Connect with us

Terrorism

The Rome Conference for Libya

Giancarlo Elia Valori

Published

on

Photo: State Department

As many as twenty-four countries gathered on February 2 last to finally decide how, to what extent and where to start opposing the Daesh/Isis expansion to Syria-Iraq and particularly to Libya.

Those countries included Turkey, accused by various sources of being part of the problem and not of the solution, as well as Saudi Arabia, which has never hidden its support for some Islamist factions in Syria and Iraq having connections with the Caliphate.

They also included Qatar, the Emirate which directly supports – in opposition to Saudi Arabia – the Muslim Brotherhood and some groups of the insurgency against President Assad in Syria.

Also the United States, however, supported and sometimes trained the Syrian group linked to Al Qaeda, the Jabat Al Nusra Front, with a view to combating Isis, as also recommended by General Petraeus, mindful of his surge in Iraq against Al Qaeda, organized with the mobilization of Al Anbar Sunni tribes.

Using the enemy against the enemy is an old formula of the 15th century alchemy and ruses, but I fear that strategic thinking is another thing.

Furthermore, according to some reports obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Hillary Clinton – when she was Secretary of State – was supposed to have supported and armed Qaedist and Muslim Brotherhood to combat Isis-Daesh both in Libya and in the crisis region stretching from Iraq to the Syrian coast.

Therefore, within the narrow scope of the war waged against the Caliphate, the meeting held on February 2 last at the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs – officially called “Ministerial Meeting of the Global Coalition against Daesh/Isis in the Small Group format” – is not a “coalition of the willing”, but rather a coalition of those who do not want to take actions or which take them so late as to jeopardize any action taken to oppose Isis/Daesh both in Libya and Syria.

In fact, the meeting was not attended by the country which has really taken decisions in the region threatened by Al Baghdadi, namely Russia, which has so far launched thousands of air strikes against the Caliphate, thus reducing its territorial size significantly.

The same holds true for Assad’s Syrian Baathist regime, with the Syrian Arab Army strengthened by the Russian contribution, or even for China which, while refusing to participate in any coalition, supports with weapons, equipment and intelligence the Russian effort that has so far avoided Al Baghdadi’ strategic point: reaching the Mediterranean coast and directly threatening the Atlantic Alliance and the “moderate” Arab countries.

Moreover, the US-led operation Inherent Resolve has so far launched over 20,300 attacks on Isis targets.

Hence why is Daesh/Isis still a terrible threat? Obviously because its territory is limited to the minimum required to manage the operations and also because the Caliph Al Baghdadi has been extraordinarily good at handling complex and differentiated relations between his Islamic supporters.

He has played the enemy with the friend and his enemies with each other.

“Allah (himself) does mock at them, and he leaves them alone in their inordinacy, blindly wandering on” (Surah Al-Baqarah, The Cow, verse 15)

Nevertheless the Caliph Al Baghdadi’s Islamic State has already lost about 14% of its original territory, mainly thanks to the Russian-Syrian and Iranian-Iraqi actions, but still rules essential cities for the passage of fighters, means and resources throughout the region: Mosul, Sinjar, Qaim, a large part of Fallujah, the suburbs of Ramadi and the refineries of Baiji.

Turkey has only waged its regional war, especially against the PKK Kurds, sometimes covertly by supporting the Caliphate so as to combat the Kurds and has then managed some Islamist groups with a view to opposing Russia.

In that region, every country has waged the war it liked most.

In fact, the Turkish leaders’ goal is the de facto annexation of the Syrian Sunni area which accounts for 74% of the population and, starting from there, the hegemonic reunification of Central Asia, by using the many Turkmen minorities , up to reaching China’s borders.

A return to the past of the Turkish civilization – turning from a tribe moving from Northeast Asia towards the sea and the region of the old Argonauts’ Golden Fleece into a civilization returning from the Mediterranean to its Asian roots.

Many years ago Carl Schmitt had that insight while thinking of rebuilding the great land empires against the North American and British “thalassocracies”.

Conversely, Saudi Arabia’s goal is to destroy a regime such as the Baathist and Alawite one, linked to Iran. Hence Saudi Arabia wants to regionalize and isolate Iran from the Mediterranean – since Iran has not a necessary buffer like Syria, which is useful to control and manage all oil and non-oil trade originating from Iran towards the Mediterranean and the European Union.

