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Nord Stream Nr. 2: The Project’s Implications in Europe

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Russia, Germany and a consortium of Western European companies have re-activated the Gazprom-led Nord Stream Two gas pipeline project. Parallel to the existing Nord Stream One pipeline on the Baltic seabed, Nord Stream Two would double the system’s total capacity to 110 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually, all earmarked for direct delivery to Germany.

Nord Stream is billed as the world’s biggest natural gas transportation project, in terms of pipeline length and throughput capacities. Initially announced in 2011–2012 through non-binding agreements of intent, Nord Stream Two had to be shelved for the duration of Europe’s economic slump. The project agreement signed on September 4, 2015, however, is binding. Gazprom’s management anticipates economic-financial recovery in Western Europe and, consequently, gas demand recovery by 2019, the target date for completing Nord Stream Two. It also expects gas extraction to decline in Norway after having been capped in the Netherlands, thus boosting European import demand (Gazprom.com, accessed September 14).

The project’s other role is to bypass Ukraine’s gas transit system, its continuation through the Slovakian and Czech transit corridors, and potentially Poland’s. Those transit routes are beyond Gazprom’s control. The Kremlin intends to re-direct the lion’s share of its gas exports to the “old” European Union into the Gazprom-controlled Nord Stream route. This would not merely deprive Ukraine and those other countries of transit revenue. Strategically, it would result in Gazprom controlling gas transportation as well as the supply to Western European customers.

Gazprom claims that it would, in due course, deliver “new gas”—i.e., gas sourced from newly developed fields—through Nord Stream. But it has not identified those resources; its barely disguised near-term intent is to switch the flow from Ukrainian pipelines into Nord Stream. For years to come, gas volumes diverted from Ukraine will be Nord Stream’s main resource.

In the short and medium term, Nord Stream Two strengthens Russia’s hand against Ukraine and a number of Central-Eastern European countries. Gazprom will henceforth be able to bypass or cut off these countries—or extort concessions under such threats—before these countries would have made arrangements with non-Russian suppliers.

As a bypass project, Nord Stream Two is potentially more effective compared with South Stream (in its various configurations). Bypassing Ukraine, South Stream would have changed Gazprom’s export route but would have targeted basically the same markets. Nord Stream Two, however, aims to break into new, highly lucrative markets in northwestern and western Europe. Or by words of prof. Anis Bajrektarevic: “This arching pipeline network eliminates any transit barganing premium from Eastern Europeans and poses in effect a joint Russo-German pressure on the Baltic states, Poland, Ukraine, and even as far as to Azerbaijan and Georgia.”

The European Commission finally blocked South Stream on the legal level at the end of 2014; and the other southern bypass option, Turkish Stream, looks no more convincing in 2015, even to Moscow, than its closely resembling predecessor Blue Stream Two had looked a decade ago. Thus, Moscow has turned to Nord Stream again in the new circumstances and based on its forecasts of medium-term market demand (see above).

If completed as designed, Nord Stream Two could cement the Russo-German special partnership in the energy sector for the long term, with ramifications in the financial sector and foreign policy.

Germany is the exclusive designated recipient of Nord Stream gas. This evolution casts Germany in a new role, on top of Germany’s familiar role as Europe’s leading importer of Russian gas. Nord Stream Two promises the much-coveted status of an “energy hub” for Germany. It opens the prospect for Germany to become the main center for the transit and storage of Russian gas and its onward distribution in Western Europe. This would mean higher sales revenues for German energy companies, as well as a potential windfall from transit fees and taxes accruing to the German federal and state budgets. Even if Nord Stream One and Two operate (as seems likely) below their combined capacity of 110 bcm per year, the volumes carried into Germany could be staggering in magnitude. The prospects of transit and tax revenue on such a scale must be a significant consideration behind the German government’s support for Nord Stream Two.

