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Nord Stream Nr. 2: The Project’s Implications in Europe

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Russia, Germany and a consortium of Western European companies have re-activated the Gazprom-led Nord Stream Two gas pipeline project. Parallel to the existing Nord Stream One pipeline on the Baltic seabed, Nord Stream Two would double the system’s total capacity to 110 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually, all earmarked for direct delivery to Germany.

Nord Stream is billed as the world’s biggest natural gas transportation project, in terms of pipeline length and throughput capacities. Initially announced in 2011–2012 through non-binding agreements of intent, Nord Stream Two had to be shelved for the duration of Europe’s economic slump. The project agreement signed on September 4, 2015, however, is binding. Gazprom’s management anticipates economic-financial recovery in Western Europe and, consequently, gas demand recovery by 2019, the target date for completing Nord Stream Two. It also expects gas extraction to decline in Norway after having been capped in the Netherlands, thus boosting European import demand (Gazprom.com, accessed September 14).

The project’s other role is to bypass Ukraine’s gas transit system, its continuation through the Slovakian and Czech transit corridors, and potentially Poland’s. Those transit routes are beyond Gazprom’s control. The Kremlin intends to re-direct the lion’s share of its gas exports to the “old” European Union into the Gazprom-controlled Nord Stream route. This would not merely deprive Ukraine and those other countries of transit revenue. Strategically, it would result in Gazprom controlling gas transportation as well as the supply to Western European customers.

Gazprom claims that it would, in due course, deliver “new gas”—i.e., gas sourced from newly developed fields—through Nord Stream. But it has not identified those resources; its barely disguised near-term intent is to switch the flow from Ukrainian pipelines into Nord Stream. For years to come, gas volumes diverted from Ukraine will be Nord Stream’s main resource.

In the short and medium term, Nord Stream Two strengthens Russia’s hand against Ukraine and a number of Central-Eastern European countries. Gazprom will henceforth be able to bypass or cut off these countries—or extort concessions under such threats—before these countries would have made arrangements with non-Russian suppliers.

As a bypass project, Nord Stream Two is potentially more effective compared with South Stream (in its various configurations). Bypassing Ukraine, South Stream would have changed Gazprom’s export route but would have targeted basically the same markets. Nord Stream Two, however, aims to break into new, highly lucrative markets in northwestern and western Europe. Or by words of prof. Anis Bajrektarevic: “This arching pipeline network eliminates any transit barganing premium from Eastern Europeans and poses in effect a joint Russo-German pressure on the Baltic states, Poland, Ukraine, and even as far as to Azerbaijan and Georgia.”

The European Commission finally blocked South Stream on the legal level at the end of 2014; and the other southern bypass option, Turkish Stream, looks no more convincing in 2015, even to Moscow, than its closely resembling predecessor Blue Stream Two had looked a decade ago. Thus, Moscow has turned to Nord Stream again in the new circumstances and based on its forecasts of medium-term market demand (see above).

If completed as designed, Nord Stream Two could cement the Russo-German special partnership in the energy sector for the long term, with ramifications in the financial sector and foreign policy.

Germany is the exclusive designated recipient of Nord Stream gas. This evolution casts Germany in a new role, on top of Germany’s familiar role as Europe’s leading importer of Russian gas. Nord Stream Two promises the much-coveted status of an “energy hub” for Germany. It opens the prospect for Germany to become the main center for the transit and storage of Russian gas and its onward distribution in Western Europe. This would mean higher sales revenues for German energy companies, as well as a potential windfall from transit fees and taxes accruing to the German federal and state budgets. Even if Nord Stream One and Two operate (as seems likely) below their combined capacity of 110 bcm per year, the volumes carried into Germany could be staggering in magnitude. The prospects of transit and tax revenue on such a scale must be a significant consideration behind the German government’s support for Nord Stream Two.

