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Putting Teeth into Peace: Making the JCPOA Legitimate

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Since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed on July 14, 2015, a fierce debate has ensued within the United States. While the agreement is not perfect by any stretch of the imagination, it remains the best option currently available to the U.S. and other world powers to address Iran’s growing nuclear threat. Despite its shortcomings, the deal provides the opportunity for the U.S. to make an essential security impact on the Middle East while potentially improving worldwide relations with Iran.

First and foremost, for the JCPOA to be effective the U.S. must adopt a policy of strict enforcement to the conditions of the agreement and not scrap the deal altogether. Some U.S. law-makers still believe that there is a better option than the JCPOA, as proven by the letter that 47 Senators sent to the Ayatollah warning him that the deal could easily be undone by a future Republican President or Congress. To back out of the JCPOA would be extremely risky at this point, however, as the U.N. Security Council voted for the deal unanimously and more than 100 countries around the world have already publicly endorsed it.

Instead of hoping to get Iran and the P5+1 back to the negotiating table, the U.S. should focus on enforcing the best deal that it is likely to get with Iran now. Senator Coons of Delaware explains, “The President should coordinate a whole government effort utilizing the Pentagon, Intelligence Community, State, Treasury, and Energy to fully enforce this deal. The President must support action by Congress to increase funding and resources for the IAEA and the Office of Foreign Assets Control to allow strict enforcement of sanctions against Iran and the most effective snapback mechanism possible.” If the U.S. proves now that it is willing to strictly enforce the agreement, then it will give Iran less incentive to cheat on the deal in the future, thereby increasing global security.

It is equally essential for the U.S. to enforce the Additional Protocol that supplements the JCPOA. According to the IAEA, “the Additional Protocol aims to fill the gaps in the information reported under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. By enabling the IAEA to obtain a much fuller picture of such states’ nuclear programs, plans, nuclear material holdings and trade, the Additional Protocol helps to provide much greater assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in those States.” By demanding that Iran strictly adheres to the Additional Protocol the U.S. can avoid an outcome similar to the First Gulf War, when it became clear that Iraq had exploited a loophole in the standard IAEA Safeguards Agreement and used undeclared facilities to build a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Olli Heinonen, a veteran International Atomic Energy Agency arms inspector, explains, “Without unfettered access to people and all sites in Iran, and if limitations and sanctuaries are carved out, it will be impossible to convincingly certify that Iran is fully complying with its undertakings.” Further assurances of Iran’s commitment to its obligations under the JCPOA can be achieved by dedicating resources to fully implement the Additional Protocol and by expanding the dimensions of the protocol to include Iran’s military sites.

Despite the presence that the U.S. commands in the world, it will not be enough to deter Iran without assistance. The U.S. must enlist the support of its European allies to make sure that they will take effective action against marginal violations by Iran. This includes re-imposing sanctions against Iran in order to prevent ballistic missile proliferation and the support of terrorism if necessary. When the U.S. helped to establish the United Nations after WWII, it learned that attacking a problem as a united front has many benefits. Current U.S. policy should mirror the philosophy of international partnership rather than hoping to deter Iran solely through its own military might and financial institutions alone.

For the future success of the JCPOA and worldwide security, the U.S. should look to strengthen the parameters of international treaties now, rather than in 15 years, when the most restrictive aspects of the JCPOA will be basically unenforceable. The two treaties that have the potential to affect nuclear proliferation most are the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). The CTBT is a legally binding ban on nuclear explosive testing and the FMCT would prohibit the production of the two main components of nuclear weapons – highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium.

The first step in strengthening both of these treaties is to get them passed and ratified in the United Nations. Then, under the precedent of these treaties, the U.S. can begin to pursue an international ban on HEU and plutonium, beginning in the most unstable region of the world: the Middle East. The U.S. and other world leaders should consider adding amendments to these treaties as well. As Senator Coons correctly assesses, “We should require continuous access to all IAEA inspection sites under the Additional Protocol and develop new standards for when a country can build a nuclear facility based on a minimum standard of international economic competitiveness.” Additionally, new technology has been developed in online enrichment monitoring and the U.S. should advocate for this technology to be standard practice for all nuclear facilities. If the U.S. decides to implement these changes over the next decade, then Iran will find that it is faced with a new set of barriers on its nuclear program when the restraints of the JCPOA finally come to an end.

