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Russian Interference in Syria and Turkey FP in Middle East

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Russia after October 1, aiming to support the Assad regime, is carrying out military operations on ISIS and the other opposition forces. Such a development has created a serious concerning the Middle East from the view point of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey.

This situation is contrary to Turkey’s Syrian policy based on Assad’s leaving power that it has been carrying on continually for almost four years. The existing circumstance in the area brings Turkey closer to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as it does Moscow, Tehran, Bagdad, Damascus and the Kurdish movements. Such a balance of power complicates the solution of the Syrian problem and had adverse impact on Moscow-Ankara relations especially on October 4-5-6 due to border violations of Russian military planes.

The strategic affiliation Turkey has established since 2012 with Muslim Brothers and Qatar and the policies to design the region accordingly have been altered in 2014 with the new king in Saudi Arabia. The fact that Muslim Brothers lost Egypt and its failure to be effective in Syria have forced Erdogan to seek new cooperation possibilities in the Arab World. Especially following the agreement on nuclear issues between US and Iran, Turkey was forced to ally with the Sunni countries. His several visits to Saudi Arabia prior to Russian interference in Syria and improvement in relations with the Gulf countries, helped Turkey’s convergence policies on the Syrian issue. It is important to perceive Russia’s latest military interference in this context. Namely, Russia was recently uncomfortable about the opposition forces, backed by Saudi Arabia, Arab Emirates and Turkey, progressing toward areas under Assad regime’s control. As a result of dialogues between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, the opposition groups in Syria could merge and gain strength. These developments threatening Russian military presence in Syria have forced Moscow to openly defend Assad. A military move in Syria was essential to counter these proceedings as well as to save Russia from international isolation. Lack of direct intervention from the USA, despite all these developments in the region, helped Moscow take advantage of the gap formed.

It is possible that Russia may be alienated by siding with the Arab countries or with Turkey. In order to prevent being pulled into the regional anti-Sunni equation, Russia is continuing its dialogue with Egypt and is trying hard to get Egypt on his side. But this is not expected to be successful. It could be a very dangerous game for the Egyptian President Sisi, who came to power with a coup. It was Saudi Arabia that provided the greatest support in bringing Sisi to power. Both the US and the EU allowed this to happen. If Sisi gets into this game with Putin, it is a great possibility that he will be toppled by Muslim Brothers and Salafis again.

The Russian military operation seems to proceed in two directions. First is air strikes on the South-Western parts of opposition group in Syria and operations against ISIS to ensure the existence of Assad’s regime. Here we should take into consideration the feeling that there has been an exchange of information between Russia and Turkey prior to these operations. Before the start of operations Erdogan visited Moscow to open a Mosque. According to information infiltrated from these meetings, Russia has informed Turkey on the joint military quarters they had established with Iran, Iraq and the Assad regime against ISIS and proposed Turkey to take part in it. Second is that they have agreed on a transition period under the leadership of Assad. Third is I think that Turkey has been given an important guarantee regarding the Kurdish Issue? This was that there will no Kurdish corridor formed from North to South in Western Syria.

After his visit to Russia, Erdogan stated that a transition period may be possible with Assad. Also the diplomatic sources rendered the fact that a proposal was made by Russia to Turkey to join the military quarters. For this reason, on the first days of the operations Turkey has expressed its discomfort only by diplomatic language. Later when Russia has directed its air attacks against the opposition forces, it became hysterical. It is evident that the Turkish side was not expecting this.

Turkey’s continued presence in Syria depends on the existence of the opposition forces it supports. With Russia’s elimination of these forces, Turkey will be out of the battlefield. A development like this will weaken Turkey’s hand at the table on its cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries related to Syrian issues.

Russian Interference in Syria and Turkey

Turkey’s discomfort on the matter is felt clearly. Such a development would mean a total failure of the Turkish Syrian policy. For Turkey to save its position in the Middle East equation, it has to continue dialogues with the Gulf Emirates and Saudi Arabia as well as maintain its strength on the battlefield. This is also a strong instrument in its negotiations with US and EU on Syrian issues.

As we have observed on Geneva I. and II. told, Russia always by-passes Turkey, as much as it can, when negotiating Syrian issues with USA. This time because it has no direct relation with US and EU, Russia is by-passing Turkey on the battlefield in order to strongly pressure Ankara into accepting his own conditions.

