Authors: Matthew Crosston, PhD & Dmitrii Seltser
We have undertaken an inter-regional comparison of seven subjects of the Russian Federation: the Ryazan, Samara, Tambov, and Ulyanovsk oblasts and the Republics of Mordovia, Udmurtia, and Chuvashia.
This approach we feel creates an adequate field for analysis as it encompasses two oblasts each from the Volga and Central Russian regions (these are traditional subjects for comparison in Russia) as well as three national republics with their extraordinarily high political diversity. The principal results of the project have already been published [1, 2]. However, in Russia over the past 10 years, new elections were held.
Electoral procedures for city heads and rural raion administrations in Russia (1991-2015)
|5.||2008-2010||Mixed electoral system|
|6.||2012-2014||Mixed electoral system|
In Russia sub-regional authority was first appointed in 1991 and then elected through five electoral cycles (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008-2010, 2012-2014). Two new electoral cycles have occurred, thus creating a need to continue the research. This article is a report made by the authors in ICCEES IX World Congress, Makuhari, Japan, 3-8 August 2015.
II. The Collision: 1991
Recall the historical context: the autumn of 1991 was the zenith of Yeltsin’s glory as concerns societal support (not popularity, mind you, but glory in the pop-culture movie-star sense). This glory was marked by the ovations from oblast committees, the renaming of newspapers, the removal of Derzhinskii’s statue from Lyubyanka Sqaure and the naked pursuit of the local nomenclature with the shrill question – where were you on August 19? In a word, it was the apotheosis of an emergent anti-communist democratic country. The new authority would be able to begin its reign with great fanfare and, in the sense of obtaining legitimacy, with great effectiveness. The way was open and obvious – if you could win through general, fair, direct, and transparent elections, in direct contradiction to the Soviet experience, you could be infused by the process with a true democratic essence. Such a task seemed wholly attainable.
But if that was the case, why weren’t there such elections? The official explanation always returned first to the danger of a communist retrenchment, of a new August putsch: that the extraordinary circumstances brought the threat of the Russian state’s actual dissolution. These maxims (Don’t let the Russian Federation suffer the same fate of the Soviet Union!) were widely distributed both for public consumption and the scholarly community. Thus, the new Russia missed its chance for constituent elections (i.e., missed its chance for making a real movement to democracy) and began instead a transition to a more ‘culturally appropriate Russian way.’ Ultimately, this was in fact a tremendous mistake by the new authorities, a barrier to the democratization of the country, a blow to the party system, and a main source of the bitter conflict that would emerge between the President and Federal Parliament.
In our view this mistake was largely false and man-made, connected with a critically low-brow and peculiar world-view that was seemingly innate to the post-putsch Russian leadership. The new residents of the Kremlin not only understandably feared the Communist party, but they also didn’t believe in the personal victory they had just achieved and were not ready to fulfill a more responsible governance role. They possessed neither the statesman’s demeanor nor the legislative experience and thus found themselves buried deep in the captivity of decades-long complexes and stereotypes. From this foundation they inevitably positioned themselves like a fortress under siege and treated all around them as if they were enemies, actual or potential.
The Presidium of the Verkhovnii Soviet of the RSFSR, which had just before been a supporter of Yeltsin in opposition to the Soviet Union central government, adopted a decision on September 6, 1991 to allow for the direct election of the heads of regional administrations beginning on November 24, 1991. However the decision was subsequently vetoed: analysts for “Democratic Russia” prognosticated a tremendous defeat for the supporters of the President (at best they felt there might be 10 or 12 victories versus 36 iron-clad defeats). It was this very prognosis, which subsequently proved to be partly mistaken, that served as the basis for the realization of the “executive vertical.” As a result of this dramatic struggle the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies acquiesced to a resolution on November 1, 1991 that effectively placed a moratorium on elections across all administrative levels until December 1, 1992. Thus, in 1991 the new authority de facto rejected constituent elections and began a “democratic” transition in the style of a Byzantine court. The procedure they developed, born from the President’s inner circle, was quite simple: the President would appoint governors while these, in turn, would appoint the heads of sub-regional administrations. In this way, the glow of democratic victory following the August coup led immediately to the very same democrats turning their backs on democracy for the rest of the country moving forward. If Lenin felt he needed a vanguard of the proletariat, Yeltsin’s team apparently felt it needed the exact same for democracy.
Recruiting the heads of City and Raion administration (1991-1992)
Dep. Chair, Soviets
|Chair, Dep.Chair,Exec. Soviets||21||21||15||10||15||13||14||109||54,8|
In more than half of the cases (52%), the heads of administration were recruited directly from the chairs of the city and raion executive committees. The directorate and first secretaries lagged significantly behind, with only 17.6% and 16.6% respectively. The chairs and deputy chairs of the soviets, as well as the deputy chairs of the executive committees, added to the surprisingly impressive success of Soviet apparatchiks (5.1% and 4.6% respectively). In total it worked out that 117 people came to leadership positions in the sub-regions (58.4%) directly from the Soviet nomenclature apparatus. Most importantly, there were no striking inter-regional differences with this percentage, only a few minor exceptions. In Ryazan Oblast, the chairs of the executive committees of the Soviets achieved an extraordinary 75.9%. In Samara Oblast, the divergent result came from the first secretaries with 28.6%. In Udmurtia, the directors were greatly represented with 34.5%.
