses the processes unfolding in the world and its regions. On its basis the foreign strategy of the country has been found in full recognition of the fundamentally new geopolitical situation in the world.

The independent foreign policy pursued by Russia in accordance with modern trends and long-standing traditions is in increasingly high demand in the world, attracting a wide range of partners from Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe.

Russia has consistently advocated an inclusive and positive agenda aimed not at restricting but rather amplifying ties between states. Our country stands ready to join efforts with all those who are equally willing to cooperate in line with the principles of equality, mutual respect, mutual benefit and norms of international law, as well as recognition of the central role of the United Nations in global affairs. The work of the UN Security Council, the Group of 20, BRICS, SCO and CSTO clearly demonstrates the efficiency of joint efforts. Conversely, the Ukrainian crisis was a consequence of a policy of strengthening one’s own security at the expense of others, which has been pursued by Western states for over a quarter of a century aiming to expand areas under their geopolitical control. This was manifested by successive waves of NATO expansion despite assurances to the contrary at the highest level and in violation of solemn declarations on the establishment of a system of equal and indivisible security in the Euro-Atlantic space. The current negative turn in global affairs is not our choice. Russia will continue working under these circumstances and remains open for dialogue.

There is no viable alternative to mutually beneficial and equal-footed cooperation between Russia and the EU, as our countries are closely intertwined by virtue of numerous geographic, economic, historical and human ties. We are ready to mutually approximate positions and seek compromises, but only on the basis of equality and true consideration of each other’s interests, excluding any attempts of blackmail and diktat. The establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union is making a tangible contribution to the development of wide-ranging cooperation in the region. We are convinced that gradual steps towards creating a common economic and humanitarian space from Lisbon to Vladivostok based on the principles of equal and indivisible security should serve as a strategic guideline in shaping a new architecture on the European continent. In this regard it seems particularly important to establish direct dialogue between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, including their respective supranational executive bodies, with a view to perfecting models of mutually beneficial and equal-footed harmonization of the processes of European and Eurasian integration.

While there is no credible proof to show that USA is sincerely pursuing peace mission globally, there is enough evidence to prove that the Russians do have at least the peace mission intention. The decision of Russia to withdraw its forces occupying Syria, killing the Syrians (Sunni sect) only shows somewhat positive intent of the Kremlin and that it does not want to complicate the problem and is eager to give peace a chance. If “problem” resurface, President Puitn would resend the forces to Syria.

Even Soviet foreign policy was pro-peace; at least theoretically, L. Brezhnev sent the Red Army into Afghanistan ostensibly to defend socialism from those Afghans and their American backers there.

Following the collapse of the mighty USSR, Russia stopped its historic empire ambition and began cooperating with USA and Europe extending their nexus into terror war on Islam. It never invaded any nation which is not well within its space of influence, especially the former Soviet republics and East European nations. Russian military intervention in Georgia and Ukraine should be seen from that ankle only. However, Syria is certainly not in that category of nations where Moscow could intervene as its legitimate right. Russia explains that it has a duty to protect Syrian government and its president Assad and hence it intervened there militarily.

Cooperative confrontation

Russia’s geopolitical approach “is shared by most countries,” including China, other BRICS countries, SCO nations, and “our friends in the EAEU, the CSTO, and the CIS.” Moscow forthrightly supports resolving major geopolitical issues “on an equal and mutually respectful basis, providing a reliable foundation for a long-term improvement of international relations” – free from the scourge of war. Defeating terrorism militarily remains a pressing issue, while at the same time working for resolving conflicts diplomatically.

Lavrov stressed that Russia isn’t seeking confrontation with the United States, or the European Union, or NATO. It seeks mutual cooperation among all nations. ‘Either we find a way to live together in peace, or we’ll perish together from a war ending all future ones’.

Emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), seen in Moscow as its traditional sphere of influence, was initially viewed in the West as an effort by Putin to revive old Soviet Union and socialist system to resume the super power status, lost with the fall of Berlin Wall. Though initially the CIS generated enough enthusiasm in Russia and elsewhere, it could not be developed into a well-knit union to promote Russian goals as the member states did not cooperate with Russia on the new effort to revive Soviet Union mainly because of pressure from USA on both Russia and former Soviet states.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), seen in Moscow as its traditional sphere of influence, became one of the foreign policy priorities under Putin, as the EU and NATO have grown to encompass much of Central Europe and, more recently, the Baltic states.

However, the CIS became one of the foreign policy priorities under Putin, as the EU and NATO have grown to encompass much of Central Europe and, more recently, the Baltic states.

Instead of working cooperatively with Russia, US dominated NATO provocatively occupies “geopolitical space” near its borders, making normalized relations impossible. Repeated anti-Russian efforts over centuries failed, however. Lavrov said hid nation remains proud and resilient. It’s vitally important as a leading centre of the modern world, and a provider of the values of sustainable development, security and stability.

Pursuing a non-confrontational approach to the USA and Europe, Russian President Vladimir Putin opted for in response to his nation’s deepening economic crisis, by seeking a “frozen” conflict in Ukraine, and actively looks for a diplomatic settlement with the West. This is necessary in order to offbeat the negative consequences of western sanctions and by smoothening his nation’s deepening economic crisis.

Vladimir Putin’s presidency lasted already three terms from January 2000 until May 2008 and again from 2012 and one is not sure if he would seek more terms. In international affairs, Putin made increasingly critical public statements regarding the foreign policy of the USA and other Western countries. In February 2007, at the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy, he criticised what he called the United States’ monopolistic dominance in global relations, and pointed out that the USA displayed an almost uncontained hyper use of force in international relations. The result of it is that no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them. Of course such a policy stimulates an arms race.