Designating Germany as the privileged “hub” country is not an entirely novel idea in Moscow. In 2006, President Vladimir Putin had publicly offered to select Germany as the distribution center for Russian gas in Western Europe. Counting at that time on the development of Russia’s supergiant Shtokman field, Putin proposed to export Shtokman gas through the then-planned Nord Stream One pipeline to Germany, for onward distribution to other EU countries. The Shtokman project, however, turned out to be unfeasible and was abandoned in 2012.

Putin’s stillborn offer to Germany in 2006 would not have affected the Ukrainian transit of Russian gas to the European Union, given that Shtokman gas would have been “new gas,” not diverted from the Ukrainian transit system. Now, however, Russia is at war in Ukraine and is enlisting Germany into this anti-Ukrainian project. It can also be viewed as an anti-EU project, insofar as it enables Gazprom to replace a transportation route beyond its control with a route under its control.

Part Two

Within Germany, Nord Stream has spawned a system of gas transmission pipelines and storage sites, dedicated to handling Gazprom’s gas en route to German and other countries’ markets. That system’s ownership and operation pose serious challenges to the European Union’s energy market and competition norms. Those challenges will mount, if and when Nord Stream Two adds another 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) to Nord Stream One’s 55 bcm in annual capacity. From 2012 to date, Nord Stream One has operated at about half-capacity.

The dedicated infrastructure on German territory includes the OPAL and NEL transmission pipelines and the Rehden and Jemgum storage sites, all intended to operate in conjunction with Nord Stream One and Two. Gazprom and other Nord Stream stakeholders in various combinations also own and operate OPAL, NEL, Rehden and Jemgum. Alongside that dedicated system, Gazprom and Wintershall jointly operate another gas transmission network that can also be fed with gas volumes from Nord Stream One and Two.

The European Commission had, all along, viewed those plans as aiming to create vertically integrated monopolies. The Commission used its authority and legal powers to resist such arrangements (e.g., restricting Gazprom’s use of OPAL to one half of that pipeline’s capacity). For their part, the German government and regulatory agencies allowed Gazprom to expand its pipeline and storage assets in Germany through joint ventures with German companies. A flurry of such takeovers were agreed upon in 2013 and early 2014, linked with the completion of Nord Stream One and the expected agreement to build Nord Stream Two. Russia’s military intervention against Ukraine in February 2014, however, made it politically impossible for Germany to complete those transactions.

Germany’s time-out is now over. On September 4, Gazprom’s buyout of Wintershall’s gas trading and storage was finalized, and the Nord Stream Two shareholders’ agreement was signed. The agreement has created the New European Pipeline AG project company to build and operate Nord Stream Two. The companies’ press releases stopped short of identifying the chief executive of the New European Pipeline AG project company. Gazprom’s photo of the signing ceremony, however, shows an uncaptioned Matthias Warnig signing the Nord Stream Two agreement, alongside the presidents/CEOs of the stakeholder companies (Gazprom.com, accessed September 14). As managing director of Nord Stream One since that project’s inception, Warnig will apparently hold the same position in Nord Stream Two. Nord Stream Two’s shareholding largely overlaps with that of Nord Stream One and with the shareholdings of the dedicated onshore pipelines and storages in Germany.

These actions are already accompanied by pressures from the interested companies and the German government to override EU energy market and competition legislation. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble apparently proposes transferring some of the European Commission’s anti-trust competencies to other authorities, not publicly specified as yet. Germany’s own anti-trust and regulatory agency, the Bundesnetzagentur, does not object to Gazprom’s monopolistic use of the OPAL and (in prospect) NEL pipelines (Naturalgaseurope.com, September 3).

According to the European Commission, the offshore Nord Stream One was implemented in line with EU law at that time, but “the Commission will ensure that Nord Stream Two, if implemented, fully complies with the EU’s Third Package of energy legislation.” And “any pipelines, whether northern or southern, on EU member countries’ territories must be fully compliant with EU legislation (Bloomberg, UNIAN, September 11). This official statement alludes, first, to the fact that the Third Package was not yet in force when Nord Stream One was built, but has entered into force since then. It further alludes to the European Commission’s effective use of EU law to block South Stream—that other Gazprom-led project in Europe.