What accounts for this relative lack of success of the first secretaries? We surmise the continuous rotation of the oblast committee first secretaries (it subsequently came to be commonly known as the cadre meatgrinder), organized by the general secretary across the top echelons of the party hierarchy, created a de facto collapsing interchangeability at the sub-regional level.
Interchangeability of City and Raion First Secretaries of the Communist Party of USSR
The continuous shifting of first secretaries across various locations placed them in a tremendously difficult position. Many who appeared in the sub-regions for the first time were immediately placed in the position of first secretary. For a non-competitive system with a continuous rotation of cadres this would have been almost normal. In a competitive system this made the first secretaries politically doomed. Recall that in March 1990 Gorbachev became the President of the USSR and allowed for the simultaneous holding of dual political office, thereby crudely raising the status of local soviet leaders. The elections for these local soviet deputies in 1990 became a bitter pill for the city and raion first secretaries. They were charged with the difficult task of finding a way to be elected to these local soviets and then subsequently head them. Those who did not succeed were consequently relieved of their right to head the city and raion committees. In the majority of cases where the first secretaries succeeded in becoming the leaders of the local soviets, they usually found themselves in collision with the directors of local industry (for example, in Samara and Ulyanovsk Oblasts and the Republic of Udmurtia.)
Chairs of local Soviets (elections of 1990)
|Region||1st Secretary||Secretary||Chair, 1st Dep. Chair of Exec. Committee||Others (Directorate)||In Sum in the sub-regions|
This collision produced a direct hit on the authority of the first secretaries acting as the new chairs of local soviets and felt like someone was playing a cruel joke on them (in Tambov Oblast and the Republic of Chuvashia, for example). This “contra-elite” worked against the first secretaries/new soviet chairs, blocking all their attempts to penetrate the elite local power structure. Recruiting for the new elite thus came mostly from an old reservoir of power – the old guard Soviet party nomenclature with its preservation of an unadulterated pre-Perestroika rhetoric and access to local insider knowledge. In opposition to this development a democratic movement did try to emerge simultaneously at the local level, but in reality the aforementioned contra-elites had already formed the irrefutable foundation of regional power by 1991.
In the regions, where the successes of the first secretaries had been more humble in 1990, an immediate substitution was consequently made in favor of the chairs of the city and raion executive committees. Thus, the new federal authorities by 1991 had placed a risky political wager on their success. This was most easily symbolized by President Yeltsin’s decree on July 20, 1991, ‘About the dismantling of the party’ (O departizatsii). In the Republic of Mordovia, for example, the local apparatchiks reacted to the decree by being totally demoralized and were subsequently more preoccupied with finding new work. In the Republic of Bashkortastan only 34 city and raion secretaries remained, in Tambov Oblast only 13. In most cases replacements would end up being second secretaries who had no future prospects. These substitutions would succeed in place for only a few weeks at most, while some only managed to work in these positions for just a few days. These people were nearly without authority and wholly unsuited for the role of head of the local administration. The only remaining ‘choice’ to the first secretaries, becoming a source of regional support for the federal center, was not much better.
“Agents of Influence” for the federal center in the regions
|Region||Name of regional leader||Mini-political bio||Sub-regional politics|
|Industrial director, Chair of Oblast Exec. Committee (1988 – 1990)||The domination of the chair and his recent subordinates|
|Deputy director of “Informatika”, Chair of city soviet (1990)||Support the exec. committee chair and his recent subordinates|
|Chief doctor of Oblast Hospital (1977 – 1991), People’s Deputy of RSFSR (1990)||Support the exec. Committee chair and agricultural directors|
V.V. Malafeev (appointed, 10/24/1991-11/2/1991)
Y.F. Goryachev (appointed)
Director of “Kontaktor”,
First sec. of oblast comm. CPSU (1990), chair of oblast soviet (1990)
|Support the exec. Committee chair and agricultural directors|
(elected President of Mordovia, 12/22/1991)
|Senior scholar of NPO, People’s Deputy (1990)||Support the exec. Committee chair and agricultural directors|
Chair of Supreme Soviet (1990)
Chair SM (1989)
|Support the exec. Committee chair and agricultural directors|
Presidential elections in 1991 did not achieve results
Chair of Supreme Soviet (1991)
Chair of SM (1989)
|Support the exec. Committee chair and agricultural directors|
“Partycrat” Y.F. Goryachev (Ulyanovsk Oblast), industrialist L.P. Bashmakov (Ryazan Oblast), academic V.D. Guslyannikov (Republic of Mordovia), doctor V.D. Babenko (Tambov Oblast), duma deputies V.K. Tubilov, N.E. Mironov (Republic of Udmurtia) and E.A. Kubarev, N.A. Zaitsev (Republic of Chuvashia), all were chosen according to one stark logic: chief support fell on the chairs of the local executive committees as they were the least politically dangerous. If for whatever reason the chairs were inappropriate, then the choice fell on the industrialists. Only in those instances where both chairs and industrialists were not available did they seek out “loyal” first secretaries of the new authority, capable actors of the democratic movement, or people who had fallen out of the nomenclature during the Soviet era. Indeed this process of appointing first secretaries was done only with great reluctance. The only exception to this process seemed to be K.A. Titov in Samara.
