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Nord Stream Nr. 2: The Project’s Implications in Europe

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Russia, Germany and a consortium of Western European companies have re-activated the Gazprom-led Nord Stream Two gas pipeline project. Parallel to the existing Nord Stream One pipeline on the Baltic seabed, Nord Stream Two would double the system’s total capacity to 110 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually, all earmarked for direct delivery to Germany.

Nord Stream is billed as the world’s biggest natural gas transportation project, in terms of pipeline length and throughput capacities. Initially announced in 2011–2012 through non-binding agreements of intent, Nord Stream Two had to be shelved for the duration of Europe’s economic slump. The project agreement signed on September 4, 2015, however, is binding. Gazprom’s management anticipates economic-financial recovery in Western Europe and, consequently, gas demand recovery by 2019, the target date for completing Nord Stream Two. It also expects gas extraction to decline in Norway after having been capped in the Netherlands, thus boosting European import demand (Gazprom.com, accessed September 14).

The project’s other role is to bypass Ukraine’s gas transit system, its continuation through the Slovakian and Czech transit corridors, and potentially Poland’s. Those transit routes are beyond Gazprom’s control. The Kremlin intends to re-direct the lion’s share of its gas exports to the “old” European Union into the Gazprom-controlled Nord Stream route. This would not merely deprive Ukraine and those other countries of transit revenue. Strategically, it would result in Gazprom controlling gas transportation as well as the supply to Western European customers.

Gazprom claims that it would, in due course, deliver “new gas”—i.e., gas sourced from newly developed fields—through Nord Stream. But it has not identified those resources; its barely disguised near-term intent is to switch the flow from Ukrainian pipelines into Nord Stream. For years to come, gas volumes diverted from Ukraine will be Nord Stream’s main resource.

In the short and medium term, Nord Stream Two strengthens Russia’s hand against Ukraine and a number of Central-Eastern European countries. Gazprom will henceforth be able to bypass or cut off these countries—or extort concessions under such threats—before these countries would have made arrangements with non-Russian suppliers.

As a bypass project, Nord Stream Two is potentially more effective compared with South Stream (in its various configurations). Bypassing Ukraine, South Stream would have changed Gazprom’s export route but would have targeted basically the same markets. Nord Stream Two, however, aims to break into new, highly lucrative markets in northwestern and western Europe. Or by words of prof. Anis Bajrektarevic: “This arching pipeline network eliminates any transit barganing premium from Eastern Europeans and poses in effect a joint Russo-German pressure on the Baltic states, Poland, Ukraine, and even as far as to Azerbaijan and Georgia.”

The European Commission finally blocked South Stream on the legal level at the end of 2014; and the other southern bypass option, Turkish Stream, looks no more convincing in 2015, even to Moscow, than its closely resembling predecessor Blue Stream Two had looked a decade ago. Thus, Moscow has turned to Nord Stream again in the new circumstances and based on its forecasts of medium-term market demand (see above).

If completed as designed, Nord Stream Two could cement the Russo-German special partnership in the energy sector for the long term, with ramifications in the financial sector and foreign policy.

Germany is the exclusive designated recipient of Nord Stream gas. This evolution casts Germany in a new role, on top of Germany’s familiar role as Europe’s leading importer of Russian gas. Nord Stream Two promises the much-coveted status of an “energy hub” for Germany. It opens the prospect for Germany to become the main center for the transit and storage of Russian gas and its onward distribution in Western Europe. This would mean higher sales revenues for German energy companies, as well as a potential windfall from transit fees and taxes accruing to the German federal and state budgets. Even if Nord Stream One and Two operate (as seems likely) below their combined capacity of 110 bcm per year, the volumes carried into Germany could be staggering in magnitude. The prospects of transit and tax revenue on such a scale must be a significant consideration behind the German government’s support for Nord Stream Two.

Designating Germany as the privileged “hub” country is not an entirely novel idea in Moscow. In 2006, President Vladimir Putin had publicly offered to select Germany as the distribution center for Russian gas in Western Europe. Counting at that time on the development of Russia’s supergiant Shtokman field, Putin proposed to export Shtokman gas through the then-planned Nord Stream One pipeline to Germany, for onward distribution to other EU countries. The Shtokman project, however, turned out to be unfeasible and was abandoned in 2012.

