The primary point of interest here is why Syrians are fleeing their nation and where they are going. The primary reason they are fleeing is relatively obvious: Syria is currently being torn apart by war and its citizens want to be free of the violence, destruction and general unrest.
But with increased pressure being placed on western states to accept a larger number of refugees, a secondary reason now also exists. There is a segment of the population fleeing in the hopes of upgrading their quality of life, despite not having been affected, or having been very negligibly affected, by the violence in Syria. In some cases the ‘refugees’ have yet to be displaced at all. The more interesting point of interest here is where Syrian refugees are going. The Syrian refugees have largely settled in nations along immediate borders such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. There has also been a coalition of support from European and Eastern nations that have accepted large numbers of refugees. One group of nations, however, is notably rejecting support and has remained almost entirely refugee free: the Caspian states. These states are all geographically located very close to Syria and to date have either failed to accept any refugees or have accepted a trivial amount. In contrast, a nation such as Canada, literally on the other side of the world, has done more in the past month to support refugees than the entire Caspian region has since the conflict began.
Geography is the most easily justifiable reason for refugees to choose a nation to emigrate to. It is easier, logistically speaking, to take in refugees from one country to another if the countries are bordering each other. In the case of the Syrian conflict this is best exemplified by Turkey. Since the conflict began, it has taken in over 2 million Syrian refugees, nearly twice as many as the next highest, Lebanon. However, other nations that either directly or very closely border Syria have failed to take on any refugees. The most readily apparent Caspian state to fit the bill is Iran. To date they have accepted zero confirmed refugees despite being the closest state in the Caspian to Syria. Russia and Azerbaijan would be the next closest Caspian states to border with Syria, though there is a small nation in between (Georgia and Armenia respectively). Similar to Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia have taken in zero refugees. What may be occurring in this case is ‘opportunity asylum.’ Meaning that by having to travel through one nation to reach another, which is necessary to reach any of the Caspian states, refugees may receive asylum from the first nation they cross before reaching the second. Most refugees will accept guaranteed asylum in a nation rather than take their chances at the next one. This theory receives some support from the number of refugees in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq, but doesn’t explain why western nations significantly further away are accepting larger numbers of refugees while the much closer Caspian states continue to accept none. Thus, there must be other factors at play outside of geography and opportunity asylum.
Politics always plays a significant role with refugees. This does not appear to be the issue in the Caspian region, however, as all five nations of the Caspian have policies in place to deal with the intake of refugees, be it from Syria or anywhere else. The history of refugee intake in the Caspian is not one decorated with successes, however. Azerbaijan has the most visibly negative track record for refugees, as its own citizens have historically at times fled from the nation to become refugees elsewhere, primarily in Armenia. Every other state in the Caspian, however, has accepted refugees at one time or another. Iran in particular boasts by far the most impressive track record for refugee intake in the region. They have hosted the largest population of refugees in the world since 1979 and an Iranian, Sadruddin Aga Khan, assumed the position of High Commissioner for Refugees on behalf of the UN from 1965 to 1977. Thus, there is precedent within the Caspian region for accepting refugees. So there must be other factors at play outside of politics keeping Syrians from finding asylum in the Caspian.
Social concerns and persecution have played the largest role in keeping Syrians out of the Caspian region. Despite the fact that all Caspian nations have refugee policies in place there are some significant social concerns when accepting asylum in a foreign nation. Will that nation treat you well? Will they respect your customs, culture, or religion? Will they temporarily house and feed you until a more permanent solution materializes? Does the possibility of permanent citizenship and naturalization exist? These are important questions for a refugee to consider when fleeing any nation, particularly Syria, as there are currently many other options available. The policies may be in place formally but Caspian states have been notoriously difficult for refugees seeking asylum. Numerous human rights groups have been particularly critical of Russia’s refugee policies. There have been multiple reports citing concerns with everything from detention centers to impossibly tight deadlines to submit refugee applications, which could then deny them refugee status if not completed on time. Perhaps of greatest concern is the fact that Russia does not prohibit the return of refugees to their home country, which therefore does not guarantee asylum and is inconsistent with international norms. In Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan there have been numerous reports of refugees experiencing human rights violations and racism. Combine that with general poverty for refugees in these nations and none of the states are particularly appealing options for seeking asylum. This therefore begs perhaps a rhetorical question: why would a refugee flee from persecution and violence in Syria only to arrive in a Caspian state and be persecuted more?