In the Middle East, arguably the greatest plausible conflict is still between Israel and Iran. To regulate this potential threat the U.S. must reaffirm its support for Israel so that Iran understands that if it threatens Israel, it threatens the U.S. by default. The current Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) provides Israel with $30 billion in U.S. assistance through 2018. While the U.S. has always considered Israel’s security a top priority, money assistance as a means to an end will not be enough to convince Israel that the U.S. still has its best interest at heart. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent President Obama a letter outlining its support for a strengthened MOU with Israel. Michael Bennet, the ranking member of the committee correctly determined, “These measures are necessary to deter conventional and asymmetric threats to Israel. We also support providing missile defense funding, as necessary and appropriate, to accelerate the co-development of missile defense systems, and increased bilateral cooperation on cyber, intelligence, and research and development for tunnel detection and mapping technologies.” The measures outlined in this letter to President Obama are precisely the kind of enhancements that should be added to the MOU. These revisions will give Israel the military assurance that it requires to embrace the JCPOA, while effectively deterring Iran from escalating the regional rivalry.

The JCPOA has the potential to supply the world with a promising future, but only if the policies outlined above are adopted. All of these policies are moot, however, if the U.S. does not have the fortitude to take military action if Iran violates the terms of these agreements. Engaging threats through multilateral institutions remains the best option, but the U.S. cannot afford to hesitate to use force if diplomacy fails. For now, the JCPOA is proof that the U.S. has embraced diplomatic options with both its allies and enemies in order to enhance world unity and security. By strictly enforcing the JCPOA, strengthening nuclear treaties, and endorsing Israel’s security, the U.S. can help to assure that the JCPOA is as effective as the world hopes that it will be.

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Can Lula walk the tightrope between Washington and Beijing?

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Image source: lula.com.br

As Brazil’s New President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (popularly known as Lula) prepares to visit China later this month, maintaining neutrality would be difficult as the winds of change enwrap  Beijing.

Brazil is Back

President Lula’s coming to power has marked a decisive shift in Brazilian foreign policy. With the Pink Tide resurging in South America, the new President has clearly spelled out his foreign policy aims: restoring Brazil’s neutrality and importance in international affairs at par with both the West and East after nearly 4 years of impasse under his predecessor Jair Bolsonaro, who had adopted a Sinophobic, pro-Trump foreign policy.

Brasilia’s 39th President, who previously presided over the office between 2003-2010, will have a lot to talk about as he visits his nation’s largest trading partner that imported $89.4 billion in 2022 mostly in soy and iron ore which added a surplus of $28.7 billion to Brazil’s coffers. Boosting the economic partnership with China will be a priority for Lula, who intends to integrate South America into a closely held economic unit. Another important item on the agenda includes the appointment of former President Dilma Rousseff as the new BRICS Bank president.

Lula and the West

Lula had rattled swords with Washington on several occasions during his previous tenure such as alleging the United States for reducing South America to its “backyard” by intervening in its internal politics as well as by opposing the Iraq War. Even though he recognises the importance of maintaining good relations with the superpower up North; several of Lula’s moves including sending a delegation to Maduro-led Venezuela, refusing to sign a UN Human Rights resolution condemning human rights violations in Nicaragua, allowing Iranian warships to dock at Rio de Janeiro, maintaining an ambiguous approach on the Russia-Ukraine War and refusing to send arms to Kyiv, dubbing the ‘Balloongate’ incident a bilateral issue  between the US and China and defining  the Taiwan issue as Beijing’s internal matter, have deeply irked the West.

While tensions remain, Lula’s focus on combating climate change and call for saving the Amazon have earned a thumbs up from the Biden administration as the former’s election to power comes as a breath of fresh air after his staunch “Trump of the Tropics”  predecessor adopted a not-so-friendly approach towards Biden’s entry in the White House. Lula understands Washington’s support is required and hence it was a top spot on his foreign visits list. Lula and Biden held talks amidst a cordial ambience and vowed to reboot bilateral ties by promising to protect democracy and combating climate change.

Winds of Change in Beijing

However, winds of change in the East have dispersed the clouds of ambiguity and China now stands more vocal, more critical and more confident in dealing with the United States.

The recent session of the National People’s Congress, which won Xi Jinping a never-seen-before third term as the President, saw him voicing his criticism against “Washington-led attempts” to “contain, encircle and suppress” China which pose ” serious challenges to its development” (“以美国为首的西方国家对我实施了全方位的遏制、围堵、打压,给我国发展带来前所未有的严峻挑战。”). Sino-US relations have been in the trough since President Trump’s tenure with the recent point of clash being the ‘Balloon incident’ which made Anthony Blinken call off his visit to Beijing.

