Future Foreign Policies: Possibilities Facing Iran

Iran’s foreign policy continues to be driven by a series of complex and often times overlapping and contradictory factors, involving its own ideological pursuits, the perception of threats caused by the US and its allies, national identity, and a belief in its historical right to regional hegemony.

These policies are also molded by the various factions within the Iranian domestic ruling elite, comprised of the leadership of the Ayatollah Khamenei, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, President Rouhani, and other key reformist figures.

The foreign policies created are then applied in a number of manners throughout the region that are based on its own strategic interests. The methods employed range from direct funding of militant proxy groups such as Hezbollah, diplomatic means via its numerous embassies around the world, and other methods such as Islamic training and education centers. The methods of application and the strategic reasoning behind these policies have been a source of intense scrutiny and conflict for many states around the world. This has ultimately been the reason behind many of the punitive measures applied to Iran.

For countries within the region, Iran’s perceived quest for regional hegemony has led to the majority of tensions, Saudi Arabia being foremost among them. Saudi Arabia has long accused Iran of trying to spread its religious ideology around the region in order to become the de facto “head” of the Muslim world. Iran, conversely, claims that Saudi Arabia also is attempting to assert its own brand of Sunni Islam and to subjugate Shi’i populations in Sunni-led states. This has led both states to take especially hardline stances against the other and has led to a number of proxy fights between the two.

Iran’s policy of supporting militant groups throughout the region also continues to be a major concern to states both within the region and beyond. Groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen enjoy considerable support financially and militarily from Iran and have been major players in Iran’s proxy wars. Iran, interestingly enough, has not solely supported Shi’i groups but has also shown a willingness to support groups that support its core interests, such as with Hamas in its confrontations against Israel. Currently these policies pay dividends for Iran as in most locations it has a strategic upper hand, as in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. It is unlikely that Iran would be keen to end such an advantage. But it must for a greater global future.

Where does Iran head next in its quest to regain its place at the world table and to once again be an accepted nation within the global community? The nuclear accord and the subsequent lifting, or easing, of international sanctions will go a long way in determining the courses of action that Iran might take. Regardless of whether the sanctions are fully lifted or simply eased, Iran’s economy stands to improve dramatically. If Iran follows through on the terms of the agreement, then its standing in the world order will also improve dramatically. This new standing, coupled with the increase of foreign interest in investing in Iran, will also bring challenges as Iran struggles to develop the trust it needs to renew and/or improve international relationships.

This is one area that Iran needs to focus on. If its leaders are able to find ways to improve relations with Western nations, then that will allow it to reduce its fears of armed conflict and will allow for new partnerships greatly benefiting the general population. Another area that Iran could find improvement would be in developing joint energy ventures within the Caspian region. With its strengthening relations with Russia it could potentially leverage that relationship to forge partnerships in the region much in the same way that China and Japan have done. Joint partnerships would reduce the perception within the region that Iran is attempting to assert its dominance independently.

Iran and Saudi Arabia need to continue to work diplomatically to reduce their mistrust and misconstrued perceptions of one another. One potential item for the agenda should be Yemen. Yemen does not appear to be a dispute that has any core value to Iran outside of it being a target of opportunity to create havoc in the region and threaten Sunni hegemony. Given that this does not seem to be of true strategic value to Iran, it is possible that it could work diplomatically with Saudi Arabia toward conflict resolution that might ease the fears of the GCC states in a post-JCPOA world. Additionally, Iran should seek to resolve its longstanding conflicts with its GCC neighbors over issues such as the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs.

The largest hurdle for Iran to overcome within the region is the fear of Sunni-states that it will continue to support proxy groups against them, trying to foment uprisings within said states. Many of these issues can only be lessened by the passage of time where there is an indication of new trust. It is also possible that Iran may not want to effect change in this area. Given the very structure of Iranian leadership, change is oftentimes slow if not glacial. The complex web of the domestic political machine in Tehran is not geared toward change but rather is built to ensure the dominance of status quo.

If Iran could implement these changes to the way it conducts its foreign policies around the globe it could well be on its way to building the trust needed for the global community to accept it back into the fold as a full and productive member. The world must believe that Iran is a country willing to abide by its international agreements and does not pose a threat to other nations within the region and beyond. But this future is dependent on both Iran and its Gulf neighbors accepting that their own mutually interactive policies have been collectively responsible for the problems now facing the region. They must all work to make the internal adjustments necessary to ensure that a lasting peace is possible. Otherwise, the entire world will have to remember that the ‘status quo’ ultimately just translates into more conflict, more mistrust, and more suffering.