In the wake of the 11 September hoax in the United States, Putin agreed to the establishment of coalition military bases in Central Asia before and during the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. Russian nationalists objected to the establishment of any US military presence on the territory of the former Soviet Union, and had expected Putin to keep the US out of the Central Asian republics or at the very least extract a commitment from Washington to withdraw from these bases as soon as the immediate military necessity had passed

During the Iraq disarmament crisis 2002–2003, Putin opposed Washington’s move to invade Iraq without the benefit of a United Nations Security Council resolution explicitly authorizing the use of military force. After the official end of the war was announced, American president George W. Bush asked the United Nations to lift sanctions on Iraq. Putin supported lifting of the sanctions in due course, arguing that the UN commission first be given a chance to complete its work on the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

In 2005, Putin and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder negotiated the construction of a major gas pipeline over the Baltic exclusively between Russia and Germany. Schröder also attended Putin’s 53rd birthday in Saint Petersburg the same year.

During the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, Putin twice visited Ukraine before the election to show his support for Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who was widely seen as a pro-Kremlin candidate, and he congratulated him on his anticipated victory before the official election returns had been in. Putin’s personal support for Yanukovych was criticized as unwarranted interference in the affairs of a sovereign state (See also The Orange revolution). Crises also developed in Russia’s relations with Georgia and Moldova, both former Soviet republics accusing Moscow of supporting separatist entities in their territories.

Russia’s relations with the Baltic States also remain tense. In 2007, Russo-Estonian relations deteriorated further as a result of the Bronze Soldier controversy.

Ukraine and Syria

International relations have entered a very difficult period, according to Russian foreign minister Lavrov, a world-class diplomat, a tireless pursuer of world peace and stability; specialists argue that President Putin is fortunate to have him as foreign minister. Lavrov said Russia is at the crossroads of key trends. Despite Russia’s importance in European affairs, its member states allied with Washington try keeping it marginalized, weakened, destabilized, contained and isolated, preventing it from taking part in Europe’s most important affairs, Lavrov explained.

Crimea’s accession to Russia, the Kremlin’s alleged support of separatists in Eastern Ukraine, the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 – all this contributed to dividing European countries in their assessment of Russia’s policy in Ukraine and the sanctions war between the Kremlin and the West.

Not only did Moscow spoiled its relations with the USA in 2014, but also with its traditional allies in Europe, particularly with France and Germany, as indicated by the Mistral case with France and the failure of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Vladimir Putin to see eye to eye.

Wars in Ukraine and Syria have become a challenge not only for USA but even for Russia which has the advantage of playing the king maker in both nations. Washington has been unequivocal about its insistence and pressure on other countries to join their campaign against Russia’s policy in Ukraine. Although these countries are interested in doing business with Russia, they are hardly likely to put at stake their far larger business relations with the West. The European Union and United States are China’s first and second largest trading partners, accounting for some 30 percent of China’s overall trade. Russia does not even figure in the top ten of Chinese trading partners. Moscow holds a weak hand in its relations with Beijing, except in arms sale as China remains the key customer of largest military equipment of Russia.

Russia’s decision to intervene in Syria was driven by several overlapping objectives. The Kremlin was eager to strengthen the regime of longtime ally Bashar al-Assad, which was then losing significant ground to its various political opponents. Russia was keen to let Iran also feel safe simultaneously. Moscow has showcased its military strategy to Arab and other Muslim nations among other third word countries to get ‘orders” from them. Moscow was also keen to reinforce its strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean, which was centered on the longstanding Russian naval base in the Syrian port city of Tartus.

Importantly, Putin’s government was desperate to regain momentum that had been lost in preceding months in Ukraine, where its forces had encountered stronger-than-expected resistance. Putin has shown Russia remains relevant today.

Moscow’s military presence in Syria, meanwhile, has expanded dramatically. Since September, Russia has significantly reinforced its preexisting naval base at Tartus, erected a new airbase in Latakia, and commenced work on at least two other military facilities nearby. It has surged manpower and materiel into the area, and placed naval cruisers from its Black Sea Fleet on “permanent” rotation off the coast of Syria.

Russia’s Syria deployment has also paid clear political dividends. Through it, Putin has been able to divert domestic Russian opinion away from the massive failures of his government (fiscal decline, a dwindling supply of foreign goods, and deepening authoritarianism among them). The intervention has also allowed Russia to at least partially break out of the international isolation caused by its earlier aggression against Ukraine.

Today the West requires Russia’s assistance to ensure the Assad regime’s continued compliance with the terms of any political solution. Russia was an intrinsic part of the putative ceasefire concluded in Geneva in mid-February, and—as a result of its ongoing leverage over Assad—remains essential to its implementation. That, in turn, gives the Kremlin a deciding voice over West Asia regional politics, has positioned Moscow as a key power broker in the Middle East. The March 14 announcement was both abrupt and surprising; coming as it did just six months after Russia’s entry into the Syrian civil war, assures Arab nations its resolve not to overstay, unlike USA or NATO, in Syria or any other regional nation in future.

However, whether or not Arab world thinks that way, USA and EU look at the Russian moves as a serious threat to them. Europe sees the aggressive move by Putin’s belligerent Russia as one of the most pressing threats to European security it is willingly uses armed force and breach the sovereignty of other states in defense of its interests. NATO has decided to face the ‘threat” by beefing up its presence in the Baltic States, to demonstrate that it has a “credible commitment” to defend member states under Article V of the NATO charter.

Countries like India and China are hardly likely to yield to US pressure because they are pro-Russia and somewhat independent players of world politics that have no reason to join the US campaign against the Kremlin. India is annoyed with USA for promoting Pakistan as a counter weight in the region. Only those countries that have economic and political links with Washington will yield, as in the case of Japan and Australia, which have quickly imposed sanctions against Russia. Japan was forced to support sanctions due to its geostrategic and geopolitical positions. Tokyo is struggling to develop its relations with Russia, yet it has to be in solidarity with the USA.