The fact of the matter is that Syrian refugees are not being accepted into the Caspian region largely because they do not want to claim asylum in the Caspian states. There are other contributing factors in geography and policy but ultimately when other nations with a better track record in economy, human rights and historical refugee acceptance exist as asylum options, then there is no reason to choose a lesser Caspian state. Though to be fair to refugees, the Caspian nations certainly are not encouraging Syrians to come and claim asylum either. In fact, the very opposite is occurring, as states like Russia have explicitly stated they will not be accepting any.
Finally, there could be an element of public image at play as well. If Syrians claim asylum in the Caspian and are persecuted shortly thereafter, an immense amount of critical attention and involvement from the UN and global community could be drawn. It could very well cause a state to suffer embarrassment or even sanction. Rather than potentially suffer this embarrassment on the international stage, the Caspian states have de facto closed their borders knowing it would be near impossible to guarantee that Syrian refugees would remain free of persecution in the host nations. The chance of this changing before the Syrian conflict ends is virtually zero and thus the Caspian will remain free of Syrian refugees for the foreseeable future.
Thorny path towards peace and reconciliation in Karabakh
On January 11 the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a deal to develop cross-border transportation routes and boost economic growth to benefit the South Caucasus and the Wider Region. This meeting took place two months after the Moscow-brokered armistice between Armenia and Azerbaijan ended a 44-day war over Nagorno-Karabakh.
This ethno-territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has drawn dividing lines between Armenia and Azerbaijan for almost 30 years. Some estimates put the number of deaths on both sides at 30,000 after the First Karabakh war before a ceasefire was reached in May 1994. As a result of this war, one fifth of the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan was occupied and the entire Azerbaijani population of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) and seven adjacent districts (Lachin, Kalbajar, Agdam, Fizuly, Jabrail, Gubatli and Zangilan) was forcibly expelled by the Armenian armed forces. Incidentally, due to sporadic frontline skirmishes and clashes, both military personnel and civilians have been killed along the Line of Contact, devoid of any peacekeeping force, since 1994.
Over the years, Armenia and the separatist regime that emerged in the occupied Azerbaijani territories refused any final status short of independence for Nagorno-Karabakh and tried to preserve this status quo and achieve international security guarantees on the non-resumption of hostilities while avoiding the withdrawal of its armed forces from the occupied territories and preventing the safe return of expelled Azerbaijani inhabitants to their permanent places of residence. However, such a policy, in its turn, polarized the region and reduced to naught any meaningful regional cooperation between the three South Caucasus states.
The Second Karabakh war, which took place from September 27 to November 9, 2020, and the subsequent Russia-brokered peace deal on November 10, significantly changed the facts on the ground and created a new political reality that replaced the “no war, no peace” situation that had been hanging over the region for almost 30 years. As a result of this war, more than 6,000 soldiers died on both sides in fighting.
This war came to an end because of a clear victory for Azerbaijan, which has restored its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Owing to the humiliating defeat of Armenia,the myth of the invincibility of the Armenian armed forces has been shattered and the Prime Minister of this country has been under continuous pressure from the opposition to step down.
Thus, after the Second Karabakh war, the pendulum has swung from devastating war towards actual peace. The question, is, however, whether the conflicting parties will be able to achieve lasting peace in the coming years: How can a relationship that has been completely destroyed owing to this protracted armed conflict and previous wars be restored?
The fate of all inhabitants of both the highlands and lowlands of Karabakh, irrespective of their ethnic origin, is crucial in this context. Security arrangements for the Armenian minority residing in this area are currently organized through the deployment of 1,960 Russian peacekeepers for at least five years to monitor the implementation of the trilateral statement signed by the heads of state of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Russian Federation on November 10 (hereafter, the trilateral statement). At the same time, the return of the former Azerbaijani inhabitants to their permanent places of residence previously occupied by the Armenian armed forces is envisaged by the trilateral statement and the UNHCR has been assigned to oversee this task.