Xi recently unveiled his new 24 Character Foreign Policy which, Dr. Hemant Adlakha believes, marks “China’s new foreign policy mantra in the ‘New Era’ ” acting as its “ideological map to attain national rejuvenation by 2049”. The characters “沉着冷静;保持定力;稳中求进;积极作为;团结一致;敢于斗争 ” which translate as “Be calm; Keep determined; Seek progress and stability; Be proactive and go for achievements; Unite under the Communist Party; Dare to fight” are set to replace Deng Xiaoping’s 24 Character Strategy  focussed on never seeking leadership and assuming a low profile.

China’s confidence is further boosted by its successful attempt to broker peace between Saudi Arabia and Iran, who have been staunch rivals for the past many years. With the handshake that brought the Sunni Arab Kingdom and the Shiite Persian theocracy together, Beijing has garnered accolades from nations across the region and is all set to play a greater international role by not just pulling American allies such as Riyadh to its side but also through actively putting forth its plans to end wars with Xi all set to pay Putin a visit over the Russia-Ukraine War before he meets Lula at Beijing. Lula too eagerly anticipates what Beijing has to say as he told German Chancellor Olaf Scholz “it is time for China to get its hands dirty”.

Neutrality no more?

If the state of Sino-US relations does not improve, things would get hard for many leaders like Lula who seek to balance between the two superpowers. Lula knows  neutrality is his best bet but money matters– as his former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim noted “Our surplus with China—and I’m talking just about our surplus—is bigger than all of our exports to the United States. It is impossible not to have good relations with China.” Isolating  China, with which Brazil has had a long strategic partnership since the 1990s, at the expense of moving closer to the US might come hard on the purse and exacerbate the many economic challenges he faces. Nor can Washington be isolated– not just because of the economic necessities but also in the face of challenges from far-right forces that both Lula and Biden face.

Lula realises the risks of placing all his eggs in one basket but would he be left with the choice to divide them equally into both? The issue is bound to get stickier but if he successfully manages to escape the quagmire of the unfolding great power rivalry, Lula will set a precedent for not just South America but nations across the globe. The only viable solution would be to strengthen regional alliances in Latin America and boost partnerships with  developing nations like India while using the collective strength to push Beijing and Washington to come together.

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The Malvinas feud as a Global Constant

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As an event gets bigger, it’s more likely that interesting things will happen behind the scenes, that is, in unplanned activities.

The seventh meeting of G20 foreign ministers in India in 2023 confirms this. Bilateral meetings between Qing-Jaishankar, the Blinken-Lavrov dispute, and the meeting between Santiago Cafiero and James Cleverly, during which the former notified the latter of the end of the Foradori-Duncan agreement.

On March 2, 2023, by rescinding the Foradori-Duncan agreement, the Argentine government de facto reopened one of the most important territorial disputes in the Western Hemisphere, perhaps the most important, and did so in the most theatrical way possible: at the G20, the main North-South dialogue platform.

What was the purpose of the Foradori-Duncan agreement?

The idea behind the agreement was for the Argentine government to renounce its claims and any serious discussion regarding the territorial dispute over the sovereignty of the Malvinas (Falklands) Islands and the adjacent territories in the South Atlantic. Instead, the Argentine government would adopt a position of claiming “light sovereignty” in order to obtain benefits, mainly economic ones, through joint exploitation of the natural resources of the islands and adjacent territories in the South Atlantic with the United Kingdom (UK), as well as through British investments in the country.

In practice, this agreement implied the Argentine government’s resignation to discuss sovereign rights over the Falkland Islands and their adjacent territories in the South Atlantic. It can be inferred that this was a disguised surrender clause by the government of Mauricio Macri to continue with Argentina’s sovereign claim over the Malvinas Islands.

The purpose of the Foradori-Duncan agreement was in line with the foreign policy stance of the Macri administration (2015-2019), which had a marked pro-Western (and more Atlanticist) position than previous governments (Kirchnerism 2003-2015).

