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The Russian Federation’ strategic equation in Syria

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How are the Russian-Syrian operations and the operations of the United States and its coalition in Syria going and, more importantly, what can we expect from them? According to Western sources, Isis/Daesh has recently reduced its size by 40% overall and by 20% in Syria, while it had lost only 14% of its territory throughout 2015 when the Caliphate’s Daesh expanded – without recovering the same amount of territory – in Eastern Syria.

Another area where the Caliph Al Baghdadi has lost much of his territorial control is the area along the border with Turkey – while the Caliph has arrived up to the areas along the border with Jordan, the traditional area of smuggling and transit of its militants. Areas towards the Lebanese border and in the Palmira region are reported to be under Isis/Daesh control.

Hence, so far, both the US Coalition’s and the Russian-Syrian pressures do not seem to be sufficient to definitively destabilize Al-Baghdadi’s Caliphate, despite its current territorial losses.

Therefore Isis/Daesh is likely to restructure itself in the form of a first-phase Al Qaeda, as indeed it already appears to do.

This means that Isis/ Daesh could create – or has already done so – a small and centralized organizational structure, with informal peripheral networks in Europe, North Africa and Central Asia, with a view to organizing mass terrorist actions and blocking the Western resistance against the jihad, as well as finally disrupting the European security forces.

Nevertheless why the Russian-Syrian actions and the other US-led action do not work fully?

Firstly, we must analyze the Caliphate’s weapons: it has acquired most of the stocks abandoned by the Iraqi and Syrian armies, including sufficiently advanced weapons to counter the Russian and the Coalition’s weapon systems.

Absolute technological superiority is not needed.

The will to fight and the higher mobility of the Caliphate’s armies are more than enough.

In essence, Isis/Daesh can avoid attacking the best equipped areas of both coalitions, while it can predict and avoid the West’s points of attack thanks to a joint and unified command/control centre located far from the lines.

Said centre employs the same technologies as the anti-jihadist forces, as well as similar logics of action. Mimicking the enemy is an effective way of fighting it.

Furthermore mobility replaces technological superiority and currently nobody – except for the Russian Federation – wants to fight “for Gdansk”, which today means fighting for Damascus.

A Caliphate’s conventional strategy “from the weak to the strong” – just to use the same terminology as the philosophers of war, Beaufre and Ailleret – where the Western weakness is twofold: both on the ground – where Isis/Daesh is much more mobile and causes politically unacceptable damage to the West (with the exception of Russia and the Kurdish and Yazidi militias) and within the Western public, slackened off by the fairy tale of “good” immigration which blocks the European governments’ reactions on the necessary presence of Western troops on the ground.

Not to mention the fact that Isis/Daesh has taken possession, on its own territory, of the Hamas line in Gaza: a very thick and dense network of underground tunnels, which protects from air attacks and allows the economic activities needed to support the organization.

Another primary goal of the Caliph Al Baghdadi is to saturate Western police forces and making them actually unusable since they are already scarce in number and weapons, while Europe dies in “multiculturalism”.

This is a primary goal of Isis/Daesh which, in the future, will certainly attack – probably also territorially – some areas in European countries “from the weak to the strong”.

The bell tolls for us, too – just to make reference to John Donne’s verse, which became famous as the title of Ernest Hemingway’s novel on the Spanish Civil War, which in fact paved the way for World War II.

Hence, we will soon have a core of militant jihadists not necessarily trained in Syria, but connected via the Internet, and a vast network of “fellow travelers” who can serve as cover, logistical support, recruitment area, political and media manipulation for the more gullible or fearful Westerners.

This will be – and, indeed, it already is – the structure of Al Baghdadi’s Caliphate in Europe.

The “branches” of Al-Baghdadi’s Caliphate are equally efficient: in the Barka province in Libya – and now in the Sirte district with the agreement between the Isis/Daesh and Gaddafi’s tribes – as well as Jund-al-Kilafah in Algeria, Al Shaabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, Jundallah in Pakistan and Abu Sayyaf in Malaysia.