And to think that it was the wisdom of Louis Massignon, a distinguished Arabist and agent of the Deuxiéme Bureau, the Second Bureau of the General Staff (France’s external military intelligence agency) to favor the Alawites (also known, in ancient times, as nusayri, Islamic Gnostics influenced by early Christianity) and to support the quasi-Shi’ite Alawites in managing power in Syria, obviously to prevent the Sunni dominance.

And while Iran and its allies follow, for various reasons, the “party of Ali”, the Shi’a, and Saudi Arabia is closed to the north by a Yemen now run by the Houthi, who are also Shi’ites – while in the Eastern provinces of the Wahhabi Kingdom and in Bahrain the Shi’ite uprising of the workers of the largest Saudi Arabia’s oil fields and gas deposits will break out – on the other side of the Persian Gulf, Iran will manage the uprising thus becoming the absolute master of the Shatt el Arab.

For the Islamic Republic of Iran, managing the maritime, military and economic passageway of the sea crossing where over 70% of world seaborne trade transits is a vital objective. It is the culmination of a no longer regional – and even directly religious – hegemony.

Furthermore, together with the P5+1, the United States have accepted the military Denuclearization Plan of Iran, the Russian pivotal ally in the Middle East.

However, regardless of the actual substance of the JCPOA treaty reached by the P5+1 with Iran, this should make the United States think that the strategic equation of the region must be changed.

This means using Iran to oppose the jihadists and achieve a strategic rebalancing with Saudi Arabia, in exchange for a “new deal” with Israel and the creation of a corridor of alliances between the Iranian Shi’ites, Russia, China and the other nations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Instead of being tied down to “the Saudi lobby”, the United States could start playing at many tables, thus having greater strategic autonomy and putting stronger pressure on the Greater Middle East.

Hence a large containment action, which would ease tensions in that strategic region and put in place – in addition to SCO – a new possible loose alliance linked to the European Union and the United States.

This is the only way to better manage the next land and maritime Silk Way designed by President Xi Jinping.

But our ruling classes are still hostages to what the 17th century libertines called “the old thinking” and swing between a global strategy of generic economic agreements and the return of the old Cold War, while the global jihad is knocking at our doors and, indeed, has already cruelly entered our homes.

Hence is there someone who can really think of using “moderate” Islamists in the new Cold War? And to what end, given the expansion of China and its economic dominance?

Apart from the Russian Federation and the Sunni countries, in addition to Iran, which actively supports, also with ground forces, Assad’s regime and Russia itself, none of the twenty-four countries gathered at the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has clear ideas on what to really do against Daesh/Isis both in Syria and Libya.

Obviously the United States want to avoid the Russian mainmise on the Syrian-Iraqi region, but this logically means that they must somehow support a few Islamist groups that claim they are fighting against the Caliphate. Tertium non datur.

It is worth recalling that some US military trainers were precisely those who set up – with moderate “Islamists” somehow linked to the Muslim Brotherhood – the real “Kominform” of the jihad, a sort of 30th Brigade which, in a first phase, after its passage from Jordan, refused to fight against the Al-Qaeda faction in Syria. Later on some members of the Brigade even defected to Isis, starting from Turkey. Hence the result was exactly the opposite of the one initially planned.

Basically the United States do not want a Syrian-Iraqi area where Russia can “give cards” and master the game in view of a new bilateral confrontation between the United States and Russia. But, apart from the old needs of the “military-industrial complex” that also President Eisenhower feared, what is the strategic logic of a new world bipolar structure, with China which is going to be the first global economy?

In fact the US Forces in Europe are increasing in number (by several thousands) and efficiency, so as to “strengthen” the Eastern European countries’ resistance against Russian influence.

A dangerous bipartition of European security, which is either unitary or does not exist.

But here the strategic equation becomes trivial: either Russia is opposed at global level – and hence the Caliphate’s wound in Syria and Iraq is left open – or a new type of relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation is redefined so as to have a political project and sufficient human and material resources to eradicate the jihad from Syria and Libya.

Once again, tertium non datur.

It is also worth recalling that the magnitude of terrorist attacks will certainly increase, along with their apparent randomness and their distribution throughout the world.

It is a war for infra-Islamic hegemony between the jihad and the Koranic “apostate” areas, but the end point is also domination over Western countries and over their immigrant populations, as well as over the “infidels.”

And we must not forget that this is the real stake.