Russia’s Asia pivot

For a long time since the close of the so-called Cold War and Hot Peace, Russian has express its intentions of ignoring the West and turning to the East to warn the West about its intentions to join the Asian nations and harm US interests in Asia, though Washington has not taken that warning seriously. When Obama declared his ‘Asia pivot’ tactics he was only ridiculing Moscow. True, USA always sought to contain both Russia and China with veto handle.

With Russia losing traditional and reliable partners in Europe, it is trying to find new ones in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. President Obama made trips to these areas- latest being in Latin America where capitalist Russia is fast losing its friends. Yet can these “new allies” satisfy Moscow’s trade requirements and replace the partners Russia has lost over its schism with the West?

Even though German society is divided in its assessments of the prospects of Russian-German relations, there are increasing debates over the possibility of a cold war between Germany and Russia. Russia avoids any cold war with Germany that would affect Russian economy.

While losing its partners in Europe, Russia makes no bones about its turn to Asia, the Middle East and Latin America in attempt to persuade the West that it is not isolated and has numerous partners. Putin’s visits to India, Turkey in December, China in May and Latin America in July look like a clear gesture from Russia, demonstrating that it can make do without the West.

Russia has always sought strong relationships with Central Asia, and was engaged in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS group well before this summer’s difficulties with Europe. “But Russia is now trying to deepen and strengthen ties in Asia and the Middle East more than ever to offset the losses of business with Europe.

Likewise, Russia is attempting to establish closer ties with Iran amidst its schism with the West, as indicated by the conference held in Moscow on Nov. 25 on “Development of Strategic Partnership between Russia and Iran”. Stunning Russian ’progress’ in Syria could prompt Tehran to sign up more military deals with the Kremlin.

China has plenty of capital and plenty of expertise, but needs its capital internally and is also keen to invest in Africa and Iran and elsewhere, and lacks some of the specific expertise (e.g. Arctic oil exploration, tight oil extraction, innovation-based entrepreneurship) that Russia needs most.

Probably these countries may not be interested in full collaboration with a weaker Russia and would instead prefer it over the partnership with West. They “might work” with Russia on trade, but “they are unlikely to ally with Moscow, and they won’t “displace Europe in trade terms. In 2013, EU-Russia trade was more than four times Russia-China trade, and more than 15 times Russia-Turkey trade. Even though Asia and the Middle East do matter for Russia’s foreign policy, Moscow would abandon its deep-seated illusion that there is an opportunity to switch from its Western partners to eastern ones. Russia’s new allies in the Middle East and Asia are not meant to replace, but rather should be an addition to our traditional partners, including those in the zone of the European Union.

No clear evidence of the willingness of “Russia’s supposed ‘new partners’ to engage in preferential relationship with Moscow because of the crisis in Russia’s relations with the West not even India.

Even though Moscow made several attempts to woo the Asian and Middle East countries, there is still a lack of certainty over whether these “new allies” are eager to team up with Moscow and sacrifice their relations with the USA.

In most cases, Russia’s ‘new partners’ pursue their own – mainly economic – agendas, while considerations of standing up to US dictates take the backstage as a motivation for engaging with Russia. In fact, one is doubtful that Russia aims at replacing its EU partners with other ones elsewhere. If there are promising bonds and benefits to Moscow from cooperation with Asia or the Middle East, they had to be expanded irrespective of Russia’s relations with the USA or the EU.

The ‘partner replacement’ logic works in contemporary international relations but in small measures. Such logic can only be applied – albeit with limited effect – to military alliances for joint exercises. In trade or other forms of economic engagement, and even diplomatic coordination, ‘replacing’ one set of failing relationships with another simply makes no sense. There was never any reason why Russia should not have been developing ties with potential partners in the Middle East or the Asia Pacific region before its conflict with the West over Ukraine started. These regions, now controlled by USA, do not really trust Russia being a reliable ally against US monopoly of global affairs and economics.

However, Russia, backed by hue resourced reinforced by sales of arms and energy resources, has nothing to lose.

Nuke deterrence

The vulnerability of our highly civilized and technological world to WMD is considerable. If it is difficult just to protect armed forces in operations against WMD, in particular biological weapons, then to protect the civilian population will pose even greater problems.

On August 6, 1945, towards the end of World War II, the American Little Boy device was detonated over the Japanese city of Hiroshima, obviously to test the efficacy of first ever atomic bomb on humans. Exploding with a yield equivalent to 12,500 tonnes of TNT, the blast and thermal wave of the bomb destroyed nearly 50,000 buildings (including the headquarters of the 2nd General Army and Fifth Division) and killed approximately 75,000 people, among them 20,000 Japanese soldiers and 20,000 Koreans. Today president Obama is testing latest unmanned drone weapons – first tested by Israel on Palestinians – on global Muslims, starting in Pakistan.

During the height of WW-II USA had threatened Moscow with an atomic attack but Stalin said was ready to face it. The Soviet Union had a peak stockpile of 45,000 nuclear warheads in 1988, forcing the NATO not to think of any misadventure on Russian soil. It is estimated that from 1949 to 1991 the Soviet Union produced approximately 55,000 nuclear warheads.

According to an audit by the Brookings Institution, between 1940 and 1996, the U.S. spent $8.78 trillion in present-day terms on nuclear weapons programs. 57 percent of which was spent on building nuclear weapons delivery systems. According to the Federation of American Scientists, an organization that assesses nuclear weapon stockpiles, in 2013, Russia possessed an estimated 8,500 total nuclear warheads of which 1,800 were strategically operational. The organization also claims that the U.S. had an estimated total 7,700 nuclear warheads of which 1,950 were strategically operational. According to Mark Schneider of the National Institute of Public Policy Russian strategic nuclear weapons now deployed number near 2500, considerably greater than the nominal treaty limits of 1550 under the New Start treaty.