It is paramount that Azerbaijan has to demonstrate a policy of “strategic patience” in the coming years to entice the Armenians of Karabakh region into closer incorporation through attractive political, economic, social, and other development.
On the other hand, Armenia has to concentrate on its own internationally recognized sovereign territory. Today, it is important that this country changes its external minority policy and withdraws its territorial claims against Azerbaijan. As a next step, both Armenia and Azerbaijan can recognize the territorial integrity of one other.
Such rapprochement can lead to the opening of the borders between Armenia and Turkey and Armenia and Azerbaijan, which would increase economic opportunities for landlocked Armenia. It can thereby contribute to regional stability, development, and trans-regional cooperation among the three South Caucasian states. At the same time, it would create an enabling environment that could be more conducive for future dialogue and interactions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
We must face the fact that a stable equilibrium between these two nations has never previously been achieved. However, despite ups and downs, there was peaceful coexistence between the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in Karabakh as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan’s respective minorities in Azerbaijan and Armenia. This protracted conflict has, however, led Armenians and Azerbaijanis to live in parallel realities for almost 30 years.
In light of the recent past, we cannot soon reconcile our different narratives. It is a long process; however, reconciliation is not only an outcome, it is also a process. Although the gestation period might be long, the process of reconciliation itself can be extremely rewarding.
In fact, the Armenian and Azerbaijani inhabitants of Karabakh have lived together in this region in the past. However, for almost 30 years this was impossible. Will and determination should be put to good use in order to arrive at such a peaceful coexistence once again.
Dawn of great power competition in South Caucasus
The pace of geopolitical change in the South Caucasus is staggering, with the recent Karabakh war only underlining several major geopolitical trends in the region.
The first noticeable trend being the undercutting of democratic ideals and achievements of the region’s states. Take Armenia, its young democracy had high hopes following the 2018 revolution, but now it will be more even more dependent on Russia.
It is not a matter of whether a democratic model is better or not, the matter lies in the incompatibility of an aspiring democracy with a powerful nondemocracy such as Russia.
The Armenian leadership will now have to make extensive concessions to Moscow to shore up its military, backtracking on its democratic values. Building a fair political system cannot go hand in hand with the Russian political model.
The war also put an end to any hopes of Armenia implementing a multivector foreign policy, an already highly scrutinized issue. Mistakes were made continuously along the way, the biggest being an overreliance on Russia.
In the buildup to 2020, Armenia’s multiaxial foreign policy efforts gradually deteriorated, with the 2016 fighting showing the limits. Armenian politicians attempted to develop ties with other regional powers in the aftermath, but Russian influence had already begun to incrementally increase.
Tipping the scales in a no longer balanced alliance culminated in the 2020 war with Azerbaijan thanks to Yerevan’s maneuvering. More crucially, the war has obliterated Yerevan’s multiaxial policy efforts for years to come.
Now, Armenia’s dependence on Russia would be even more pronounced with no viable geopolitical alternatives.
With no more foreign policy diversification, the three South Caucasus states are divided by larger regional powers, further fracturing the region.
The return of Turkey and the growth of the Russian military could resurrect the great power competition, in which a nation’s military power, infrastructure projects and economic might are directly translated into their geopolitical influence over the region, ultimately deterring long-term conflict resolution.
The Western stance
The Karabakh war highlighted a regression in Western peacekeeping standards. The Western approach to conflict resolution based on equality rather than geopolitical interests has been trumped by the Russian alternative.
Moscow is not looking to resolve the conflict (it never does in territorial conflicts); instead, it is seeking to prolong it under its close watch in a bid to increase its influence.
Looking at the situation from the Russian perspective, it is clear the country will continue to influence Armenia and Azerbaijan, only now to a far greater extent than before.
The West’s inability to accommodate fluid geopolitical realities in the South Caucasus also raises questions about its commitment to resolving the issues at hand. The second Karabakh war was in a way a by-product of the West’s declining engagement in the region over the past several years.
