Ever since the establishment of the modern Greek State, Greece has formed strong, mainly psychological, ties with Russia. Indeed, it was the Russian support to the Greek National Revolution of 1821, that set in alarm the other Great European Powers of the time, internationalized the greek demand for liberty and paved the way for action to be taken to help the Greeks. The endgame of the help that was offered to Greeks was to prevent Russia from gaining access to the Mediterranean, a fact that would have changed the international balance of power in its favor.
It is essential to note that the Russian involvement in the Balkans, when manifested, it is expressed in a very vivid and dynamic way, only to be slowly yet steadily diminished. This is the case due to the fact that Russia uses this geopolitical area as a lever in order to improve its position to other issues of foreign policy that are higher in its agenda. It is safe to argue that the greater area of the Balkans is an arena for Russia to secure its interests and strengthen its position in other issues. Bearing in mind the proximity that Balkan states feel towards Russia due to the common orthodox and soviet past, we can not avoid the observation that ever since Putin rose to power, Russia implements a pragmatic foreign policy, in which narratives such as “omodoxy” or the communist ideology and affinity have absolutely no place. The immediate goal of Putin’s policy is for Russia to regain its status as a Great Power, through the consolidation of its power in the former soviet area while, preserving its territorial footholds worldwide.
A detached analysis of the current state of Greek-Russian affairs would safely argue that the two countries never shared a strategic relationship, rather their collaboration was limited in secondary issues. High expectations were cultivated particularly in the period of 2004-2009, which, however, soon failed. The momentum (and interventions of every kind) did not favor the conclusion of the pursued partnerships, mainly in the energy sector. To elaborate a bit more, from 1993 onwards, any plan that has to do with the construction of pipelines is not fruitful. For one, Greece is a very small market for Russia to take up the high cost of such projects. Moreover, Greece can not yet pose itself as a transit state in order to lure investors. Finally, we can not ignore that the European Commission is very susceptible towards Russia, due to Gazprom’s monopoly in the European energy market. Clearly, there is a great issue with the sanctions that have been implemented on Russia and are focusing primarily on its energy sector, which is undoubtedly the basic pillar of its economy. For instance, in the list of sanctions, for the first time, we see that they name a specific natural gas field, Sahalin, and they forbid any prospective investors from exploring the chances to participate and invest in any plans to develop the particular field. The importance of this particular prohibition lies in the fact that the deposits under development call for high- tech equipment, which is not at the disposal of Russian oil companies. Therefore, the participation of international (western) oil companies, which have the technological “know-how” to develop such projects, is a necessity.
Taking as a given that the EU has diverged from its original utopian dimension, attributed to it by its founding conventions, Greece needs to understand the specific axis under which it can shape its policy towards Russia. Firstly, any effort to promote bilateral relations in the form of alliances should not be perceived as a competition of a strategic and consolidated alliance against another possible and infinite alliance. Secondly, for the balance of power to change in Europe, Greece needs to ally with other European countries with which it has common interests and goals in order to shape a common path and present a united front. It is common knowledge that countries of the so- called core of the EU claim for themselves the unilateral right to set the pace in the relations with Russia, usually in accordance to a tight interpretation of their national interests. Any unilateral effort on behalf of Greece to change the current status of Russia’s image and participation in the European affairs is doomed to fail. Greece is in a very weak economic place. Most importantly, Greece is no longer considered a reliable partner: the irresponsible and opportunistic actions of successive governments regarding the economic crisis led to the loss of whatever political capital the country had. At the moment and unless catalytic events take place, member states sharing interests and views with Greece can not trust the latter to be a reliable partner. For instance, we can refer to the way the Greek government tried to use the negotiations with Russia, at January 2015: Greece gave the impression of a country that tried to manipulate Russia (and China) in order to set them against EU and gain leverage in the main negotiations with EU. Both powers perceived this behavior as an arrogant effort to exploit them. As a result, they dismissed the efforts of the Greeks as superficial and meaningless while the bilateral ties were severed, though not damaged. It remains to be seen whether the current government can learn from its mistakes and make steps towards the right direction to restore the balance and save Greece’s face.
