Connect with us

Russia

How International Sanctions Helped Putin at Home

Published

on

The United States imposed sanctions on Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea and subsequent involvement in the war in Ukraine. The sanctions have hit Russia’s economy hard largely due to foreign investors pulling $96 billion out of Russia since 2014.

The sanctions imposed by the United States have affected Russia as a whole, from the top to the bottom, from the government to the people. This is an important issue as the Russian government has no intention of backing down or moving away from its defiant stance.

The purpose of economic sanctions is to impose economic harm so as to effect policy change in the target nation. President Obama signed Executive Order 13660 on March 6, 2014, which authorized sanctions for violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and/or stealing assets belonging to the people of Ukraine. The sanctions would restrict certain individuals’ travel, which included Russian and Crimean officials, as well as businessmen who were part of Putin’s “inner circle”, and would demonstrate the United States’ willingness to “impose a cost on Russia and those responsible for the situation in Crimea.” Also, certain Russian government officials’ assets would be frozen, thereby preventing them from buying or selling in the European Union.   Eleven days later, Executive Order 13661 was signed by President Obama which stated that Russia’s actions toward Ukraine undermined the democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine and thus expanded sanctions further against Russian entities such as parts of Russia’s financial, energy, and military industries.

Three days after President Obama signed Executive Order 13661, he issued Executive Order 13662 Directive 4. President Obama enlarged the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13660 and had then expanded in Executive Order 13661 to declare that Russia’s actions and policies toward Ukraine were a threat to American national security and foreign policy:

“The provision, exportation, or re-exportation, directly or indirectly, of goods, services, or technology in support of exploration or production for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil in the Russian Federation, or in a maritime area claimed by the Russian Federation and extending from its territory, and that involve any persons determined to be subject to this Directive, its property, or its interests in property is prohibited.”

A second round was applied on July 16, 2014, called sectoral sanctions. The sanctions prevent Russia from borrowing money to mitigate the blow of falling oil prices. Russian international reserves declined by $135 billion in 2014 and there has also been a huge outflow of capital from the country. Basic food prices have subsequently sharply increased since the sanctions began, with the price of buckwheat increasing as much as 70 percent, for example. The exchange rate in Russia jumps up and down, often by five percent a day, at times even ten percent, which is causing consumer panic. Incomes in Russia have also decreased. In 2014, real incomes decreased by 1% and already by 3.1% in the first half of 2015. This is the first time that has happened since Putin took office in 1999. Inflation also soared to 11.4% in 2014 and the ruble continued to decline, losing 40% of its value to the dollar. Those in the Russian government and the Russian people overall blame the United States for their worsening economy. Thus the blame for food shortages, inflation, devaluation of the ruble, decreasing real income, etc. also falls on the United States in their eyes.

The sanctions most likely will not do much to change the mind of the Putin administration but rather will continue to lower the quality of living for millions in Russia. Russia is highly dependent on food exports, especially from the United States and Europe. In 2013, Russia received $1.3 billion in food and agriculture exports from the United States and $15.8 billion in exports from the European Union. While Russia may try to increase its domestic production of food, it will not be able to fill the void that will be caused by such a loss. “Russia’s Central Bank pointed out that bans on imported food will push up Russia’s already high inflation rate, eroding the purchasing power of Russian citizens.”

The people of Russia have shown deep dissatisfaction with the United States and have increased their approval of Putin. According to the Levada Center polling organization, the Russian people have been decreasing their approval of the United States since the sanctions were imposed in 2014. From this data, it can be implied that the sanctions started the current downward trend of negative views on the US. Looking at the data from 1990, there are three spikes of anti-Americanism that occur prior to 2014. One in the late 1990s during the Kosovo War; one in 2003 when the United States invaded Iraq; and one in 2008 when the United States was critical of Russia’s conflict with Georgia. The difference between these spikes of anti-Americanism and the current trend is that this spike seems more intense and personal.

02ruch

The title of the graph roughly translates to “How do you view the US generally”; the blue line represents the percentage of Russians who say they view the US positively, while the red line is percentage of Russians who view the US negatively.