The void of Western inanity is immediately filled by ISIS, which does not know international law, but only a miserably manipulated Koran.

Hence a mechanism similar to communicating vessels is in place: the more the Isis/Daesh crisis deepens on its territory of origin, the more threatening and powerful the peripheral groups become.

While, at the same time, in Europe we are witnessing some mass radicalization manoeuvres which rely on Al Qaeda’s old techniques: at first, the more or less crazy “Manchurian candidates”, who played havoc in small areas.

Later – as today – mass actions, like that in front of the Cathedral and train station in Cologne, which will certainly bring good results to the Caliph in the future; then again real, visible and very effective terrorist attacks.

Not to mention similar mass actions in Hamburg and Zurich.

Finally, when and how it will be logistically possible, we will witness the creation of small “Caliphates” in Europe, in the areas which the enormous long-term stupidity of EU leaders has left fully in the hands of Islamic mass immigration that has seized neighborhoods and cities.

The war against the Caliphate is and will be a very long war and the West – probably with the only exception of the Russian Federation – has in no way the political and psychological ability, nor the power to fight it with a view to winning it.

The West will die of soft power, as well as of a lot of talk with Islamists who do not want to hear it – all convinced of their alleged cultural, religious and military superiority.

Years of peacekeeping, “stabilization” and peace-enforcing have turned the European Armed Forces – already largely undersized at that time – into traffic guards and organizers of elections – always rigged – just to be as quick as possible and go away without disturbing the sleep of European peoples.

The very size of the European Armed Forces, considered individually or in a ramshackle coalition “against terror”, is not even comparable with those of the United States or Russia, after decades of equally unreasonable reduction of investment in the military and in the public safety sectors, even after the first Al Qaeda attacks.

Quos Deus perdere vult, dementat – Those whom God wills to destroy he first deprives of their senses.

On the contrary, Russia has implemented a thorough reform of its Armed Forces in 2008, after the war with Georgia, and it has worked much more on the “human factor” than on technology which, however, has not been neglected.

So far the Russian forces in Syria have deployed artillery groups and other ground forces while, according to reports coming from Russian sources, Russia is deploying batteries of S-400 anti-aircraft missiles again on Syrian territory, over and above providing “Buk” anti-aircraft missile systems to the Arab Syrian Army.

The S-400 missile – also known as “Growler”, according to the NATO designation – is an anti-aircraft missile which intercepts aircrafts flying up to 17,000 kilometers per hour, while “Buk” (also known as SAM 17) is a surface-to air missile system (also known as “Gainful” according to the NATO designation) with radars for the acquisition of targets, which are the enemy cruise missiles and strike aircrafts.

Nevertheless, why does Russia deploy such an advanced anti-aircraft structure if Isis/Daesh has no planes?

The simple answer to this question is because Russia wants to reduce and eventually eliminate Western raids, often objectively inconclusive or scarcely effective, also due to the lack of a network for target acquisition.

Conversely, Russia wishes to take Syria as a whole, after destroying or minimizing Al Baghdadi’s Caliphate.

President Putin needs a victory in Syria – firstly because the defeat of Al Baghdadi’s Caliphate avoids the jihadist radicalization of the over twenty million Muslim residents and citizens of Russia.

If the Russian and Central Asian Islam takes fire, Russia can no longer control – militarily or economically – the energy networks towards Europe and the Mediterranean region, which is the central axis of its geoeconomy.

Moreover, Vladimir Putin wants to become the only player of the Syrian crisis because, for Russia, ousting the West from a NATO neighboring country, which is pivotal for control over the Mediterranean region, means to become – in the future – one of the two players or even the first player in the Mare Nostrum, with strategic consequences which are unimaginable today.

Finally the Russian anti-aircraft missile systems are needed to wipe out the aircrafts of the powers not coordinating with Russia and to strengthen military cooperation with the countries which have accepted the Russian air superiority.

