Connect with us

Middle East

The Persian Lion Still Roars

Published

on

Why does Iran still harbor such distrust and animosity towards the United States? This question is a key factor for understanding the continuous failures of negotiations, even after the concluded nuclear accord.

Much of Iran’s bitterness and mistrust towards the United States can be traced back to the Iran-Iraq War. Iranians refer to the war as the “Imposed War” because Iranians believe the United States orchestrated and funded Iraq’s war efforts against Iran (Riedel, 2013). In July 1988, a U.S. Navy ship shot down Iran Air flight 655 killing all 290 people aboard. Iran still marks the anniversary of the incident, alleging the U.S. intentionally destroyed the civilian aircraft. Since the U.S. military maneuvers near Abu Musa Island in 1994, the Iranian government is suspicious of any U.S. military presence in the region. This was further compounded by rhetoric such as President Bush’s declaration of Iran as part of the Axis of Evil and Senator McCain’s call for the U.S. to support regime change in Iran. Cyber-attacks like the Stuxnet virus against Iran’s nuclear facilities further increased animosity and suspicion of U.S. policies and goals.

Understanding the Iranian mindset requires an insight into the foundation of their national identity and national security interests. Shia Islam and nationalism are inextricable elements of Iranian culture. Neglecting this knowledge will lead to more exclusionary policies devoid of the cultural aspects that make negotiations more palatable to Iranians. There are two distinct facets of Iranian culture that form the foundation of all relations: Iranian nationalism and Shiite particularism. According to Bar (2004), Iranians have a strong self-image dating back to an ancient civilization. Persian pride pervades every cultural, political, and economic facet in Iranian affairs. Iranian national identity is birthed from a lineage of Persian history, mythology, kings, and a massive empire. Conversely, this self-image drives their discrimination against Arabs and other non-Farsi groups. A successful policy must address the Persian and Iranian nationalism factors. Ignoring the cultural aspect will likely be seen as more exploitation of Iran’s affairs and so-called rightful hegemonic influence in the region.

Iran’s Security Interests

The first security strategy is regime survival. The foundation of the Islamic Republic is the concept of velayat-e fagih, which is rule of the jurist. The Supreme Leader exercises complete governing authority under the guardianship of velayat-e fagih. The constitution was later amended to give the Leader extrajudicial powers to correct any “flaw” in the judiciary. He enjoys the full support of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which refer to him as “Imam” or Source of Enlightenment. The IRGC are the protectors of the revolution and view themselves as the continuity and security of the regime’s ideals.

The second national security interest is defending the country against all adversaries. Initially, this meant defense against military threats from other nation-states but has since evolved to include soft power as well. The Supreme Leader, the IRGC, and the Basij continue emphasizing Iran’s efforts in the soft war supposedly being waged by the West against them. The soft war entails all aspects of soft power against Iran’s Islamic and cultural values.

The third national security interest is expanding Iran’s regional influence. More specifically, this includes all efforts to export Iran’s Shia ideology throughout the region, support Shia uprisings, and become the Shia authority in the region. Davis, Martini, and Alireza further assert, “This involves increasing military support for its allies in the region, especially Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria, and, increasingly, Iraq. Iran sees not only Israel but also Sunni Arab states (such as Egypt) and Turkey and Pakistan as geopolitical rivals” (2011).

Considering the Iranian perspective is not just tallying up prior injustices, identifying the cultural and geopolitical causes of conflict provide insight into the state’s mindset. Hunter writes, “Indeed, both sides have become prisoners of the past; both have a long list of grievances. To be limited by the past in analysis, perceptions and policy flexibility is a natural human trait, but in today’s circumstances it would be self-indulgent and self-defeating.” Parasility adds, “After three decades of mutual hostility and infrequent direct diplomatic contacts, differences in political culture and diplomatic style, disproportionate involvement of intermediaries and message carriers, and sometimes confusing and mixed signals from those presumed to be speaking for those in authority, such clarity cannot be assumed.” The recently concluded deal does not, of course, eliminate these concerns or these complex relationships. In fact, engagement with Iran doesn’t only make the nuclear fear not go away, it may make the problem in some ways more daunting and challenging.

Complex Problem

The most significant continued concern is Iran’s nuclear aspirations. Additionally, other problems include: Iran’s support for terrorist groups; the regime’s hostility towards Israel; the expansion of Shia theology throughout the region; Iranian threats to close the Straits of Hormuz; Iran’s proliferation of instability through proxy groups; and the theological contention between the Qom and Najaf Howza. Iran’s strategic objectives clash with U.S. goals for the region. Robb and Wald (2012) write, “Tehran’s strategic objectives to expand its influence, export revolution and undercut the Middle East peace process have threatened longstanding U.S. efforts to maintain a regional balance of power, defend key allies and support Arab-Israeli peace”. Moreover, Iran’s strategic objectives adversely affect other nations.