Putin’s stillborn offer to Germany in 2006 would not have affected the Ukrainian transit of Russian gas to the European Union, given that Shtokman gas would have been “new gas,” not diverted from the Ukrainian transit system. Now, however, Russia is at war in Ukraine and is enlisting Germany into this anti-Ukrainian project. It can also be viewed as an anti-EU project, insofar as it enables Gazprom to replace a transportation route beyond its control with a route under its control.

Part Two

Within Germany, Nord Stream has spawned a system of gas transmission pipelines and storage sites, dedicated to handling Gazprom’s gas en route to German and other countries’ markets. That system’s ownership and operation pose serious challenges to the European Union’s energy market and competition norms. Those challenges will mount, if and when Nord Stream Two adds another 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) to Nord Stream One’s 55 bcm in annual capacity. From 2012 to date, Nord Stream One has operated at about half-capacity.

The dedicated infrastructure on German territory includes the OPAL and NEL transmission pipelines and the Rehden and Jemgum storage sites, all intended to operate in conjunction with Nord Stream One and Two. Gazprom and other Nord Stream stakeholders in various combinations also own and operate OPAL, NEL, Rehden and Jemgum. Alongside that dedicated system, Gazprom and Wintershall jointly operate another gas transmission network that can also be fed with gas volumes from Nord Stream One and Two.

The European Commission had, all along, viewed those plans as aiming to create vertically integrated monopolies. The Commission used its authority and legal powers to resist such arrangements (e.g., restricting Gazprom’s use of OPAL to one half of that pipeline’s capacity). For their part, the German government and regulatory agencies allowed Gazprom to expand its pipeline and storage assets in Germany through joint ventures with German companies. A flurry of such takeovers were agreed upon in 2013 and early 2014, linked with the completion of Nord Stream One and the expected agreement to build Nord Stream Two. Russia’s military intervention against Ukraine in February 2014, however, made it politically impossible for Germany to complete those transactions.

Germany’s time-out is now over. On September 4, Gazprom’s buyout of Wintershall’s gas trading and storage was finalized, and the Nord Stream Two shareholders’ agreement was signed. The agreement has created the New European Pipeline AG project company to build and operate Nord Stream Two. The companies’ press releases stopped short of identifying the chief executive of the New European Pipeline AG project company. Gazprom’s photo of the signing ceremony, however, shows an uncaptioned Matthias Warnig signing the Nord Stream Two agreement, alongside the presidents/CEOs of the stakeholder companies (Gazprom.com, accessed September 14). As managing director of Nord Stream One since that project’s inception, Warnig will apparently hold the same position in Nord Stream Two. Nord Stream Two’s shareholding largely overlaps with that of Nord Stream One and with the shareholdings of the dedicated onshore pipelines and storages in Germany.

These actions are already accompanied by pressures from the interested companies and the German government to override EU energy market and competition legislation. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble apparently proposes transferring some of the European Commission’s anti-trust competencies to other authorities, not publicly specified as yet. Germany’s own anti-trust and regulatory agency, the Bundesnetzagentur, does not object to Gazprom’s monopolistic use of the OPAL and (in prospect) NEL pipelines (Naturalgaseurope.com, September 3).

According to the European Commission, the offshore Nord Stream One was implemented in line with EU law at that time, but “the Commission will ensure that Nord Stream Two, if implemented, fully complies with the EU’s Third Package of energy legislation.” And “any pipelines, whether northern or southern, on EU member countries’ territories must be fully compliant with EU legislation (Bloomberg, UNIAN, September 11). This official statement alludes, first, to the fact that the Third Package was not yet in force when Nord Stream One was built, but has entered into force since then. It further alludes to the European Commission’s effective use of EU law to block South Stream—that other Gazprom-led project in Europe.

The European Commission’s vice-president for the Energy Union, Maros Sefcovic, has announced “a host” of questions to be raised on Nord Stream; e.g., Does it correspond with the EU’s supply diversification strategy? What does it mean for Central and Eastern Europe? What conclusions should be drawn, if this project aims practically to shut down Ukraine’s transit route? “All projects of this magnitude would have to comply with EU legislation,” he declared (Politico.eu, September 7, 11; UNIAN, September 11; BTA, September 15).