For example Israel which, for the time being, offsets by Russia the de facto breaking of military and strategic relations with the United States and the political anti-Semitism mounting in Europe.

Furthermore, Putin also holds together – in a hegemonic way – Iran, Bashar al-Assad’s Syria and the Lebanese Hezbollah, thus setting himself up as a mediator and power broker between the Shi’ite bloc and the West when, in all likelihood, the clash between the Sunnis and the “Party of Ali” will become disastrous and fatal for European security.

Furthermore, the Russian President wants to push the United States away from the Middle East definitively, regardless of the United States maintaining or not their preferential relations with Saudi Arabia.

Finally, within the UN Security Council, Russia will do its utmost to capitalize on its hopefully future victory against Isis/Daesh, by exchanging it with the achievement of other Russian primary interests: the management of the Arctic; the forthcoming militarization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; the regionalization of NATO eastward and possibly a new military agreement with China, which would make the composition of the UN Security Council completely asymmetrical.

Not to mention the great attraction which Russia would hold for a Eurasian peninsula left alone by the United States and devoid of acceptable defenses in the Southeast.

In this case, the Eurasia myth of the Russian philosopher and strategist, Alexander Dugin, would come true very quickly.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Russia and Belarus: An increasingly difficult alliance

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Way back in 1991, while the crisis of the Soviet system was leading to the disintegration of that galaxy of nations which, under the acronym of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), was the second world power in political, military and economic terms, Russia promoted and obtained the establishment of the “Commonwealth of Independent States” (CIS)in view of curbing the centrifugal force triggered by Ukraine’s declaration of independence of December 1, 1991.

On December 8, 1991, all the former Soviet Republics joined the CIS, with the exception of the independent Ukraine and the Baltic States, which had been absorbed into the USSR in September 1939 thanks to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and since then had always considered themselves militarily ‘occupied’ by the Soviets.

Currently, after the defection of Georgia and other statelets in the Caucasus, the Commonwealth of Independent States has eight other members in addition to Russia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Belarus.

A glance at the map shows that Russia has placed itself physically at the centre of a region in which the CIS Member States play a fundamental role, not only as a free trade area covering a single market of over 180 million people, but also as an important collective security area that has ensured to Russia – which psychologically has never recovered from the Nazi aggression of 1941 – a ‘buffer zone’ around its territory, which is very important from a military viewpoint(all the more so after the “betrayal” of Ukraine, which, by siding militarily with NATO in 2014, helped fuel the Kremlin’s paranoia about border security).

It is in this political and “psycho-political” context that the “special relationship” between Russia and Belarus was born and developed – a relationship that for some time has been showing increasingly visible cracks.

Belarus is a Presidential Republic ruled since 1994 by “President-dictator” Alexander Lukashenko.

 Elected and re-elected again and again over the last 25 years after elections looked on with suspicion by all Western diplomacies, Lukashenko has been tolerated with more or less obvious annoyance by the Kremlin, which is interested in maintaining a privileged and advantageous relationship at economic and military levels, even in the face of the harshness with which the Belarusian President has been trying for years to keep the political opposition in his country under strict control with his iron fist and with instruments that appear excessive even to the certainly non-liberal Kremlin representatives.

The straw that threatens to break the camel’s back and try Vladimir Putin’s patience vis-à-vis his Belarusian colleague was his umpteenth re-election in August 2020 to the Presidency of the Republic with vote percentages that in the eyes of the entire West, but also of Russia, appeared to be the result of shameless electoral fraud.

Last year’s August elections put the Kremlin in a very awkward and uncomfortable position.

 On the one hand, continuing to support Lukashenko’s discredited government diminishes the Russian government’s democratic credibility not only in the eyes of Europe and the United States, but also in those of the more moderate allies in the CIS and, at the same time, risks alienating the respect and support of the pro-Russian citizens of the Belarusian Republic who are calling for more democracy in their country without undermining the friendly ties with Russia.

