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The Power of Siberia Pipeline: Multiple Layers of Complex Geopolitics

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The Power of Siberia pipeline is particularly well-suited to exploring the convergence of energy resource scarcity and climate change and that convergence’s impact on international relations and potential conflict.

Gas production for the pipeline begins in Russia’s Irkutsk region, and will stretch from there through Kharabarovsk to Vladivostok, ultimately for exports to the Asian-Pacific region (Gazprom, 2014). In 2014, officials from Russia and China signed a 30 year contract “to supply pipeline gas from Russia to China via the eastern route,” stipulating that Russia will annually supply 38 billion cubic meters of gas to China (Gazprom, 2014). This pipeline, and the deal between Russia and China, adds additional complexity to the geopolitics of the Arctic and will contribute to the possibility of conflict in the Arctic region, which will be influenced by climate change.

This article examines the potential conflict over the Power of Siberia pipeline. It is first necessary to put the pipeline into theoretical, environmental, and geopolitical contexts. Lee’s theory of Hot and Cold Wars provides an excellent theoretical framework through which to understand this issue. It is also vital to understand the role that the environment plays in contributing to future conflict. The two primary environmental factors are shrinking reserves of energy resources and the melting of Arctic ice. These two developments are, in this case, linked and it is necessary to understand their combined influence. Finally, the geopolitical dynamics of the nations involved will be analyzed in order to characterize the threat.

Lee’s Theory of Cold Wars

James R. Lee (2009) has developed a useful model for thinking about how climate change influences conflict, which he terms Hot and Cold Wars. This theory posits two types of zones in which climate change will contribute to conflict, the Equatorial Tension Zone which is comprised of countries along the equator, and the Polar Tension Zones, made up of the Arctic and Antarctica as well as nearby countries (Lee, 2009). The Equatorial Tension Zone will experience Hot Wars, while the Polar Tension Zones will experience Cold Wars. Cold Wars are conflicts of expansion in which rising temperatures cause previously inaccessible resources to become available, as a result of which relevant states engage in competition over those resources.

Potential conflict involving the Power of Siberia pipeline will be characterized by the elements of a Cold War. It is designed to transport natural gas from Russia and “will be filled with gas from Yamal, the gas-rich peninsula in the Russian far north” (Staalesen, 2014). Yamal has a maximum annual gas production “comparable to the volume of Gazprom’s current gas supplies to the domestic market and exceeds twofold the volume of [exported] gas.” Furthermore, as Arctic ice melts, offshore development will be possible and is projected to begin after 2025 (Miller, 2015). When compared to the criteria for a Cold War, the Power of Siberia pipeline displays each necessary element. Having established the Power of Siberia pipeline within a theoretical framework, it is worth exploring its environmental impacts.

Environmental Impacts

The first and perhaps most pertinent environmental influence on potential conflict involving the Power of Siberia pipeline is the melting Arctic ice. In 2015, Arctic sea ice was at its lowest recorded winter maximum (Smith-Spark, 2015). Counterintuitively, researchers at NASA have found that the thickest Arctic ice sheets are melting faster than the thinner sheets, and these areas are most heavily concentrated north of Russia (Gran & Vinas, 2012). According to Lee’s Cold War theory, as these resources become available, the nations who begin to exploit these resources increase their likelihood of coming into conflict.

The most recent “Energy Outlook” published by BP assesses that while global energy demand will decrease by 2035, China will still be a principle driver of demand growth (BP, 2014). The International Energy Agency estimates that by 2030 China will have a larger gas market than the European Union, while its total energy demand by 2040 is nearly double the demand of the US (International Energy Agency, 2015). This demand places Russia and the Power of Siberia pipeline in a privileged position vis-a-vis China’s rising energy demand.

The strategic value of energy resources is illustrated in the increasing tendency of states to take national control of oil companies, forming what are known as national oil companies (NOCs). Rising awareness of and concern for depletion of energy resources has led to states taking a mercantilist approach to energy resources (Klare, 2009). Energy resource competition has already led great powers to intervene militarily in weaker states, but the likelihood of great power conflict is also increasing in indirect ways (Klare, 2009). Aside from general trends toward conflict, the particular geopolitical tensions concerned with the Power of Siberia pipeline have a particular contribution to the likelihood of conflict.