This geopolitical code (if we can speak of the existence of a “Macrista geopolitical code” coming from the geopolitical code of the traditional Argentine ruling class) consisted of a series of agreements (tacit and official) of Argentine resignation and subordination to traditional Western powers (of which the Foradori-Duncan agreement was one of its greatest exponents) which aimed –in theory– to obtain greater economic benefits and a renewal of the country’s public image in the supposed “international community.”

These types of foreign policy positions would be a constant of the Macri government. Even the Argentine scholar Juan Gabriel Tokatlian has conceptualized such a stance as “Concessive Peripheral Unilateralism” to define the foreign policy of the Macri government [1].

In practice, these ideas and plans, were shown to be totally ineffective and unproductive. Argentina practically did not receive economic benefits from such positions, nor did its public image have a significant and positive international projection. And the Foradori-Duncan agreement is the most scandalous example of this reality.

Why did the Argentine government of Alberto Fernández decide to end such an agreement?

The first explanation is the internal conformation and political identity of the government of Alberto Fernández, which logically demanded a change in the previous government’s (Macri) stance on the Malvinas agreements, his predecessor and opponent. But this inference raises another question: Why were such measures not taken before? The answers to this question are only conjectures.

Since the end of the Malvinas War (1982) until today, except for the years of the Menem governments (1989-1999), Argentina’s bilateral relationship with Great Britain has always been marked by a strong “Malvinense” [2] component on the agenda of their interaction, which has often led to high-pitched disputes between both parties. The “agenda” of the Malvinas cause was a constant trend of the Kirchnerist governments (2003-2015), such claims were made, denouncing British illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands on numerous occasions in various international forums, bilateral meetings, and multilateral forums.

But as mentioned earlier, the Macri government would have a diametrically opposed position to its Kirchnerist predecessors regarding the Malvinas question. However, the reality of the country and its foreign policy changed again when Argentina “presented” a new government in 2019, with Alberto Fernández as the head of the presidency.

The government of A. Fernández has an eclectic political character [3], as a result of a coalition between several political sectors, so the foreign policy of his government also reflects the heterogeneous internal conformation of the government coalition sectors.

In such conformation, sectors such as Kirchnerism, as well as more orthodox Peronist sectors, are present, both of which have traditionally had a more                       “Post-Western” stance, aiming to “rewrite the Argentine geopolitical code” and the vectors of Argentine foreign policy, projecting an alternative foreign policy, in first place towards their own region: South America, Ibero-America, the Caribbean, and in more modern times, especially towards the Global South, the BRICS, and Asia. In such guidelines, the action of rescinding the Foradori-Duncan agreement was logical. But logic also makes us wonder, why were such measures not taken before? Such questions enter the realm of speculation.

Another analysis could be given in an electoral key reading, this year 2023, presidential elections will be held in Argentina, and Alberto Fernández has expressed on several occasions through words and gestures [4], that he is willing and interested in being re-elected as the head of the Argentine executive branch.

Facing a public image tarnished by the covid-19 pandemic, and mainly a negative macroeconomic situation, the electoral nature of this foreign policy measure cannot be ruled out: the Malvinas cause is a cause that mobilizes emotions in Argentine society and remains a deep wound to national pride, and is a valid rhetorical and practical tool to antagonize the Argentine opposition (liberals and conservatives), which has never had (and perhaps never will have) a firm geopolitical stance nor interest in the Malvinas question.

Also, the reading of tensions within the coalition of the current Argentine government can’t be ruled out, in this last aspect, this measure could be read as a gesture of balance from the “Albertismo” towards Kirchnerism, a sector of the government in which many leaders believe that the sector identified with the president has geopolitically leaned too much towards Washington and the West since the 2022 debt agreement with the IMF and the war in Ukraine.

Argentina informed the British of its decision during the G20 foreign ministers’ summit, which was dominated by the BRICS. Is it a coincidence that such a measure was taken at one of the most representative events of the Global South?

it clearly cannot be considered a coincidence.

The symbolic weight of such an action, in such a context, must be clearly considered. The G20 has a dual character as the main forum in which traditional (Western) powers dialogue but also reflects their tensions and antagonisms with emerging powers and peoples, including those of the so-called Global South.

With tensions between former metropolis countries and former colonies that make up the G20, and which are now emerging in material capabilities, a post-colonial and decolonial reading cannot be ruled out, and therefore a strong message from Argentina to the world’s emerging powers and the Global South.

Did China have any influence on the finalization of the pact?