 

During the Kosovo war, Russian disapproval of America peaked at around 53% over a two-year period. In 2003, Russian disapproval of America peaked at around 66% over a five-month period. In 2008, Russian disapproval of America peaked at around 67% over a three-month period. Even though the disapproval lasted the longest in the late 1990s, only half of the population held these views. Since January 2015, Russian disapproval of America stands at 81% and has been increasing for almost a year. With this data, there is evidence to suggest that the level of anti-Americanism within Russia is strongly related to domestic economic conditions in the country. This further supports the primary hypothesis that current economic sanctions, and specifically their impact on the Russian people, will lead to intensifying levels of anti-Americanism.

Even though the sanctions have worsened the economic situation in Russia, they have also created a foreign policy backlash resulting in an increased approval rating for Putin:

02ruch2

Fisher, M. (2015, February 9). Chart: Anti-Americanism is exploding in Russia

 

As seen in the chart above, Putin’s approval rating was slowly declining from 2008 to the beginning of 2014. In July 2008, Putin’s approval rating was at around 88%. By January 2014, his rating had dropped almost 28 percentage points. After the US sanctions were enacted in 2014, within eight months Putin was almost back to his 2008 rating. What this clearly shows is that there is definitely a sense of ‘nationalist backlash’ connected to the imposition of sanctions against Russia. Whereas there has always been something of a low-grade anti-Americanism in Russia for American global actions, these actions have always largely impacted Russian peripheral interests. The sanctions today, however, are direct and personal: they are seen as an explicit attempt by the United States to hurt Russia, not Russian interests. For that reason it is perhaps more surprising the West could not anticipate this attitudinal backlash. This is, it seems, political naiveté at its finest.

Russia

Putin’s post-Soviet world remains a work in progress, but Africa already looms

Published

on

Russian civilisationalism is proving handy as President Vladimir Putin seeks to expand the imaginary boundaries of his Russian World, whose frontiers are defined by Russian speakers and adherents to Russian culture rather than international law and/or ethnicity.

Mr. Putin’s disruptive and expansive nationalist ideology has underpinned his aggressive

 approach to Ukraine since 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the stoking of insurgencies in the east of the country. It also underwrites this month’s brief intervention in Kazakhstan, even if it was in contrast to Ukraine at the invitation of the Kazakh government.

Mr. Putin’s nationalist push in territories that were once part of the Soviet Union may be par for the course even if it threatens to rupture relations between Russia and the West and potentially spark a war. It helps Russia compensate for the strategic depth it lost with the demise of communism in Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

However, equally alarmingly, Mr. Putin appears to be putting building blocks in place that would justify expanding his Russian World in one form or another beyond the boundaries of the erstwhile Soviet Union.

In doing so, he demonstrates the utility of employing plausibly deniable mercenaries not only for military and geopolitical but also ideological purposes.

Standing first in line is the Central African Republic. A resource-rich but failed state that has seen its share of genocidal violence and is situated far from even the most expansive historical borders of the Russian empire, the republic could eventually qualify to be part of the Russian world, according to Mr. Putin’s linguistic and cultural criteria.

Small units of the Wagner Group, a private military company owned by one of Mr. Putin’s close associates, entered the Centra African Republic once departing French troops handed over to a United Nations peacekeeping force in 2016. Five years later, Wagner has rights to mine the country’s gold and diamond deposits.

Perhaps surprisingly, the Russian mercenary presence persuaded President Faustin-Archange Touadera that the African republic should embrace Russian culture.

As a result, university students have been obliged to follow Russian-language classes starting as undergraduates in their first year until their second year of post-graduate studies. The mandate followed the introduction of Russian in the republic’s secondary school curriculum in 2019.

Mr. Touadera is expected to ask Mr. Putin for Russian-language instructors during a forthcoming visit to Moscow to assist in the rollout.

Neighbouring Mali could be next in line to follow in Mr. Touadera’s footsteps.

Last month, units of the Wagner Group moved into the Sahel nation at the request of a government led by army generals who have engineered two coups in nine months. The generals face African and Western sanctions that could make incorporating what bits of the country they control into the Russian world an attractive proposition.

While it is unlikely that Mr. Putin would want to formally welcome sub-Saharan and Sahel states into his Russian world, it illustrates the pitfalls of a redefinition of internationally recognised borders as civilisational and fluid rather than national, fixed, and legally enshrined.

For now, African states do not fit Mr. Putin’s bill of one nation as applied to Ukraine or Belarus. However, using linguistics as a monkey wrench, he could, overtime or whenever convenient, claim them as part of the Russian world based on an acquired language and cultural affinity.