Geopolitical Dynamics

The agreement that Russia would supply China with natural gas from the Power of Siberia pipeline was signed in the wake of widespread, largely Western international condemnation and application of sanctions against Russia as a result of its military interventions in Ukraine. This highlights the international tensions that characterize the Power of Siberia Pipeline. The combination of economic conflict between Russia and the West, and cooperation between Russia and China, reflects and amplifies the geopolitical tensions that existed before the creation of the pipeline.

A concept common to both is the notion of a multipolar world order (Turner, 2009). Russia has pursued this goal in several ways, most recently with the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union at the beginning of this year (Michel, 2015). China likewise has established a number of economic challenges to Western supremacy. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), designed to function like the International Monetary Fund, includes “a quarter of the world’s nations, 16 of the world’s largest economies, and includes countries in Europe and in Latin America.” (Tiezzi, 2015) In the context of Russia’s and China’s revisionist ambitions, and Russia’s international isolation, the Power of Siberia pipeline offers a chance for the two powers to strengthen each other’s strategic positions. This will embolden both nations in their challenge to the West. On the other hand, as energy resources become increasingly scarce, Russia’s access to and control of Arctic resources will increase the likelihood of conflict over these resources.

Conclusion

It is clear that the confluence of climate change and geopolitical tensions are increasing the likelihood of conflict between Russia and China on one side and the US and its Western allies on the other. The theory of Cold Wars predicts that as warming temperatures in the Polar Tension Zone rise, Arctic resources will become more available, resulting in competition and conflict. In the case of the Siberian Power pipeline, the resource involved is natural gas, a critical energy resource. Diminishing energy resource reserves is already raising tensions between major powers. Finally, preexisting rivalries between the West and Russia and China will be exacerbated by climate change and resource scarcity. In the middle of all of this will likely be the Power of Siberia pipeline, something that very few global analysts seem to be focusing on right now.

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Don’t listen to the naysayers, the ICC’s arrest warrant for Putin is a game changer

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The International Criminal Court’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin is a game changer. The wheels of justice are turning, and not in Putin’s favour.

This comes as the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Putin last week, accusing him of responsibility for illegally transferring Ukrainian children to Russia, which is a war crime. A warrant was also issued for Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights.

The Ukrainian government welcomed the decision. Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba reacted to the warrant by stating that the “wheels of Justice are turning: I applaud the ICC decision to issue arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova” and that “international criminals will be held accountable for stealing children and other international crimes.”

Both Putin and Lvova-Belova have been accused of forcefully transferring thousands of Ukrainian children across the border to Russia.

The Ukrainian government claims 16,226 children – ranging from infants to teenagers – have been deported to Russia, while others estimate a figure closer to 400,000.

It’s reported this is part of a large-scale, systematic attempt at adopting and ‘re-educating’ thousands of Ukrainian children in at least 40 camps throughout Russia.

Kubela has labelled Russia’s actions as “probably the largest forced deportation in modern history” and a “genocidal crime”.

Russian officials have been surprisingly open about the transfer of children, unapologetically claiming it is part of a humanitarian project designed to re-home orphaned Ukrainian children.

The ICC investigators clearly disagree.

Commentators and legal experts have pointed out that the court has no powers to enforce its own warrants and that – because Russia is not a party to the court – it is also incredibly unlikely Putin will find himself in The Hague.

While these observations are probably correct, they ignore the broader implications of the court’s decision.

Putin is the first world leader to have a warrant issued for his arrest since former Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir was issued a warrant by the court in 2009.

Like Al-Bashir, Putin is unlikely to be arrested outside of Russia.

But symbolism is important. It signals to despots around the world that they cannot commit heinous crimes with impunity.

It’s also important for Ukrainians, validating their suffering by having their abuser named and shamed.

The warrant also sets the scene for a larger investigation into crimes committed in Ukraine by Putin’s regime.

Yesterday, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine Kostin Andriy signed an agreement with the court to establish an ICC country office in Ukraine.

This is a signal that the court intends to investigate other alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has claimed Russia has committed over 400 war crimes in the Kherson region alone.

Mass graves have also been discovered outside the towns of Bucha and Izium, with 400 and 450 bodies found respectively. Russia has been accused of murdering and murdering these people.