Israel

Israel views Iran as the biggest threat to their national security. Israel contends that Iran is will never try to build a peaceful nuclear program but rather that Iran is enriching uranium to build nuclear weapons to use specifically against the Jewish homeland. On October 1, 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In his remarks, Netanyahu (2013) stated, “Israel will never acquiesce to nuclear arms in the hands of a rogue regime that repeatedly promises to wipe us off the map. Against such a threat, Israel will have no choice but to defend itself.” Israel does not consent to any negotiations that allow Iran to pursue a nuclear program, regardless of the enrichment levels. Israel does not accept containment. This is why Israel still does not accept or consider the new deal as a positive step or one to secure a new kind of Iran for the future.

Turkey

Turkey supports Iran’s pursuit of a peaceful nuclear program and has occasionally acted as a mediator to support Tehran’s efforts. Despite Turkey’s assistance, Iran and Turkey are regional rivals with diametrically opposed worldviews. According to Barkey, “Turkey is a constitutionally secular state where the military is the self-appointed guardian of secularism. Iran is a theocracy in which Islamic law rules and clerics play decisive roles, including control over the military.” (2012). Like its neighbors, Turkey opposes any Iranian efforts to build a nuclear weapon, which Turkey views as a destabilizing, regional factor.

The Gulf States

Iran maintains strained relationships with its regional neighbors. The Gulf States or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), collectively oppose the prospect of a nuclear Iran building a nuclear weapon. The GCC warns that a nuclear Iran would threaten the stability of the region well into the Persian Gulf. This would also change the balance of power by enhancing Iran’s persistent efforts to export its ideology and influence the internal affairs of Gulf Coast states. Some of the most notable examples are the violent, Iranian-supported Shia protests occurring in Bahrain and Yemen and the continued dispute over the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs (Fulton & Farrar-Wellman, 2011).

Russian and Chinese Interests in Iran

Russia and China have a unique and somewhat symbiotic relationship with Iran. The Iranian government has been steadily increasing exports to both countries despite international sanctions. Russia and China openly state their opposition to any Iranian efforts to build nuclear weapons, but also believed in alternative approaches beyond punitive and extreme sanctions. Both countries have conceded to international sanctions against Iran but also violate the sanctions when it is opportunistic for them both. Russia and Iran continue to bolster the Iranian government through military arms shipments, dual-use technology, oil purchases, and financial transactions. Iran is a strategic partner for them both and serves to limit Western influences in the region in a way that benefits both Chinese and Russian geopolitical interests.

No Easy Fix

Iran’s new accord could and hopefully will signal a new engagement that builds new channels of trust and interaction with rivals, both regional and global. Even if this most optimal outcome does occur, however, the national, cultural, historical, and geopolitical tensions that caused issues to begin with will not completely disappear. Iran not having a nuclear weapon will of course be good news to Europe, the United States, and Israel, just to name a few. But that will by no means stop Iran from pursuing its long-held belief in being an important global player and unquestioned regional hegemon. As the saying goes, the game has only just begun!

Continue Reading
Comments

Middle East

“Today Saudi Arabia finally lost the war on Yemen.”

Eric Zuesse

Published

on

On August 17th, an anonymous German intelligence analyst who has perhaps the world’s best track-record of publicly identifying and announcing historical turning-points, and who is therefore also a great investigative journalist regarding international relations (especially military matters, which are his specialty) headlined at his “Moon of Alabama” blog, “Long Range Attack On Saudi Oil Field Ends War On Yemen”, and he opened:

Today Saudi Arabia finally lost the war on Yemen. It has no defenses against new weapons the Houthis in Yemen acquired. These weapons threaten the Saudis economic lifelines. This today was the decisive attack:

Drones launched by Yemen’s Houthi rebels attacked a massive oil and gas field deep inside Saudi Arabia’s sprawling desert on Saturday, causing what the kingdom described as a “limited fire” in the second such recent attack on its crucial energy industry.  …

The Saudi acknowledgement of the attack came hours after Yahia Sarie, a military spokesman for the Houthis, issued a video statement claiming the rebels launched 10 bomb-laden drones targeting the field in their “biggest-ever” operation. He threatened more attacks would be coming. 

New drones and missiles displayed in July 2019 by Yemen’s Houthi-allied armed forces

Today’s attack is a check-mate move against the Saudis. Shaybah is some 1,200 kilometers (750 miles) from Houthi-controlled territory. There are many more important economic targets within that range.  …

The attack conclusively demonstrates that the most important assets of the Saudis are now under threat. This economic threat comes on top of a seven percent budget deficit the IMF predicts for Saudi Arabia. Further Saudi bombing against the Houthi will now have very significant additional cost that might even endanger the viability of the Saudi state. The Houthi have clown prince Mohammad bin Salman by the balls and can squeeze those at will.