Mr. Putin’s definition of a Russian world further opens the door to a world in which the principle of might is right runs even more rampant with the removal of whatever flimsy guard rails existed.

To accommodate the notion of a Russian world, Russian leaders, going back more than a decade, have redefined Russian civilisation as multi-ethnic rather than ethically Russia.

The Central African Republic’s stress on Russian-language education constitutes the first indication in more than a decade that Mr. Putin and some of his foreign allies may expand the Russian world’s civilisational aspects beyond the erstwhile Soviet Union.

Some critics of Mr. Putin’s concept of a Russian world note that Western wars allegedly waged out of self-defense and concern for human rights were also about power and geopolitical advantage.

For example, pundit Peter Beinart notes that NATO-led wars in Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya “also extended American power and smashed Russian allies at the point of a gun.”

The criticism doesn’t weaken the legitimacy of the US and Western rejection of Russian civilisationalism. However, it does undermine the United States’ ability to claim the moral high ground.

It further constrains Western efforts to prevent the emergence of a world in which violation rather than the inviolability of national borders become the accepted norm.

If Russian interventionism aims to change borders, US interventionism often sought to change regimes. That is one driver of vastly different perceptions of the US role in the world, including Russian distrust of the post-Soviet NATO drive into Eastern Europe and independent former Soviet states such as Ukraine.

“People with more experience of the dark side of American power—people whose families hail from Guatemala, Chile, Brazil, Haiti, or Mexico, where US guns have sabotaged democracy rather than defended it—might find it easier to understand Russian suspicions. But those Americans tend not to shape US policy towards places like Ukraine,” Mr. Beinart said.

Continue Reading

Russia

Neighbours and Crises: New Challenges for Russia

Published

on

Through all the discussions that accompanied the preparation of the Valdai Club report “Space Without Borders: Russia and Its Neighbours”, the most clear question was whether Russia should or should not avoid repeating the historical experience of relations with its near abroad. This experience, in the most general terms, is that after Russia pacifies its western border with its foreign policy, the Russian state inevitably must turn to issues related to the existence of its immediate neighbourhood. With a high degree of probability, it will be forced to turn to its centuries-old method for solving problems that arise there: expansion for the sake of ensuring security.

Now Russia’s near abroad consists of a community of independent states that cannot ensure their own security and survival by relying only on their own forces; we cannot be completely sure of their stability. From Estonia in the west to Kyrgyzstan in the east, the existence of these countries in a competitive international environment is ensured by their link with one of the nuclear superpowers. Moreover, such connections can only complement each other with great difficulty. As the recent developments in Kazakhstan have demonstrated, they are not limited to the threat of an external invasion; even internal circumstances can become deadly.

The dramatic events in that country were intensified by external interference from the geostrategic opponents of Russia, as well as international terrorists, but it would be disingenuous to argue that their most important causes are not exclusively internal and man-made. We cannot and should not judge whether the internal arrangements of our neighbours are good or bad, since we ourselves do not have ideal recipes or examples. However, when dealing with the consequences, it is rational to fear that their statehood will either be unable to survive, or that their existence will take place in forms that create dangers which Russia cannot ignore.

In turn, the events experienced now in relations between Russia and the West, if we resort to historical analogies, look like a redux of the Northern War. The Great Northern War arose at the beginning of the 18th century as the result of the restoration of Russia’s power capabilities; the West had made great progress in approaching the heart of its territory. Within the framework of this logic, victory, even tactical victory, in the most important (Western) direction will inevitably force Russia to turn to its borders. Moreover, the reasons for paying more attention to them are obvious. This will present Russia with the need to decide on how much it is willing to participate in the development of its neighbours.

The developments in Kazakhstan in early January 2022 showed the objective limits of the possibilities of building a European-style sovereign state amid new, historical, and completely different geopolitical circumstances. More or less all the countries of the space that surrounds Russia, from the Baltic to the Pamir, are unique experiments that arose amid the truly phenomenal orderliness of conditions after the end of the Cold War. In that historical era, the world really developed under conditions where a general confidence prevailed that the absolute dominance of one power and a group of its allies creates conditions for the survival of small and medium-sized states, even in the absence of objective reasons for this.