The European Commission’s vice-president for the Energy Union, Maros Sefcovic, has announced “a host” of questions to be raised on Nord Stream; e.g., Does it correspond with the EU’s supply diversification strategy? What does it mean for Central and Eastern Europe? What conclusions should be drawn, if this project aims practically to shut down Ukraine’s transit route? “All projects of this magnitude would have to comply with EU legislation,” he declared (Politico.eu, September 7, 11; UNIAN, September 11; BTA, September 15).

Part Three

According to the European Union’s Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete, Ukraine is a “reliable transit country,” while Nord Stream Two does not help diversify supply sources, hence “it is not a priority” in terms of EU policies (Naturalgaseurope.com, September 3). “Not a priority” was also the European Commission’s standard diplomatic phrase when blocking South Stream. The phrase implies (inter alia) no access to EU funding, which is reserved for projects of common interest in the trans-European network-energy (TEN-E) category.

Austrian OMV’s entrance into the Nord Stream Two consortium is noteworthy, both politically and from a business perspective. OMV is the majority owner of the Central Europe Gas Hub (CEGH), at Baumgarten, near Vienna. This was the planned terminus of two major, rival pipeline projects: the EU-backed Nabucco and the Gazprom-led South Stream, both defunct. The CEGH’s remaining role is that of terminus of the Ukraine-Slovakia gas transit corridor to Europe. But the transit volumes have been falling sharply in recent years in that corridor; down to some 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2014. Nord Stream Two threatens to kill that corridor altogether, by switching Russian gas flows from Ukrainian pipelines into Nord Stream.

Hence, OMV has joined Nord Stream Two to keep the CEGH alive, apparently expecting to connect Baumgarten, ultimately, with Nord Stream, via the OPAL and Gazela pipelines in Germany and the Czech Republic. OMV’s new president, Rainer Seele, has indicated at this possibility (Naturalgaseurope.com, August 12). Seele was Wintershall’s president until July 2015 and is closely aligned with Gazprom. Presumably, Seele’s value to OMV is to unlock Gazprom’s doors more widely for the Austrian company, and keep the CEGH alive by connecting it with Nord Stream (Vedomosti, September 4).

If Nord Stream Two kills the Ukrainian transit route—with Slovakia as collateral victim—Hungary could be left up in the air. Ukraine is the sole existing route for Russian (or any) natural gas into Hungary.

Re-routing gas flows from Ukraine into Nord Stream would also affect Poland and the Czech Republic adversely, albeit less dramatically than it would affect Ukraine, Slovakia or Hungary.

Czech dependence on Russian gas stands at about two thirds of the Czech consumption of some 9 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually. In recent years. The Czech Republic also provides transit service for Russian gas to Germany.

The Czech Republic’s pre-existing two trunklines are traditionally sourced with Russian gas from the Ukraine-Slovakia transit corridor. The new pipeline, Gazela, is dedicated to Russian gas to be sourced from Nord Stream, which feeds directly into the OPAL pipeline in Germany, thence to connect with Gazela in the Czech Republic. According to calculations in 2014, Russian natural gas reaching Central Europe via the Baltic sea entails far higher transportation costs—and, thus end prices—compared with the same volumes of Russian gas reaching Central Europe via Ukraine.

Poland, in the last two decades, has provided transit service for Russian gas through the Yamal-Europe pipeline, with an annual capacity of 35 bcm, which runs via Belarus and Poland into Germany. New transport capacity in Nord Stream Two would enable Moscow to either re-direct gas volumes into that offshore pipeline, bypassing Poland, or threaten to do so in order to re-negotiate supply and transit terms with Poland in Russia’s favor under duress. Re-negotiations are due ahead of 2022.