On the other hand, there is concern in the Kremlin’s upper echelons that too openly supporting the reasons for the people’s uprising against Lukashenko and the demand for more democracy in Belarus could turn the neighbouring Republic into a symbol for those who are calling for a similar expansion of democratic rules in Russia.

The cunning Lukashenko who, before the August 2020 elections had shown signs of impatience with Vladimir Putin’s policies – according to reliable sources, they hate each other – going as far as to order the arrest (a few weeks before the vote) of 33 Russian “mercenaries” accused of being part of a Kremlin plot to sabotage his re-election, after having been put in difficulty by internal unrest and the international reaction to his authoritarian methods of government, backtracked vis-à-vis Russia.

Initially Belarus granted Russia exclusive rights on the use of Russian ports for Belarusian oil exports – a request that Lukashenko had resisted for years. Later he agreed to the stationing of military contingents of the Russian National Guard on his territory. Finally, on January 10, the Belarusian President publicly called for “the removal of any obstacles…to greater integration between Russia and Belarus”.

In spite of the increasingly worried moves of the Belarusian autocrat, faced with the choice between supporting the Belarusian regime and trying to get rid of the troublesome neighbour with a coup –Russia is considering a third option which could safeguard the stability of a country like Belarus, which Russia deems essential not only from an economic, but above all from a military viewpoint, as basic foundation of the ‘strategic depth’ ensured by Belarus on the Russian borders in its important role of ‘buffer state’ safeguarding the security of Russia’s Western borders.

The third option is included in two documents leaked by the Kremlin at the end of last year and published by the Russian investigative website The Insider.

The first document is entitled “Strategy of Operational Intervention in the Belarusian Republic” and was drafted in September 2020, when Lukashenko’s democratic reputation was at the lowest ebb, after the evident electoral fraud and the harsh repression of people’s protests.

The drafters of the document speak of the need to change the Belarusian Constitution also through “the penetration of all opposition parties and organisations” to the regime “with a view to encouraging the creation of new political forces promoting the reform of institutions”, as well as through a propaganda work with the use of modern communication channels such as Telegram and Youtube.

The aim of this operation would be twofold: to turn the Belarusian Presidential Republic into a Parliamentary one and increase consensus towards the Russian ally.

The second document drafted by Kremlin strategists and skilfully leaked to The Insider talks about the foundation of a new political party in Belarus called “The People’s Right”, which would promote changes to the Constitution along Parliamentary lines, as well as social and economic reforms that would win citizens’ support.

The creation of this new Party has not yet been publicly announced, but its programme suggests that the Kremlin hopes to divert popular support in the neighbouring Republic towards a Parliamentary and democratic transition of the country, which – as a side effect – could reduce protests over electoral fraud in the last elections.

The new Party’s plans envisage that, even if – at least in an initial phase – Lukashenko remains in power to enable him to save face with a dignified departure from the scene, he will be deprived of almost all his current executive powers, as his future functions will be reduced to the typical representative functions of a ‘normal’ President in a Parliamentary Republic.

Furthermore, the programme of the new pro-Russian Party includes plans for extensive privatisation of the Belarusian public sector, as well as the ‘dismantling of censorship’ and ‘respect for the freedom and dignity of the individual’.

The first feedback to the publication of these two documents, with which the Kremlin wants to demonstrate not only an obvious interest in the stability of Belarus, but also an unexpected (at least for us in the West) attention to democratic rules and respect for human rights, have aroused very positive reactions in the Russian business world, which is obviously very interested in penetrating more deeply into a country that has a well-developed industrial sector, exports a significant quantity of goods to Europe as well as to Russia, has two excellent large oil refineries and is at the forefront in the field of information technology and IT services.

In short, it is a potentially good geopolitical achievement for Vladimir Putin and his government: limiting and frustrating the ambitions of an autocrat who does not want to give up the reins of power and, at the same time, gain credit – towards Europe and the new U.S. Administration – as promoter of Western-style democratic and economic reforms.