In the case of Libya, we are faced once again with an almost total lack of strategic and geopolitical vision.

Meanwhile, the various Libyan factions have no interest in coming together to then accept military aid from Italy, Great Britain, Holland, the United States and France.

Indeed, it is now likely for the tripartite territory of post-Gaddafi’s Libya to remain what it is today: Fezzan, Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the areas of the Toubu and the Tuaregh, with further internal differentiations.

It is true that some Europeans maintain we could intervene also without the official request for a joint Libyan government, but obviously our alliance with one single Libyan force on the field would automatically mean that the others are at war against us.

As is well-known, the Parliament of Tobruk – which is the only internationally recognized one – has not accepted the list of Ministers proposed by Al Serraj, the candidate as Prime Minister of the “national unity government”.

The official excuse regards the excessive length of the list of Ministers – as many as thirty-two – but the essence and the substance of the political conflict is different.

It regards the tough opposition of General Khalifa Haftar, the Head of Operation Dignity and Supreme Commander of the Army of the same Parliament in Tobruk.

Meanwhile Caliph Al Baghdadi’s “sword jihad” is organizing itself along the coast; it targets oil infrastructure and therefore aims at biting the jugular vein of the European system.

It does so through oil and, in particular, the jihad strategic point is the management of the over ten million migrants who will leave Mesopotamia to come to Europe according to the pace and time-schedule set by the jihadists.

And Turkey will demand a high price by using its three million refugees as an indirect strategic weapon against the European Union, the Middle East and Libya.

A demographic bomb intended, at first, to destroy the EU Welfare State and later to destabilize our democracies.

Obviously, behind the superficial idea of a “surgical” action in Libya, there is mainly the EU governments’ desire to reduce the tension and concern of their publics, still worried by the para-terrorist attacks in Paris and in many other nations: just think of the 635 women in Cologne who reported to the police the rape attempts and the other offenses perpetrated by over a thousand Maghreb Arabs.

But “feelings” and psychology do not define a strategy.

And the jihadists in Libya already range between 2,800 and 3,500 – including 1,600 in the Sirte region, in the Libyan “oil crescent”.

The Daesh/Isis members are not so many, but quite enough to trigger off a mesh of power similar to the Syrian-Iraqi one: the management of some cities and points of contact between them, without expanding on a desert territory which is useless to retain.

The Caliph Al Baghdadi is the Islamist and jihadist revival of Lawrence of Arabia: the British lieutenant was not interested in land. For him the desert was to be militarily intended as sea: only the lines and routes, and not the entire and huge expanse of water, are to be controlled.

I would define the Isis/Daesh war as an interdiction war – hence the issue does not lie in “eating” the territory away, but in developing a strategy and a tactic which are equal and opposite.

We must organize the resistance and protection of the cities that Isis needs to conquer, as well as the very tough management of connection and communication lines, and finally make the enemy drown into the void stretching between our nerve centers and their lines.

Furthermore, considering that the Isis/Daesh strategy is asymmetrical and “hybrid”, we, too, should do the same.

We can and we must use against Daesh/Isis what is improperly called “terrorism” (which is, in fact, the jihad) so as to destabilize it, intimidate and frighten its militants and especially eradicate its covers among civilians, as well as finally restrict the terrorists’ scope of action.

Wars en dentelles or the old cry of the French captains during the Thirty Years’ War, Messieurs les Anglais, tirez les premiers!, are no longer possible.

I dare not even imagine what will be written on the Rules of Engagement (ROE) of a possible Euro-American action on the Libyan territory.

I am reminded of the Italian ROE in the first phase of our engagement in Afghanistan, which seemed written by Monsignor della Casa, the author of the famous treatise Il Galateo overo de’ costumi.

As experienced by Russia during its actions in Ukraine, in modern warfare we cannot make too many differences between civilians and the military, between soldiers and uniformed officers and guerrillas, between psywar actions and real war operations.

Moreover, what should Western troops do in Libya?

Should they curb or wipe out the excessive power of Isis, which can rely on de facto alliances which would remain in place, like the one with “Libyan Dawn”, which is also the enemy of General Haftar’s forces?

Should they carry out the usual UN “State-building” activity, although many local people do not want a State but only their political system? Furthermore, who would participate in this State-building activity?

The forces which are now fighting each other bloodily or the usual “moderate jihadists” revived for the occasion?