He went on to say that the drones aren’t from Iran but are copies from Iran’s, “assembled in Yemen with the help of Hizbullah experts from Lebanon.”

He has been predicting for a long time that this war couldn’t be won by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman al-Saud (MbS). In the present report, he says:

The war on Yemen that MbS started in March 2015 long proved to be unwinnable. Now it is definitely lost. Neither the U.S. nor the Europeans will come to the Saudis help. There are no technological means to reasonably protect against such attacks. Poor Yemen defeated rich Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi side will have to agree to political peace negotiations. The Yemeni demand for reparation payments will be eye watering. But the Saudis will have no alternative but to cough up whatever the Houthi demand.

The UAE was smart to pull out of Yemen during the last months.

If he is correct (and I have never yet found a prediction from him turn out to have been wrong), then this will be an enormous blow to the foreign markets for U.S.-made weapons, since the Sauds are the world’s largest foreign purchasers of those, and have spent profusely on them — and also on U.S. personnel to train their soldiers how to use them. So (and this is my prediction, not his), August 19th might be a good time to sell short U.S. armament-makers such as Lockheed Martin.

However: his prediction that “the Saudis will have no alternative but to cough up whatever the Houthi demand” seems to me to be the first one from him that could turn out to have been wrong. If the Sauds have perpetrated, say, $200 billion of physical damage to Yemen, but refuse to pay more than $100 billion in reparations, and the Housis then hit and take out a major Saudi oil well, isn’t it possible that the Sauds would stand firm? But if they do, then mightn’t it be wrong to say, at the present time, that: “Today Saudi Arabia finally lost the war on Yemen.”? He has gone out on limbs before, and I can’t yet think of any that broke under him. Maybe this one will be the first? I wouldn’t bet on that. But this one seems to me to be a particularly long limb. We’ll see!

Continue Reading

Middle East

The message behind the release of Iranian oil tanker

Mohammad Ghaderi

Published

on

The Gibraltar court ordered the Iranian oil tanker Grace 1 to be released. The tanker was seized by the British Royal Marines about a month ago. 

This verdict was the ending of an elaborate game designed by John Bolton National Security Advisor of the United States and Mike Pompeo, carried out by the Britain government. 

With seizing the tanker, Bolton was trying to put psychological and political pressures on Iran and force other countries to form a consensus against Iran, but he couldn’t fulfill any of these goals. 

Iran’s firm, logical and wise answer to the seizure of Grace 1 (like making solid legal arguments) and the seriousness of our country’s armed forces in giving a proper response to Britain’s contemptuous act, made the White House lose the lead on reaching its ends. 

Washington imagined that the seizure of Grace 1 will become Trump’s winning card against Iran, but the release of the tanker (despite disagreement of the U.S.) became another failure for the White House in dealing with Iran.  

Obviously, London was also a total loser in this game. It is worth noting that U.S. was so persistent about keeping the oil tanker in custody that John Bolton traveled to London and insisted on British officials to continue the seizure of the ship. Their failure, however, clearly shows that the White House and its traditional ally, Britain, have lost a big part of their power in their relations with Iran. 

Clearly, the illegal seizure of the Iranian oil tanker by Britain proceeded by the seizure of a British tanker by Iran and the following interactions between the two countries is not the whole story and there is more to it that will be revealed in coming days. 

What we know for sure is that London has to pay for its recent anti-Iran plot in order to satisfy Washington; the smallest of these consequences was that Britain lost some of its legal credibility in international arena as it illegally captured an Iranian oil tanker. 

The order of the Gibraltarian court revealed that London had no legal right to seize the Iranian oil tanker and nobody can defend this unlawful action. Surely, Iran will take all necessary legal actions to further pursue the matter.  

In this situation, the Islamic Republic of Iran is firm on its position that it doesn’t have to follow the sanctions imposed by the European Union on other countries (including Syria). 

No entity can undermine this argument as it is based on legal terms; therefore, Iran will keep supporting Syrian nation and government to fight terrorism. This is the strategic policy of the Islamic Republic and will not be changed under the pressure or influence of any other third country. 

Finally, it should be noted that the release of Grace 1 oil tanker was not only a legal and political failure for Washington and London and their allies but it was also a strategic failure. Undoubtedly, the vast consequences of this failure will be revealed in near future. 

From our partner Tehran Times

Continue Reading

Middle East

Business and boxing: two sides of the same coin

Dr. James M. Dorsey

Published

on

What do a planned US$15 billion Saudi investment in petroleum-related Indian businesses and a controversial boxing championship have in common?

Both reflect a world in which power and economics drive policy, politics and business at the expense of fundamental rights.

And both underscore an emerging new world order in which might is right, a jungle in which dissenters, minorities and all other others are increasingly cornered and repressed.