The idea of the “end of history” was so convincing that we could accept it as a structural factor, so powerful that it would allow us to overcome even the most severe objective circumstances.

The Cold War era created the experience of the emergence and development of new countries, which until quite recently had been European colonies. Despite the fact that there are a few “success stories” among the countries that emerged after 1945, few have been able to get out of the catch-up development paradigm. However, it was precisely 30 years ago that there really was a possibility that a unipolar world would be so stable that it would allow the experiment to come to fruition. The visible recipes of the new states being built were ideal from an abstract point of view, just as Victor Frankenstein was guided by a desire for the ideal.

Let us recall that the main idea of our report was that Russia needs to preserve the independence of the states surrounding it and direct all its efforts to ensure that they become effective powers, eager to survive. This desire for survival is seen as the main condition for rational behaviour, i.e. creating a foreign policy, which takes into account the geopolitical conditions and the power composition of Eurasia. In other words, we believe that Russia is interested in the experiment that emerged within the framework of the Liberal World Order taking place under new conditions, since its own development goals dictate that it avoid repeating its past experience of full control over its neighbours, with which it shares a single geopolitical space.

This idea, let’s not hide it, prompted quite convincing criticism, based on the belief that the modern world does not create conditions for the emergence of states where such an experience is absent in more or less convincing forms. For Russia, the challenge is that even if it is technically capable of ensuring the immediate security of its national territory, the spread of the “grey zone” around its borders will inevitably bring problems that the neighbours themselves are not able to solve.

The striking analogy proposed by one colleague was the “hallway of hell” that Russia may soon face on its southern borders, making us raise the question that the absence of topographic boundaries within this space makes it necessary to create artificial political or even civilisational lines, the protection of which in any case will be entrusted to the Russian soldier. This January we had the opportunity to look into this “hallway of hell”. There is no certainty that the instant collapse of a state close to Russia in the darkest periods of its political history should be viewed as a failure in development, rather than a systemic breakdown of the entire trajectory, inevitable because it took shape amid completely different conditions.

Therefore, now Russia should not try to understand what its further strategy might be; in any case, particular behaviour will be determined by circumstances. Our task is to explore the surrounding space in order to understand where Russia can stop if it does not want to resort to the historical paradigm of its behaviour. The developments in Kazakhstan, in their modern form, do not create any grounds for optimism or hopes for a return to an inertial path of development. Other states may follow Ukraine and Kazakhstan even if they now look quite confident. There are no guarantees — and it would be too great a luxury for Russia to accept such a fate.

This is primarily because the Russian state will inevitably face a choice between being ready for several decades of interaction with a huge “grey zone” along the perimeter of its borders and more energetic efforts to prevent its emergence. It is unlikely that Moscow would simply observe the processes taking place on its immediate periphery. This is not a hypothetical invasion of third forces — that does not pose any significant threat to Russia. The real challenge may be that in a few decades, or sooner, Moscow will have to take on an even greater responsibility, which Russia got rid of in 1991. Even now, there seems to be a reason to believe that thirty years of independence have made it possible to create elements of statehood that can be preserved and developed with the help of Russia.

from our partner RIAC

Continue Reading

Russia

Do as You’re Told, Russia Tells the Neighborhood

Published

on

The Kremlin has always argued that it has special interests and ties to what once constituted the Soviet space. Yet it struggled to produce a smooth mechanism for dealing with the neighborhood, where revolutionary movements toppled Soviet and post-Soviet era political elites. Popular movements in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and most recently Kazakhstan have flowered and sometimes triumphed despite the Kremlin’s rage.

Russia’s responses have differed in each case, although it has tended to foster separatism in neighboring states to preclude their westward aspirations. As a policy, this was extreme and rarely generated support for its actions, even from allies and partners. The resultant tensions underlined the lack of legitimacy and generated acute fear even in friendlier states that Russia one day could turn against them.

But with the activation of the hitherto largely moribund six-nation Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Kazakhstan seems to be an entirely different matter. Here, for the first time since its Warsaw Pact invasions, Russia employed an element of multilateralism. This was designed to show that the intervention was an allied effort, though it was Russia that pulled the strings and contributed most of the military force.