It was because of this that the first secretaries only managed to maintain their positions in 15% of the cases. Simultaneously, a small part of their number (less than 10%) did not fall from the nomenclature but simply exited into the oblast structures, as the new heads of local administration needed experienced and young administrators. These first secretaries of the provinces who ended up in the oblast centers were not considered dangerous and therefore acceptable. For example, first secretary of the Kotovsk city committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union O.I. Betin became the first deputy for the head of the Tambov Oblast administration in 1999. Betin would then become Governor of Tambov Oblast and has remained in this position. In this way nearly a quarter of the leaders of the sub-regions were able to preserve a primary spot for themselves in the local organs of power.
III. The Transformation: 1992-2015
The above explains why the events of 1991 did not allow the first secretaries many chances to hold on to their former positions of power. At best, only a few of them were able to hold on to power at the sub-regional level. This collision of appointments happened throughout 1991-1992. It is now necessary to move forward, discussing the developments that have emerged since the fall of the Soviet Union. After this appointing collision, the sub-regions in Russia went through three electoral cycles (the mid-1990s, the late 1990s, and the early 2000s). Each successive cycle further weakened the position of the first secretaries. Each successive election the first secretaries suffered losses of around 50%: the first cycle put an end to their dominant leadership role in the sub-regions; the second cycle displayed the futility in attempting to return to power; and the third cycle basically ended as a total fiasco for the former first secretaries.
First secretaries of the City and Raion Committees of the CPSU – subregional leaders
(<+> = appointment of first secretaries as heads of administration [between elections])
(<-> = removal of first secretaries as heads of administration [between elections])
1st Electoral Cycle
2nd Electoral Cycle
3rd Electoral Cycle
|4rd Electoral Cycle (2008-2010)||5rd Electoral Cycle (2012-2014)|
What accounts for these trends across the electoral cycles? This ‘washing away’ of the party nomenclature out of the local administration system can be explained through a number of circumstances. During the elections of the mid-1990s the first secretaries who remained in power largely conceded to one of two groups: either to the minions of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) or to the local industrialists/businessmen (ironically, these candidates were often overlapping in the sub-regions). During this time the opposition leaders within the CPRF were concentrated mostly in the local legislative organs (the Soviets and Dumas) and were continuously on the attack. For them, the first secretaries – whether they be the heads of administration already or simply candidates for the position – were traitors and opponents to their overall agenda. In Tambov Oblast, for example, during the elections for the head of the Muchkapskoi raion administration in December 1996, the raion committee for the CPRF issued a summons for its members to vote for A.V. Trubnikov as first secretary of the raion committee. Trubnikov was at the time only a farmer and had as the height of his Soviet career a position as instructor of the agricultural divison of the raion committee of the CPSU. As a result, nine candidates ended up being carried to victory across the oblast because of the support of the CPRF. Amongst them were only three former first secretaries (Uvarovo, Staryuryevskii, and Mordvoskii raions). Fascinatingly and contrary to the scholarly literature in the West, the Tambov communists simply ignored the former party nomenclature. The organizational structures of the CPRF instead supported representatives from the powerful industrial elite, who had been almost wholly unconnected to the former nomenclature.
The elections in the late 1990s clearly demonstrated that the only leader capable of mobilizing the popular vote was one that had become part of some clan, namely, one that was pro-presidential. At the local level a peculiar ‘party of power’ arose again and again – formed from the various politico-economic groups that were stable enough to be consolidated around formal and informal leaders. The unity of such structures was established through official coordination, informal connections, coinciding interests on the personal front, and the manipulation of extreme dependence. The elections in the early 2000s only strengthened that trend toward clan development. Unfortunately for them, a place for the first secretaries really was not part of this new power structure. It quickly became clear to them, however, that there were other options, post-USSR, for achieving a more-or-less comfortable standard of living outside the organs of local administration. In fact, it would be more accurate to say that only the less successful first secretaries were ultimately recruited into the organs of local administration. For obvious financial reasons, these administrative positions were clearly on a secondary level in terms of priority. Two other sectors were more ideal and preferred: head in the direction of industrial activity, as captains of new industry emerging with the privatization of state property, or the pursuit of positions within the oblast administrative structures. Regardless of the choice, both of these options were attractive in comparison with local administrations because of their swift opportunities for personal enrichment. And so, where does that leave scholars if they seek to find the footprints of the sub-regions’ original ‘local heroes’? What became of them and what finally were their long-term career trajectories?
IV. The post-Soviet careers of City and Raion first secretaries
The post-Soviet career of city and raion first secretaries evolved along six trajectories:
First trajectory: ‘The Boom – jumping to a new system.’ This trajectory comprised governors, vice-governors, heads of oblast administrative structures, and top managers. It was less than 10% of the overall nomenclature and was marked by an ability to achieve increases in overall authoritative capacity. In 1991-1992 they became the new authority and ultimately the self-interested protectors of the new order. These figures would have likely achieved a comparable status within the Soviet Union with but one significant difference: under the new system they were incomparably better off financially.