Turkey, in order to by-pass Russia and actually prevent Russia’s emergence from international isolation on Syrian issues, has to change its attitude toward Moscow this time. This means that Turkey ends the cooperation among the two countries regarding the Turkish Stream Project and the power plants and must join the policies followed by US and EU on Crimean issues. Actually Turkey didn’t take part in the economic sanctions of the western countries against Russia. As a matter of fact its wish was to penetrate the Russian markets more deeply. It is known that the Turkish companies’ investment in Russia is over 10 billion US dollars. We can say that in the first 7 months of 2015, the total trading volume between the two countries has decreased by 21,5% and dropped to 14,4 billion US dollars.

According to some, the reason why the Turkish Stream treaty has not been signed yet is the failure of Russia’s signing the promised %10.25 price reduction agreement. Since reaching an agreement on gas prices transmitted by the South Stream Project, Turkey wishes the Turkish Stream treaty to be evaluated separately. Russia, however, favors discussing the 10.25 percent reduction in gas prices to be paired with the Turkish Stream Project. The aim of Turkey, in this case, is to bring different terms to the negotiation table concerning the new line. Turkey wants guarantees not to relive the stress of “buy or pay” articles of previous gas agreements with this new pipeline project. However, the Turkish side has already reached an agreement within the scope of the Turkish Stream Project, with Russia, upon two of the total of four pipelines crossing underneath the Black Sea. The four pipelines together have a total export capacity of 63 billion cubic meters of gas. The capacity of the permitted two pipelines is 15.75 billion cubic meters. The aim is to utilize the gas from these lines mainly in the Turkish domestic market.

After all these developments, on October 6, the yearly capacity of the Turkish Stream gas line has been diminished from 63 billion cubic meters to 32 billion cubic meters by the decision of Russian energy company, Gazprom. It has been noted that with this decision the Russian-Turkish relations have declined even more. Actually Turkey is not in a position to risk its economic relations with Russia and both energy and economic relations with Moscow are of great importance for Turkey.

Therefore it is not possible for Turkey to take any harsh measures against Russia at present, since any such action can also seriously affect the November 1st general elections. The vulnerability of the Turkish Lira against the US dollar can increase. Due to all this, the prediction is that without support from USA, Turkey’s hand will grow weaker in Syrian policies and it will be left out of the field.

It is expected that Erdogan will continue his convergence policy with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries as before the Russian operations in Syria. As the leader of the Sunni bloke in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia together with Turkey wants them to stop soon. Keeping in mind the fact that the decisions on Turkish foreign policy are taken not by Erdogan but the National Security Council, after November 1 elections, in case of a CHP (Republican People’s Party)-AKP (Justice and Development Party) coalition there is a possibility of improvement in Turkish-Egyptian relations. That is why we can say this is one of the greatest expectations after November 1. elections. A CHP-AKP coalition is also expected to smooth out relations with Israel. Turkey, not getting the full support of US regarding Middle East policies, wants to adjust the political balance on his side by taking part in building the Sunni bloke and concurrently improving relations with Israel. So as a result, we can witness Russia’s super activity in the area together with Turkey settling relations with Israel and Egypt. Actually, my opinion is that Israel will have the priority.

In case of AKP getting enough votes to come to power alone, the expectation is a Middle East policy based on close relations with the Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The unfavorable relations between Turkey and Israel is expected to continue as it is. The relations with Egypt might be established again if the most important issue Morsi, the leader of Muslim Brothers, is freed.

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Attack in Iran raises spectre of a potentially far larger conflagration

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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An attack on a military parade in the southern Iranian city of Ahwaz is likely to prompt Iranian retaliation against opposition groups at home and abroad. It also deepens Iranian fears that the United States. Saudi Arabia and others may seek to destabilize the country by instigating unrest among its ethnic minorities.

With competing claims of responsibility by the Islamic State and the Ahvaz National Resistance for the attack that killed 29 people and wounded 70 others in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan, which borders on Iraq and is home to Iran’s ethnic Arab community, it is hard to determine with certainty the affiliation of the four perpetrators, all of whom were killed in the incident.

Statements by Iranian officials, however, accusing the United States and its allies, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel, suggest that they see the Ahvaz group rather than the Islamic State as responsible for the incident, the worst since the Islamic State attacked the Iranian parliament and the mausoleum of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Tehran in 2017.