 All this while safeguarding the role of Belarus as a “buffer zone” against a NATO that, although weakened, remains a strategic opponent in the eyes of the Kremlin.

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How Crimea Strengthened Russia’s Eurasian Identity

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While the west imagined Crimea was just a territorial dispute that had got out of hand and its annexation a move forced on Putin to salvage something from the ruins of his Ukrainian policy, the Chinese saw it as the moment Russia flipped from being a Eurocentric power to a Eurasian one. The bridge that connected mainland Russia to Crimea which cost $3,69 bln and stretched for 19km symbolized the fact that this was not just a buffer zone but sacred territory and there was no going back as its unity with Russia was eternal. A massive new mega church the resurrection to honour Crimea’s return to the motherland. Leading Siloviki from the power ministries such as defence minister Sergei Shoygu was pictured in a mosaic to show that the days of Russian were over and that the security services were once again watching over Russia and ensuring that the enemies encircling it were kept at bay .The temporal and the sacral under Putin were once again in harmony after decades of being at odds with one another.

The idea that Russia through Eurasia was coming back to itself was a perennial topic of influential nationalists .The infatuation with the west was over and Russians were once again appreciating that being different did not mean inferior. For example Dmitry Rogozhin the head of Russia’s space agency commented that “in space one must not run after beautiful goods with wonderful labels under the music of Bowie, but one must lean first and foremost on well functioning systems.” The excellence of Russia’s high performance sectors should energize the low expectation culture that bedevilled many Eurasian projects . So for example regarding the Blagoveshchensk-Heihe bridge which was built to accommodate  300,000 vehicles and had a load capacity of 4 million tonnes prime minister Mikhail Misushtin on its commemoration wanted to know “what it was like working with Chinese partners” on the project. Like the Chinese Russians should not tolerate excuses for shoddy work and should not look at the Crimea annexation as an exception but a rule. Not as a one off event with a short lived effect that disappeared once the euphoria ended but something to be harnessed permanently so it could be applied on an industrial scale across multiple sectors.

Eurasian road

Russia had proved in Crimea that it had an edge in cyber technology in particular and could act unilaterally to defend its interests. But it was working at razor thin margins and stretching them to the limits so it could only be sustained for a short time. It was much more effective combined with a partner China that had spare capacity and an abundance of riches and did not have to work fast in case it used up all its resources too quickly. It only needed to employ a fraction of their strength and allow the Russians to spread the  burden with the Chinese. Where  they could concentrate on upgrading their labour and production capacity  without the pressure of bringing immediate results.  So whereas  the Blagoveshchensk- Heihe bridge was a “difficult object because the weather did not allow us to work in the snow, the access road was snowed over”  the barriers were ” quickly pushed them to one side”. And apart from Vant all the material was sourced from Russian factories. So “we ordered different products from Omsk, Tomsk – at various factories.”

 As new technology became available the costs and risks of operating in the region would fall to acceptable limits and allow it to “reach central Russian living standards.” Its mass introduction would have a dramatic effect so that Siberia and  companies like SIBUR would “have highly efficient and competitive production which would strengthen its position not only in the domestic market but in the world.” It could then pave the way for “thousands of high technology work places, transport and social infrastructure.” This would have a “multiplying effect” on the economy there. And in the case of joint projects such as the Amur gas processing plant the goal was “in the area of metal construction, building material, laboratory and tele mechanical equipment it would be 100% localized.” The problem was to keep as much production as possible within the region and not allow it to move across the border while engaging with the Chinese to the maximum extent. And that any gains in efficiency brought about by digitalization would not come at the expense of hollowing out of the local economy and turn it into a hub for low grade goods.