Designating Germany as the privileged “hub” country is not an entirely novel idea in Moscow. In 2006, President Vladimir Putin had publicly offered to select Germany as the distribution center for Russian gas in Western Europe. Counting at that time on the development of Russia’s supergiant Shtokman field, Putin proposed to export Shtokman gas through the then-planned Nord Stream One pipeline to Germany, for onward distribution to other EU countries. The Shtokman project, however, turned out to be unfeasible and was abandoned in 2012.

Putin’s stillborn offer to Germany in 2006 would not have affected the Ukrainian transit of Russian gas to the European Union, given that Shtokman gas would have been “new gas,” not diverted from the Ukrainian transit system. Now, however, Russia is at war in Ukraine and is enlisting Germany into this anti-Ukrainian project. It can also be viewed as an anti-EU project, insofar as it enables Gazprom to replace a transportation route beyond its control with a route under its control.

Part Two

Within Germany, Nord Stream has spawned a system of gas transmission pipelines and storage sites, dedicated to handling Gazprom’s gas en route to German and other countries’ markets. That system’s ownership and operation pose serious challenges to the European Union’s energy market and competition norms. Those challenges will mount, if and when Nord Stream Two adds another 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) to Nord Stream One’s 55 bcm in annual capacity. From 2012 to date, Nord Stream One has operated at about half-capacity.

The dedicated infrastructure on German territory includes the OPAL and NEL transmission pipelines and the Rehden and Jemgum storage sites, all intended to operate in conjunction with Nord Stream One and Two. Gazprom and other Nord Stream stakeholders in various combinations also own and operate OPAL, NEL, Rehden and Jemgum. Alongside that dedicated system, Gazprom and Wintershall jointly operate another gas transmission network that can also be fed with gas volumes from Nord Stream One and Two.

The European Commission had, all along, viewed those plans as aiming to create vertically integrated monopolies. The Commission used its authority and legal powers to resist such arrangements (e.g., restricting Gazprom’s use of OPAL to one half of that pipeline’s capacity). For their part, the German government and regulatory agencies allowed Gazprom to expand its pipeline and storage assets in Germany through joint ventures with German companies. A flurry of such takeovers were agreed upon in 2013 and early 2014, linked with the completion of Nord Stream One and the expected agreement to build Nord Stream Two. Russia’s military intervention against Ukraine in February 2014, however, made it politically impossible for Germany to complete those transactions.

Germany’s time-out is now over. On September 4, Gazprom’s buyout of Wintershall’s gas trading and storage was finalized, and the Nord Stream Two shareholders’ agreement was signed. The agreement has created the New European Pipeline AG project company to build and operate Nord Stream Two. The companies’ press releases stopped short of identifying the chief executive of the New European Pipeline AG project company. Gazprom’s photo of the signing ceremony, however, shows an uncaptioned Matthias Warnig signing the Nord Stream Two agreement, alongside the presidents/CEOs of the stakeholder companies (Gazprom.com, accessed September 14). As managing director of Nord Stream One since that project’s inception, Warnig will apparently hold the same position in Nord Stream Two. Nord Stream Two’s shareholding largely overlaps with that of Nord Stream One and with the shareholdings of the dedicated onshore pipelines and storages in Germany.

These actions are already accompanied by pressures from the interested companies and the German government to override EU energy market and competition legislation. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble apparently proposes transferring some of the European Commission’s anti-trust competencies to other authorities, not publicly specified as yet. Germany’s own anti-trust and regulatory agency, the Bundesnetzagentur, does not object to Gazprom’s monopolistic use of the OPAL and (in prospect) NEL pipelines (Naturalgaseurope.com, September 3).

According to the European Commission, the offshore Nord Stream One was implemented in line with EU law at that time, but “the Commission will ensure that Nord Stream Two, if implemented, fully complies with the EU’s Third Package of energy legislation.” And “any pipelines, whether northern or southern, on EU member countries’ territories must be fully compliant with EU legislation (Bloomberg, UNIAN, September 11). This official statement alludes, first, to the fact that the Third Package was not yet in force when Nord Stream One was built, but has entered into force since then. It further alludes to the European Commission’s effective use of EU law to block South Stream—that other Gazprom-led project in Europe.