Iran’s summoning, in the wake of the attack, of the ambassadors of Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark, countries from which Iranian opposition groups operate, comes at an awkward moment for Tehran.

It complicates Iranian efforts to ensure that European measures effectively neutralize potentially crippling US sanctions that are being imposed as a result of the US withdrawal in May from the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic republic’s nuclear program.

Ahvaz-related violence last year spilled on to the street of The Hague when unidentified gunmen killed Ahwazi activist Ahmad Mola Nissi. Mr. Nissi was shot dead days before he was scheduled to launch a Saudi-funded television station staffed with Saudi-trained personnel that would target Khuzestan, according to Ahvazi activists.

This week, a group of exile Iranian academics and political activists, led by The Hague-based social scientist Damon Golriz, announced the creation of a group that intends to campaign for a liberal democracy in Iran under the auspices of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the ousted Shah of Iran who lives in the United States.

While Iran appears to be targeting exile groups in the wake of the Ahvaz attack, Iran itself has witnessed in recent years stepped up activity by various insurgent groups amid indications of Saudi support, leading to repeated clashes and interception of Kurdish, Baloch and other ethnic insurgents.

Last month, Azeri and Iranian Arab protests erupted in soccer stadiums while the country’s Revolutionary Guards Corps reported clashes with Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish insurgents.

State-run television warned at the time in a primetime broadcast that foreign agents could turn legitimate protests stemming from domestic anger at the government’s mismanagement of the economy and corruption into “incendiary calls for regime change” by inciting violence that would provoke a crackdown by security forces and give the United States fodder to tackle Iran.

The People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran or Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK), a controversial exiled opposition group that enjoys the support of serving and former Western officials, including some in the Trump administration, as well as prominent Saudis such as Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former Saudi intelligence chief, who is believed to be close to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has taken credit for a number of the protests in Khuzestan.

The incidents fit an emerging pattern, prompting suggestions that if a Gulf-backed group was responsible for this weekend’s attack, it may have been designed to provoke a more direct confrontation between Iran and the United States.

“If the terrorist attack in Ahvaz was part of a larger Saudi and UAE escalation in Iran, their goal is likely to goad Iran to retaliate and then use Tehran’s reaction to spark a larger war and force the US to enter since Riyadh and Abu Dhabi likely cannot take on Iran militarily alone… If so, the terrorist attack is as much about trapping Iran into war as it is to trap the US into a war of choice,” said Trita Parsi of the National Iranian American Council.

Iran appears with its response to the Ahvaz attack to be saying that its fears of US and Saudi destabilization efforts are becoming reality. The Iranian view is not wholly unfounded.

Speaking in a private capacity on the same day as the attack in Ahvaz, US President Donald J. Trump’s personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, declared that US. sanctions were causing economic pain that could lead to a “successful revolution” in Iran.

“I don’t know when we’re going to overthrow them. It could be in a few days, months, a couple of years. But it’s going to happen,” Mr. Giuliani told an audience gathered in New York for an Iran Uprising Summit organized by the Organization of Iranian-American Communities, a Washington-based group associated with the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq.

Mr. Giuliani is together with John Bolton, Mr. Trump’s national security advisor, a long-standing supporter of the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq that calls for the violent overthrow of the Iranian regime.

Mr. Bolton, last year before assuming office, drafted at the request of Mr. Trump’s then strategic advisor, Steve Bannon, a plan that envisioned US support “for the democratic Iranian opposition,” “Kurdish national aspirations in Iran, Iraq and Syria,” and assistance for Iranian Arabs in Khuzestan and Baloch in the Pakistani province of Balochistan and Iran’s neighbouring Sistan and Balochistan province.

The Trump administration has officially shied away from formally endorsing the goal of toppling the regime in Tehran. Mr. Bolton, since becoming national security advisor, has insisted that US policy was to put “unprecedented pressure” on Iran to change its behaviour”, not its regime.

Messrs. Bolton and Giuliani’s inclination towards regime change is, however, shared by several US allies in the Middle East, and circumstantial evidence suggests that their views may be seeping into US policy moves without it being officially acknowledged.

Moreover, Saudi support for confrontation with Iran precedes Mr. Trump’s coming to office but has intensified since, in part as a result of King Salman’s ascendance to the Saudi throne in 2015 and the rise of his son, Prince Mohammed.

Already a decade ago, Saudi Arabia’s then King Abdullah urged the United States to “cut off the head of the snake” by launching military strikes to destroy Iran’s nuclear program.