In Europe’s southeast, however, Gazprom has no bypass solution available. Gazprom will have to continue using the Ukrainian transit route in order to supply Moldova, Romania (which has almost stopped importing Russian gas in 2015), Bulgaria, Greece, and western parts of turkey. That would amount to an aggregate volume of up to 10 bcm per year, transiting Ukraine en route to the Balkans.

Whether Gazprom has the gas volumes available to deliver 55 bcm annually through Nord Stream One by 2019, and a total of 110 bcm annually through both lines after that year, seems doubtful, even by switching most of the flow from Ukraine, if Nord Stream Two ultimately materializes.

 

First published by the INGEPO Consulting’s Geostrategic Pulse magazine

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Global energy investment in 2017 fails to keep up with energy security and sustainability goals

MD Staff

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The electricity sector attracted the largest share of energy investments in 2017, sustained by robust spending on grids, exceeding the oil and gas industry for the second year in row, as the energy sector moves toward greater electrification, according to the International Energy Agency’s latest review of global energy spending.

Global energy investment totalled USD 1.8 trillion in 2017, a 2% decline in real terms from the previous year, according to the World Energy Investment 2018 report. More than USD 750 billion went to the electricity sector while USD 715 billion was spent on oil and gas supply globally.

State-backed investments are accounting for a rising share of global energy investment, as state-owned enterprises have remained more resilient in oil and gas and thermal power compared with private actors. The share of global energy investment driven by state-owned enterprises increased over the past five years to over 40% in 2017.

Meanwhile, government policies are playing a growing role in driving private spending. Across all power sector investments, more than 95% of investment is now based on regulation or contracts for remuneration, with a dwindling role for new projects based solely on revenues from variable pricing in competitive wholesale markets. Investment in energy efficiency is particularly linked to government policy, often through energy performance standards.

The report also finds that after several years of growth, combined global investment in renewables and energy efficiency declined by 3% in 2017 and there is a risk that it will slow further this year. For instance, investment in renewable power, which accounted for two-thirds of power generation spending, dropped 7% in 2017. Recent policy changes in China linked to support for the deployment of solar PV raise the risk of a slowdown in investment this year.

As China accounts for more than 40% of global investment in solar PV, its policy changes have global implications. This confirms past IEA reports that have highlighted the critical importance of policies in driving investment in renewable energy.

While energy efficiency showed some of the strongest expansion in 2017, it was not enough to offset the decline in renewables. Moreover, efficiency investment growth has weakened in the past year as policy activity showed signs of slowing down.

“Such a decline in global investment for renewables and energy efficiency combined is worrying,” said Dr Fatih Birol, the IEA’s Executive Director. “This could threaten the expansion of clean energy needed to meet energy security, climate and clean-air goals. While we would need this investment to go up rapidly, it is disappointing to find that it might be falling this year.”

The share of fossil fuels in energy supply investment rose last year for the first time since 2014, as spending in oil and gas increased modestly. Meanwhile, retirements of nuclear power plants exceeded new construction starts as investment in the sector declined to its lowest level in five years in 2017.

The share of national oil companies in total oil and gas upstream investment remained near record highs, a trend expected to persist in 2018. Though still a small part of the market, electric vehicles now account for much of the growth in global passenger vehicle sales, spurred by government purchase incentives. For electric cars, nearly one quarter of the global value of EV sales in 2017 came from the budgets of governments, who are allocating more capital to support the sector each year.

Final investment decisions for coal power plants to be built in the coming years declined for a second straight year, reaching a third of their 2010 level. However, despite declining global capacity additions, and an elevated level of retirements of existing plants, the global coal fleet continued to expand in 2017, mostly due to markets in Asia. And while there was a shift towards more efficient plants, 60% of currently operating capacity uses inefficient subcritical technology.

The report finds that the prospects of the US shale industry are improving. Between 2010 and 2014, companies spent up to USD 1.8 for each dollar of revenue. However, the industry has almost halved its breakeven price, providing a more sustainable basis for future expansion. This underpins a record increase in US light tight oil production of 1.3 million barrels a day in 2018.