Second trajectory: ‘The Preservation – successfully maintaining the continuation of administrative-political activism.’ This trajectory was comprised largely of the heads of oblast and raion administrations and was about 15% of the overall nomenclature. These figures managed to sustain their pre-1991 levels of authority. They did not form a support network for the new powers within the system (as this effort would be politically dangerous) and by the mid-1990s had achieved an administrative distance between themselves and the top trajectory.
Third trajectory: ‘The Quasi-Survival – remaining in the system of administration but suffering a reduction in authority to secondary roles within municipal structures.’ This trajectory comprised the largest percentage of the nomenclature, nearly 35%, and included the deputy heads of city and raion administration, the chairs and deputy chairs of city and raion soviets, and municipal workers who had a higher administrative status pre-1991. These successes did sometimes become significant: across a majority of sub-regions (57.1%) the first secretaries succeeded by 1990 in combining their post with another, usually chair of the local soviets. The dissolution of all local soviets, however, in 1993 ended this opportunity.
Fourth trajectory: ‘The Exchange – voluntarily transitioning away from political authority toward economic opportunities.’ This trajectory was the second largest category (25%) and was comprised of the managers/directors of industry. A large number of industrial managers came into the party organs by answering the “Gorbachev summons” during the second half of the 1980s, as Gorbachev sought to produce a swift transformation of party cadres. This status gave them a significant advantage when the privatization of industry and agriculture began. These managers and directors eagerly returned to what was for them a more comfortable and habitual role of activity and quickly established for themselves an enviable standard of living.
Fifth trajectory: ‘The Orthodox – resisting the new system.’ Comprising only 10% of the overall nomenclature, this group was mostly made up of the first secretaries of the official raion and city branches of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. They successfully clung to their orthodox rhetoric and became ideological fighters against the new system. In the first half of the 1990s this trend was actually rather popular. The calculation to pursue this course of action paid off in the success of G.A. Zyuganov as a potential candidate for Russian Federation President and in their own personal success as the most believable and trusted heads of local administration. In the present day such opposition to the authority of V.V. Putin is not only futile but almost masochistic. Today this trajectory is basically closed.
Sixth trajectory: ‘The Exit – retiring into the pension system.’ This age group, who were mainly the most elderly first secretaries of the local Communist Party branches, made up only 5% of the total nomenclature. For the most part they put in for retirement immediately after the failed coup attempt in 1991.
This presentation has elaborated six trajectories which explain the general mutation and flow of authority and power of the sub-regional party nomenclature after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While this article certainly provides proof of the fusion between municipal service and business, it also shows the subtlety and diversity of options from which the late-stage Soviet nomenclature was able to choose. Clearly some options for lines of authority dominated over others. What should be emphasized, however, is how closely those choices ultimately gave foreshadowing for some of the most significant problems and flaws that would occur throughout the 1990s and beyond as Russia tried to complete its transition to democracy and a free-market economy. The poor choices and frustrations of the sub-regional nomenclature were often ultimately mirrored in poor choices and frustrations within the transition at the federal level.
Thus, the chain of power in Russia evolved in the following manner:
1991 – Manager with work experience in Soviet organs (so-called «the Soviet nomenclature»).
1996 – Manager Nomenclature of the Soviet era.
2000 – Non-nomenclature Managers, placed by clans.
2004 – Non-nomenclature Managers plus other persons, also placed by clans.
2008-2010 – Peoples from outside, Varangians (Businessmen and Intelligence officers).
2012-2014 – Varangians somewhat transformed into a new type, but still close to the governors.
Matthew Crosston, PhD
Bellevue University, Omaha, Nebraska, USA
Professor of Political Science
Miller Endowed Chair for Industrial and International Security,
Director – The ISIS Program: International Security and Intelligence Studies
Tambov State University named after G.R. Derzhavin, Tambov, Russia
Doctor of Political Science, Professor of Foreign Affairs and Political Science
XV Congress of the International Association of Teachers of Russian Language
The XV Congress of the International Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature “Russian Language and Literature in a Changing World” began on September 13 in St. Petersburg. Outstanding Russian philologists from all over the world took part in the world congress. The objectives of the event and its significance for promoting the Russian language abroad were discussed at a press conference in TASS by the chairman of the congress program committee, adviser to the President of the Russian Federation, president of MAPRYAL and ROPRYAL, chairman of the supervisory board of the Russkiy Mir Foundation Vladimir Tolstoy, co-chairman of the congress program committee, rector St. Petersburg State University, member of the presidium of the Russian Language Council under the President of the Russian Federation, co-chairman of the Russian Language Council under the Government of the Russian Federation, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Nikolai Kropachev and president of the Leo Tolstoy Institute in Colombia Ruben Dario Flores Arcila.
The XV Congress of MAPRYAL is the largest event in the life of world Russian studies, in which about 600 delegates from 63 countries of the world take part: specialists in the field of scientific description and teaching of the Russian language, literature, theory and practice of translation, lexicography and other aspects. During the congress, 418 reports will be presented, which will present a whole range of international studies of Russian studies – from teaching methods to translations of literary texts and analysis of phraseological units.
As the President of MAPRYAL and the Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Russkiy Mir Foundation Vladimir Tolstoy noted, today MAPRYAL has 130 collective and 65 individual participants, and interest in the study of the Russian language and Russian literature is only growing around the world.