Writing in 2012 in Asharq Al Awsat, a Saudi newspaper, Amal Al-Hazzani, an academic, asserted in an op-ed entitled “The oppressed Arab district of al-Ahwaz“ that Khuzestan “is an Arab territory… Its Arab residents have been facing continual repression ever since the Persian state assumed control of the region in 1925… It is imperative that the Arabs take up the al-Ahwaz cause, at least from the humanitarian perspective.”

More recently, Prince Mohammed vowed that “we won’t wait for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia. Instead, we will work so that the battle is for them in Iran.”

Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a prominent UAE scholar, who is believed to be close to Emirati Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, played into Iranian assertions of Gulf involvement in this weekend’s attack by tweeting that it wasn’t a terrorist incident.

Mr. Abdulla suggested that “moving the battle to the Iranian side is a declared option” and that the number of such attacks “will increase during the next phase”.

A Saudi think tank, believed to be backed by Prince Mohammed last year called in a study for Saudi support for a low-level Baloch insurgency in Iran. Prince Mohammed vowed around the same time that “we will work so that the battle is for them in Iran, not in Saudi Arabia.”

Pakistani militants have claimed that Saudi Arabia has stepped up funding of militant madrassas or religious seminaries in Balochistan that allegedly serve as havens for anti-Iranian fighters.

The head of the US State Department’s Office of Iranian Affairs, Steven Fagin, met in Washington in June with Mustafa Hijri, head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), before assuming his new post as counsel general in Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The KDPI has recently stepped up its attacks in Iranian Kurdistan, killing nine people weeks before Mr. Hijri’s meeting with Mr. Fagin. Other Kurdish groups have reported similar attacks. Several Iranian Kurdish groups are discussing ways to coordinate efforts to confront the Iranian regime.

Similarly, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) last year appointed a seasoned covert operations officer as head of its Iran operations.

Said Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Khalid bin Salman, Prince Mohammed’s brother: President “Trump makes clear that we will not approach Iran with the sort of appeasement policies that failed so miserably to halt Nazi Germany’s rise to power, or avert the costliest war ever waged.”

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Turkey’s Great Game in Syria

Ahmet S. Yayla, Ph.D.

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With ISIS on the run in the desert of South Syria, Al Qaeda’s affiliated jihadists in Idlib brace for the final assault by the combined forces of the Syrian Army, the Russian air force and the Iranian proxies. The president of Turkey, who fancies that he could be the new Caliph himself, implores the United States to join in the quashing of Bashar Al-Assad “before he kills again.” While there are some common of interests between Washington and Ankara, the United States gains nothing by assisting Erdogan’s Syrian gambit, because the cure he would bring could be worse than the disease. On the other hand, the President’s call five months ago to pull out of Syria altogether would be risky.

Idlib, Home to some three million people, half of whom are the displaced people running away from Assad’s atrocities, has also been an uncertain sanctuary for former Salafist-jihadi fighters, who may number  30,000 according to the US military. The UN special envoy for Syria estimates there are around 10,000 al-Qaeda affiliated fighters in Idlib, most of whom under the control of Hay’atTahrir al-Sham, (HTS), al-Qaeda’s latest rebranding, which hold nearly 60 percent of the city. The rest of Idlib is controlled by Turkey-backed militias. Turkey has a dog in this fight; the Western coalition does not.

Armies of four major players in the area vie for territory: Syria, Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Ankara agreed to help create de-escalation zones and 12 observation posts to protect civilians during the Astana peace talks in January 2017.

The battle for Idlib has differing objectives for the four armies on the field.

For Syria, the Idlib offensive allows al-Assad to kill thousands of Sunni rebels with barrel bombs, Russian airstrikesand Iranian militias, all with an unforgettable exclamation point. Brutal, yes, but it’s a strategy that has worked in the area for 5,000 years.

For Russia, driving on Idlib will be the final blow against the rebels and the guarantee of Russia’s permanent military bases in Tartus and Latakia.

For Iran, conquering Idlib would remove the last major obstacle to the Shia land bridge from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. Iran wants to extend its influence in the region and have uninterrupted access to Lebanon to boost Hezbollah’s power and its supply chain.