Part Three

According to the European Union’s Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete, Ukraine is a “reliable transit country,” while Nord Stream Two does not help diversify supply sources, hence “it is not a priority” in terms of EU policies (Naturalgaseurope.com, September 3). “Not a priority” was also the European Commission’s standard diplomatic phrase when blocking South Stream. The phrase implies (inter alia) no access to EU funding, which is reserved for projects of common interest in the trans-European network-energy (TEN-E) category.

Austrian OMV’s entrance into the Nord Stream Two consortium is noteworthy, both politically and from a business perspective. OMV is the majority owner of the Central Europe Gas Hub (CEGH), at Baumgarten, near Vienna. This was the planned terminus of two major, rival pipeline projects: the EU-backed Nabucco and the Gazprom-led South Stream, both defunct. The CEGH’s remaining role is that of terminus of the Ukraine-Slovakia gas transit corridor to Europe. But the transit volumes have been falling sharply in recent years in that corridor; down to some 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2014. Nord Stream Two threatens to kill that corridor altogether, by switching Russian gas flows from Ukrainian pipelines into Nord Stream.

Hence, OMV has joined Nord Stream Two to keep the CEGH alive, apparently expecting to connect Baumgarten, ultimately, with Nord Stream, via the OPAL and Gazela pipelines in Germany and the Czech Republic. OMV’s new president, Rainer Seele, has indicated at this possibility (Naturalgaseurope.com, August 12). Seele was Wintershall’s president until July 2015 and is closely aligned with Gazprom. Presumably, Seele’s value to OMV is to unlock Gazprom’s doors more widely for the Austrian company, and keep the CEGH alive by connecting it with Nord Stream (Vedomosti, September 4).

If Nord Stream Two kills the Ukrainian transit route—with Slovakia as collateral victim—Hungary could be left up in the air. Ukraine is the sole existing route for Russian (or any) natural gas into Hungary.

Re-routing gas flows from Ukraine into Nord Stream would also affect Poland and the Czech Republic adversely, albeit less dramatically than it would affect Ukraine, Slovakia or Hungary.

Czech dependence on Russian gas stands at about two thirds of the Czech consumption of some 9 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually. In recent years. The Czech Republic also provides transit service for Russian gas to Germany.

The Czech Republic’s pre-existing two trunklines are traditionally sourced with Russian gas from the Ukraine-Slovakia transit corridor. The new pipeline, Gazela, is dedicated to Russian gas to be sourced from Nord Stream, which feeds directly into the OPAL pipeline in Germany, thence to connect with Gazela in the Czech Republic. According to calculations in 2014, Russian natural gas reaching Central Europe via the Baltic sea entails far higher transportation costs—and, thus end prices—compared with the same volumes of Russian gas reaching Central Europe via Ukraine.

Poland, in the last two decades, has provided transit service for Russian gas through the Yamal-Europe pipeline, with an annual capacity of 35 bcm, which runs via Belarus and Poland into Germany. New transport capacity in Nord Stream Two would enable Moscow to either re-direct gas volumes into that offshore pipeline, bypassing Poland, or threaten to do so in order to re-negotiate supply and transit terms with Poland in Russia’s favor under duress. Re-negotiations are due ahead of 2022.

In Europe’s southeast, however, Gazprom has no bypass solution available. Gazprom will have to continue using the Ukrainian transit route in order to supply Moldova, Romania (which has almost stopped importing Russian gas in 2015), Bulgaria, Greece, and western parts of turkey. That would amount to an aggregate volume of up to 10 bcm per year, transiting Ukraine en route to the Balkans.

Whether Gazprom has the gas volumes available to deliver 55 bcm annually through Nord Stream One by 2019, and a total of 110 bcm annually through both lines after that year, seems doubtful, even by switching most of the flow from Ukraine, if Nord Stream Two ultimately materializes.

 

First published by the INGEPO Consulting’s Geostrategic Pulse magazine

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We Need a Global Fund to Ensure a Clean Energy Revolution

MD Staff

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A radical new approach to energy innovation is needed if the sector is to meet the demands placed on it by the Paris Climate Agreement and play a positive role in the fight against climate change. This is the main finding of a white paper, Accelerating Sustainable Energy Innovation, published today by the World Economic Forum.