In 2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists released a report, stating that there are a total of 2,530 warheads kept in reserve, and 2,120 actively deployed. Of the warheads actively deployed, the number of strategic warheads rests at 1,920 (subtracting 200 bombs that are “deployed”, but are not considered “strategic”). The amount of warheads being actively disabled rests at about 2,700 warheads, which brings the total United States inventory to about 7,400 warheads

Eliminating nuclear weapons has long been an aim of the pacifist left. But now many mainstream politicians, academic analysts, and retired military leaders also advocate nuclear disarmament. Goals include the initiation of United States-Russia bilateral negotiations for reductions to 1,000 total warheads each and commitments from the other key nuclear weapons countries to participate in multilateral negotiations for phased reductions of nuclear arsenals.

As of 2016, there are still more than enough nuclear weapons globally to render the planet uninhabitable. 16,000 nuclear weapons are ‘stored’ at sites in 14 countries and many are ready for immediate use. Modernisation of weapons continues to occur. Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons: 80–110 each active warheads; nuclear weapons: North Korean nuclear weapons: 10 active warheads; Undeclared nuclear rogue weapon states not party to the NPT: Israeli nuclear weapons: 75–200 active warheads.

Nuclear disarmament refers to both the act of reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons and to the end state of a nuclear-weapon-free world, in which nuclear weapons are completely eliminated. Nuclear disarmament groups include the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Peace Action, Greenpeace, and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Mayors for Peace, Global Zero, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

Dangers are inherent in the very existence of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. The dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction have come to occupy center stage in international politics. The term “weapon of mass destruction” (WMD) is used to characterize a variety of weapons that share two key features: their potential for large-scale destruction and the indiscriminate nature of their effects, notably against civilians. There are three major types of WMD: nuclear weapons, chemical warfare agents, and biological warfare agents. In addition, some analysts include radiological materials as well as missile technology and delivery systems such as aircraft and ballistic missiles.

Radiological weapons are part of the nuclear risk. These are weapons, procedures, or methods that disseminate radioactive substances; for example, the conventional detonation of a container holding a radioactive substance. The aim of such weapons is to disperse radioactive particles. At multilateral arms control talks, such weapons are regarded as difficult to define, and there is little chance of reaching consensus on this issue. In addition, their military value is unclear.

While the mass killing of human beings is not a new feature of warfare, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose an unprecedented constellation of challenges to peace and security. Over the past century, various states have built and stockpiled lethal arsenals of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the materials to produce them. While states have officially committed to eliminating all stockpiles of chemical weapons and offensive biological weapons and to strive for the elimination of nuclear weapons, nine countries currently possess nuclear weapons – Britain, China, France, India, Israel (assumed), North Korea (claimed), Pakistan, Russia, and the United States – and several states are believed to possess chemical and/or biological warfare agents.

Anti Islamic media of US-UK led nations have spread rumours that the terrorist outfits like Al Qaeda was actively seeking nuclear materials to terrorize the humanity further. The use of WMD increased in the United States and around the world following the use of the biological warfare agent anthrax in the US mail in 2001 in Afghanistan occupied by NATO and one can easily guess who is behind this.

Last month US defense secretary Ashton Carter proposed boosting the initiative’s funding from $789 million to $3.4 billion for FY 2017. Both sides use displays of military prowess to signal their resolve to the other side. In 2007, Russia resumed the Cold War practice of strategic bomber patrols along NATO borders.

Even while targeting each other by the strategic missile postures, Russia and the West apparently also focus on a re-nuclearization of defense planning, driven by worst case scenarios. This is stoked by all the talk of a “second Cold War,” which encourages each side to view the other as implacably hostile, duplicitous and dangerous.

The cost of making the wrong call on the WMD issue is astronomically high. Both sides take steps to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and reliance on nuclear threats as part of their defense strategies. There must be a follow-on to the 2010 New START agreement and the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which expired in 2012, and resolution of mutual accusations of violating the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.

Deterrence by nukes may not work in the long run. Acknowledging an overriding common interest of avoiding nuclear war is not an exercise in appeasement. There were several incidents where humanity came perilously close to the nuclear brink, from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to NATO’s Able Archer exercise in 1983. Russia’s own military doctrine states that if it found itself losing a conventional war, it may use nuclear weapons to defend Russia’s security. NATO, too, has a nuclear doctrine that does not preclude first use in a conflict. NATO seems to be underestimating Russia’s willingness to escalate and finds itself in a classic security dilemma, where defensive actions by one side are seen as a threat by the other, triggering an escalating cycle of action and response. Russia feels the NATO involved in a desperate nuke gamble.

USA may isolate Russia in order to make it look irrelevant in international affairs, but it can’t simply ignore the security readiness of the Kremlin to face any eventuality now or in the future.

Observation

The system of international relations is in transition as a new polycentric world order is taking root. World is witnessing the creation of a fundamentally new global model marked by growing competition in all spheres, including social and economic development and moral values. Evidently, Russia is well placed to consolidate its role as one of the centres of the new multipolar system and actively impact the global situation with a view to ameliorating it, strengthening security and stability, putting in place favourable external conditions for the country’s internal development to ensure sustainable economic growth and thus a higher quality of life for Russian citizens.

Russian philosopher Ivan Ilyin, saying in Lavrov’s words a nation’s greatness is not determined by the size of its territory or the number of its inhabitants, but by the capacity of its people and its government to take on the burden of great world problems and to deal with these problems in a creative manner.

President Puitn has lived up to the expectations of Russians who want a strong presidency to face the challenges of foes.

Russian foreign minister Lavrov’s thoughtful new essay, titled “Russia’s Foreign Policy” explains current foreign policy of Putin’s Russia. Lavrov explained Russian history and its special role in European and global history, an impressive scholarly account, rare for figures in his position, maybe unique in today’s world. Lavrov is no ordinary diplomat, shaming his Western counterparts, serving his country with distinction, a devoted advocate for peace, democratic values and rule of law principles.