The European Commission’s vice-president for the Energy Union, Maros Sefcovic, has announced “a host” of questions to be raised on Nord Stream; e.g., Does it correspond with the EU’s supply diversification strategy? What does it mean for Central and Eastern Europe? What conclusions should be drawn, if this project aims practically to shut down Ukraine’s transit route? “All projects of this magnitude would have to comply with EU legislation,” he declared (Politico.eu, September 7, 11; UNIAN, September 11; BTA, September 15).

Part Three

According to the European Union’s Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete, Ukraine is a “reliable transit country,” while Nord Stream Two does not help diversify supply sources, hence “it is not a priority” in terms of EU policies (Naturalgaseurope.com, September 3). “Not a priority” was also the European Commission’s standard diplomatic phrase when blocking South Stream. The phrase implies (inter alia) no access to EU funding, which is reserved for projects of common interest in the trans-European network-energy (TEN-E) category.

Austrian OMV’s entrance into the Nord Stream Two consortium is noteworthy, both politically and from a business perspective. OMV is the majority owner of the Central Europe Gas Hub (CEGH), at Baumgarten, near Vienna. This was the planned terminus of two major, rival pipeline projects: the EU-backed Nabucco and the Gazprom-led South Stream, both defunct. The CEGH’s remaining role is that of terminus of the Ukraine-Slovakia gas transit corridor to Europe. But the transit volumes have been falling sharply in recent years in that corridor; down to some 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2014. Nord Stream Two threatens to kill that corridor altogether, by switching Russian gas flows from Ukrainian pipelines into Nord Stream.

Hence, OMV has joined Nord Stream Two to keep the CEGH alive, apparently expecting to connect Baumgarten, ultimately, with Nord Stream, via the OPAL and Gazela pipelines in Germany and the Czech Republic. OMV’s new president, Rainer Seele, has indicated at this possibility (Naturalgaseurope.com, August 12). Seele was Wintershall’s president until July 2015 and is closely aligned with Gazprom. Presumably, Seele’s value to OMV is to unlock Gazprom’s doors more widely for the Austrian company, and keep the CEGH alive by connecting it with Nord Stream (Vedomosti, September 4).

If Nord Stream Two kills the Ukrainian transit route—with Slovakia as collateral victim—Hungary could be left up in the air. Ukraine is the sole existing route for Russian (or any) natural gas into Hungary.

Re-routing gas flows from Ukraine into Nord Stream would also affect Poland and the Czech Republic adversely, albeit less dramatically than it would affect Ukraine, Slovakia or Hungary.

Czech dependence on Russian gas stands at about two thirds of the Czech consumption of some 9 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually. In recent years. The Czech Republic also provides transit service for Russian gas to Germany.

The Czech Republic’s pre-existing two trunklines are traditionally sourced with Russian gas from the Ukraine-Slovakia transit corridor. The new pipeline, Gazela, is dedicated to Russian gas to be sourced from Nord Stream, which feeds directly into the OPAL pipeline in Germany, thence to connect with Gazela in the Czech Republic. According to calculations in 2014, Russian natural gas reaching Central Europe via the Baltic sea entails far higher transportation costs—and, thus end prices—compared with the same volumes of Russian gas reaching Central Europe via Ukraine.

Poland, in the last two decades, has provided transit service for Russian gas through the Yamal-Europe pipeline, with an annual capacity of 35 bcm, which runs via Belarus and Poland into Germany. New transport capacity in Nord Stream Two would enable Moscow to either re-direct gas volumes into that offshore pipeline, bypassing Poland, or threaten to do so in order to re-negotiate supply and transit terms with Poland in Russia’s favor under duress. Re-negotiations are due ahead of 2022.