Regional Dynamo

The Chinese would not be allowed to capture the regional market but it would not done in a way that would discriminate against Chinese companies and deter them from trading. The Russian attitude was that it would be scrupulous in respecting Chinese economic interests and would not disrupt the level playing fields to gain an unfair advantage. They might look to tweak the relationship a bit but not undermine the general direction of travel. The Chinese would continue to enjoy a privileged status within the Russian far east just as minority autonomous regions enjoyed a privileged position within the Federation. This allowed them to champion the cause of engagement with China by presenting it as a Eurasian enclave which shared as much with China as it did with Russia. So the Governor of the Jewish autonomous province Rostislav Goldstein extolling the opening of the bridge between Nizhneleninsko and Tsunyan looked forward to the time where “in the territories around the bridge industrial parks should appear which could produce additional value. And then we need to learn to produce our own products.” He added that “there is an idea now unrealized that we could get permission to create a cross border territory where Russian companies could learn from Chinese comrades.”  So in the enterprise of Vostochny port for example “very attractive conditions of work were established.” And thus  “decent pay, social guarantees, comfortable and secure conditions for production” would develop “team building”. And the benefits would be shared by “colleagues and members of their family who had access to health resorts, nurseries and convalescence centres.”

The degree of political closeness did not heavily influence Chinese economic decision making. It did not mean that because a country had friendly relations with China business opportunities would automatically follow. For the Chinese geopolitical considerations were much less important than economic opportunities .They viewed Eurasia in pragmatic   rather than hard line ideological terms so that even if they shared the same authoritarian leanings the most important factor was economic competence. A country was judged by its economic fitness rather than its political compatibility. The departure from liberal norms was minimal and the extent of their ambitions was confined to working within the system and adapting it to its needs rather than replacing it with a new order based around Moscow and Beijing . The Chinese approach was subtle and multidimensional helping reinterpret the Russian state as a  conservative bulwark at its core  with distinct, complementary  regional particularities open to prevailing  global influences.

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How to strengthen the unity of the people of Russia?

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The significance of the recent changes to the Russian Constitution, and topical issues of interethnic relations were the centerpiece of an online international conference held at the Moscow headquarters of the Public Chamber of Russia.

Opening the conference, “We are the multinational people of the Russian Federation: unity in diversity,” the chairman of the Public Chamber’s Commission and member of the Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations, Vladimir Zorin, described the period when the Constitution was adopted as very difficult and characterized by an active development of new concepts and approaches pertaining to interethnic relations. The 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union, then one of the world’s two superpowers, brought about a flurry of serious problems, many of ethno-political nature, which rippled out into the outside world. These included a resurgence of national and cultural self-awareness of Russia’s many peoples, a religious revival, the exacerbation of old and the emergence of new ethno-political conflicts, and finally, the growth of ethnic and ethno-confessional separatism, which sometimes degenerated into open terrorism. All this threatened the very existence of the Russian Federation as a sovereign state. Russia was forced to make a swift transition from the Soviet to what was then perceived as a liberal-democratic model of “minimal state,” paying an enormous socio-economic and political price for that changeover, which ignored Russia’s traditional values and historical continuity and, at the end of the day, proved largely counterproductive. And all this time, sociologists and politicians alike have been searching for the optimal way of establishing Russia’s statehood and for an ideological doctrine that would be consistent with this country’s traditional values.

The Constitution, adopted on December 12, 1993, contained a number of innovations that laid the foundations for a new society. In its original version, it made no mention of the country’s ethnic and state makeup, as well as of differentiation between the subjects of the Russian Federation along ethnic-state, administrative-territorial and ethno-territorial lines. Neither did it provide the right or the procedure for their exit from the federation. Thus, the people’s right to self-determination is clearly interpreted as self-determination within Russia.

The Constitution allows broader legal regulation of ethnic-related processes, and of ethnic and civil identification at the personal, regional and national levels. In keeping with Section 2 of Article 26 of the Constitution, people are free to determine and indicate their nationality, and no one can be forced to either determine of indicate his or her nationality.

“The amendments proposed in the course of the discussion of the results of the nationwide vote on July 1, 2020, enlarged on these approaches. As a result, in recent years, the ethno-cultural sovereignty of the Russian Federation has been restored, with the state focusing once again on issues of an ethno-political nature,” Zorin concluded.