For Turkey and Erdogan, the Idlib strategy is complicated. It is estimated that an assault would drive more than 700,000 people toward the Turkish border. But Turkey, with more than 3 million refugees already and a spiraling financial crisis, won’t accept another humanitarian flood, according to Turkey’s foreign minister. Additionally, Turkey has been investing in northern Syria to extend its influence including in Idlib by providing humanitarian aid via NGO’s such as the IHH (Humanitarian Relief Foundation), opening schools, and sending teachers and imams to establish a favorable Turkish sphere of influence for long-term investment; therefore, Turkey fears to lose the ground it already controls.

Since January 2017 Erdogan anticipated that he could trust Russia and Iran and have a military presence in the region per the Astana agreement. According to Erdogan, Turkish military presence would thwart a Syrian offense against Idlib. He also wanted to extend Turkish control of northern Syria along the Turkish border, including the cities of al-Bab and Afrin, in an effort to block a Kurdish-controlled corridor along the same border. On both counts, Erdogan miscalculated.

Erdogan has been playing a dangerous game both at home and abroad. He closely but surely distanced Turkey from the West; particularly the U.S. Under his control, Turkey has become an authoritarian state, jailing thousands of people on false charges. Among the victims are hundreds of journalists, including several Western reporters and an American Christian pastor.

The fact is, Turkey no longer behaves as a U.S. ally. Under Erdogan, Turkey allowed more than 40,000 foreign fighters to pass through her borders to join Salafist Jihadi terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq from 2013 to 2016. Though Turkey may be an enemy of Assad, the Erdogan regime has been a silent partner with Russia and Iran.

Erdogan’s disdain for the United States also stems from a New York federal court case involving the Iranian embargo. Turkish Halkbank and gold trader Reza Zarrab, under the orders of Erdogan, helped Iran to circumvent the American embargo banning the sale of Iranian oil and transferring millions of dollars to Iran and its proxies. Turkey’s president likely thought the Trump Administration would kill the Zarrab case.

Realizing his ill-intended policies and demands were not being met by the Trump Administration, Erdogan decided to play the Russia card. Turkey, a NATO member nation, recently purchased Russian s-400 missile systems amid US protests and will install these weapons systems in 2019.

The U.S. should set its priorities in the region based on international and humanitarian values and to eradicate the conflict in the long run by promoting the protection of the civilians first. U.S. military assets in Syria should stay put for four reasons. First, to act as a deterrent to al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons and other atrocities. Second, to frustrate Turkish expansion and control of Syria’s northern border. Third, to control Iranian ambitions in the region. Fourth, to assist the local allies to prevent the re-emergence of Islamic State 2.0.

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Putin and Erdogan Plan Syria-Idlib DMZ as I Recommended

Eric Zuesse

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As I recommended in a post on September 10th, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdogan jointly announced on September 17th, “We’ve agreed to create a demilitarized zone between the government troops and militants before October 15. The zone will be 15-20km wide,” which compares to the Korean DMZ’s 4-km width. I had had in mind the Korean experience, but obviously Putin and Erdogan are much better-informed about the situation than I am, and they have chosen a DMZ that’s four to five times wider. In any case, the consequences of such a decision will be momentous, unless U.S. President Donald Trump is so determined for there to be World War III as to stop at nothing in order to force it to happen no matter what Russia does or doesn’t do.

What the Putin-Erdogan DMZ decision means is that the 50,000 Turkish troops who now are occupying Idlib province of Syria will take control over that land, and will thus have the responsibility over the largest concentration of jihadists anywhere on the planet: Idlib. It contains the surviving Syrian Al Qaeda and ISIS fighters, including all of the ones throughout Syria who surrendered to the Syrian Army rather than be shot dead on the spot by Government forces.

For its part, the U.S. Government, backed by its allies and supported in this by high officials of the United Nations, had repeatedly threatened that if there occurs any chemical-weapons attack, or even any claimed chemical-weapons attack, inside Idlib, the U.S. and its allies will instantaneously blame the Syrian Government and bomb Syria, and will shoot down the planes of Syria and of Russia that oppose this bombing-campaign to conquer or ‘liberate’ Syria from its Government. The U.S. has announced its determination to protect what one high U.S. official — who is endorsing what Trump is doing there — “the largest Al Qaeda safe haven since 9/11.” He admits it, but he wants to protect them from being bombed by Syria and by Russia.