“This year, new colleagues from Argentina, Venezuela, Qatar, Kenya, Nigeria, Lebanon, Peru, Senegal, Tanzania, Ecuador, as well as our old friends from the CIS countries, Asia, the Balkan region, countries of Eastern and Western Europe joined the work of the congress . We are grateful to St. Petersburg State University for its active participation in organizing the congress,” said Vladimir Tolstoy during a press conference.
The XV Congress is being held in Russia for the first time in 20 years, and St. Petersburg is becoming its capital for the second time in the history of the event. In 2003, it was held in St. Petersburg on the initiative of the outstanding Russian scholar, rector and president of St. Petersburg State University Lyudmila Alekseevna Verbitskaya, who is the author of more than 300 scientific and educational works in the field of Russian and general linguistics, phonetics, phonology and methods of teaching the Russian language , as well as the significant project “Let’s speak correctly!” As part of the “zero” day of the congress, a sculptural portrait of Lyudmila Alekseevna Verbitskaya was unveiled at St. Petersburg State University, which will greet philologists and linguists every day.
Today, St. Petersburg University pays great attention to the study of the Russian language and its promotion abroad. The University has 112 Russian language centers, represented in 50 countries. In 2023, St Petersburg University opened Russian language centers in Indonesia, Malaysia, South Africa, Kenya, Algeria and Paraguay.
“SPbU has traditionally become the most popular university in Russia among foreign applicants. Citizens from 105 countries come to study at the University; the competition among foreign students is 21 people per place. Young people come to St. Petersburg University to learn Russian and study in Russian. St Petersburg University also teaches more than 100 world languages, including rare ones spoken in two or three countries. We teach our students not just foreign languages, but culture, history, economics, and law in these languages, because language does not exist separately from other areas of human life. I believe that today the Russian language is so popular and strong, partly because our country is open to all languages of the world. And it will always be like this,” said Nikolai Kropachev.
As the participants of the press conference noted, the rules for using the Russian language as the state language of the Russian Federation require special attention today. Rector of St. Petersburg State University, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Nikolai Kropachev noted that the changes made on behalf of Russian President Vladimir Putin to the Law on the State Language established new requirements for consolidating the norms of the Russian language, which must be observed in areas of compulsory use of the state language. Such norms must now be enshrined in normative dictionaries, reference books and grammars, the list of which will be approved by the Government. The normative dictionary must also define those foreign words that have no analogues in the Russian language and therefore can be used in the areas of use of the state language.
Associate Professor at the National University of Bogota, President of the Leo Tolstoy Institute Ruben Dario Flores Arcila spoke about the motivation for foreign students to learn Russian. In Colombia, Russian has been taught since 1944, when the Institute of Friendship with the USSR was founded. According to him, the first foreign articles devoted to the study of the work of the Russian writer Leo Nikolaevich Tolstoy were written in Colombia, Cuba.
“I am confident that Russian literature and the Russian language are special cultural codes that help foreigners understand the identity of Russia and better recognize the culture of this unique country,” said Ruben Dario Flores Arcila.
As part of the events of the XV MAPRYAL Congress, experts will pay attention to the methods of teaching Russian as a foreign language, various aspects of translating the works of Russian writers and poets into different languages of the world, discuss issues of reflecting cultural changes in language, and much more.
According to the director of the MAPRYAL secretariat, Alexander Korotyshev, the list of participants and topics of reports indicate that in order to competently teach and study the Russian language, you need to know a lot about both the culture and history of the country. “Modern methods of teaching the Russian language strive for accuracy in conveying linguistic facts and are literally “tuned” to the cultural and linguistic characteristics of different national audiences. The number of congress delegates suggests that interest in the Russian language in almost all parts of the world continues to grow,” added Alexander Korotyshev.
It should be noted that from September 1, 2023, on the basis of St. Petersburg University, with the support of the Government of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation, the online school of St. Petersburg State University began its work. A unique educational project allows schoolchildren from different countries to undergo training in Russian according to an approved educational program for grades 5–11 and receive a standard certificate. As the rector of St. Petersburg State University Nikolay Kropachev noted, the project already in the first year of its existence showed that studying in Russian is important in different parts of the world: the University received applications from schoolchildren from 44 countries.
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The XV Congress of MAPRYAL was organized by the International Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature together with St. Petersburg State University with the support of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation and the Russkiy Mir Foundation.
The first MAPRYAL congress was held in 1969 in the USSR, and since then it has traditionally been held once every five years in different cities around the world. Since 1969, MAPRYAL congresses have been hosted by Moscow, Varna, Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Budapest, Regensburg, Bratislava, St. Petersburg, Shanghai, Granada, Astana.
Common wealth of independent states
The geopolitical environment of Eurasia underwent a profound change with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. A new regional structure known as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) arose to deal with the difficulties and uncertainties that came along with this momentous event as the largest communist state in the world began to fall apart. The former Soviet governments that make up the CIS sought to maintain regional stability in the post-Soviet era while fostering political, economic, and cultural cooperation among its member states.
This research explores the intricate topography of the Commonwealth of Independent States and offers a thorough examination of its establishment, structure, and governance. We can understand the motivations behind the formation of this regional organization better by looking at the historical context of the demise of the Soviet Union and the CIS’s ensuing establishment.