“The United States shale industry is at turning point after a long period of operating on a fragile financial basis,” said Dr Birol. “The industry appears on track to achieve positive free cash flow for the first time ever this year, turning into a more mature and financially solid industry while production is growing at its fastest pace ever.”

The improved prospects for the US shale sector contrast with the rest of the upstream oil and gas industry. Investment in conventional oil projects, which are responsible for the bulk of global supply, remains subdued. Investment in new conventional capacity is set to plunge in 2018 to about one-third of the total, a multi-year low raising concerns about the long-term adequacy of supply.

This edition of World Energy Investment, which is being released for free this year, provides a wealth of data and analysis for decision making by governments, the energy industry and financial institutions to set policy frameworks, implement business strategies, finance new projects and develop new technologies.

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Off-grid Renewables are Growing, Bringing Socio-economic Benefits to Millions

MD Staff

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Off-grid renewable energy has witnessed spectacular growth over the last decade. Since 2008 capacity has trebled and the number of people in rural communities served by the technology has witnessed six-fold growth. Today, up to 133 million people are receiving life-changing access to low-cost, secure renewable energy and benefit from the socioeconomic impact access delivers. Global off-grid investments in 2017 reached USD 284 million.

These findings feature in a new IRENA brief launched during the UN High-Level Political Forum in New York. The paper, entitled: Off-grid Renewable Energy Solutions, Global and Regional Status and Trends, builds on IRENA’s statistical analysis to offer a global picture of the sector’s trajectory and impact. The data highlights the extent to which off-grid renewables are emerging as a mainstream solution to the expansion of electricity services all over the world, contributing to sustainable development goal 7 (SDG 7) by broadening the reach of electricity beyond existing grid infrastructure.

“Off-grid renewable energy is an important contributor to energy access across the developing world having witnessed widespread, rapid growth in deployment over the last few years,” said Dr. Rabia Ferroukhi, Deputy Director of the Knowledge, Policy and Finance at IRENA.  “Our analysis captures this momentum whilst shedding light on the need to step-up efforts towards 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.”

Africa has emerged as a dynamic, fast-moving hub for off-grid renewables. The development of solar lighting solutions and innovations in deployment and financing models, such as pay as you go options and mobile payment platforms have contributed to Africa’s rapid advances. The continent’s off-grid industry now serves around 53 million people – the equivalent of the entire population of South Africa – up from just over two million in 2011.

The brief identifies Asia as a global leader in off-grid renewables capacity deployment. Today, up to 76 million people across the continent may now benefit from such power sources.

South America, home to some of the highest rates of electricity access in the developing world, has also witnessed off-grid renewable growth the brief suggests, where the technology is considered key to ‘last mile’ electricity access.

Off-grid renewable energy solutions are being deployed to provide electricity services for a wide range of end-uses, including for powering agriculture, telecommunication infrastructure, healthcare centres, schools, and rural enterprises. The paper emphasises that linking delivery of off-grid solutions to energy service delivery can unlock substantial socio-economic benefits, contributing to multiple SDGs.

While dramatic cost reductions have been the primary driver of this acceleration, it is the multifaceted socioeconomic benefits that provide the greatest incentives for its deployment. Renewable energy’s centrality to the SDG 7 goal on universal access to clean, reliable and affordable energy against a backdrop of a billion people who still live without it, is unquestionable. However, beyond energy itself renewables are a key contributor to sustainable development, generating jobs, stimulating growth, ensuring resource security and improving health.

The paper notes that in Bangladesh, around 133 000 jobs have been created through a Solar Home System programme and an off-grid renewables initiative in Rwanda aims to generate 7 000 jobs whilst delivering energy access to almost 80 000 people. Similarly, incomes in rural households benefit from lower cost solar lanterns, and remote health and educational facilities are enhanced through consistent availability of power.