The head of the General Secretariat of the Eurasian Peoples’ Assembly, Svetlana Smirnova, noted that on the basis of the proposed constitutional changes, work is already underway to enshrine them in the law.

“This conference was on the list of events that are part of our program and were approved by the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs. This year is the first time that our federal and national-territorial cultural autonomies and associations have had the opportunity to hold events with the Agency’s support. Our main goal is to further improve the mechanisms for strengthening the civic unity of the Russian nation, preserve and develop ethno-cultural and linguistic diversity, popularize the spiritual and moral values ​​of the peoples of Russia in accordance with the amendments to the Constitution,” Smirnova noted.

One of the most important constitutional amendments makes it incumbent on the Russian Federation to help compatriots living abroad exercise their rights to protect their interests and preserve their Russian and cultural identity. The state safeguards the cultural identity of all peoples and ethnic communities, guarantees the preservation of the country’s ethno-cultural and linguistic diversity. This is not just a declaration. According to the State Ethnic Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation, adopted in 2012, there are people of 193 nationalities now living in the Russian Federation and speaking 277 languages ​​and dialects. At the same time, 87 languages ​​are used in the system of education. By the time the amended version of the Strategy was adopted six years later, their number had already risen to 105. This requires additional efforts and financing needed to write new  textbooks and train school and university teachers, and the Russian state is ready to foot the bill.

“In our country, as one of the world’s most multi-ethnic and multilingual states, issues of ethnic policy are of particular relevance,” said Anna Kotova, State Secretary – Deputy Head of the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs.

Leokadia Drobizheva, who heads the Center for the Study of Interethnic Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Sociology, emphasized the all-importance for any country of the concept of “consent” that was added to the text of the State Ethnic Policy Strategy in 2012. Without this, it is impossible to implement either economic or cultural plans.

“This concept meant not just good relations between people, but also trust and the ability to coordinate their interests and settle disputes,” she explained.

According to the results of a sociological survey published by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) and the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), the indicator of trust in Russian society is constantly fluctuating, especially since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. And still, apart from their desire to survive, our people also demonstrated a an acute sense of compatibility and a desire to help each other, especially in multiethnic places like Astrakhan region, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Yakutia and Karelia. The respondents named family, work and material wellbeing as their main values. They also mentioned equality of all people before the law, justice, equal opportunities for education and work, as well as the right for paid vacations among the goals that need to be achieved to maintain unity. Thus, the concept of “consent,” introduced into the Strategy, is provided with the most important social functions for a person, which also pertains to interethnic relations in Russia.

“Currently, only 4 percent of our citizens have experienced prejudice based on their ethnicity and race. However, the actual percentage of such attitudes is higher and varies depending on the situation in the region, with 78-80 percent of those polled saying that they do not experience any negativity.  On the other hand, we know that such problems arise regularly and need to be taken into account in order to ensure effective prevention of extremism. First of all, we are talking about the observance of a citizen’s constitutional rights. One’s nationality should not impede employment or career growth, and this is something about 40 percent of respondents are concerned about. The situation in Bashkiria, Yakutia and Tatarstan deserves special attention and here we have no reason for complacence,” Drobizheva noted.

In turn, the concept of “consent” is directly related to Russian identity. Even though Russian citizens are primarily concerned about their material wellbeing, it is equally important that they feel themselves as being one people. According to data released by VTsIOM, before the pandemic struck, 90 percent of those surveyed identified themselves as Russian citizens. This is a very high percentage, of course. However, Russian citizens differ in their perception of national identity. While some of them associate themselves primarily with a single state, the majority associate themselves with the legal field they live in. At the same time, when it comes to history and culture, just under 50 percent of respondents said that besides unifying tendencies there are also separatist tendencies there, depending on the region.  

“This area deserves close and delicate attention,” Leokadia Drobizheva concluded.

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