With energy consumption and production representing two thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions, business as usual is no longer an option. Increasing the pace at which innovative sustainable energy solutions get to market is critical to diversify the energy technology landscape and to meet the Paris targets at affordable costs.

The white paper, produced with analytical support from KPMG, highlights that while technology and innovation policies have been successful in rapidly scaling up some renewable technologies such as solar, photovoltaics and wind power in the past decade, the breadth of innovation and the way it has been coordinated have been disappointing. Because investments in energy technology typically require long investment horizons and entail high technological risks, the sector has struggled to attract sufficient amounts of funding, or to align the investments of those active in the space.

“Unleashing the full power of entrepreneurship and innovation across the energy system is at the crux of delivering global climate goals and spurring new opportunities for growth. We must take advantage of the Fourth Industrial Revolution to bring about a step change in investments and accelerate the pace at which new technologies are brought to market,” says Cheryl Martin, Managing Director and Head of the Global Centre for Innovation and Entrepreneurship, World Economic Forum.

The paper highlights a set of ideas that were identified to channel more investment into R&D and fast-track the road to commercialization, targeting regulatory frameworks and financial mechanisms. At the international level, the paper calls for a new global fund modelled on successful funds in other sectors to provide a secured and focused financing mechanism to tackle some of tomorrow’s most important energy technology challenges.

As well as increasing the energy sector’s contribution to the fight against climate change, the ideas set out in the paper also have the potential to generate significant employment opportunities and spur sustainable economic growth. The six ideas are in a nutshell:

Establish an independent international sustainable energy innovation accelerator fund to finance innovative energy technology projects, blending public and private sources of capital

Develop instruments for public-private co-investment at the national or regional level to support and finance deep-tech energy innovations, reduce risks and improve the effectiveness of available public and private funding; if properly designed, such instruments would not only stimulate more private money into breakthrough energy projects but also would significantly improve the success rate and impact of public RD&D grants

Mainstreaming energy innovation through strategic public procurement to use the power of public procurement to accelerate development and commercialization by providing first markets for innovative energy technologies and solutions

Create strong national institutions for energy innovation acting as a single voice for public support in energy innovation, bundling responsibilities as the main public funding authority, overlooking and steering the overall sustainable energy innovation process

Co-define energy technology roadmaps through public-private collaboration to align global policy and industrial innovation efforts and create a credible road to scale for technology areas of high potential currently advancing slowly

Super-transparency of government RD&D spending to improve the efficiency of the public R&D funding process and increase the transparency of opportunities and volume of public funding available for entrepreneurs and investors

“The opportunities that exist around energy innovation are incredibly exciting and demonstrate that the industry as a whole is focused on imminent change. However, the pace at which innovation occurs requires a deeper sense of collaboration from all of us as energy stewards to drive the agenda forward, including how we go about funding, access to technology, global energy policy, and research and development,” said Regina Mayor, Global Sector Head, Energy and Natural Resources, KPMG. “It is critical that the industry works to accelerate these discussions among industry players, government, entrepreneurs and investors around the world to address systemic barriers and fully develop and commercialize energy technologies that have the power to change the way we access energy in the future.”

One year since the start of their formal collaboration, the World Economic Forum and Mission Innovation continue to strengthen their partnership. In co-designed sessions at Mission Innovation’s third ministerial in Malmö, the collaboration is bringing together government ministers, industry CEOs and innovation pioneers to move to action on innovation challenges, discuss how to implement ideas, and set a precedent for the public-private partnerships that are required to accelerate sustainable energy innovation.

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The bp in Iraq’s Oil Industry: A Comeback to The Historical Role?

Shahriar Sheikhlar

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The official history of the Iraq’s oil began when a well at Baba Gurgur just north of Kirkuk was struck in the early hours of 14 October 1927 by the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) however the early negotiations for an oil concession was started with Ottoman Sultan from the late 19th century.