In Europe’s southeast, however, Gazprom has no bypass solution available. Gazprom will have to continue using the Ukrainian transit route in order to supply Moldova, Romania (which has almost stopped importing Russian gas in 2015), Bulgaria, Greece, and western parts of turkey. That would amount to an aggregate volume of up to 10 bcm per year, transiting Ukraine en route to the Balkans.

Whether Gazprom has the gas volumes available to deliver 55 bcm annually through Nord Stream One by 2019, and a total of 110 bcm annually through both lines after that year, seems doubtful, even by switching most of the flow from Ukraine, if Nord Stream Two ultimately materializes.

 

First published by the INGEPO Consulting’s Geostrategic Pulse magazine

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Renewable Energy is a Brewing Geopolitical Catastrophe

Todd Royal

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According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) “the world will spend $US 162 billion subsidizing renewable energy (mainly solar and wind.” This money could be spent on the over 2 billion people globally without electricity – over 600 million in just Africa – that will be used to prop-up chaotically, intermittent and grossly inefficient renewables. Every nation-state, country, or individual state that uses renewables on a wide-scale basis realizes higher electrical prices and emissions for the simple reason they need constant fossil fuel or nuclear energy backup.

Consider Australia, which has “substantial energy reserves.” Green state governments have legislated keeping their oil, natural gas, and coal in the ground, and this means the Australian Defense Minister, Linda Reynolds has been seeking U.S. help for their dangerously low national fuel supplies. Australia – in a perilous, geopolitical move – is likely sending warships to the Strait of Hormuz to protect the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Australia should have never been in this predicament if it weren’t for overreliance on renewables, and energy battery storage systems that cannot meet Australia’s supply of energy needed causing substantial capacity issues.

Now realize the entire world going down this path except China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, since the Paris Climate Agreement (PCA) if fully implemented:

“Will cost the world from $US1 trillion to $US2 trillion a year by 2030, neither of these hugely expensive policies will have any measureable impact on temperatures by the end of the century.”

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change has also debunked the Paris Climate Agreement by estimating: “

Even if every country makes every single carbon cut suggested in the Paris treaty to the fullest extent, CO2 emissions would be cut by only 1 per cent of what would be needed to keep temperature rises under 2C.”

To reiterate the complete-nothingness of energy policy options coming from green-aligned legislators – the much-touted U.S. Green New Deal – from Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, D-N.Y., and Senator Ed Markey, D-Mass., “would have no meaningful impact on global temperatures.”If the U.S. entirely cut out every ounce of carbon dioxide emissions (CO2), “100 percent it would not make a difference in abating global warming.”

Every green policy being considered and utilized by governments globally – particularly, in the U.S. and European Union (EU) – would:

“Fundamentally change how people produce and consume energy, harvest crops, raise livestock, build homes, drive cars, travel long distance, and manufacture good.”

The entire green movement believes harnessing the sun and wind is the answer when nothing could be farther from the truth. Besides zero-carbon nuclear power plants, there is new technology from net-zero natural gas-fired power plants currently being “demonstrated,” or natural gas-fired power plants are the best option, because there use allowed the U.S. to be the only industrialized nation to meet the Kyoto Protocol standard.

The other low cost, simple option to reduce emissions is planting trees. Instead, the west continues committing a suicidal, economic death spiral that will allow their enemies to pick up the pieces in their race toward authoritarian, governmental control.

If the U.S. cannot ensure the liberal-led order in place since World War II (WWII) over keeping fossil fuels in the ground and nuclear energy on the shelf then who will use realist balancing against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea? Not Australia – realistically, and militarily, the Australians do not have the blue water navy capabilities, or force projection to deter the Iranians in the Middle East. Only the Americans backed by NATO do at this time.

The premier environmental organization – the United Nations (UN) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change said: “if we did absolutely nothing to respond to global warming, the total impact by the 2070s will be the equivalent to a 0.2 per cent to 2 percent loss in average income.” Then a global poll of 10 million people by the UN “found that climate change was the lowest priority of all 16 challenges considered.” Climate change and renewables are interwoven.