Should our troops perhaps organize the protection of cities from ISIS (which is not only a military, but also a political problem) or the protection of oil infrastructure, without considering the network of people traffickers?

In short, there is a fact which has become clear: the West can no longer wage war, hence it will never be able to achieve real peace.

And here we are at war on a ground and with actions defined by our enemy – an opponent we have left basically undisturbed for three years.

Therefore the strategic asymmetry plays completely against us.

And I do not even rule out the possibility that some of the governments which want to take action have already thought of negotiating with some Libyan Islamist forces, with a view to avoiding the worst and minimizing the presence of our military in the country

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs "La Centrale Finanziaria Generale Spa", he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group and member of the Ayan-Holding Board. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d'Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: "A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title of "Honorable" of the Académie des Sciences de l'Institut de France

Terrorism

Beyond Bombs and Bullets: A Comprehensive Approach Needed to Defeat ISIS

Zakir Gul, Ph.D.

Published

on

Many articles with similar ideas have been written about the current situation with ISIS and what will happen to the terrorist organization in the future. Most of these articles, however, ask incomplete or incorrect questions, which leads to inaccurate assessments of the safety of the world when ISIS is defeated. The articles typically ask questions such as: Can it be claimed that removal of ISIS from the territory in which it operates mean the end to ISIS, or is it only the displacement of terrorism? Shall we celebrate the defeat of ISIS or still be concerned about it? These questions, unfortunately, are incomplete and do not address key elements of the issue. The critical, and more appropriate, questions to ask are: Will the violent and extreme mindset and ideology end when ISIS is defeated? Is it possible that ISIS will transform itself or merges with another terrorist group? Is hard power the solution?

ISIS is just another body into which the violent and extremist ideology of jihadi Salafism has entered. The body dies, but the soul does not. When the body dies, the bad soul will enter another body of a different name. In the case of a defeated ISIS, the organization will die physically but survive as others take up its cause. As long as the violent and extremist ideology and dark soul of ISIS survives, there will always be a body for the soul to wear. The jihadi Salafist ideology will live a new life in a body transformed into another shape and structure.

Failure to ask the right questions means being unable to see and diagnose the problem correctly, intervene correctly, respond correctly, offer the correct solutions, and correctly assess the outcome rightly. In other words, a mistaken first step often leads to subsequent missteps and dire consequences in the long run. For example, when tar is on fire, the expected and first response would be to douse the fire with water; however, the compounds in the tar render water ineffective in putting out the fire and may even make the situation worse.In terms of terrorism, ISIS is the tar, and the commonsense first response would be to use all power available to eradicate the organization.

The literature on terrorism acknowledges that terrorism and radicalization are complex and multidimensional concepts that involve social, psychological, political, financial, and educational issues. Given this mix of factors, could a military and/or law enforcement intervention be the solution to terrorism and radicalization? The answer is “no.” Could the hard power be the solution to some psychological factors (i.e., alienation) or political factors (i.e., political exclusion and oppression) of joining terrorist groups? Again, the answer is “no.” The answer will always be “no” until the solution offered addresses the multiple dimensions of the problem with a comprehensive, but individualized, approach. A reliance on bombs, bullets, and warfare alone will not suffice.

For example, if an individual joins a terrorist group because of a family issue—such as forced marriage, domestic violence, or alienation from close relatives, lack of love and respect among family members—then the approach should focus on family structures and family environments. If an individual whose spouse, children, or extended family members were killed by government security forces longs for revenge and is recruited as a suicide bomber, a military/law enforcement solution alone will not solve the underlying problem. Nor is it the correct approach when an individual has joined a terrorist organization in response to the lack of democratic and human rights. If militants are recruited and exposed to propaganda in virtual environments, then the counterterrorism approach should address those virtual environments to neutralize the terrorist indoctrination. If potential militants are easily swayed by radicals misinterpreting and exploiting religious scriptures because they are poorly educated and lack religious awareness and knowledge, then the counterterrorism approach should focus on counter-narratives and religion-awareness programs. A continued emphasis on tanks, gunfire, and bombs, is a waste of precious money, time, and effort, and lives and, worse yet, justification of terrorist narratives.

Continue Reading

Terrorism

Jihadists of Katibat Imam al Bukhari are afraid of the US strike

Uran Botobekov

Published

on

The US State Department added Central Asian jihadist group Katibat Imam al Bukhari (KIB) to the US government’s list of specially designated global terrorist organizations on March 22, 2018.