Indeed, the significant proved reserves of crude oil during the steps of new government installation in the Iraq was enough appealing for giant oil companies to own the shares of TPC. In 1928 the composition of TPC was rearranged through a formal agreement and TPC shareholders were formed by Anglo – Persian Company(the forerunner of the British Petroleum), Royal Dutch-Shell, Compagnie Française des Pétroles (which was named later the Total) and NEDC, an American consortium included Standard Oil of New Jersey (The prior name of Exxon which merged to Mobil and formed Exxon Mobil Company in 1999), Standard Oil Company of New York, Gulf Oil, the Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Company, Atlantic Richfield Co and an Turkish American businessman Calouste Gulbenkian.

Meanwhile by the new structure of TPC shareholders, it was renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) and its operational territory was expanded to all the Red Line (except of Kuwait), though by establishing the Bahrain National Petroleum Company and later, the ARAMCO (Saudi Arabia) followed by last two U.S companies’ exit from the NEDC in 1948, the IPC was limited to the Iraq country and left the Iraq after nationalizing the country’s oil industry in 1972.

Of course the bp’s roll in IPC’s achievements was significantly different than another shareholders, not only because of Great Britain Government’s supports, but also by its great perseverance from 1928 until 1972 when Iraq’s oil industry was nationalized completely, the historical character of bp in the Iraqi minds.

bp’s comeback to the Iraq’s oil

Regarding to the high dependence of Iraq’s economy and its public budget on the oil’s income which is on the top of world countries’ level, the Iraqi government in the new era (after 2003) made plans to increase the oil production which was followed by inviting the IOCs’ return to the Iraq’s oil industry, after 40 years of divorce.

While the Iraq’s statement in 2007 declared sharp raises in its proven oil reserves up to 115 billion barrels, 26 international oil companies returned to the Iraq’s oil industry, including the Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch-Shell, Total and bp, the main shareholders of the IPC. Of course some another famous companies expressed their intend and won some projects, such as Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC), Malaysian Petronas, GAZPROM, Turkiye Petroleum Anonim Ortakligi (TPAO), Lukoil or Dragon oil.

Whereas the several International Oil Companies participated in the Iraq’s oil projects and development plans but the bp’s comeback was significantly different, especially when the bp’s strong involvement in the giant Rumaila field enhanced its production rapidly while the most of IOCs stay in studying phases yet.

Afterwards, the bp expressed it’s interest in developing the Kirkuk’s oilfields, where was the first entrance of bp to the Iraq’s oil industry. The negotiations with the Ministry of Oil of Iraq resulted in an agreement in 2013 which was a basis for making common operational team in February 2014 but bp’s operations in Kirkuk was stopped until the October 2017 when the Kirkuk was handed over to the Iraqi federal government.

The preliminary Kirkuk’s production target of 750,000 bpd which it’s not only seemed far to be quickly achieved, but also it’s predictable to be increased up to 1,500,000 bpd until 2021.

Meanwhile, if the bp could has the chance to participate in the development of the big Majnoon oilfield, its historical synergy in the Iraq’s oil industry could be revived again. While the bp would be involved in the fields containing 40% of Iraqi Federal reserves, it will influence on producing more than half of Iraqi federal’s oil production.

Despite the bp’s concern for strong participation in the Iraq’s oil industry, the most of IPC shareholders pulled out or limited their activities in the Iraq’s projects such as ExxonMobile which sold the most of its share in the big field of West Qurna#1 or Royal Dutch-shell which left the critical field of Majnoon. Meanwhile, the Total’s participation in the Iraq’s oil industry limited to the Halfaya field by just 18.75%. In the same approach, some another international oil companies limited their actives or shares in the Iraq’s oil projects, such as the Petronas who left the Majnoon recently or Sonangol which is going to resume it’s operation in Qayara and Najma fields that were stopped from 2015.

The next months when the Iraqi government would make decision about the service companies in the Manoomn oilfield, the perspective of bp in Iraq’s oil industry could be clarified whether it will comeback to the historical rail or continuously run in the limited situation.

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Businesses Taking Lead in Climate Response

MD Staff

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Spurred by consumer demand for eco-friendly practices, many businesses across the U.S. are moving aggressively to reduce their carbon footprint, including a major embrace of renewable energy and alternative-fueled vehicles, according to Deloitte’s “Resources 2018 Study – Businesses Drive, Households Strive” released today.

The annual survey shows that businesses see addressing climate change as key to long-term industry resilience. Sustainability seems no longer optional – it has become important to fostering business growth and satisfying a wide range of stakeholders, including customers, suppliers, partners, employees and investors.