Vaclav Smil, author of the premier energy book, Energy and Civilization, endorsed by Bill Gates opined about renewables by saying: “The great hope for a quick and sweeping transition to renewable energy is wishful thinking.” Al Gore’s chief scientific advisor, Jim Hansen also opined the same sentiments:

“Suggesting that renewables will let us phase rapidly off fossil fuels in the United States, China, India or the world as a whole is almost the equivalent of believing in the Easter Bunny and Tooth Fairy.”

Where this is geopolitically concerning comes to India. In coming years they will have a larger population than China, and they need more, not less fossil fuels for prosperity and development. According to the UN 2019 Multidimensional Poverty Index, “India lifted 271 million people out of poverty in a decade,” by building nuclear power plants, coal-fired power plants, and using fossil fuels in way they never have in their history.

If India went the way of Australia, which is currently experiencing electrical blackouts from wind turbine farms, and political instability, then the Kashmir crisis could be enflamed further, and China would move to conquer or crush India in every way possible. Deterrence that comes from fossil fuels and nuclear that fuel militaries and nuclear arsenals will continue keeping the peace that has led to unprecedented global prosperity and poverty reduction. Currently, renewables cannot accomplish those goals.

What geopolitics understands is the reality that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are presenting to world peace. Renewables are on the precipice of causing a geopolitical disaster when policymakers believe this will solve world energy problems that actually don’t exist. Renewables need to be weaned off subsides and an all-of-the-above approach is what will eventually allow solar panels and wind turbines to displace fossil fuels. But the problem of what to do with the over 6,000 products that come from a barrel of crude oil will need to be solved – including every part of the solar panel and wind turbine supply chain emanates from crude oil. Or else, the world is walking into a geopolitical disaster of their own making believing renewables will displace fossil fuels or nuclear energy.

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Three priorities for energy technology innovation partnerships

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Authors: Jean-Baptiste Le Marois and Claire Hilton*

Governments around the world are setting increasingly ambitious climate targets while at the same time pursuing challenging national policy goals such as affordable and sustainable energy for all. In many cases, achieving these goals will require technologies that either do not yet exist, or are not yet ready for market, meaning innovation will be critical. Technology innovation can be a game changer across all sectors, including power generation, industry, buildings and transport.

Yet it is unlikely that any single country will be able to solve all of its energy and climate problems alone. International collaboration can help countries accelerate innovation processes by identifying common priorities and challenges, tackling pressing innovation gaps, sharing best practices to improve performance, reducing costs and reaching broad deployment of clean energy technologies. Given this massive potential, the fundamental question is not if countries should collaborate, but rather who should collaborate and how they can do so efficiently.

As part of the IEA’s efforts to support global energy transitions, we are working to help governments identify relevant collaborative partnership opportunities, engage with international partners and optimise possible synergies among existing initiatives. Our recent Energy Technology Innovation Partnerships report is a key step along this path, providing an overview of the global landscape of multilateral efforts relevant to energy technology innovation, and examining four selected collaborative partnerships. There are three key takeaways that highlight the challenges and potential of these efforts.

Enhancing collaboration among existing multilateral initiatives

International collaboration in the field of energy technology innovation is not new – many countries already participate in numerous multilateral initiatives, some of which have been active for decades, such as The Technology Collaboration Programme by IEA (TCP) which was established in 1974. Today, 38 independent Technology Collaborations operate under the TCP, made up of over 6,000 experts from nearly 300 public and private organisations based in 55 countries, who work together on topics ranging from renewable energy and smart grids to hydrogen and nuclear fusion.