No, there is no such “Chinese hand” that has driven such a measure by the Argentine government. These are paranoid arguments with a stubborn anti-Chinese bias that also ignores Argentina’s own reality. To put it plainly, if we use common sense, the decision was not elaborated nor driven from Beijing.

As mentioned earlier, the issue of the Malvinas is a deeply rooted national cause in Argentine society, and a constant in the foreign policy of Kirchnerism, which today is part of the coalition that compose the current Argentine government, which with such measures such as revoking the Foradori-Duncan agreement seeks to                “retake the ownership of the Malvinas and South Atlantic issue in its agenda,” marking a clear differentiated stance from the current political opposition (Juntos por el Cambio) that made such a pact in the previous presidential term.

The decision was not elaborated nor driven by Beijing, and in any case, recent and clear positions of support for Argentina’s sovereign claim in the Malvinas Islands by powers such as China [5] and Russia [6] were considered within the decision-making process to take such measures. Therefore, the positions of Beijing and Moscow influenced, but did not condition or generate, Buenos Aires’ decision.

The future of the Malvinas Question

It’s very difficult to envision a future scenario for such a specific and complex issue, especially in the long term. But a prospective scenario can be envisioned in the short term, which is basically and probably that the situation will not change significantly under current conditions. Unless the world is altered by seismic events.

It’s highly unlikely that we will see a dialoguing UK government in the short and medium term that is willing to negotiate the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. And it is similarly unlikely to see a future Argentine government, especially if it has the characteristics of a Peronist, Kirchnerist, or progressive government, openly giving up its claims to the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands.

Such a proposition would surely change if there were a liberal-oriented government in Argentina, such as Mauricio Macri’s.

The problem with the current Argentine government, as well as future ones, regarding the Malvinas dispute, is that the country does not have, and will not have in the short and medium term, the set of soft and hard capabilities (economic, diplomatic, military, ideological influence) to press and force the UK hard enough to revise its traditional stance on the occupation of the islands. At least until the current balance of power and the position of emerging powers, such as China, would consolidate even further in the world order.

But in any case, such changes and opportunities will depend on the international context and the agency of third parties, which are independent variables for the positions that future Argentine governments may take.

Most experts in international relations and geopolitics agree that the territorial dispute over the Falkland-Malvinas Islands between Britain and Argentina will not have an easy or predictable resolution in the short term.

Some experts point out that the strategic geographical position of the Malvinas Islands and the presence of significant natural resources in the area, such as fishing and hydrocarbons, make the dispute even more complicated.

Moreover, many experts believe that Britain’s position has been strengthened in recent years thanks to the exploitation of the area’s natural resources and the lack of a clear strategy on the part of Argentina to resolve the dispute.

A hypothetical Chinese presence in the region, through the southern Argentine city of Ushuaia, through the construction of a logistics hub, has added an intervening element that makes it even more complex to envision a prospective scenario [7].

However, some experts believe that the issue of the territorial dispute over the Falkland Islands, Argentina’s position is legitimate, which has won it great support and sympathy among peoples and emerging powers, most of them with a colonial past [8].

References

[1] Tokatlian, J. G. (2018, 2 de febrero). Relaciones con EEUU: ¿nueva etapa? (Relations with the US: a new phase?) Clarín.
https://www.clarin.com/opinion/relaciones-ee-uu-nueva-etapa_0_rka7ze-UM.html

[2] Porto, J. M. (26/03/2022). Despite diplomatic ups and downs, the Malvinas claim became a state policy. Telam. https://www.telam.com.ar/notas/202203/587606-diplomacia-soberania-argentina-islas-malvinas.html

[3] In its composition as a coalition, including important elements of what might be called “Centre-Right” sectors that have Western – especially Washington – affinities.

[4] Its relevant to remember that on 22 February Alberto Fernandez led a public act in situ celebrating 119 years of Argentine presence in Antarctica. “Alberto Fernández visits Antarctica“. Sputnik. (23/02/2023). https://sputniknews.lat/20230223/alberto-fernandez-visita-la-antartida-1136141105.html

[5] Joint Statement between the Argentine Republic and the People’s Republic of China on Deepening the Argentina-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. (06/02/2023). https://cancilleria.gob.ar/es/actualidad/noticias/declaracion-conjunta-entre-la-republica-argentina-y-la-republica-popular-china

China’s support for the Malvinas deepens a relationship with many agreements. Telam. (03/07/2021). https://www.telam.com.ar/notas/202107/560027-apoyo-china-malvinas-cada-vez-mas-explicito-profundiza-relacion-muchos-acuerdos.html    

