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A Struggle in Shadows: The Fight between a New and Old Iran

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Prior to the 1979 Revolution Iran had experienced an epic transformation during the Pahlavi monarchy. During this time Iran transformed from a mainly tribal state into a more modern one based largely on its oil and manufacturing sectors.

But this tremendous growth did not come without its costs. The same reforms that had accounted for much of the growth had also alienated many influential Iranians. Land reforms had uprooted many rural Iranians who then ended up in the slums and shantytowns of the swelling cities. This upheaval of much of Iran’s traditional past and the sufferings as Iran strove forward in its march towards modernization led to a resentment of the West and fueled a growing militancy which eventually led to the Shah’s ouster.

Since the revolution, Iran’s domestic politics have mainly revolved around two main ideologies: one being an intense nationalism based on historical achievements and rich culture and the other being centered on an influential role for promoting Shia Islam within the region. These two ideologies have created an enormous internal tension, as those who believe firmly in Persian exceptionalism that prefer a return to more historico-cultural roots based on Iranian identity have clashed with those from a combined religious-secular side that work to push Iran as the leader of the Muslim world and regional political hegemon.

Atop the Islamic Republic’s power structure resides the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Through his role of being responsible for the general policies that guide the Republic, he sets the direction for all foreign and domestic initiatives for the state. He also directly commands both the military and intelligence sections of the country, as well as appointing members of the judiciary, the supreme commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and a number of other representatives, clerical commissars, throughout the government. Second only to the Ayatollah is President Rouhani. In his role as the chief executive, together with the Council of Ministers and Parliament, he is responsible for the day-to-day running of state affairs. Unlike the common Western concept of “President,” he does not control the military nor define state policies. Under the presidential layer is an intricate web of interwoven power centers, both formal and informal, that constitute the heart of the Republic. These are somewhat mysteriously lorded over by members of the leadership elite. The connections, and competitions, between the various power centers create a complex web mainly designed to ensure that no single leader within the structure is capable of posing a threat to the control of the Supreme Leader.

Prior to President Rouhani’s election Iran suffered from a fractured elite leadership and an international community resolved in preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon through crippling sanctions. Iran’s technological achievements throughout history are a main source of pride and its ability to successfully develop a nuclear program is seen as a continuation of this exceptionalism. As such, the nuclear program has become somewhat woven into its national identity and is therefore of great importance not only as a security tool but also of national pride. Tired of a history filled with foreign oppression and occupying a unique geographical space between Asia and the Middle East, Persians tend to possess an intense sense of uniqueness and honor that often drive them to resist outside influences even when it creates hardship as in the case of sanctions. As such, Iran’s nuclear development program as a tool in domestic politics continues to play a major role. Additionally, while recent presidencies have seen more pragmatic leaders that are somewhat removed from the religiosity of the revolution, the revolution itself still remains a powerful source of legitimacy.

From the top the leadership of Iran appears to have moved into a stage where it is now more willing to engage foreign leaders and move the state towards globalization. In the years following the revolution much effort was spent on securing power domestically and instituting a system whereby that power could be protected and maintained. Today, it seems Iranian leaders are keen to rejoin the international community. In the most recent presidential election the majority of the focus was on economic reform and the ability for the next leader to effectively manage the country’s struggling economy. In addition, the ability to lead the nation’s merger back into the global environment with religion taking almost no role was a prominent talking point. Consequently, Hassan Rouhani, a man who had campaigned on a platform based on restoring the economy, improving relations with western states, increased access for the general public to information, more personal freedom, and increased women’s rights, was elected as the nation’s seventh president.

On the nuclear issue President Rouhani is seen as a nuclear centrist: a person who is willing to accept some temporary constraints on the uranium enrichment program in order to relieve international sanctions and allow Iran back into the international world order. He firmly believes that Iran has the right to enrich its uranium but that it also needs to possess the ability to work with the international community and be flexible as it continues toward modernization. He walks a tightrope on the nuclear issue, however, as much of Khamenei’s power base, which has final say on the nuclear issue, is comprised of nuclear supporters that believe a nuclear Iran is a necessary geostrategic deterrent to ensure Iran’s security and status. Thus, Rouhani must show positive progress while not “weakening” Iran in order to retain the support of Khamenei, who remains relatively guarded on the issue outwardly.