As noted in the statement “the Department of State has designated KIB as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Section 1(b) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which imposes strict sanctions on foreign persons determined to have committed, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. This designation seeks to deny KIB the resources it needs to plan and carry out further terrorist attacks. Among other consequences, all of the group’s property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with the group.”

It is already common knowledge that,KIB is fighting in Syria as part of the al Qaeda-linked rebel coalition Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. The KIB detachment was created in Afghanistan on the basis of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. KIB also operates in Afghanistan and has pledged loyalty to the Taliban, who are in turn tight allies with al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network. After the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2012, KIB, on the recommendation of Al-Qaeda, moved to the province of Idlib and distinguished itself as one of the major rebel groups fighting against the regime of Bashar Assad. A group of the jihadists of the KIB is also based in Afghanistan today and is fighting together with the Taliban. About 200 militants are known to fight in the KIB. The propaganda materials of the group are actively disseminated in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia and Kazakhstan.

Three days after the decision of the US State Department to include KIB in the list of global terrorist organizations, Shura of the KIB issued its own statementin response. In itsown statement, which was released via Telegram on March 25, 2018, KIB protested their designation as terrorists by the State Department. KIB states that it “was surprised by the American resolution to enlist the Imam al Bukhari Brigade on the world terror list notwithstanding that we do not have ideological or intellectual ties with any faction internationally enlisted.”

It is most interesting that Shura of the KIB, for its protection, used a lot of peaceful terms in their response such as «international law», «rights of freedom», “murderous Assad regime”, “struggle for а decent life of the Syrian people”, etc.

KIB claimed in their response, that their volunteers from many Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan, formed their brigade “as a result of the war’s long duration in Syria and the increasing number of expats.”Shura of the KIB described his mission in the Middle East as protecting the simple and peaceful Syrian people from the bloody regime of Assad and his external sponsors, Hezbollah, Iranian Shiite militants and Russia.

KIB also claimed that they’ve been fighting with the Free Syrian Army to protect civilians against threats like ISIS, “which pushed ISIS to assassinate our previous leader (Sheikh Salahuddin).””The classification of Imam al-Bukhari Brigade by U.S., turns a blind eye on thousands of the Iranian-backed foreign Shiite militias that commit war crimes against the Syrians, and proves that the U.S. applies double standards and it is only concerned about its interests,” KIB continued.The Shura of group vowed to stay the course “in spite of pains and problems whether in our country or by the world order.”

In this regard, it should be noted that the “justifiable arguments” of the KIB that its fighters are fighting against the regime of Bashar al-Assad and precisely because of this fact they should not be included in the list of world terrorist groups does not make sense.Firstly, not only the numerous factions of armed revolutionaries and the fragmentary Syrian opposition are fighting against the regime of Bashar Assad, but also the world jihadist groups ISIS and Al-Qaeda.However, their goals are completely different. If the peaceful Syrian opposition wants to build a democratic state in Syria in the future, then ISIS and Al Qaeda are fighting for the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East.Al-Qaeda backed KIB that affiliated with Jabhat al Nusra, completely shares the position of his patrons.

Secondly, radical Salafism and militant Takfirism are the fundamental basis of the jihadi ideology of the KIB.In accordance with the ideological doctrine of KIB that was recently published on its Telegram channel, the group considers its goal the construction of an Islamic state in Central Asia, the overthrow of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, and the protection and spread of jihadi ideology around the world by force.

Jihadists of Katibat in training

Thirdly, jihad is the main tool for KIB in achieving its goals, that is, in building the Islamic Caliphate.In their propaganda materials, KIB leaders urge Muslims to wage jihad against the godless regimes of Central Asia and the West.After President Trump decided the U.S. Embassy would move from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, KIB leader Abu Yusuf Muhojir posted on his Telegram page a pledge to defend the Al-Aqsa Mosque and wage jihad on the West.

The Syrian Liberation Front (SLF) — a joint venture formed by Ahrar al-Sham and the Nur al-Din al-Zanki Movement in February — has joined KIB in denouncing the State Department’s designation as well.In its statement the SLF argues that the KIB is an “independent” faction comprised of Uzbeks who were “forced out of their country” and who now fight against the Assad regime and ISIS. It is known that Ahrar al-Sham is an al Qaeda backed Salafi-jihadi group who fought alongside Al Nusrah Front in the past.The SLF also points to the assassination of KIB leader Sheikh Salahuddinlast year, alleging that ISIS cooperated with “Russian intelligence” in the killing.