Governments have launched several new partnerships over the last decade, such as the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) in 2009 and Mission Innovation (MI) in 2015, which both aim to accelerate international efforts to address climate change. The 27 members of CEM collaborate to promote the deployment of clean energy technologies through over 20 initiatives and campaigns. Similarly, MI counts 25 members who have pledged to double clean energy RD&D spending and co-lead activities under eight key innovation challenges, such as clean energy materials and affordable heating and cooling in buildings. Participation in Technology Collaborations, MI and CEM present a great degree of overlap, as countries tend to join the full suite of collaborative partnerships. In fact, 13 countries and the European Commission participate each in more than 20 Technology Collaborations, CEM and MI: the United States, Japan, Korea, Canada, China, Germany, Australia, France, Sweden, Finland, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom. This “core” group of decision makers is in a strong position to pursue further synergies across partnerships.

There are also many relevant regional partnerships that are making valuable contributions to energy technology innovation, such as the European Technology and Innovation Platforms (EU-ETIPs), which bring together EU governments and companies to identify research priorities and relevant energy innovation strategies.

Other examples of regional partnerships include mechanisms under the African Union and other African regional partnerships; the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; various partnerships in the Middle East; and the Latin American Energy Organisation and the Organisation of American States. Many other partnerships focus on specific themes of interest, such as the Biofuture Platform, a group of 20 countries seeking to advance sustainable bioenergy and facilitated by the IEA.

As the global landscape of multilateral activities relevant to energy technology innovation becomes increasingly diverse and complex, it can be challenging for policy makers to identify which partnerships to engage with. In fact, despite the central role of innovation in energy transitions and the potential of international collaboration, there is limited information available on the full landscape of multilateral initiatives and how they interact.

Examining a selection of collaborative partnerships reveals that numerous initiatives focus on the same technology areas. Our own examination shows that in eight technology areas, at least three of the four selected partnerships have active initiatives: heating and cooling; carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS); nuclear; bioenergy and biofuels; wind; solar; smart grids; and hydrogen. The overlap becomes even more apparent when including other global, regional and thematic partnerships: for example, Technology Collaborations, MI, EU-ETIPs, the Biofuture Platform and the Global Bioenergy Partnership all focus on bioenergy. More generally, recent trends suggest that partnerships are increasingly centring on low-carbon energy sources and cross-cutting themes including systems integration.

Focusing on the same technologies across different partnerships may induce risks of duplication, thereby diluting policy maker attention and creating fundraising or political support challenges. That said, in some instances, activities may well address different aspects of the same technology area, justifying the overlap. Yet even in those cases, stakeholders have acknowledged that the perception of duplication may be enough to trigger a degree of competition between multilateral efforts. Policy makers would therefore benefit from identifying possible synergies between mechanisms to avoid replication of efforts while at the same time maximising complementarity.

Enhanced cross-mechanism collaboration may increase the impact of ongoing activities. For instance, co-locating stakeholder dialogue, events and roundtables may mobilise more actors and bring varied and valuable perspectives, attract attention from policy makers and enhance networking opportunities. Co-branding technology policy and market analyses may reveal new findings thanks to the combined experience, knowledge and networks of the initiatives involved. Collaboration between early-stage activities executing RD&D and initiatives providing competitive funding or grant opportunities may facilitate the development of energy technologies and their demonstration in real-life conditions or in strategic markets.

However, innovation stakeholders have also reported challenges in engaging with other collaborative mechanisms, in part because of a lack of systematic co-ordination processes. As a result, the number of interactions between existing partnerships, whether at the political or working level, remains low relative to the number of ongoing activities.

Despite these challenges, there are some initiatives that are already effectively collaborating across partnerships. For example, last year the co-leads of collaborative activities on smart grids under the International Smart Grid Action Network (ISGAN) (both a TCP and a CEM Initiative), identified a strategic opportunity to work more closely with the relevant Innovation Challenge under MI and formalised this co-operation.

Focus on emerging markets

Participation in collaborative partnerships continues to grow and diversify every year. IEA Members and Association countries currently account for the broadest participation in Technology Collaborations, CEM and MI, as illustrated by the “core” group of top-collaborators mentioned above.