Politically speaking, President Rouhani does not belong to either of the two main camps, reformist or conservative, but is rather seen as a moderate. This is important as it means that he has to walk a tightrope to draw support from both sides, which becomes of great importance as he manages priorities between nuclear discussions and the domestic issues he campaigned on. The pressure at the moment is on from the reformist side with the nuclear agreement. Domestic issues have largely been ignored and Rouhani has seen a slip in his popularity as the economy continues to flag, several important pro-reform (Green Party) leaders – Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi – remain under house arrest, and other campaign promises have failed to materialize. He will clearly be hoping that once sanctions are lifted there will be a boost to the economy, lifting him to re-election.

The relieving of sanctions, however, will also bring another key issue back into focus, one that is especially important to the conservatives who currently hold the majority of power: the issue of foreign investment and involvement inside Iran. Given Iran’s deep resentment and mistrust of outside entities this will be a major hurdle to overcome as the lifting of sanctions will bring a flood of outside companies and nations eager to do business. How Iran deals with the inevitable pressure for further reforms and the increased flow of foreign involvement in its domestic dealings may well hinge on whether those deals are viewed as legitimate business dealings or whether it is some sort of grand plan by western states to control Iran.

Iran is at an important crossroads at this moment. It is still too early to tell whether the lifting of sanctions and inevitable foreign wave will be met with open arms or whether mistrust will take hold and prevent them from accepting change. With the more pro-reform populace pushing for inclusion back into the global economy and the conservative elite keen to continue its tight hold on power, it remains to be seen just how this quiet power struggle will be settled.

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Iraq: Three Years of Drastic Changes (2019-2022)

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When the wave of the protests broke out at the beginning of October 2019 in Iraq, the Iraqi politicians did not realize the size of the gap between the demands of the protesters which were accumulated more than seventeen years, and the isolation of the politicians from the needs of the people. The waves of the protests began in a small range of different areas in Iraq. Rapidly, it expanded as if it were a rolling snowball in many regions of Iraqi governorates. Moreover, the platforms of social media and the influencers had a great impact on unifying the people against the government and enhancing the protest movement.

Al Tarir Square was the region where most protesters and demonstrators were based there. At that time, they stayed all day in this region and set up their tents to protest and demonstrate against the public situation of their life.

The protesters demanded their looted rights and asked for making economic reforms, finding job opportunities, changing the authority, and toppling the government presided by Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi. The protest stayed between ebb and tide, pressuring the political authority in Iraq.

A new period began in the history of Iraq where clashes between the protesters and the riot forces broke out in Al Tahrir Square and many governorates in the south of Iraq. Tear gas and ductile bullets were used against the protesters to compel them to retreat and disperse them. But the protesters insisted on continuing their demands. Many protesters were killed and wounded due to the intensive violence against them. The strong pressure with falling many martyrs gave its fruit when the Iraqi representatives of the Parliament endeavored to achieve the protesters’ demands by changing the election law into a new one. On 24 December 2019, the Iraqi Parliament approved of changing the unfair Saint Leigo election law into the open districts. The new law divided Iraq into 83 electoral districts.

Moreover, this violent protest led to the collapse of the Iraqi government presided by Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi. He was compelled to resign by the end of 2019. Many political names were nominated by the Iraqi politicians but the protesters refused them all because they were connected with different political parties.

Finally, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, who worked in the Iraqi Intelligence Service and had no party, was nominated by the politicians to be the new Prime Minister. He was well-known for ambiguity and far from the lights of media.

Mustafa Al-Kadhimi has become the Prime Minister in March 2020. The protests were over at the beginning of April 2020. With the taking of responsibility of helping Iraq, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi promised the protesters, who were called “Octoberians”, to hold a premature election, and the election was fixed on 10 June 2020.

Many politicians tried to postpone or cancel the premature election. Under their pressure, the premature election was postponed and fixed on 10 October 2020. During Mustafa Al-Kadhimi’s period as a Prime Minister, he opened new channels with the Arab states to enhance the cooperation and held many summits to support Iraq in the next stage.

Attempts to postpone the premature election by the Iraqi politicians were on equal foot, but all these attempts failed and the election occurred on the due time.

Before the election, many Octoberians and influencers encouraged the people not to participate in the election. On the day of the election, it witnessed low participation, and people were convinced of not happening any change. These calls gave their fruits in the process of elections in Iraq where the election witnessed very low participation, and most Iraqis refused to participate and vote to the nominees even though there was a new election law. When the elections were over, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) in Iraq announced that the results would be within two days. After announcing the results of the election partially and defeating many political factions in the Iraqi arena, many convictions were directed to the commission, and it was convicted by fraud and manipulation with the results. This aspect affected the activity of the Commission and led to put great pressure on it. After two weeks of pressure and convictions, the final results of the elections were announced and many political elite Iraqi leaders were defeated gravely.