This research’s main goal is to explain the political and economic aspects of cooperation within the CIS. We focus on the decision-making processes that have an impact on how the CIS functions as we examine the organizational structure of the CIS as well as the obligations of its member nations. We can gain a better understanding of the role the CIS plays in promoting regional stability by looking at political cooperation initiatives including those that address shared security concerns and participate in political and legal coordination.
The economic cooperation of the CIS nations is also examined, with an emphasis on attempts for trade and economic union. We evaluate the same economic issues these countries confront and look into the coordinated actions done to address them. We intend to determine how well the CIS is fostering stability and economic progress in the region by studying its economic component.
We take into account the CIS’s accomplishments and future advantages while also acknowledging its flaws and detractors. Both the efficacy of institutional processes and the internal problems brought on by disputes and conflicts among the member states are explored. We also look at how the outside world perceives the CIS, focusing on how Russia is seen as the organization’s dominant force and how the CIS is perceived as important and having an impact on global concerns.
Then, we evaluate the CIS’s possibilities while taking into consideration the modifying dynamics among its member states and the transforming global scenario. We look at possible areas for growth and transformation while examining the CIS’s role in solving fresh concerns and promoting deeper regional integration.
This research study aims to increase understanding of the Commonwealth of Independent States and its importance in the post-Soviet era by closely evaluating the group’s conception, structure, functioning, and prospects for the future.
The Soviet Union’s fall in December 1991 is where the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) got its start. Moscow’s centralized control over the vast lands and several republics that made up the union came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union. A number of causes, such as economic difficulties, political changes, and the growing yearning for independence among the Soviet republics, led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Following the Russian Federation’s declaration of independence, other former Soviet republics started down a similar road in an effort to assert their sovereignty and create independent states. In the Belovezhskaya Pushcha, a woodland reserve on the border between Belarus and Poland, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus met when the Soviet Union fell.
They approved the Belavezha Accords on December 8, 1991, thus dissolving the Soviet Union and founding the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Creating a framework for coordination and collaboration among the newly independent countries was the CIS’s main goal. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was founded in 1991 with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as its founding members. More former Soviet Union countries were added as the CIS grew over time to comprise the 12 member states it does now.
In its early years, the CIS faced numerous challenges. The difficulties that the member states faced included economic hardship, political upheaval, and territorial disputes from the Soviet era. The CIS provided a forum for dialogue and collaboration to address these problems and maintain regional stability.
The CIS had problems accomplishing its objectives while being technically created. Some member states prioritized their own national interests over group efforts while others offered varying degrees of support to the CIS. The Soviet Union, which had an intricate web of connections covering politics, economy, and security, was no longer as intertwined as the CIS.
The CIS has changed in terms of operations and organizational structure over time. While some programmes have improved member state cooperation, others have had very little success or have mostly been token efforts. The organization, despite various levels of efficacy and influence, provides a space for communication and collaboration. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, an effort was made to encourage regional cooperation among the newly independent republics by creating the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, independent nations established the regional organization known as the Commonwealth of Independent Nations (CIS). The CIS promotes intergovernmental cooperation and aims to deepen the links that bind its member nations politically, economically, and culturally. The CIS’s organizational structure is made up of a number of important parts, including:
Council of Heads of State: The Council of Heads of State is the CIS’s highest legislative body. It meets at least once a year to talk about and decide on crucial topics affecting the CIS. The participating nations’ heads of state or government make up this group.
The Council of Prime Ministers, also known as the Council of Heads of Government, coordinates and implements the decisions taken by the Council of Heads of State. It meets frequently to discuss and organize many aspects of cooperation and is made up of the heads of state or prime ministers of the member states.
Council of Foreign Ministers: The foreign ministers of the member nations make up the Council of Foreign Ministers. It acts as a forum for coordination and diplomatic dialogue on issues related to politics, security, and foreign affairs. The majority of the CIS’s foreign policy priorities are established by the Council of Foreign Ministers.
Economic Council: The member states’ economic cooperation is the main emphasis of the Economic Council. It aspires to improve economic integration, trade, and investment inside the CIS. The implementation of joint economic projects, the creation of common economic policies, and the encouragement of intra-CIS commerce are all coordinated by the Economic Council.
Sectoral Cooperation Bodies: The CIS has a number of specialized organizations that focus on particular sectors of cooperation. These organizations represent a wide range of professions, such as those in the legal, judicial, cultural, educational, and medical fields. They promote collaboration, knowledge sharing, and team projects in their specialized domains.
A structure of intergovernmental cooperation and consensus-based decision-making underlies the operation of the CIS. The following elements are essential to how the CIS functions:
- In the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), decisions are frequently reached by consensus. Negotiations and discussions among the member nations frequently result in important decisions. All key decisions and initiatives shall be developed and approved by the Council of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Heads of State.
- Cooperation Agreements and Protocols: The CIS is governed by a number of agreements and protocols that set the standards for member state cooperation. These accords cover a wide range of topics, including cultural exchange, economic integration, and security collaboration.
- Working Groups and Committees: The CIS creates a range of working groups and committees to help with the execution of decisions and objectives. These organizations are in charge of planning events, keeping an eye on initiatives as they take shape, and resolving particular problems within their individual spheres of expertise.