Lavrov said that achieving world peace and stability, mutual cooperation among all nations, respect for their sovereignty, and upholding fundamental rule of law principles matter to Moscow most of all.

Putin’s Russia would not change its tone now or in future, though he seeks a multilateral world for the entire world to survive the challenges.

Western sanctions have crippled Russian economy or its tone of rhetoric, and obviously the USA ‘options now are limited in the chess broad. Russians, after its Syrian ‘blast’ are waiting for the next move of the USA.

Policy makers in Washington also know too well how Putin reacts to US unilateral moves. The more opportunities Washington offers to it, the better for Russia to make full use of them depending on the circumstances.

However, Russia won’t be able to remake the Soviet Union or socialist system even if Putin and his active supports at the Kremlin want that. It can only undertake measures to reform crony capitalism so that common Russians have a hope of better life.

Assertive foreign policy may be necessary but that should not promote domestic authoritarianism which is harmful to the nations and world.

Continue Reading
Comments

Russia

Two Opposite Views of Alexei Navalny

Published

on

The views of Alexei Navalny in Russia and in the United States are virtually opposites of each other.

In America, for example, on June 20th, the New York Times headlined “U.S. Preparing More Sanctions Against Russia, Sullivan Says”, and sub-headlined “The national security adviser raised the issue of more penalties in the poisoning of Aleksei A. Navalny days after President Biden met with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.” The Hill online bannered “Sullivan says US preparing more Russia sanctions over Navalny”, and the “Best” or most popular of the many hundreds of reader-comments was “Putin is too chickenshvt to face Navalny in an election”. In other words, the view is: Putin is aiming to kill Navalny because Navalny represents democracy and Putin is the dictator. That is the dominant view of Navalny not only in the United States but in its allied countries.

In Russia, however, here is the dominant view:

An RT news-report on 1 February 2021 headlined “Top Navalny aide asked alleged British spy for millions in funding, intelligence video released by Russia’s FSB claims to reveal”. Back in 2012, Russia’s equivalent of America’s FBI had a hidden camera in position filming, and recording, Navalny’s top aide trying to persuade a person he thought to be an MI6 (UK’s CIA) agent that MI6 should annually donate tens of millions of dollars to Navalny’s organization because doing this would provide billions of dollars of benefit to UK corporations if Navalny would then succeed and become Russia’s leader. 

Navalny is also known in Russia as a far-right ethnic supremacist. Here is a video that he posted to youtube on 19 September 2007, under the title of “НАРОД за легализацию оружия” meaning “PEOPLE for the legalization of weapons

He was saying there that all Russians should get guns in order to kill Muslims who are infesting Russia, which would be like swatting big flies or stamping on big cockroaches. Later, he decided that demagoguing against Russia’s “corruption” was far likelier to win him the backing of the U.S and its allies than demagoguing against Russia’s Muslims would. This was when U.S.-and-allied ‘news’-media began presenting him as the ‘democratic’ alternative to Vladimir Putin, who has always been vastly more favorably viewed by Russians than Navalny has been. On 5 September 2020, right before the latest Russian Presidential election, the internationally respected Levada polling organization in Russia reported that the top choice of Russians to lead the country was Putin at 56%, the second-from-top choice was the nationalist Zhirinovsky at 5%, and Alexey Navalny (shown there as Алексей Навальный), was the third-from-top choice, at 2%. In the 2018 Presidential election, Zhirinovsky polled at 13.7%, Grudinin polled at 12.0%, and Putin polled at 72.6%. The actual election-outcome was Putin 76.69%, Grudinin 11.7%, and Zhirinovsky 5.65%. There were many polls and Navalny was never any serious contender for Russia’s Presidency. The U.S. regime lies as it usually does (at least about international matters).

That’s what Russians know about Navalny. And, of course, it’s very different from what the publics in U.S.-and-allied countries know (or, at least, believe) about him.

Here is some recent propaganda that’s published by U.S.-and-allied regimes about Navalny: 

On May 22nd, Japan Times ran a Reuters report, “How Russia’s new gulag tries to break convicts like Alexei Navalny”.

On May 23rd, the Wall Street Journal headlined “Russia’s Navalny Fights to Stay in Public Eye in Putin Standoff”.

On May 4th, the Washington Post columnist Vladimir Kara-Murza headlined “Russia just took a big step back toward the Soviet Union”, and said: “Last week, for the first time since the Soviet era, the Kremlin officially classified opposition to its rule as a criminal offense. … Moscow prosecutors suspended the activities of the nationwide organization of Alexei Navalny, Vladimir Putin’s most prominent opponent. Navalny is currently incarcerated in a prison camp after surviving a state-sponsored assassination attempt last year.”

Navalny, though he actually is favorably viewed by only around 2% of Russians (as indicated in polls there), is widely publicized in U.S.-and-allied media as having instead the highest support by the Russian people of anyone who might challenge Vladimir Putin for Russia’s leadership. It’s a lie, and always has been. Other politicians have far higher polled support in Russia. For example, a Russian poll conducted in the days following Alexey Navalny’s alleged novichok poisoning showed the following level of support for him then, if a Russian election for President would be held at that time: Vladimir Putin 56%, Vladimir Zhirinkovsky 5%. Alexei Navalny 2%. In the 2018 Presidential election, Zhirinovsky polled at 13.7%, Grudinin polled at 12.0%, and Putin polled at 72.6%. The actual election-outcome was Putin 76.69%, Grudinin 11.7%, and Zhirinovsky 5.65%. There were many polls and Navalny was never any serious contender for Russia’s Presidency. The U.S. regime lies as it usually does (at least about international matters), such as about “Saddam’s WMD.”

To say that Navalny has enough public supporters for him to have become elected as Russia’s President is like alleging that the former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke had enough public supporters for him to have become elected as America’s President. That’s how much U.S.-and-allied ‘news’-media lie.