The results of the election gave a new start through new leaders who were supporting the October revolution that happened in 2019. And most names of these winning movements and alliances were inspired by the October Movement. Those, who represented October Revolution, were also convicted by other Octoberians that Octoberian winners in the election deviated from the aims of the October Revolution.

A new struggle has begun between the losers in the election and the new winners who will have the right to be in the next term of the Iraqi Council Parliament of Representatives. Moreover, many independent individuals won in the election, and the conflict would deepen the scope of dissidence between the losers and winners. Finally, all raised claims of election fraud have not changed the political situation.

The final results of the election had been announced, and the date of holding the first session of the Iraqi Parliament of Representatives was fixed to nominate and elect the spokesman of the Iraqi Parliament of Representatives.  The Shiite Sadrist movement, which represents 73 seats, has wiped out its competitors. This aspect has compelled the losing Shiite competitors to establish an alliance called “Coordination Framework” to face the Sadrist movement, represented by the cleric Sayyed Muqtada al-Sader. On the other hand, Al-Takadum Movement (Progress Party), represented by the spokesman of the Iraqi Parliament of Representatives, Mohamed Al-Halbousi, has taken the second rank with 37 seats.

The final results of the election had been announced, and the date of holding the first session of the Iraqi Parliament of Representatives was fixed to nominate and elect the spokesman of the Iraqi Parliament of Representatives.

Finally, the first session of the Iraqi Council Parliament of Council was held. Mohamed Al-Halbousi has been elected as the spokesman of the Iraqi Council Parliament of Council. During the next fifteen days, the president of the republic will be elected.

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China-US and the Iran nuclear deal

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Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amirabdollahian that Beijing would firmly support a resumption of negotiations on a nuclear pact [China Media Group-CCTV via Reuters]

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with  Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi on Friday, January 14, 2022 in the city of Wuxi, in China’s Jiangsu province.  Both of them discussed a gamut of issues pertaining to the Iran-China relationship, as well as the security situation in the Middle East.

A summary of the meeting published by the Chinese Foreign Ministry underscored the point, that Foreign Ministers of Iran and China agreed on the need for  strengthening bilateral cooperation in a number of areas under the umbrella of the 25 year Agreement known as ‘Comprehensive Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People’s Republic of China’. This agreement had been signed between both countries in March 2021 during the Presidency of Hassan Rouhani, but the Iranian Foreign Minister announced the launch of the agreement on January 14, 2022.

During the meeting between Wang Yi and Hossein Amir Abdollahian there was a realization of the fact, that cooperation between both countries needed to be enhanced not only in areas like energy and infrastructure (the focus of the 25 year comprehensive cooperation was on infrastructure and energy), but also in other spheres like education, people to people contacts, medicine and agriculture. Iran also praised the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and said that it firmly supported the One China policy.

The timing of this visit is interesting, Iran is in talks with other signatories (including China) to the JCPOA/Iran nuclear deal 2015 for the revival of the 2015 agreement. While Iran has asked for removal of economic sanctions which were imposed by the US after it withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, the US has said that time is running out, and it is important for Iran to return to full compliance to the 2015 agreement.  US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in an interview said

‘Iran is getting closer and closer to the point where they could produce on very, very short order enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon’

The US Secretary of State also indicated, that if the negotiations were not successful, then US would explore other options along with other allies.

During the course of the meeting on January 14, 2022 Wang Yi is supposed to have told his Chinese counterpart, that while China supported negotiations for the revival of the Iran nuclear deal 2015, the onus for revival was on the US since it had withdrawn in 2018.

The visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister to China was also significant, because Foreign Ministers of four Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain — and Secretary General of GCC,  Nayef Falah Mubarak Al-Hajraf were in China from January 10-14, 2022 with the aim of expanding bilateral ties – especially with regard to energy cooperation and trade. According to many analysts, the visit of GCC officials to China was driven not just by economic factors, but also the growing proximity between Iran and Beijing.

In conclusion, China is important for Iran from an economic perspective. Iran has repeatedly stated, that if US does not remove the economic sanctions it had imposed in 2018, it will focus on strengthening economic links with China (significantly, China has been purchasing oil from Iran over the past three years in spite of the sanctions imposed by the US. The Ebrahim Raisi administration has repeatedly referred to an ‘Asia centric’ policy which prioritises ties with China.