While a strong central core of support is invaluable, an important trend for global innovation ecosystems is the increasing participation of emerging economies, such as China (currently a member of 23 Technology Collaborations), India (11), Mexico (10), South Africa (8) and Brazil (5).

Emerging market countries also tend to participate in regional partnerships, which allow governments that are not necessarily members of global efforts to benefit from international co-operation. The transition from regional to global collaboration is an encouraging trend for key emerging market countries, with which the IEA seeks to deepen engagement as part of the Clean Energy Transitions Programme (CETP).

Partnerships have made it clear that emerging economies are a top priority. As part of a survey conducted in 2019 by the IEA Secretariat, India was identified as a key prospective partner by 14 Technology Collaborations; Brazil by 12; Chile and China by 8; Mexico and Indonesia by 7. If prospective membership materialised, China would consolidate its high participation by holding membership in over 30 Technology Collaborations; India would join the “core” group of top-collaborative countries; and both Mexico and Brazil would be involved in over 15 Technology Collaborations.

Strengthening public-private cooperation

In addition to public agencies, private-sector actors play a critical role in RD&D and in ensuring key technologies reach markets. Examining both public and private contributions can help governments better understand the broader innovation ecosystem, engage with companies to leverage corporate expertise, influence and capital; and strategically allocate public funds in those energy sectors that remain underfunded or face financing access challenges.

While there is substantial interest from collaborative partnerships to deepen engagement with private-sector actors, this engagement is, at least for now, relatively uncommon. Among the four partnerships analysed in the report, only EU-ETIPs are co-led by industry stakeholders while some 80% of participants in Technology Collaborations are public bodies. For now, membership in MI and CEM is restricted to national governments, although engagement of private sector is actively sought and governments may designate in-country private sector experts to represent national interests in certain initiatives.

Different factors may be preventing companies from seeking engagement with government-led multilateral initiatives, including a lack of awareness of such programmes, differing working cultures between public and private actors, diverging priorities and little incentive to share information, and burdensome administrative procedures. On the other side, some stakeholders within collaborative partnerships remain reluctant to engage with industry, fearing the influence of corporate interests on their strategic decisions, work programmes or outputs. These reasonable concerns need to be overcome for effective public-private co-operation to take place.

Thankfully, we are seeing some positive developments. For instance, over 100 private-sector companies are now participating in the technical work of CEM activities, resulting from both CEM stakeholders reaching out to companies, and vice versa. In collaboration with the IEA, CEM also leads an Investment and Finance Initiative (CEM-IF) to help policy makers mobilise investments and financing, particularly from private sources, for clean energy deployment. Policy makers, collaborative partnerships and energy innovation stakeholders may benefit from further research on private-sector participation, building on these encouraging cases, to find ways to best leverage corporate capabilities.

Ways forward

As we continue to enhance our efforts related to technology innovation to support global energy transitions, the IEA encourages broad international collaboration to tackle pressing innovation gaps, share best practices and accelerate the deployment of clean energy technologies. Enhancing collaboration between existing initiatives, engaging with emerging markets and leveraging corporate capabilities, are three areas of promising focus for policy makers looking forward.

*Claire Hilton, Energy Partnerships Analyst.

IEA

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Iran’s huge energy subsidies: supporting or battering the economy?

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In one of its latest reports dubbed “World Energy Outlook 2018”, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has allocated a section to fossil-fuel subsidies. The IEA has gathered the information regarding different countries’ fossil-fuel consumption subsidies and presented it in a chart on top of which the name of “Iran” catches the eye.

Based on the report, in 2018 with $69 billion of subsidies allocated for various types of energy consumption including oil, natural gas and electricity, Iran holds the first place among the world’s top countries in terms of the amount of subsidies which is allocated to energy consumption.

According to the IEA report, in the mentioned year, Iran has allocated $26.6 billion, $16.6 billion and $26 billion of subsidies for oil, electricity and gas respectively.