In this regard, it should be noted that the assassination of the leader of KIB Sheikh Salahuddin is related to the confrontation between ISIS and al-Qaida, which led to internal fighting among the Central Asian jihadists in Syria.His real name was Akmal Jurabaev and he was born and grew up in the Uzbek town of Namangan. He shared the religious views and Salafi ideology of the Taliban and al Qaeda. On April 27, 2017, during the evening prayer in the mosque of a Syrian city of Idlib, Sheikh Salahuddin was killed by an Uzbek militant who was a member of ISIS. The Islamic State distributed the following statement via Telegram messenger in this regard, “The emir of detachment of Katibat al-Imam Bukhari, Sheikh Salahuddin, was punished according to the Sharia law for all the betrayals he committed.”

The Uzbek militant from Tajikistan, known as Abu Yusuf Muhojir, was appointed the new leader of the group. The Uzbek social networks have characterized him as the distinguished military strategist who has implemented a series of successful operations against the army of Bashar Assad. After the comprehensive analysis of his public speeches in the audio format published on the Telegram, we can draw the following conclusions: Abu Yusuf Muhojirhas the deep religious knowledge, knew the nuances of the Islamic Fiqh (jurisprudence) and jihad.

It is no accident that in their statements, KIB and SLF appealed to the fact that the leader of the Uzbek jihadists, Sheikh Salahuddin,was assassinated by ISIS militants.Using this argument that Uzbek militants are fighting with ISIS and their leader has fallen by the hands of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi supporters, KIB is trying to justify its terrorist activities and to avoid international persecution in accordance with the US list of Specially Designated Global Terrorist.

This is not the first time that the United States has designateda Central Asian jihadist group on the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) list.After designation of a terrorist group in the list of global terrorists, the US special services are allowed to carry out operations to eliminate the leaders of those terrorist groups, to take decisive measures to destroy financial schemes and to effectively put international pressure on them.

As is already known, the US State Department has designated the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan(IMU) in the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list on September 25, 2000.As a result, the leader of the group Tahir Yuldash (2009) and the military commander of the group Juma Namangoni (2001) were killed as a result of US missile airstrike.

On June 17, 2005, the US State Department designated the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) to the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list.The IJU is a splinter faction of the IMU, and a substantial number of its members are from Central Asia.The IJU has been waging jihad in the Afghan-Pakistan region for more than a decade. It maintains close ties with al Qaeda and Taliban leaders. The US has killed several top IJU leaders, including its emir, Najmuddin Jalolov, in drone strikes in North Waziristan 2009.

On December 29, 2004, the US State Department designated Uyghur Salafi-jihadi group the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (the Turkestan Islamic Party) to the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL).As a result, leaders of the Turkestan Islamic Party Hassan Mahsum (2003) and Abdul Shakur al-Turkistani (2012) were killed in US drone strike.

Based on this, we can assume what fate awaits the leaders and militants of the KIB in the near future. The designation of the KIB in the Specially Designated Global Terrorist list testifies to the US Government’s determination to combat the jihadist ideology of Salafism worldwide.This is a tangible support to the governments of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, which are facing a real threat of transnational terrorism.After all, the backbone of the KIB is made up of people from the Ferghana Valley of Central Asia, mainly of Uzbek nationality.

According to the Soufan Group, out of 5,000 people who left Central Asia for Syria and Iraq, about 500 jihadists in the ISIS ranks went back to their homes. But among the returnees, there are almost no militants KIB, Katibat al-Tawhidwal Jihad (KTJ), IJU and TIP, which are affiliated with al Qaeda. After the fall of ISIS, it is the militants linked with the al Qaeda that pose a big threat to the countries of Central Asia. Therefore, the emergence of two theatres of war for al Qaeda backed Central Asian militants in Syria and Afghanistan and the relative ease of transit between these two theatres via Turkey increases the threat that jihadists can return to Central Asia at an opportune moment, such as at a time of political, social or economic crises.This would be dangerous for the regimes of Central Asia.