- Joint Programmes and Projects: The CIS supports collaborative initiatives that encourage member states to work together and integrate. These programmes cover topics like infrastructure construction, international interchange, scientific research, and humanitarian aid. Bilateral and multilateral agreements among member states are used to implement joint programmes and projects.
- Interaction with International Organizations: The CIS is in touch with other international bodies as well as regional groups. In order to address shared difficulties and advance shared objectives, it cooperates and engages in discourse with organizations like the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
The CIS aims to improve cooperation and collaboration among its member states in different political, economic, and cultural domains by operating within its organizational structure and functional framework. The operation of the CIS has, however, altered over time as a result of changing member state dynamics and a more general geopolitical environment.
Political and economic cooperation
A crucial component of the CIS’s operation is the political collaboration between its member states. It seeks to solve shared security issues, advance regional stability, and foster political and legal discussion. The following are some of the important CIS political cooperation areas:
- Common Security Issues: The CIS focuses on resolving common security issues that member governments encounter. Combating terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and illegal immigration are included in this. To improve regional security, the member states work together through collaborative initiatives like intelligence sharing, law enforcement coordination, and joint military exercises.
- Regional Stability Initiatives: The CIS contributes to efforts to maintain peace and resolve disputes in the region. In order to resolve territorial disputes and disagreements between member states, it develops procedures for discussion and negotiation. The group promotes peaceful dispute resolution procedures, aids in negotiations, and offers a forum for communication between disputing parties.
- Cooperation on Political and Legal Issues: The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) promotes cooperation on political and legal issues with the goal of harmonizing legal systems among member states. There are initiatives to harmonize legal frameworks, improve judicial collaboration, and advance the rule of law. Through discussion, the sharing of experience, and cooperative projects, the organization also addresses topics including human rights, democratic government, and electoral procedures.
Another important part of the CIS’s operation is economic cooperation, which aims to improve trade, investment, and economic integration among member states. Among the crucial components of economic cooperation within the CIS are the following:
- Initiatives for Trade and Economic Integration: The CIS promotes intra-CIS trade and economic integration through a number of programmes. The establishment of a free trade zone, standardization of customs practices, the removal of trade restrictions, and the mutual recognition of standards and certifications are all included in this. Processes for trade are streamlined, cross-border travel is made easier, and investment flows are encouraged within the CIS.
- Economic Reforms, Market Transitions, and Infrastructure Development are a few of the common problems that the CIS member nations must deal with. To meet these problems, the CIS promotes the sharing of knowledge, best practices, and technical support. Key economic sectors are developed, innovation is encouraged, and economic growth and stability are fostered through joint efforts and projects.
- Joint Energy and Transportation Projects: The CIS places a high priority on energy and transportation cooperation. In order to develop and manage energy resources, such as oil, gas, and power, the member states work together. To improve regional connection and guarantee dependable energy supplies, projects including pipelines, power grids, and transportation networks are launched.
- Financial Coordination: The CIS encourages member state coordination in the financial sphere, notably in the areas of capital markets, banking, and insurance. The region’s financial systems are being strengthened, monetary cooperation is being improved, and financial transactions are being made easier. Initiatives to stop corruption, money laundering, and illegal financial activity are also supported by the CIS.
It’s significant to note that over time and across member nations, the extent of political and economic cooperation within the CIS has changed. While some programmes have produced observable effects, others have run into difficulties because of conflicting national interests, economic inequalities, and geopolitical factors. As member states adjust to shifting conditions and work to further integrate the region, the efficacy of political and economic cooperation continues to change.
Challenges and Criticisms
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has encountered the following difficulties and criticisms:
- The member states of the CIS have a variety of political, economic, and security interests. This could make it more challenging to conduct collaborative activities and achieve genuine cooperation. It could also make it harder to coordinate on important topics and develop consensus.
- Institutional Weaknesses: The CIS’s institutional framework’s efficacy has been called into question. Some detractors contend that the organization’s capacity to respond quickly to new challenges is constrained by the bureaucratic and delayed decision-making processes. Concerns concerning the implementation of cooperative measures are also raised by the absence of enforcement procedures for agreements and protocols.
- Conflicts and Disputes: Left over from the Soviet era, the CIS has had to deal with persistent conflicts and disputes among its member states. Territorial conflicts, separatist movements, and racial tensions are a few of these. Such disputes can erode confidence and make it harder for employees to work together.
- Economic Disparities: The CIS faces difficulties integrating and cooperating economically due to the widening gap in wealth between its member states. Achieving equitable and sustainable economic cooperation may be hampered by differences in resource endowments, diverse economic systems, and varying levels of development.
- Perception of Dominance: There has been criticism and worry over Russia’s perceived dominance inside the CIS. Some contend that the organization’s power dynamics are unbalanced as a result of Russia’s sway and ability to make decisions, which eclipse the interests of smaller member nations.
The case studies below demonstrate the difficulties and dynamics that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) faces:
Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: Within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Armenia-Azerbaijan war in Nagorno-Karabakh has continued for some time. Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh territory, which is predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians, is the focus of a disagreement that has led to a protracted conflict and a precarious security situation. The CIS has attempted to aid in a peaceful resolution of the conflict through its processes and mediation efforts. Despite this, the crisis has brought to light issues like how difficult it is to come to a sustainable peace deal, how different national interests affect discussions, and how ineffective the CIS is at settling conflicts.