“Renewables are a central pillar of SDG 7 and represent one of the most effective and economicmeans available in the pursuit of universal energy access,” said Rabia Ferroukhi, Deputy-Director of Knowledge Policy and Finance at IRENA. “Yet beyond this, we are now beginning to truly understand the way in which distributed renewable electricity is transforming the lives of those receiving from it, bringing stability and opportunity to millions of people around the world.”

Read the brief on the Off-grid Renewable Energy Solutions and the six case studies developed to showcase the socioeconomic impact of off-grid renewables in South East Asia.

IRENA

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CPEC and Pakistan-China Energy cooperation

Venita Christopher

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The demands of global energy are substantially rising day by day in the 21st century, whereas the dependency on fossil fuels like coal, oil and natural gas have become a serious concern which is about 80% of the world’s primary source of energy. The concerns about fossil fuels are due to their ever rising prices and their negative impact on the environment due to the harmful emission of greenhouse gases. Therefore, in this context the reliance on nuclear power energy is considered by various countries, including Pakistan, as a good alternative option of energy supply, which is comparatively cheaper also.

Pakistan has great strategic importance in South Asia because of its location, its dynamic young population, its vibrant economic potential, being a nuclear power, and now being a strategic partner of China in the backdrop of the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).The CPEC is a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road (B&R) initiative and the completion of CPEC is likely to bring major economic advantages to China, Pakistan and South Asian region.

Like many other countries, for its economic development based on enhancing its industrial and agricultural production, energy is very important for Pakistan and it needs to address its current energy crises on an urgent basis. In this context signing of the CPEC agreement with China by Pakistan in 2015 is considered as a milestone achievement, as it includes many electricity generation projects, which will help address energy shortages of Pakistan.

Apart from developing other means of electricity generation in Pakistan, China is already helping Pakistan in nuclear energy production by supplying nuclear power reactors, under IAEA safeguards based on agreements signed in the field of nuclear cooperation. Apart from installing Chashma 1 and Chashma 2 power plants, which are already producing electricity in Pakistan, in 2017 China has signed another deal with Pakistan to also install Chashma 3 and Chashma 4 power plants. Out of these each power plant, after completion, will produce 1000 megawatts of electricity. As part of the CPEC project, China is also building two HUOLONG ONE nuclear reactors in Karachi that will become ready to use by 2021.

After signing the CPEC agreement China is very keen to help Pakistan in the energy production, as energy is required not only for the construction of CPEC projects but also for its subsequent operation. This is because China is also going to get huge trade benefits by trading with the outer world using the CPEC. In other words, apart from helping its friend Pakistan in energy production, this cooperation also serves China’s economic interests in a major way. In this context, the CPEC is a win-win project that serves Pakistan and China’s interest in a similar way.

As China is doing a lot to advance its interests by expanding its economic production by basing on its CPEC related exports, Pakistan should also take the CPEC as a big opportunity to develop its economy to become economically self reliant. In this context, it should focus on completing the construction of the CPEC and its related energy projects on time, so that it addresses its energy shortages and quickly moves on towards its economic development.

In fact, it is more important for Pakistan to work harder for completion of the CPEC related projects and make use of the CPEC to advance its industry and agriculture, increase trade, attract foreign direct investment and increase its revenues. This is important because Pakistan’s economy needs a major boost to recover from its ever increasing budget deficits, inflation, domestic and foreign debt situations,widening gap of balance of payments due to constantly declining exports and falling foreign exchange reserves.

This is also important to repay the domestic debt and foreign debt in order to save Pakistan from becoming a defaulting state in the coming years. Above all it is necessary to avail the opportunity of reaping CPEC related economic advantages to develop Pakistan’s economy in a reasonable time frame to meet its aforementioned obligations and finally to bring prosperity to Pakistan and its people.

In the light of above it is logical to say that Pakistan and China’s cooperation in the energy field is beneficial for both countries and CPEC is a project that helps Pakistan in meeting its energy shortages, and it will be equally beneficial to Pakistan and China to advance their economic interests. Rather CPEC related energy projects and trade will be much more beneficial to Pakistan to meet its above discussed economic challenges.

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