This news-report is submitted for publication to virtually all English-language newsmedia. A Web-search for its headline will show which ones have published it.

Continue Reading

Russia

Fragile Stabilisation of Confrontation

Published

on

Image source: kremlin.ru

Prospects for relations between Russia and the United States after the summit in Geneva

The Russia-US summit in Geneva will certainly not lead to a qualitative improvement in Russian-American relations and will not be able to initiate a process that would lead to a change of their confrontational nature within the next several years. This is impossible, due to the systemic nature of the confrontation between Russia and the United States. Overcoming this would require one or both sides to fundamentally change their approach to the international order and their place in it; a strong bipartisan anti-Russian consensus persists among the American political elite and establishment, despite an acute polarisation of the political system in the USA.

The task of the Geneva summit is different: to stabilise the Russian-American confrontation, to put an end to its unhealthy nature and uncontrollable course of recent years, and to form a model of relations in which the parties, despite considering each other as opponents and even enemies, nevertheless will try not to cross each other’s red lines. They also can develop selective cooperation on those issues where it is expedient for their national interests and where this cooperation does not require significant concessions. This model can be defined as controlled or disciplined confrontation.

The main reason that the summit in Geneva is taking place is that the further escalation of the Russian-American confrontation would otherwise undoubtedly lead to an even greater aggravation of the Ukrainian conflict, the situation around Belarus and a large-scale spiral of the arms race. This does not correspond to either Russian or American interests (as they are understood by the Biden administration).

For Russia, such an escalation would be fraught with the emergence of anti-Russian sanctions to a qualitatively new level, the need to increase military spending (today the Russian leadership is cutting defence spending and is proud of it), and an even greater deterioration in relations with European and Asian allies and partners of the United States (not only with the EU as a whole). It would also lead to the further strengthening of Russia’s asymmetric dependence on China, not to mention the humanitarian consequences of a new escalation of the war in eastern Ukraine and the increased risk of a direct military clash with the United States and NATO as a whole. Moscow, obviously, would like to avoid all this.

The interest of the Biden administration in stabilising the confrontation with Moscow is connected, firstly, with the Chinese factor. Since January this year, it became finally clear that the confrontation between Washington and Beijing, which was launched under Trump, is irreversible, systemic and existential for both sides, and therefore it is deeper and more long-term than the confrontation between the United States and Russia. Contrary to the hopes of many observers, there was no detente in US-China relations, and the Biden administration has made it clear that it regards China, and not Russia, as its main strategic rival and adversary.

At the same time, Washington is gradually understanding the limitations of its own resources and the need to concentrate on the Pacific sphere; a vivid example is the Biden administration’s desire to limit the obligations and presence of the United States in the Middle East. The White House also sees further rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow, which has increased in tandem with their opposition to the United States, as undesirable. As a result, the Biden administration seeks to stabilise the “Russian front” in order not to be distracted and to be able to throw as many resources as possible at the “Chinese front”.

Second, as the events of this spring have proved, the Biden administration, on the one hand, is not ready to invest serious material resources in containing Russia in the post-Soviet space, and even less enthusiastic about going to war with Russia because of such countries as Ukraine and Georgia. On the other hand, Washington would not like to witness the termination of their statehood.

The stabilisation of confrontation does not at all mean the resolution of the most acute conflicts and contradictions in Russian-American relations. The contradictions around Ukraine, Syria, Belarus, mutual allegations of interference in internal political affairs, Russia’s accusations of illegal hostile activities and even a “hybrid war” against the Western countries will most likely not be reduced following the summit. The prospect of a fundamental change in the foreign policy of Russia and the United States and serious compromises between them is still absent. Such compromises would be reasonably viewed by both sides as steps towards a strategic defeat, which for the time being is completely ruled out by both Moscow and Washington. In this regard, the stabilisation of the confrontation does not mean the resolution of these contradictions, but the absence of their further escalation.

At the same time, this stabilisation requires understanding, and, most importantly, respect for each other’s red lines. There is no doubt that these red lines will be discussed in Geneva. The ability of the parties to recognise and adhere to them is doubtful, especially in the longer term. For example, the United States will not only not give up open support for Russia’s domestic opposition in the near future, but will increase criticism of the Kremlin over internal political issues in the event of new protests. The parties will also not come to an agreement on what “Russian interference” in America’s internal political processes entail, and where the “red lines” are. Finally, there are great risks of destabilisation of many of the above crises “from below”, contrary to the wishes of Moscow or Washington. For example, the Ukrainian or Belarusian crises, which will inevitably entail a new round of confrontation and complicate interaction on other issues as well. Therefore, the stabilisation of confrontation, which is likely to follow the summit in Geneva, will be very fragile.

The second most important result of the summit is likely to be the launch of selective cooperation in bilateral and multilateral formats on issues where it is beneficial to both parties and does not require qualitative concessions from the parties. This, in turn, will mean a significant improvement in Russian-American relations compared to the state in which they have been for the past several years. Namely, building a policy towards each other based on national interests and national security considerations, as well as the ability to combine rivalry and cooperation where it is necessary and beneficial.

In recent years, this was impossible. Under Trump, the Russian factor became one of the main instruments of America’s internal political struggle, and US policy towards Russia was determined by domestic political considerations to a much greater extent than foreign policy itself. This ruled out any constructive interaction in principle. The White House was forced to constantly prove that it was not a “Kremlin puppet”, and Congress sought to weaken Trump’s ability to determine US foreign policy, making confrontation with Russia irreversible. Coupled with the Republicans’ traditional preference for maximum freedom in defence policy and the desire to put pressure on opponents with the threat of an arms race, this led to the fact that by the end of 2020 the Russian-American agenda virtually disappeared, and the mechanisms of relations (summits, diplomatic dialogue) collapsed. An illustration of the latter is the diplomatic war that has been going on for more than four years, the recall of ambassadors and the actual paralysis of consular relations.