Based on the data, the total amount of allocated subsidies equals 15 percent of the country’s total GDP.

But what this information means? How one should interpret seeing the name of “Iran” on top of a chart for countries with most energy consumption subsidies?

Three main purposes of energy subsidies

Energy subsidies for long have been used by governments all around the world for pursuing certain political, economic, social, or environmental agendas. In different countries, energy subsidies are provided in different forms and modalities with a direct or indirect outcome on energy production costs and/or final prices.

Iran, as one of the world’s top energy-rich countries, for long has been offering significant amounts of energy subsidies to (according to the government claims) reach three main targets:

1- To support the less privileged population of the society

2- To create and support job opportunities across the county

3- To support domestic production

Considering these major purposes assumed for allocating gigantic amounts of energy subsidies in Iran, the question is to what extend these goals have been reached so far?

The poor, the rich or the air pollution?

Regarding the support for the less-privileged classes of the society, a look at the gasoline subsidies which the Iranian government has been offering for all people, can show the extent of this approach’s inefficiency. 

On one hand, many energy experts and scholars in the country believe that allocating great amounts of subsidies for gasoline is not in fact supporting the poor but it is more lifting the rich. They argue that most of the lower class population in the society do not use much gasoline in comparison to the upper classes with their luxury cars. That means the government is in fact supporting the upper classes’ luxurious lifestyle by providing them with cheap fuel which in fact they do not need.

On the other hand, many environmental experts believe that such subsidies are in fact encouraging people to consume more and to care less about the negative impact that they are leaving on the environment. Cheaper fuel means more careless consumption that is more consumption in fact. Most of Iran’s big cities are currently struggling with high levels of air pollution which is a direct outcome of the cheap fuel which is being consumed by everyone on a daily basis.

New job opportunities
One other argument that is behind the heavy energy subsidies in Iran, is to support and create new job opportunities. In this regard one major example could be the subsidy which is provided for the gas consumed by the industrial units.

An example in this area would be the best explanation to the question of how well this strategy has paid off.

In Iran a major part of the country’s gas is consumed in the industrial sector. In this particular example I want to take a look at the cement industry as a sample community. Every year in Iran, about 90 trillion rials (nearly $2.15 billion) is allocated to the gas subsidies used in the cement industry while based on the data provided by the industry ministry, the total revenues earned from this industry in the past Iranian calendar year (March 2018-March 2019) was reported to be 15 trillion rials (about $357 million). 

Considering the revenue earned and the amount of subsidies, it is clear that 75 trillion rials is lost. Now the interesting part is that considering the fact that there are nearly 250,000 people working in the country’s cement industry, if the subsidies money was directly paid to the workers, each worker would earn 350 million rials, which is way more than most of their actual annual income level.

Supporting domestic production

The above example might make you think that the money has been spent to support the domestic production, as it has been stated as one of the main goals for energy subsidies. 

It has been years that Iran is allocating subsidies for many industrial sectors, including the auto industry, the cement industry and etc. but the outcome has not been what is expected it to be. 

Using more and more subsidies has made most industries less competitive and more reliant on outside sources for their inefficiencies.

One recent example is the emerging of the great number of Bitcoin mining farms all over the country. It was reported that even in many of the country’s industrial parks the production units were using the subsidized electricity to farm Bitcoin instead of producing what they were supposed to be making.

Final thoughts

As many energy and economic analysts and scholars have stressed before, it is obvious and almost certainly we could say that allocating huge amounts of energy and fuel subsidies is not a good strategy to follow.

The budget that is allocated for subsidies every year could be spent in a variety of more purposeful, more fruitful areas. The country’s industry should compete in order to grow, people must learn to use more wisely and to protect the environment.

A government which provides irrational amounts of subsidies for energy consumption is just like a father who spoils his children by over-protecting and over-supporting them, those children, most probably, won’t turn out to be successful contributors to their society.

From our partner Tehran Times

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