There have also been several documented attacks on civilian infrastructure by Russian forces, including the now infamous airstrikes on a theatre and maternity hospital in Mariupol.

Greater collaboration between Ukrainian war crimes investigators and the court will likely result in more crimes being documented and more charges laid against Putin and his officials.

The decision by the ICC also isolates Putin at a time when he is searching for allies around the world.

Last year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov went on a diplomatic spree across Africa to build support for the invasion in the region. This includes trips to Libya, Mali, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Mozambique.

Russia has also leant heavily on ‘BRICS’ countries, an informal bloc of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

The problem for Putin is that any country that has signed up to the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC must arrest him if he enters their country.

In what is a case of sublime timing, Putin is scheduled to meet with his BRICS counterparts in South Africa – which is a signatory to the statute – in August.

A spokesman for South African President Cyril Ramaphosa admitted the government faces a dilemma, stating that “we are, as the government, cognisant of our legal obligation”.

The government of Brazil echoed similar sentiments. This week, the Minister of Foreign Affars Mauro Vieira said that Putin could be arrested if he entered the country. Another unnamed government official warned that “anyone who goes to a country that is a member of the ICC can have problems, I have no doubt about that.”

Even if South Africa falls foul of its legal obligations – like it did by not arresting Al-Bashir in 2015 – it still represents a two-fold problem for Putin. He will be hesitant to travel abroad for fear of arrest, and his so-called allies will be hesitant to visit Russia to avoid associating themselves with a wanted war criminal.

The seriousness of the situation for Putin’s regime can be seen in their response.

Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev responded to the arrest warrant threatening any attempt to arrest Putin would be a “declaration of war” and suggested Russia could fire missiles at the ICC headquarters in The Hague.

The Speaker of the Russian Duma Vyacheslav Volodin claimed the arrest warrant was more evidence of western “hysteria” and that “we regard any attacks on the President of the Russian Federation as aggression against our country.”

The bluster coming out of Moscow suggests the regime was surprised by the decision.

It is an acknowledgement that – overnight – the situation changed for Putin, and not for the better.

If Putin wasn’t a global pariah before, he certainly is now.

There are 123 countries he will fear travelling to and his regime – whether found guilty or not – will be forever tainted with the deaths of thousands of innocent men, women and children.

With both Ukraine and the European Union planning to establish tribunals to prosecute Russian war crimes, the pressure will only continue to build on Putin’s regime.

Will Putin ever find himself in The Hague? It is unlikely. History shows it is hard to arrest and convict heads of state.

But – just like the late Slobodan Milošević – leaders can often find themselves in places they least expect.

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How Russia Can Build Relations With Friendly Countries

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A year into the conflict between Russia and the West turning into a proxy military confrontation, the most important lesson learned in terms of the international consequences of these developments is that such a large and powerful country really cannot be isolated in terms of foreign policy. It is difficult to say with certainty how much this is connected with the merits and activity of the Russian state itself, and what simply turned out to be an inevitable consequence of the changing world over the past three-four decades.

Much more important is the result: a year after the United States and its allies announced their determination to seriously limit Moscow’s opportunities for international communication, the vast majority of countries maintain stable working relations with Russia; they trade and cooperate in various sectors. In most cases, new contacts are limited not even by Western pressure on third countries, but by Russia’s own unpreparedness to follow through on so many suddenly-open opportunities. This has become so obvious over the past few months that it is recognised even by the opponents of Russia, for whom any concession to conventional common sense is a deep and tragic experience.

We cannot now say with certainty to what extent Russia itself is capable of fully realising the new features of its international position or its true causes. The understanding of this, apparently, exists among the top Russian leadership and has become one of the reasons for its confidence that it is right, along with the conviction that a new stage in relations with the West is not only inevitable, but also necessary in the context of the development of Russia’s political civilisation. However, at the level of the implementation of a specific policy by the state apparatus, the activities of the business sector, the reflections of the expert community or the practical activities of NGOs, we still have to work on developing a number of important habits and come to an understanding of the nature of relations between Russia and the outside world.