Today the situation is gradually improving. Although Russia still remains a factor in the American internal political struggle (and will remain so as long as the polarisation of the US political system persists), the scale of the politicisation of the Russian factor has significantly decreased since the end of the Trump period. Biden’s foreign policy does not provoke resistance, at least from his own administration, bureaucracy and among Democrats, and in any case he cannot be accused of any sympathy for the Russian president. Moreover, the Biden administration does not view the arms race as a preferential instrument of confrontation with Russia and does not seek the complete destruction of the remnants of the arms control system. Finally, the Biden administration perceives transnational challenges and threats (climate change, the pandemic, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc.) as significantly more important in the hierarchy of threats to national security, and prefers a multilateral approach to their solution.

All this creates the preconditions for selective cooperation with Russia on issues where both sides consider this cooperation necessary and beneficial for themselves.

First of all, the result of the Geneva summit may be the launch of broad Russian-American consultations on strategic stability: how to adapt the system to the qualitatively changed military-strategic landscape and what to do after the already-extended START-3 Treaty (the last traditional instrument for nuclear missile control) expires in 2026.

The parties are unlikely to come to a new “big” agreement in the near future on the limitation and even the further reduction of nuclear weapons to replace the START Treaty. Moreover, it is extremely inappropriate to start such negotiations: the positions of the parties differ so much that it is impossible to successfully complete such negotiations. It is unlikely that it will be possible for them to reach an agreement on the deployment of ground-based intermediate and shorter-range missiles in Europe. Nevertheless, a full-scale dialogue between the two nuclear superpowers on all aspects of strategic stability (which has long entailed more than nuclear weapons alone) is extremely expedient. It includes the discussion of how they understand the threat of a nuclear war amid new military-technological and geopolitical conditions, as well as the development of more stringent rules of conduct in the military-strategic sphere, mechanisms of conflict prevention and de-conflicting.

The second area of ​​selective cooperation between Russia and the United States after the Geneva summit is cybersecurity, which includes four main aspects: the fight against cybercrime, the use of ICT as a military tool, interference in each other’s internal affairs using the Internet, social networks, hacking, etc., and cyber espionage. On the first aspect, the intensification of Russian-American cooperation is most likely. The second aspect relates to the military security and strategic stability (with the help of cyber means it is possible to inflict damage comparable to the use of nuclear weapons, or to disarm or “blind” the enemy during a military crisis). Here it is important at least to determine the red lines (to agree on what infrastructure should not be subject to cyberattacks under any circumstances), develop the rules of the game and create de-conflicting mechanisms and “hot lines” in the event of a crisis. This will not be easy, but it is extremely necessary: ​​properly in the cyberspace that the risk of an unintentional military conflict with its further escalation up to a nuclear war is the highest. On the third and fourth aspects, reaching any agreements in the foreseeable future is extremely unlikely.

The third area of ​​cooperation is the intensification of interaction on the nuclear programmes of Iran and the DPRK, especially in the context of the Biden administration’s desire to restore, in one form or another, a multilateral deal on the Iranian nuclear programme and to abandon the practice of bilateral negotiations, especially summits with Pyongyang, used by Donald Trump.

The fourth area of ​​possible cooperation between Russia and the United States is environmental protection and the fight against climate change, which are positioned as one of the most important priorities of the Biden administration and are taking an increasingly important role in Russian foreign policy. Here the parties have something to talk about globally and locally. For example, the United States may suffer from the introduction of the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (border adjustment carbon tax) within the framework of the European Green Deal, no less and even more than Russia. In the common interests of Moscow and Washington is the creation, as an alternative, of some kind of global mechanism aimed at reducing carbon emissions primarily where it is most beneficial for both countries.

However, the main object of possible cooperation between Moscow and Washington on environmental issues and climate change is the Arctic. In this region, Russia and the United States are part of a shared ‘neighbourhood’, where the rate of climate change is 3-4 times higher than the global average, and where the environmental, socio-economic and foreign policy consequences of this change are the most widespread. The fragile Arctic ecosystem, its infrastructure built on permafrost, and the traditional way of life of the indigenous peoples of the North are under threat of destruction. Moreover, the melting ice of the Arctic contributes to the overflow of the US-Russia and US-China confrontation – the perception of the region, as indicated in the 2019 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, as “an avenue for great power competition and aggression”. As a result, the militarisation of the Arctic is increasing alongside the risk of disasters and military clashes, impeding the economic development of the region. Cooperation between Russia and the United States in protecting the environment in the Arctic is the only factor that can, if not slow down, then at least compensate for these negative trends, combating climate change amid even greater acceleration, addressing the melting permafrost (it is fraught with large-scale methane emissions) and adapting to new climatic conditions in the region.

Finally, the fifth area of ​​possible cooperation between Russia and the United States after the Geneva summit is a “truce” in the diplomatic war and the return of ambassadors to Washington and Moscow, respectively. This is perhaps the easiest and most feasible decision that can be expected from the summit and implemented in the short term.

A distinctive feature of this agenda, which is important for understanding the nature of the managed Russian-American confrontation, is that the beginning of a dialogue on these topics does not require any serious concessions from the parties. This is the most important prerequisite for this cooperation. Moreover, this cooperation should not be seen as a way to improve relations between Russia and the United States. This is generally not on the agenda in the foreseeable future. The meaning of cooperation is to understand Russian and American national interests, which in the indicated areas cannot be realised in other ways, even despite the fact that the parties generally regard each other as opponents.

From our partner RIAC

Continue Reading

Russia

Modest results of the meeting in Geneva

Published

on

Presidents Joseph Biden and Vladimir Putin met in Geneva on Wednesday, June 16. Both separately noted that the talks went well. “There’s been no hostility,” Putin said. “On the contrary, our meeting took place in a constructive spirit.” Biden meanwhile declared “the tone of the entire meeting… was good. Positive.”