During recent weeks, the U.S. military has increasingly said that even if the jihadists they’ve been assisting to assemble the materials for a chemical-weapons attack fail to carry it out or to stage one, any attempt by Syrian and Russian forces to destroy the jihadists (which the U.S. side calls ‘rebels’) in Idlib will be met with overwhelming U.S.-and-allied firepower. That would spark WW III, because whichever side — Russia or U.S. — loses in the Syrian battlefield will nuclear-blitz-attack the other side so as to have the lesser damage from the nuclear war and thus (in military terms) ‘win’ WW III, because the blitz-attack will destroy many of the opposite side’s retaliatory weapons. In a nuclear war, the first side to attack will have a considerable advantage — reducing the number of weapons the other side can launch.

If, on the other hand, the DMZ-plan works, then Turkey’s forces will be responsible for vetting any of Idlib’s residents who try to leave, in order to prohibit jihadists and their supporters from leaving. Once that task (filtering out the non-dangerous inhabitants and retaining in Idlib only the jihadists and their supporters) is done, the entire world might be consulted on whether to exterminate the remaining residents or to set them free to return to the countries from which they came or to other countries. Presumably, no country would want those ‘refugees’. That would answer the question.

America’s Arab allies, the oil monarchies such as the Sauds who own Saudi Arabia and the Thanis who own Qatar, and which have funded Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood, would then be put on a spot, because if they say “Exterminate them!” then their clergy who have provided the moral imprimatur upon those families’ ownership of those nations, will either be in rebellion or else will themselves become overthrown either by their own followers or else by their monarch — overthrown from below or from above.

Alternatively, after Turkey’s forces in Idlib will have allowed release from Idlib of all who will be allowed out, Syria’s and Russia’s bombers will simply go in and slaughter the then-surrounded jihadists and take upon themselves the responsibility for that, regardless of what the leaders of the U.S. and its allied governments might say.

On the night of September 17th in Syria, there were missile-attacks “from the sea” against several Syrian cities; and those attacks could have come from either Israel’s or America’s ships, or from other U.S.-allied ships. Russian Television bannered, “Russian plane disappears from radars during Israeli attack on Syria’s Latakia – MoD” and reported:

A Russian military Il-20 aircraft with 14 service members on board went off the radars during an attack by four Israeli jets on Syria’s Latakia province, the Russian Defense Ministry said.

Air traffic controllers at the Khmeimim Air Base “lost contact” with the aircraft on Wednesday evening, during the attack of Israeli F-16 fighters on Latakia, said the MOD.

Russian radars also registered the launch of missiles from a French frigate in the Mediterranean on the evening of September 17. …

The attack on Latakia came just hours after Russia and Turkey negotiated a partial demilitarization of the Idlib province

If the missiles were authorized by President Trump, then WW III has already begun in its pre-nuclear stage. However, if the attacks were launched by Israel’s Netanyahu, and/or by France’s Macron, without U.S. authorization, then the U.S. President might respond to them by siding against that aggressor(s) (and also against what he used to call “Radical Islamic Terrorists”), so as to prevent a nuclear war.

Late on September 17th, Al Masdar News bannered “NATO warships move towards Syrian coast” and reported “The NATO flotilla cruising off the Syrian coast reportedly consists of a Dutch frigate, the De Ruyter, a Canadian frigate, the Ville de Quebec, and a Greek cruiser, the Elli.” Al Qaeda and ISIS have influential protectors.

Ultimately, the decision will be U.S. President Trump’s as to whether he is willing to subject the planet to WW III and to its following nuclear winter and consequent die-off of agriculture and of everyone, in order to ‘win’ a nuclear war, such as America’s aristocracy has especially championed since the year 2006. The nuclear-victory concept is called “Nuclear Primacy” — the use of nuclear weapons so as to win a nuclear war against Russia, instead of to prevent a nuclear war. That concept’s predecessor, the “Mutually Assured Destruction” or “M.A.D.” meta-strategy, predominated even in the U.S. until 2006. Trump will have to decide whether the purpose of America’s nuclear-weapons stockpiles is to prevent WW III, or is to win WW III.

In Russia, the purpose has always been to have nuclear weapons in order to prevent WW III. But America’s President will be the person who will make the ultimate decision on this. And Idlib might be the spark. Netanyahu or Macron might be wanting to drag the U.S. into war even against Russia, but the final decision will be Trump’s.

The ultimate question is: How far will the U.S. go in order to continue the U.S. dollar as being the overwhelmingly dominant global currency?

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