First of all, it is necessary to understand that the new quality of relations with the outside world cannot be considered in the context of the conflict between Russia and the West. The military-political confrontation with the United States and its allies is central to ensuring national security. However, the specific causes of the conflict are the result of how Russian-Western relations developed after the Cold War and are very indirectly related to the fate, interests and aspirations of the rest of the world. The way most states behaved towards Russia is a consequence of their own development and interests. These two factors are much more stable and long-term than the current clash between Russia and the West, so it would be erroneous, even at the theoretical level, to link the conflict in one direction and cooperation in the other. Moreover, this may turn out to be a mistake, since it can create confidence that the development of relations with non-Western states is a temporary measure, a necessity that will disappear or decrease after the acute phase of the conflict with the West ends.

Second, the behaviour of those states that do not now oppose Russia and even cooperate with it (which has become commonplace) is not a sign that they are allies of Moscow or are slated to become allies under certain circumstances. There are, of course, exceptions, and even very large ones. China, for example, associates its security and ability to realize foreign policy interests with Russia. A similar position is held by Iran, for which the inability of Russia and China to limit the assertiveness of the West may pose a serious threat in the future. In addition, there is a group of countries already associated with Moscow much more significantly than with its adversaries or third powers. However, in general, the so-called World Majority is not a group of states united by common interests, but an indicator of the democratic state of international politics.

Third, a significant number of states are friendly to Russia precisely because, in principle, they do not need allies or patrons, and rely only on their diplomatic skills. In other words, what brings them closer to Russia’s interests now is at the same time an obstacle to establishing a more solid or formalised relationship, not to mention listening to Russia’s opinions on value issues or even the way things are done in the world. One of the reasons why the United States is growing weaker in its ability to convince others that it is right is precisely that many countries are quite capable of formulating their own ideas about a fair domestic and international order. It would be a little naïve to think that there are those seeking to replace one external adviser with another.

In this regard, Russia may need to take a more careful and prudent approach to the question of the reasons for the sympathies that exist throughout the world in relation to it. In fact, dissatisfaction with oppression from the US and Europe is only one aspect of the motives that determine the desire of many states for greater independence. Perhaps this is even a little more important than the desire to benefit from relations with Russia amid conditions where it has turned to the rest of the world and connects with it many of the issues related to its economic stability. But value issues, also play a significant role. In this respect, Russia really has something to be proud of without trying at the same time to offer more comprehensive plans and objectives. Here we are talking about what makes the modern Russian state attractive to others.

The so-called “soft power”, i.e. the ability to influence the decisions of other countries in ways other than forceful pressure and bribery, is not a product of a nation’s diplomatic activity, but the degree of closeness of the internal structure to abstract ideals that exist in the minds of others. It would be a mistake to think that the state can increase its attractiveness only by investing in the expansion of culture, science or education. Moreover, exaggerated attention to these areas of activity can provoke opposition from the elites of partner countries, for which control over the minds and hearts of citizens is an essential part of strengthening their own power. Even more so, it is impossible to become attractive by organizing the direct bribery of journalists or those who are commonly called leaders of public opinion. First of all, because opponents will always be able to offer a higher price and, furthermore, a more quiet shelter.

However, much more effective than investing in self-advertising abroad can be an increase in openness to the outside world. Modern Russia for most countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East is truly a unique society that combines visible signs of European culture and traditions, on the one hand, and a tolerance for other religions and ethnic diversity that is completely uncharacteristic of the West. Already now one can hear from diplomats from Islamic countries that among all the states of the global North, Russia is the most comfortable for Muslims to live.

The same applies to smaller religious communities. Unlike European states, Russia preserves and cultivates ethnic diversity. All these are the real advantages of Russia in the eyes of humanity, with which we will have to live and cooperate in the coming decades, if not longer. The sooner we understand that the basis of “soft power” is internal, and not in the activities of Russia’s representatives abroad, the sooner we will be able to benefit from our own objective advantages.

from our partner RIAC

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Amid Ukraine Crisis, Russia Deepens Strategic Cooperation With China

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Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping have concluded their three-day diplomatic deliberations, most importantly questions focused on raising economic cooperation and finding strategic peaceful solutions to the Ukraine crisis which started since February 2022, amid the geo-political tensions and re-configuration of the world.