Although 86 percent of residential consumers believe government should be active in setting a vision and path for energy strategy, it is the private sector that is advancing the cause to manage resources for cleaner, more resilient, secure and affordable energy supplies.

“Businesses are not waiting for government to act on addressing climate change. They have picked up the gauntlet,” said Marlene Motyka, Deloitte U.S. and global renewable energy leader and principal, Deloitte Transactions and Business Analytics LLP. “They are now driven to double down on their energy management efforts as they view their long-term viability through the climate lens.”

Key findings

  • Of the 87 percent of businesses familiar with the U.S. pulling out of the Paris climate agreement, 4 in 10 are reviewing or changing their energy management policies in response, with 75 percent of those increasing their commitment and investment in energy management.
  • About 70 percent of customers are demanding companies procure a certain percentage of electricity from renewable sources.
  • The number of companies with carbon footprint goals has jumped to 61 percent in 2018, from just over half the year before.
  • Sixty-eight percent of residential consumers say they are concerned about climate change and their personal carbon footprints, outpacing the previous high of 65 percent in 2016.
  • Nearly three-fourths (74 percent) of residential consumers stated that climate change is caused by human action, up six percentage points from 2017.

Renewables rated key to energy independence, millennials tip the scale

More than three-fourths (76 percent) of survey respondents cited renewables as key for achieving energy independence, jumping five percentage points from 2017. This seems to represent a change in mindset with many respondents now seeing a connection that was once widely thought to be implausible.

In addition, many millennials – greener and “techier” than other generations – see renewables as the answer to their environmental concerns. In fact, 64 percent rank utilizing clean energy sources among their top three most important energy-related issues. Also, they are more likely to adopt new solutions, such as electric vehicles, home automation systems and time-of-use rates.

Businesses making EVs an easy choice

Many businesses not only say reducing their electricity consumption is important to staying competitive but they also are helping to transform the transportation sector as more consumers and employees eye electric vehicles and hybrids as a prime pick for their next vehicle.

Business respondents expect gasoline or diesel vehicles will make up less than half (49 percent) of their transportation fleets by 2020. If so, it would mark the first-time vehicles powered by alternative fuels will constitute a majority of corporate fleets. In fact, businesses are accelerating their efforts to support employees who drive electric vehicles, with well over half (56 percent), offering EV charging stations. Fifty-two percent of these businesses own the charging stations themselves, while 41 percent belong to the building owner.

Businesses Turn to Self-Generation for Greater Control Over Energy

On-site generation also is on the rise as distributed resources are increasingly viewed as being realistic and cost-effective, and as businesses desire greater control over their energy supplies in terms of price, quality and reliability. Fifty-nine percent of businesses now generate some portion of their electricity supply on-site, and of those businesses, 13 percent are using renewables, 13 percent use on-site co-generation and 10 percent are using on-site battery storage.

Nearly half of business respondents are working to procure more electricity from renewable sources, and nearly two-thirds (61 percent) said combining battery storage with renewable sources would motivate them to do more. Additionally, businesses are responding to increased power outages by purchasing backup generators, adding battery storage units, and expanding the amount of electricity they self-generate.

Smart home apps not catching on, cyber concerns cooling interest

Despite support for more innovative energy savings, only 20 percent of respondents have automated home functions, such as smart thermostats. In fact, amid growing reports of hacked home devices, 21 percent of respondents cited privacy and security concerns as a barrier to upgrading their thermostats, compared to 15 percent last year. In addition, penetration of smart thermostats and automation systems remains very low with only 4 percent using a home automation system and just 8 percent utilizing a programmable thermostat.

A majority of both businesses and residential consumers want environmentally responsible, reliable assets, preferably close by, that they can control to optimize reliability, flexibility and cost. However, this year’s survey seems to emphasize that privacy and security concerns should be addressed by providers soon to maintain the momentum for a clean secure energy future.

“Utilities are being challenged to get to know their customers better, and the industry has a long way to go,” said Andrew Slaughter, executive director, Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions, Deloitte Services LP. “What appears clear is that the electric utility sector’s transformation will likely be one of decentralization, digitalization, and decarbonization driven by business and residential consumer demand for a cleaner, more resilient, secure and affordable energy supply.”

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