The West can no longer treat the South Caucasus as a monolithic entity, and a diversified foreign policy should be applied in line with realities on the ground.
Policies should reflect each individual state, and the West should, perhaps, be more geopolitical in its approach.
Turkey’s recent suggestion to create a six-nation pact bringing together the South Caucasus states, Russia, Turkey and Iran, shows the regression of Western influence in the region. But the geopolitical vacuum is never empty for long, and Turkey and Russia approach.
Georgia could act as the last bastion of dominant Western influence, but even there, the West should be cautious. The country is on the cusp of Europe, making it susceptible to foreign influence.
Bordered by Russia and Turkey, two powers often discerning of Europe, Georgia also feels the pressure to adapt to the changing circumstances on the ground.
The lack of Western resolve in the region and the Black Sea could propel Tbilisi if not toward a total reconsideration of its foreign policy, toward diversifying its foreign ties – one could call a “rebalancing.”
The war also solidified that the Caspian basin and South Caucasus are inextricably linked to the greater Middle East.
Russia and Turkey are basing their strategies in the region on developments in the Middle East and the Black Sea region. Not since the end of the Soviet Union has the South Caucasus been such a critical point for the West, especially the incoming Biden administration.
But time is critical and any further delay in active U.S. policy could spell disaster for Georgia, which serves as a door to the Caspian and on to Central Asia.
The West has been in regression in the region for quite some time now; the Karabakh war only brought it to the light, and it must be proactive if things are to change.
Much will depend on the U.S. and its new administration, but the West will have to come to an understanding with Turkey, even if it be limited, to salvage its deteriorating position in the region.
After all, the South Caucasus has always been the only theater where Turkish and Western interests have always coincided. Considering its limited presence in the region, the West could consider backing Turkey.
Not only would it serve as a reconciliatory gesture pleasing Ankara, but it would also limit Russia’s movement in the region. With the ink about to dry on who will influence the region, the West must immediately adapt its approach if it wishes to have any input in the rapidly changing geopolitics of the South Caucasus.
Author’s note: first published in dailysabah
An Impending Revolution
Even on the end note, the year contains surprises enough to deem it as a year of instability and chaos given every nook and cranny around the globe is riddled with a new crisis every day. Latest down in the tally is the country of Belarus that has hardly streamlined over at least half a decade but now is hosting up as a venue to rippling protests in almost all the districts of its capital, Minsk. The outrage has resulted from the massive rigging imputed on the communist party in ruling for almost three decades since the split of Soviet Union in 1994. With Europe and Russia divided on the front as the protests and violence continue to rage: a revolution is emerging as a possibility.
The historical map of Belarus is nearly as complex as the geographical landscape which might only stand next to Afghanistan in terms of the intricacies faced by a landlocked country as such. Belarus is located in the Eastern European region bordered by Russia to the north-eastern perimeter. Poland borderlines the country to the West while Ukraine shares a border in the South. The NATO members, Lithuania and Latvia, outskirt the borders of Belarus in the Northwest, making the region as a prime buffer between the Russian regime and the western world. As Belarus stands as a junction between the European Union (EU) and Russia, the proximal nature brings about interests of either parties in the internal affairs of Minsk. However, the nature of the bond shared between the trio is by no means a triangle unlike other former soviet nations since Belarus has casted its absolute loyalty to Russia since the split of Soviet Union and ultimate accession to power of president, Alexander Lukashenko, the leader of the Communist Party of Belarus. Along with the alliance, however, came the unwanted dependency since over the 26-year rule of Lukashenko, he crippled the economy and the political writ of Belarus, using every last ounce of authority to subdue the opposition and the democratic mechanism of the country, earning him the nefarious title ‘Europe’s last dictator’.