While aspects of the Putin-Jinping diplomatic talks and results were awash in the local and foreign media, the academic researchers’ community and policy experts were upbeat with divergent views, detailed analysis and interpretations, and future political predictions. In the present circumstances, any forecast or outlook made previously, may have changed largely due to the developments emerging from Putin-Jinping meetings.

But our monitoring shows that Putin and Jinping, their large delegations from both sides, discussed a wide range of issues on the modern world agenda, with a particular emphasis on the prospects for cooperation. At the far end, Putin and Xi signed a lengthy statement on deepening their nine-point comprehensive partnership, as well as a separate statement on an economic cooperation plan through 2030.

The parties signed two documents – the Joint Statement on Deepening the Russian-Chinese Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation for a New Era, as well as the Joint Statement by the President of Russia and the President of China on the Plan to Promote the Key Elements of Russian-Chinese Economic Cooperation until 2030. 

The latter consists of eight major areas, including increasing the scale of trade, developing the logistics system, increasing the level of financial cooperation and agricultural cooperation, partnership in the energy sector, as well as promoting exchanges and qualitatively expanding cooperation in the fields of technology and innovation.

The leaders revealed the details of the talks to the media – Putin noted that Russia and China’s positions on most international issues are similar or heavily coincide. According to Xi Jinping, the parties will uphold the fundamental norms of international relations. He believes that the sphere of cooperation between Russia and China, as well as political mutual trust, is constantly expanding. 

In terms of the economic agenda, trade turnover is expected to surpass the $200 billon target. The parties also discussed their intensive energy cooperation and agreed on the main parameters of the construction of the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline. Meanwhile, the total volume of gas supplies by 2030 will be at least 98 bln cubic meters and 100 mln tons of LNG, the Russian leader specified.

In-person meetings may continue in the near future. Chinese President stated that he invited Vladimir Putin to visit China during an informal conversation. Russia’s Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin is also expected to pay a reciprocal working visit to China. Beijing, in particular, is eager to resume regular meetings between the two countries’ heads of government.

Reading through the local media, Financial and Business Vedomosti reported that Russia was ready to take Chinese peace plan for Ukraine, not for resolution of the ongoing crisis, but as a basis for future work on Ukraine. Russia has carefully reviewed China’s plan for a peaceful settlement in Ukraine and believes it can be used for future talks, Russian President Vladimir Putin said after talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping on March 21. Russia, however, sees no readiness for peace talks from the West or Kiev, according to Putin. 

Experts interviewed by Vedomosti believe that China’s initiative could be used as a basis for talks, but any progress would require long and difficult negotiations. For his part, Xi Jinping said that China supports a conflict resolution based on the UN Charter, encourages reconciliation and the resumption of negotiations, and is always committed to peace and dialogue.

China’s 12-point plan for resolving the Ukrainian crisis includes respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries as well as the norms of international law; abandoning the Cold War mentality; initiating peace talks; resolving the humanitarian crisis; protecting civilians and prisoners of war; supporting the safety of nuclear power plants; reducing strategic risks; and preventing the use of nuclear weapons. 

The document described the talks as “the only way to resolve the crisis in Ukraine” and called on all sides to support Moscow and Kiev in “moving toward each other” and promptly resuming a direct dialogue. It urged the global community to create conditions and provide a platform for the resumption of talks.

Experts, however, said that China’s initiative could benefit Russia because it involves a ceasefire and the lifting of sanctions, followed by negotiations to reach a political agreement. At the same time, such negotiations will have no chance of success unless Ukraine accepts and recognizes Russian control over the new regions and Crimea, as required by the Russian Constitution. 

At the same time, there is noticeable distinction between the Russian-Chinese position and that of Western countries and their allies. Meanwhile, United States, the West and Ukraine have openly rejected China’s position that there needed to be a ceasefire.

Before Xi Jinping landed in Moscow, the Chinese Foreign Ministry in February published a document laying out its position on a political settlement of the crisis in Ukraine. On March 20, Jinping held a one-on-one meeting with Putin that lasted about 4 1/2 hours, according to reports from the Kremlin. On March 22, he spent about six hours at talks in the Kremlin in various formats. The parties signed two statements outlining what was accomplished during the visit and called it successful. Chinese President Xi Jinping was on a three-day working visit, March 20-22 in Moscow, Russian Federation.

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