[6] United Russia leader Medvedev celebrates Argentina’s termination of Foradori-Duncan agreement. Sputnik. (2023, March 6). https://sputniknews.lat/20230306/el-lider-de-rusia-unida-celebra-que-argentina-haya-terminado-el-acuerdo-foradori-duncan-1136503626.html   

Putin defended Argentina’s sovereignty over Malvinas and took aim at Boris Johnson and Margaret Thatcher. Política Argentina. (2022, May 30). https://www.politicargentina.com/notas/202206/44954-putin-defendio-la-soberania-argentina-sobre-malvinas-y-le-tiro-a-boris-johnson-con-margaret-thatcher.html

[7] The details of the Ushuaia Logistics Hub to supply Antarctica. El Cronista. (24/12/2021).
https://www.cronista.com/economia-politica/exclusivo-los-detalles-del-polo-logistico-de-ushuaia-para-abastecer-a-la-antartida/  

An Antarctic logistics hub: official plan opens the door to strategic partners. El Cronista. (11/10/2021).
https://www.cronista.com/economia-politica/un-polo-logistico-para-la-antartida-el-plan-oficial-que-abre-la-puerta-a-socios-estrategicos/       

[8] The Group of 77+China gave strong backing to Argentina’s position on the Malvinas Islands question. Telam. (2022, November 12). https://www.telam.com.ar/notas/202011/534875-el-g77china-dio-un-fuerte-respaldo-a-la-posicion-argentina-en-la-cuestion-malvinas.html

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The History of U.S National Space Policy

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In every presidential administration, there is a correlation between space policy evolution and significant events. The process of developing space policy in the United States lacked foresight. Every government seemed to start again when it came to the development of space policy. In this article will see space policy evolution divided into two historical periods. The first was the post-WWII and the Cold War emergence, related to this case, the V-2 Rocket by Werner von Braun gave U.S. more technology to begin sampling in space as soon as World War II took place. So only the U.S. and the Soviet Union were able to access space in the late 1950s and early 1960s during the next Cold War.

Space as venue of Cold War: US – Soviet Rivalry

The U.S.-Soviet rivalry spread into space, becoming another venue for the Cold War and initially both parties took important steps to protect these 3 domains while ensuring freedom of access and thus space race and related space policies were born in this term. The Cold War and space exploration began in the 1950s and 1960s. Both were interwoven and had a maturity and direction connection. The impact of this space exploration was that the rockets provided the United States with the ability to spy on the Soviet Union and this technology would result in a nuclear ballistic missile.

During Eisenhower and Kennedy’s administration concentrated on the Cold War, initially driving the U.S space policy and strategy. In November 1954, in a highly classified project called “AQUATONE”. President Eisenhower decided to take a strategic decision Recognition of a national policy approved a high-flying U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. To ensure the efficiency of airborne reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union, Eisenhower offered a proposal to the Soviet Union to give both the US and the Soviet Union’s right to recognize each other’s overflight.

In 1955, to present both the Soviet Union and the United States, President Eisenhower brought Open Skies to Geneva. Access to one another’s airspace. The proposal was refused by Khrushchev, but the United States of America continued. Overflights in the Soviet Union. The space shooting down exacerbated the arms race further. The need for intelligence, surveillance and recognition (ISR) systems by President Eisenhower to fly over denied access areas has become a high administrative priority. One of President Eisenhower’s classified military space programs was the CORONA project. CORONA’s project aimed at carrying out recognition missions across the Soviet Union.  By the fall of 1960, the CORONA project became the backbone of America’s strategic reconnaissance capability.

In 1958, President Eisenhower proposed to Congress the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) as a civilian space agency. Congress agreed and space exploration has now become the nation’s military and civil venture. Now the United States had organizations and space exploiting capabilities that needed to establish policy because President Eisenhower signed the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act on 29 July 1958 to protect satellites and continue the program of ballistic missiles. The law regulates and declared that space activities should be dedicated to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all humanity.

The law also defined the role of the Department of Defence (DoD) in the space field as responsible for “developing arms systems, military operations or defending the United States” President Kennedy continued the strong advocacy of space exploration by President Eisenhower. In particular, President Kennedy also requested funding from the Congress, “to speed up the use of space satellites for worldwide communications and global weather observation”. The U.S. made substantial progress in space technology and space policy during these administrations.