The outburst of protests today stems from this very problem that is more deep-rooted than what comes across as apparent. The excessive and draconian use of power and autonomy has invalidated the independence of Belarusians and turned them haplessly at the mercy of Russian aid and support while blocking out any western support in the name of guarding national sovereignty. The ongoing surge of dissent was triggered earlier in August when the elections turned about to be absurdly rigged in favour of Alexander Lukashenko, granting him an indelible majority of 80% of the total vote count along with a lifetime of rule over the country despite his blatant unpopularity across the country. The accusations were further solidified when one of the popular opposing candidates, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, casted a complaint with the authorities regarding the falsification of election results. Instead of being appeased, she was detained for 7 straight hours and was even forced to exile to the neighbouring country of Lithuania. This resulted in major tide of riots and protests erupting all across Minsk, preceding over 3000 arrests over the election night.
On the official front, however, an aggressive stance was upheld along with a constant refusal of Lukashenko from stepping down from the long-held office or even considering a review of the polls counted despite exorbitant reports of unfair results. Heavy use of rubber bullets and tear gas was an eccentric protocol adopted by the local police force which instead of placating the rioters, further ignited the protests in more districts of the capital city. The anti-government relies also entitled ‘March of Neighbours’ transitioned into a high scale protest with many of the state employees resigning from their positions to stand upright against the long overdue corrupt regime. With the protests raging over months and the Lukashenko government getting more and more aggressive with their policies, the fear that once sparkled in the eyes of the natives is dwindling exceedingly and is turning into a cry for an outright revolution, which would be a ground-breaking one ever since the revolution of Iran back in 1979.
European counties have taken their conventional passive position in the crisis sinceEU is well aware of the Russian influence in Belarus and does not want to interfere with a probability of a direct conflict with Russia. However, they did call out their protest over the rigged elections, slapping sanctions over Belarus yet have not accused Lukashenko directly but instead have proposed a thorough international dialogue. Russia, on the other hand, faces a complex position since the dependence of Belarus bought Moscow a base against the West along with other regional rogues like Ukraine. However, high scale protests and rising chances of a full-blown revolution is hardly the choice Russian intends to opt. As the situation continues to unfold, economic reforms, as promised by Lukashenko, appears to be the only option that both EU and Russia could encourage as a bipartisan plan. Despite that, with six months of protests erupting as an outrage over a tyranny of 26 years, the reform-offering might be a bit late an offer since its no more about the country anymore, it’s about a struggle between a liberal or a communist Belarus.
Can The Lessons of 2008 Spare Emerging Europe’s Financial Sector From The COVID-19 Cliff?
The more we know about the past, the better we can prepare for the future. The 2008 financial crisis provides...
COVID’s led to ‘massive’ income and productivity losses
Job losses or reduced working hours due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic cost the world the equivalent of...
Russia at Crossroads with Europe
The European politics has been hazy over the course of the last decade. Whether it highlights the shocking exit of...
Syria: 18 children killed since the start of the year
The brutal fighting in Syria continues to exact a terrible toll on children, with at least 18, including a one-year-old...
The strategic thinking behind the EU-China investment deal
Washington was understandably perplexed that a China-EU investment agreement was concluded a few weeks before the Biden administration, especially a ...
Deloitte Bolsters Cyber Threat Hunting Capabilities with Root9B Acquisition
Deloitte & Touche LLP announced today its acquisition of substantially all the assets of Root9B, LLC (R9B), a leading provider of...
100th Anniversary of the Turkish Constitution
Teşkilatı-Esasiye Law, the law provides for the establishment of the State of Turkey on January 20, 1921. This law also...
Defense3 days ago
Israel continues its air strikes against Syria after Biden’s inauguration: What’s next?
Europe2 days ago
Talking Turkey With Greece: Turkey and Israel’s Marriage of Convenience
Middle East3 days ago
When is usury usury? Turkish fatwa casts doubt on Erdogan’s religious soft power drive
Defense2 days ago
Pakistan Army’s Ranking improved
Economy2 days ago
Pandemic Recovery Creates a 50-50 Future
Energy News3 days ago
Solar power charges pandemic recovery for indigenous farmers in Viet Nam
Diplomacy2 days ago
India-made Covid vaccines open a new chapter in New Delhi’s continuing medical diplomacy
Americas2 days ago
The 4 groups of Senate Republicans that will decide Trump’s impeachment trial