Conflict in Transnistria: The conflict in Transnistria, a province of Moldova that seceded, is still active. In 1990, Transnistria proclaimed its independence, sparking a bloody struggle between Moldova and the separatist territory. The Joint Control Commission, a CIS peacekeeping force, has been actively involved in maintaining tranquilly in Transnistria. The issue is a great example of how challenging it is to negotiate with separatist parties and how challenging it is to forge durable agreements inside the CIS.
Relations between Russia and Ukraine have had a significant impact on the dynamics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 have strained relations between the two nations..
Future prospects for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are uncertain and rely on a variety of factors. Within the organization, increased efforts by member nations to collaborate on security, political, and economic fronts may be seen. Increased collaboration in sectors like energy, transportation, culture, and education might lead to greater wealth and advancement for everybody. Along with forging ties with other regional organizations, the CIS may also need to adapt to altering geopolitical circumstances. However, problems such as divergent national interests, institutional shortcomings, and on-going conflicts between member states may continue to have an impact on how the CIS develops in the future.
The organization will need to deal with these concerns, encourage consensus-building, and effectively react to the changing requirements and aspirations of its member states if it is to preserve its relevance and effectiveness in the years to come.
The CIS’s future will ultimately depend on how committed its members are to overcoming obstacles, fostering cooperation, and advancing shared objectives. The CIS has the chance to promote regional stability, economic growth, and interstate peace among its numerous member nations as the geopolitical landscape changes.
Developing Far Eastern Region Russia’s Priority
The Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) is held annually in cooperation with the Far East regional administration, in the city of Vladivostok. Three years of COVOD-19, followed by Russia’s ‘special military operation’ and the current geopolitical situation have adversely affected this corporate business event, as Russia looks towards East and made its focus to develop the Far East.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said at the opening session that the government would not allow the pace of development to slacken in the Russian Far East as it is a strategic region for the country. “We will definitely not be scaling down the pace of development in the region, because the development of the Far East is an absolute priority for Russia, a direct priority for Russia as a whole for the entire 21st century, because it is a colossal region with a small population but huge potential. Of course, this is a strategic interest for the country,” the president said at the Eastern Economic Forum, which Vladivostok is hosting on September 10-13.
Putin further pointed out that it is necessary “not only to hold on to this region, but also to develop it and put its resources to work for the benefit of the state.” According to the president, “it is necessary to talk not only about the development of mineral resources in the Far East, it is necessary to build even more enterprises for the processing of industrial raw materials, so as to increase the added value.”
Putin later held discussion with Vice Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Zhang Guoqing. Both noted that Russia-China relations in this area – the area of economic cooperation – have reached a very high level. This is a derivative of what has been achieved in the political sphere, but the results are excellent, as every year trade grows by almost one third. This year, over the first seven months, trade is up about the same amount, 24 percent – to as much as 120 billion. The goal President Xi Jinping and Putin have set – to reach the US$200 billion mark in trade – can be achieved by the end of 2023.
In addition to above, Putin held discussion with Deputy Prime Minister of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Pany Yathotou, also on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum. Russia and Laos have made significant contributions to the development of bilateral parliamentary relations.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Yury Trutnev, earlier reiterated that the forum has been the world’s leading platform for discussing economic and political issues. The largest delegations are from such countries as China, Myanmar, India, Mongolia and Laos. He also expressed confident that a large number of new investment agreements with foreign participation would become the outcome of the forum. The Far East region expects new projects, technologies and jobs. And also to strengthen the Far East’s position in the system of economic relations in Asia Pacific.
For the past few years, Western and European businesses have largely been missing in this forum. And those from the Asian and Pacific are getting fewer and fewer as opportunities seem monotonous and speeches have the same message relating to world geopolitics. Business people are really for business opportunities, not geopolitics. Business people are simply looking for the unique products, services and profits.
Nevertheless, at the start of the forum the photo exhibition «Developing the Far East!», organized by the Corporation for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic with the support of the Office of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Far Eastern Federal District and the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, opened in the departure area of the domestic terminal.
The exposition presents a chronology of images: a decade during which unique conditions for business development were created in the Far East, more than 2.8 thousand investment projects were launched, about 700 of which have already been put into operation.
According to analysts interviewed by Russian media Izvestia, the forum’s agenda will be comprehensive, covering both domestic Russian and external economic issues. “This year, due to the greater focus on the East that has emerged in the country’s economy, the agenda for discussions are extensive, on both internal domestic and external issues,” according to Vladimir Klimanov, Associate Professor and Director of the Center for Regional Policy at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) Institute of Applied Economic Research.
Anton Kobyakov, Adviser to the President of the Russian Federation and Executive Secretary of the EEF Organizing Committee, says participants have the chance to exchange experiences, discuss networking practices at EEF events including a plenary session, panel sessions, round tables, and business dialogues. The main theme of this year’s forum is “The Path to Partnership, Peace and Prosperity” fixed by Roscongress Foundation. The Eastern Economic Forum will be held on 10–13 September 2023 in Vladivostok on the campus of the Far Eastern Federal University.
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