CSTO activation is also about something else. It blurred the boundaries between Russia’s security and the security of neighboring states. President Vladimir Putin recently stated the situation in Kazakhstan concerned “us all,” thereby ditching the much-cherished “Westphalian principles” of non-intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring states. The decision was also warmly welcomed by China, another Westphalia enthusiast.

In many ways, Russia always wanted to imitate the US, which in its unipolar moment used military power to topple regimes (in Afghanistan and Iraq) and to restore sovereignty (in Kuwait.) Liberal internationalism with an emphasis on human rights allowed America and its allies to operate with a certain level of legitimacy and to assert (a not always accepted) moral imperative. Russia had no broader ideas to cite. Until now. Upholding security and supporting conservative regimes has now become an official foreign policy tool. Protests in Belarus and Kazakhstan helped the Kremlin streamline this vision.

Since Russia considers its neighbors unstable (something it often helps to bring about), the need for intervention when security is threatened will now serve as a new dogma, though this does not necessarily mean that CSTO will now exclusively serve as the spearhead of Russian interventionist policy in crises along its borders. On the contrary, Russia will try to retain maneuverability and versatility. The CSTO option will be one weapon in the Kremlin’s neighborhood pacification armory.

Another critical element is the notion of “limited sovereignty,” whereby Russia allows its neighbors to exercise only limited freedom in foreign policy. This is a logical corollary, since maneuverability in their relations with other countries might lead to what the Kremlin considers incorrect choices, like joining Western military or economic groupings.

More importantly, the events in Kazakhstan also showed that Russia is now officially intent on upholding the conservative-authoritarian regimes. This fits into a broader phenomenon of authoritarians helping other authoritarians. Russia is essentially exporting its own model abroad. The export includes essential military and economic help to shore up faltering regimes.

The result is a virtuous circle, in the Kremlin’s eyes. Not only can it crush less than friendly governments in its borderlands but it also wins extensive influence, including strategic and economic benefits. Take for instance Belarus, where with Russian help, the dictator Aliaksandr Lukashenka managed to maintain his position after 2020’s elections through brutality and vote-rigging. The end result is that the regime is ever-more beholden to Russia, abandoning remnants of its multi-vector foreign policy and being forced to make financial and economic concessions of defense and economics to its new master. Russia is pressing hard for a major new airbase.

A similar scenario is now opening up in Kazakhstan. The country which famously managed to strike a balance between Russia and China and even work with the US, while luring multiple foreign investors, will now have to accept a new relationship with Russia. It will be similar to Belarus, short of integration talks.

Russia fears crises, but it has also learned to exploit them. Its new approach is a very striking evolution from the manner in which it handled Georgia and Ukraine in 2008 and 2014, through the Belarus and Armenia-Azerbaijan crises in 2020 to the Kazakh uprising of 2022.

Russia has a new vision for its neighborhood. It is in essence a concept of hierarchical order with Russia at the top of the pyramid. The neighbors have to abide by the rules. Failure to do so would produce a concerted military response.

Author’s note: first published in cepa

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Middle East2 hours ago

Ukraine crisis could produce an unexpected winner: Iran

 Iran potentially could emerge as an unintended winner in the escalating crisis over Ukraine. That is, if Russian troops cross...

Finance2 hours ago

How Twitter can help your business

Twitter is easily one of the leading online platforms which encourages networking on a global scale. The number of users,...

Economy4 hours ago

2022: Rise of Economic Power of Small Medium Businesses across the World

Why mirrors of the Wall: To fight obesity a life-sized mirror required, to uplift the national economy a simple calculator is...

Reports6 hours ago

Lebanon’s Crisis: Great Denial in the Deliberate Depression

The scale and scope of Lebanon’s deliberate depression are leading to the disintegration of key pillars of Lebanon’s post-civil war...

Defense8 hours ago

Preventing Nuclear War in the Middle East: Science, System and “Vision”

“A scientist, whether theorist or experimenter, puts forward statements, or systems of statements, and tests them step by step.”-Karl R....

Middle East14 hours ago

Unified Libya will come only via ballot box, ‘not the gun’-UNSC

Libya is at a “delicate and fragile juncture in its path to unity and stability”, the UN Political Affairs chief told the Security Council...

East Asia20 hours ago

The American politicization of the Beijing Winter Olympics, and the “post-truth era” theory

Since the Egyptian researcher has begun her academic major in “contemporary Chinese political affairs and contemporary communist studies”, I have...

Trending