Beijing is seeking to enhance its clout in the Middle East as US ties with certain members of the GCC, especially UAE and Saudi Arabia have witnessed a clear downward spiral in recent months (US has been uncomfortable with the use of China’s 5G technology by UAE and the growing security linkages between Beijing and Saudi Arabia). One of the major economic reasons for the GCC gravitating towards China is Washington’s thrust on reducing its dependence upon GCC for fulfilling its oil needs. Beijing can utilize its good ties with Iran and GCC and play a role in improving links between both.

The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East is likely to become more complex, and while there is not an iota of doubt, that the US influence in the Middle East is likely to remain intact, China is fast catching up.

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Egypt vis-à-vis the UAE: Who is Driving Whom?

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Image source: atalayar.com

“Being a big fish in a small pond is better than being a little fish in a large pond” is a maxim that aptly summarizes Egyptian regional foreign policy over the past few decades. However, the blow dealt to the Egyptian State in the course of the 2011 uprising continues to distort its domestic and regional politics and it has also prompted the United Arab Emirates to become heavily engaged in Middle East politics, resulting in the waning of Egypt’s dominant role in the region!

The United Arab Emirates is truly an aspirational, entrepreneurial nation! In fact, the word “entrepreneurship” could have been invented to define the flourishing city of Dubai. The UAE has often declared that as a small nation, it needs to establish alliances to pursue its regional political agenda while Egypt is universally recognized for its regional leadership, has one of the best regional military forces, and has always charmed the Arab world with its soft power. Nonetheless, collaboration between the two nations would not necessarily give rise to an entrepreneurial supremacy force! 

Egypt and the UAE share a common enemy: political Islamists. Yet each nation has its own distinct dynamic and the size of the political Islamist element in each of the two countries is different. The UAE is a politically stable nation and an economic pioneer with a small population – a combination of factors that naturally immunize the nation against the spread of political Islamists across the region. In contrast, Egypt’s economic difficulties, overpopulation, intensifying political repression, along with its high illiteracy rate, constitute an accumulation of elements that serves to intensify the magnitude of the secreted, deep-rooted, Egyptian political Islamists.

The alliance formed between the two nations following the inauguration of Egypt’s President Al Sisi was based on UAE money and Egyptian power. It supported and helped expand the domestic political power of a number of unsubstantiated Arab politicians, such as Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, Tunisia’s President Kais Saied and the Chairman of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant-General Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan. The common denominator among these politicians is that they are all fundamentally opposed to political Islamists.

Although distancing political Islamists from ruling their nations may constitute a temporary success, it certainly is not enough to strengthen the power of the alliance’s affiliates. The absence of true democracy, intensified repression by Arab rulers and the natural evolution of Arab citizens towards freedom will, for better or for worse, lead to the re-emergence of political Islamists. Meanwhile, Emirati wealth will always attract Arab hustlers ready to offer illusory political promises to cash in the money.   

The UAE has generously injected substantial amounts of money into the Egyptian economy and consequently the Egyptian State has exclusively privileged Emirati enterprises with numerous business opportunities, yet the UAE has not helped Egypt with the most critical regional threat it is confronting: the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Meanwhile, Egyptian President Abdel Fatah El Sisi’s exaggerated fascination with UAE modernization has prompted him to duplicate many Emirati projects – building the tallest tower in Africa is one example.

The UAE’s regional foreign policy that hinges upon exploiting its wealth to confront the political Islamist threat is neither comprehensible nor viable. The Emirates, in essence, doesn’t have the capacity to be a regional political player, even given the overriding of Egypt’s waning power. Meanwhile, Al Sisi has been working to depoliticize Egypt completely, perceiving Egypt as an encumbrance rather than a resource-rich nation – a policy that has resulted in narrowing Egypt’s economic and political aspirations, limiting them to the constant seeking of financial aid from wealthy neighbors.

The regional mediating role that Egypt used to play prior to the Arab uprising has been taken over by European nations such France, Germany and Italy, in addition of course to the essential and ongoing role of the United States. Profound bureaucracy and rampant corruption will always keep Egypt from becoming a second UAE! Irrespective of which nation is in the driver’s seat, this partnership has proven to be unsuccessful. Egypt is definitely better off withdrawing from the alliance, even at the expense of forgoing Emirati financial support.

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