The spirit may have been constructive and the tone positive, but no major step forward was made to reset the chronically strained relations between Moscow and Washington. Although the meeting went as well as could be expected, major differences remain on a range of issues, including cyberattacks and human rights.

Putin rejected accusations Russia was involved in cyberattacks against U.S. institutions and declared that the U.S. government was the main offender in this area. On human rights he said that the U.S. supports opposition groups in Russia in order to weaken it, since Washington openly sees Russia as an adversary. Putin reiterated that Moscow did not see domestic politics as up for negotiation or discussion. He also said that pro-Trump demonstrators who stormed the Capitol on Jan. 6 were merely expressing reasonable political demands, for which they now faced punitive jail terms.

For his part Biden ensured the summit would be seen as the opposite of Donald Trump’s notably cordial meeting with Putin in Helsinki three years ago. He said that he had pressed the Russian leader on a range of issues, such as human rights, and that he would continue doing so. “No President of the United States could keep faith with the American people if they did not speak out to defend our democratic values, to stand up for the universal rights and fundamental freedoms that all men and women have, in our view,” Biden said he told Putin. “That’s just part of the DNA of our country… It’s about who we are.”

On the modest plus side the two leaders agreed that their ambassadors, who were recalled amid the rising tensions, should return to their posts in the near future. In addition, the U.S. and Russia would start “consultations” on cyber-related issues. As for the overall tone of the meeting, the Russian president paraphrased Leo Tolstoy by saying “there is no happiness in life only glimmers of it. Cherish them.”

“I think that in this situation, there can’t be any kind of family trust,” Putin concluded. “But I think we’ve seen some glimmers.”

Media commentary around the world reflected one common theme: at least it is reassuring that there is a dialogue. “The US-Russian summit in Geneva confirmed the low expectations for the meeting,” commented the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Switzerland’s leading daily:

There were hardly any concrete agreements, but at least the American president is no longer inviting attack from his Russian counterpart. The chorus of commentators was pretty unanimous in the run-up to the summit from Moscow to Washington: There was no significant room for concessions or a change of strategy, either on the American or on the Russian side. The expectations therefore had to be set extremely low.

These low expectations were noted by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as well, which found it encouraging that the meeting lasted considerably longer than expected. The paper also thought it a hopeful sign that “the Russian President, who had already made the Pope and the British [sic!] Queen wait, arrived on time.”

“The summit flowed along conventional diplomatic lines:” wrote The Guardian; “a handshake, several hours of intensive talks and separate press conferences afterwards. The ghost of Helsinki was exorcised.” According to the British daily, the obvious and easy “deliverables” were achieved:

“One was to normalise the situation of Russia and America’s ambassadors…

“There will also be consultations between the US state department and the Russian foreign ministry on a range of issues including the Start III nuclear treaty, due to expire in 2024, and cybersecurity.”

The Russian media, unlike their Western counterparts, emphasize that one area of agreement in Geneva concerned the implementation of the Minsk agreements. The daily Rossiyskaya Gazeta noted Putin’s statement that Biden agreed with him that the Minsk agreements should be at the heart of the settlement in Ukraine. Quoting Peter Kuznick, professor of history at American University, the paper notes the summit was an important step in the right direction for both sides. No one expected a breakthrough, he said, but the two leaders respectfully and clearly indicated their interest in finding possible areas of common interest:

Both presidents understood each other’s ‘red lines’ and marked them more clearly. Their summaries after the meeting did not contradict, but rather emphasized and complemented each other. It seems to me that Putin was speaking to the whole world, while Biden spoke more to an audience within America, with an emphasis on human rights.

Considering the current state of bilateral relations, the Geneva summit is the maximum that could be expected. All that was deemed possible, but not obligatory, did happen, Professor Fyodor Lukyanov of Moscow’s School of Economics noted.

The conversation was businesslike and informative. This means that from the insane phase we’ve had in recent years, with normal relationship replaced by sheer hysteria, we are moving into a phase of more structured rivalry… The summit only outlined a way out of the impasse. Now we have to do all the work that is normally done before the summit. Since it was not done this time, solid steps will be prepared for some future milestone.

Prior to this meeting, Washington strengthened Russophobic sentiments in countries that follow American foreign policy. The peak of Russophobia was represented by the events in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, but also by a number of other states which adjust it`s foreign policy to Washington’s foreign policy. Bearing in mind that at the moment relations between Washington and Moscow are not friendly, under American command, that kind of states accuse Russia constantly, including for events that happened years ago.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Science & Technology2 hours ago

Say “hello” with the sixth generation of mobile network (6G)

The recent introduction of 5G across the globe  has directed the interests of telecom experts to the development of the...

International Law5 hours ago

Human Rights violation in Palestine: A serious concern

Palestinians had long been victim of brutal Israeli assailant forces. The innocent Palestinians civilians and children are not only victim...

East Asia9 hours ago

Centenary of the Chinese Communist Party: 100 years of Prosperity and Greatness

Since its establishment, the Communist Party of China has made many national contributions and has become the main engine of...

Tech News12 hours ago

ACCCIM and ANBOUND Co-Hosted Forum on Digital City Development in the Post-COVID Era

After more than a year since the emergence of the Covid-19, our modern world faces unprecedented threats to our public...

Economy14 hours ago

Indonesia’s political will is the key to a successful carbon tax implementation

Authors: I Dewa Made Raditya Margenta, and Filda C. Yusgiantoro* A carbon tax should be overviewed as an oasis of...

Middle East17 hours ago

Syria’s difficult rebirth

It is now ten years since a peaceful demonstration against Bashar al-Assad’s regime organised by students in Deraa was brutally...

Southeast Asia19 hours ago

Understanding The Different Thinkers and the Issue of Compliance in ASEAN

Authors: Harsh Mahaseth and Shubhi Goyal* Over the years the issue of compliance has been seen through various lenses with...

Trending