Therefore, the designation of the KIB by the US government into the list of global terrorist organizations gives a positive impetus to the efforts of the Central Asian countries in respect to counterterrorism.But so far the Central Asian governments have not openly reacted to the initiative of the US State Department. Perhaps such a reaction followed through diplomatic channels, which are closed to the public.

The war in Afghanistan and in the Middle East over the past 17 years has shown that the United States is in the forefront of the fight against transnational terrorism and religious extremism. Therefore, it would be difficult for the Governments of Central Asia to do without US assistance in combating the radical ideology of Salafism and world jihadism.

The Central Asian states are in a bind insofar as there is little they can do to stymie the growth of the KIB, KTJ, IJU and TIP in Syria given their lack of influenceand likely also their lack of intelligence.As a result, the Central Asian governments will likely need to develop comprehensive national security strategies with allies both within the region and abroad to manage the complexities of emerging threats.To achieve results in the fight against jihadism, the Central Asian countries need to solve three main tasks.

First, to intensify cooperation with the United States and the exchange of intelligence data.Successful coordination between law enforcement agencies will help to block the channels of financial, material and military assistance to the jihadist groups from Central Asia, affiliated with al Qaeda.Joint cooperation will contribute to the dismantling of bases, camps and training centers for Central Asian jihadist groups in Syria and Afghanistan, neutralizing prominent leaders and identifying commercial organizations and foundations that subsidize them. The fight against Al Qaeda is a more difficult than with ISIS, as it does not have its own territory, which can be hit. In the fight against Al-Qaeda, the United States has significant anti-terrorist experience, effective intelligence tools and advanced technical capabilities.

Secondly, given the increased role of another Uzbek group Katibat al-Tawhidwal Jihad in the global jihad and their successful terrorist acts in Russia (the explosion of the metro in St. Petersburg) and in Kyrgyzstan (the explosion of the Chinese embassy in Bishkek), the governments of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan should lobby the US to include the KTJ in the list of global terrorist organizations.

Thirdly, for successful international coordination of anti-terrorist efforts, security agencies and special services of the countries of Central Asia need to get rid of block thinking and anti-American sentiment, which is a legacy of the Soviet empire and which is being initiated by Russia.Kremlinis known to consider Central Asia as an area of its influence. Putin is imposing its anti-American ideology on the countries of the region, which impedes the joint struggle against world jihadism. The confrontation between Russia and the West on the activities of the Taliban and the future regime of Bashar al-Assad enable jihadist groups from Central Asia to successfully assimilate into a global jihad. Therefore, the governments of Central Asia must work out their own self-position, which allows them to actively cooperate with the US in the fight against the global jihadist threat in the world and stop being a Putin’s “whipping boy”.

Continue Reading

Terrorism

How to stop terrorism: EU measures explained

MD Staff

Published

on

Stopping terrorism requires tackling issues such as foreign fighters, border controls and cutting off funds. Learn about the EU’s counter terrorism policies.

Security is a major concern for Europeans: the vast majority (80%) want the EU to do more to fight terrorism. However, European policy makers also realise that terrorism has no borders.

EU measures to prevent new attacks run from more thorough checks at Europe’s borders, to better police and judicial cooperation on tracing suspects and pursuing perpetrators, cutting the financing of terrorism, tackling organised crime, addressing radicalisation and others.

Improving  border controls

In order to safeguard security within the Schengen zone, systematic checks at the EU’s external borders on all people entering the EU – including EU citizens – were introduced in April 2017.

To record the movements of non-EU citizens across the Schengen area and speed up controls, a new entry and exit registration system was agreed by Parliament and EU ministers on 30 November 2017. These new external border controls are expected to become fully functional by 2020 at the latest.

Stopping foreign terrorist fighters

At least 7,800 Europeans from 24 countries are believed to have travelled to conflict areas in Syria and Iraq to join jihadist terrorist groups, according to Europol. Although there is a decrease in travel, the number of returning foreign fighters is expected to rise if Islamic State is defeated militarily or collapses.

In order to criminalise acts such as undertaking training or travelling for terrorist purposes, as well as organising or facilitating such travel, Europe put in place  EU-wide legislation on terrorism that, together with new controls at the external borders, will help to tackle the foreign fighter phenomenon.

Making use of air passenger data

Airlines operating flights to and from the EU are  obliged to hand national authorities the data of their passengers such as names, travel dates, itinerary and payment method.