End of Cold War – 1980s and 1990s

               The administration of Reagan, Bush and Clinton all recognized the usefulness of Space domain in achievement of national security goals. Alas, all three of them Governments have suffered from the space policy’s short-sighted approach. The administration of Reagan concentrated on ending the Cold War.

The Reagan’s DoD budget is rumoured to have risen to the level of the government pre and early-Nixon, which amounted to 6.2% of GDP or 28.1% of the total federal budget dedicated to the overall defence plan. The Reagan Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and other initiatives forced President Gorbachev to “choose” arms race and glasnost and perestroika. No government has spent more on defence on the basis of GDP percentage or percentage of the total federal budget after President Reagan. President Reagan also launched ASAT weapons research and development that paved the way for an offensive counter-space strategy. In 1982, the National Security Decision (NSDD) 42 of President Reagan addressed the ability to “pursue space activities in support of the [ nation’s] right to self-defence”.

NSDD 42 further stated that, if these measures were to contribute to the United States, “the United States would consider verifiable and fair arms control measures prohibiting or otherwise limiting the testing and deployment of specific weapons systems”. The United States, however, opposes concepts of arms control or legal regimes that seek general prohibitions on military or intelligence use of space.

 President Reagan’s policies addressed the Soviet Union’s direct ascent and co-orbital ASAT program directly.  President Reagan’s staff including leaders who were of short view and did not further consider the policy on the long-term implications of ASAT. While at that time, their focus on space could be said to be very specific aimed at winning the Cold War. Therefore, that it will have serious adverse effects on the future of the space domain.

 Other countries have taken the lead in developing disruptive technologies such as nuclear weapons and ASAT weapons. It ended with the Cold War, so that now Globalization and technology have had a major impact on space and have taken a lot of attention to the spatial domain of the community both international and commercial communities. Unfortunately, President George HW Bush showed little concern about space and space policy until Operation Desert Storm President Bush.

Post Cold War

From a geopolitical perspective, President George W Bush and President Obama faced similar challenges. And if looked from a spatial perspective, during their administration, the lack of foresight from past events and trends in space will culminate in. Both presidents focused on Iraqi freedom and the Enduring Liberty operation and to focused it the budgets were proposed for NASA and the DoD by both presidents is different. Between 2006 and 2009, approximately 17% of the United States was allocated by Bush administrations.

These two administrations have been spatially funded by the military. The launches of the DD ISR continued at a rate of 0 to 4 per year. For the last two decades, this was the standard DoD satellite launch rate. In the meantime, eleven countries operated 22 launch sites. The law on the preservation of space for the benefit of all humanity in the coming years addresses the issue of space policy for the United States and the international community.

 As a result, the space domain has become a much more challenging operating environment due to the lack of foresight in domestic and international space policy and law. Increasing efforts by foreign parties to interfere with satellite operations. For example, Iraq in 2002 blocked U.S. positioning, navigation, and timing signals. Libya and Iran interfered with international satellite television broadcasts provided by Arab nations in 2005. In 2006, China lasted a satellite of U.S. imagery recognition.

The approach of President Obama is very different from his predecessor. By issuing the 2010 United States National Space Policy and the 2011 Strategy for National Security Space, he was aggressive with space policy. In his space policy, President Obama has discussed and made contributions to improve the capabilities of civil and commercial space. So, it can be said that United States has committed to fostering and facilitating the growth of the U.S. commercial space industry, this supports the country’s own domestic needs. Thus, the legacy and transformation of space success also pose new challenges. The possibilities of using space were limited to just a few nations when the space age began and there were limited consequences for irresponsible or unintended behaviour. The U.S is committed to addressing these challenges. But that cannot be the sole responsibility of the United States. Based on the point mentioned in the National Space Policy, “all nations have the right to use and explore space, but this right also includes responsibility. The United States therefore calls on all nations to work together to take responsible approaches in space to preserve this right for the benefit of future generations.”

This can be seen, United States to call all nations to work together and be responsible in space in order to save future generations. Based on explanation above about the development of NSP, during the Obama administration, U.S. has shown that other countries recognize and adhere to the principles of mutual interest between all countries in acting, which is certainly responsible in space to help prevent misunderstandings and distrust. The space operations should be carried out in a manner that emphasizes openness and transparency in order to raise public awareness of government activities and enable others to share the benefits of space use.

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