This so-called PNR data  is used to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute terrorist offences and serious crimes. Negotiations took more than five years and Parliament insisted on safeguards for sensitive data (revealing racial origin, religion, political opinion, health or sexual orientation) and data protection.

Stepping up the exchange of information

The man who carried out the Berlin Christmas market attack used multiple identities to evade border and law enforcement authorities. This, and other similar cases, show the importance of effective information sharing between different authorities (law enforcement, judicial, intelligence) in EU countries.

The EU already has many databases and information systems for border management and internal security. The Parliament is currently focusing on rules that will enable the interoperability of the databases and allow for the simultaneous consultation of the different systems.

Europol, the EU’s police agency, supports the exchange of information between national police authorities as the EU criminal information hub. In May 2016 the Parliament agreed to give more powers to Europol  to step up the fight against terrorism as well as to set up specialised units such as the European counter terrorism centre, which was launched on 25 January 2016.

Tackling the financing of terrorism

An effective measure to stop terrorists is to cut their sources of revenue and disrupt logistics. The Parliament wants EU countries to track suspicious financial transactions and charities and also look into the trafficking of oil, cigarettes, gold, gems and works of art.

MEPs have completed the latest update of the EU’s anti-money laundering directive, which tightens the rules on virtual currency platforms and anonymous prepaid cards.

MEPs also managed to secure additional resources in the EU’s 2018 budget to better fight terrorism and organised crime. The European Commission recently set up a blockchain observatory in response to Parliament calls to monitor virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, to prevent them being used to finance terrorism.

Reducing access to dangerous weapons

The EU does everything possible to prevent dangerous weapons falling into the hands of the wrong people. The revised firearms directive closed legal loopholes that allowed terrorists to use reconverted weapons, for example in the Paris 2015 attacks. It requires EU countries to have a proper monitoring system, while keeping exemptions for hunters, museums and collectors.

Parliament is also pushing for better control of arms exports  and an embargo on arms exports to Saudi Arabia.

Preventing radicalisation

Most of the terrorist attacks in Europe were perpetrated by home-grown terrorists. Parliament therefore proposed measures to fight radicalisation and extremism in prisons and online by making use of education and social inclusion.

The EU’s added value

The EU level is the main forum for cooperation between member states in the fight against terrorism, even though counter-terrorism policies are to a large extent the responsability of countries..

MEPs decide on a par with EU ministers on major EU counter-terrorism laws. Traditionally, Parliament makes sure fundamental rights and data protection are respected.

The EU’s counter-terrorism strategy is based on four strands: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. The current framework that the European Commission follows in its proposals is the European Agenda on Security 2015-2020, which aims to facilitate cooperation between EU countries in the fight against terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime.

In recent years there have been many EU policies on counter-terrorism and it involves many people, organisations and strategies. The Parliament set up a special committee  to suggest ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU’s response to terrorism.

Continue Reading

Latest

Energy1 hour ago

Economic value of energy efficiency can drive reductions in global CO2 emissions

Ambitious energy efficiency policies can keep global energy demand and energy-related carbon-dioxide (CO₂) emissions steady until 2050, according to a...

Newsdesk4 hours ago

UN launches global plan to strengthen protection of internally displaced persons

With multiple crises forcing millions of people away from their homes, United Nations agencies, Governments and partners have launched a...

Economy13 hours ago

Circular economy: More recycling of household waste, less landfilling

EU Parliament backs ambitious recycling targets, under legislation on waste and the circular economy, adopted on Wednesday. Improving waste management...

Middle East13 hours ago

How the Guardian newspaper fulfills George Orwell’s prediction of ‘Newspeak’

On Sunday April 15th, Britain’s Guardian bannered “OPCW inspectors set to investigate site of Douma chemical attack” and pretended that...

Diplomacy14 hours ago

The evolution of the concept of diplomacy

Transformation in diplomacy, like the transformation of other international scenes of international relations, has not stopped at a specific point,...

South Asia15 hours ago

The Not-So-Missing Case of Indian Innovation and Entrepreneurship

Hitendra Singh and Gauri Noolkar-Oak* Recently, an article published in Modern Diplomacy caught our attention. The author has cited Mr....

Economy16 hours ago

Greece can turn its education system into a source of inclusive and sustainable growth

With a qualified and well-engaged teacher workforce, motivated 15-year-old students with a strong sense of school belonging, and one of...

Newsletter

Trending

Copyright © 2018 Modern Diplomacy