Rather than furthering stability by building inclusive, cohesive societies both support trends likely to produce an evermore unstable and insecure world marked by societal strife, mass migration, radicalization and violence.

A world in which business capitalizes on decisions by a critical mass of world leaders who share autocratic, authoritarian and illiberal principles of governance and often reward each other with lucrative business deals for policies that potentially aggravate rather than reduce conflict.

No doubt, the planned acquisition by Saudi Arabia’s state-owned national oil company Aramco of 20 percent of the petroleum-related businesses of Reliance Industries, one of India’s biggest companies, makes commercial and strategic economic and business sense.

Yet, there is equally little doubt that the announcement of the acquisition will be read by Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, days after he scrapped the autonomous status of the troubled, majority Muslim region of Kashmir, as a license to pursue his Hindu nationalist policies that discriminate against Muslims and other minorities and fuel tensions with Pakistan, the subcontinent’s other nuclear power.

The ultimate cost of the fallout of policies and business deals that contribute or give license to exclusion rather than inclusion of all segments of a population and aggravate regional conflict could be far higher than the benefits accrued by the parties to a deal.

Underscoring the risk of exclusionary policies and unilateral moves, cross border skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani forces erupted this week along the Kashmiri frontier in which at least five people were killed.

The timing of the announcement of the Aramco Reliance deal in a global environment in which various forms of racism and prejudice, including Islamophobia, are on the rise, assures Indian political and business leaders that they are unlikely to pay an immediate price for policies that sow discord and risk loss of life.

Like in the case of Saudi and Muslim acquiescence in China’s brutal clampdown on Turkic Muslims in the troubled, north-western Chinese province of Xinjiang, the most frontal assault on a faith in recent history, the announcement risks convincing embattled Muslim minorities like the Uighurs, the Kashmiris or Myanmar’s Rohingya who are lingering in refugee camps in Bangladesh that they are being hung out to dry.

To be sure, Kashmiris can count on the support of Pakistan but that is likely to be little more than emotional, verbal and political.

Pakistan is unlikely to risk blacklisting by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international anti-money laundering and terrorism finance watchdog, at its next scheduled meeting in October by unleashing its anti-Indian militants.

Anthony Joshua’s controversial fight with Andy Ruiz scheduled for December in Saudi Arabia, the first boxing championship to be held in the Middle East, pales in terms of its geopolitical or societal impact compared to the Saudi Indian business deal.

Fact is that Saudi Arabia’s hosting of the championship has provoked the ire of activists rather than significant population groups. The fight is furthermore likely to be seen as evidence and a strengthening of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s selective efforts to socially liberalize the once austere kingdom.

Nonetheless, it also reinforces Prince Mohammed’s justified perception that Saudi Arabia can get away with imprisoning activists who argued in favour of his reforms as well as the lack of transparency on judicial proceedings against the alleged perpetrators of the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Saudi Arabia insists the killing was perpetrated by rogue operatives.

What Saudi investment in India and the scheduled boxing championship in the kingdom have in common is that both confirm the norms of a world in which ‘humane authority,’ a concept developed by prominent Chinese international relations scholar Yan Xuetong, is a rare quantity.

Mr. Yan employs the concept to argue without referring to President Xi Jinping, Xinjiang, China’s aggressive approach towards the South China Sea or its policy towards Taiwan and Hong Kong that China lacks the humane authority to capitalize on US President Donald J. Trump’s undermining of US leadership.

Mr. Yan defines a state that has humane authority as maintaining strategic credibility and defending the international order by becoming an example through adherence to international norms, rewarding states that live up to those norms and punishing states that violate them. Garnering humane authority enables a state to win allies and build a stable international order.

Mr. Yan’s analysis is as applicable to India and Saudi Arabia as it is to China and others that tend towards civilizational policies like the United States, Russia, Hungary and Turkey.

It is equally true for men like Anthony Joshua promoter Eddie Hearn and business leaders in general.

To be sure, Aramco is state-owned and subject to government policy. Nonetheless, as it prepares for what is likely to be the world’s largest initial public offering, even Aramco has to take factors beyond pure economic and financial criteria into account.

At the end of the day, the consequence of Mr. Yan’s theory is that leadership, whether geopolitical, economic or business, is defined as much by power and opportunity as it is by degrees of morality and ethics.

Failure to embrace some notion of humane authority and reducing leadership and business decisions to exploiting opportunity with disregard for consequences or the environment in which they are taken is likely to ultimately haunt political and business leaders alike.

Said Mr. Yan: “Since the leadership of a humane authority is able to rectify those states that disturb the international order, the order based on its leadership can durably be maintained.”

What is true for political leaders is also true for business leaders even if they refuse to acknowledge that their decisions have as much political as economic impact.

Continue Reading

Latest

Trending

Copyright © 2019 Modern Diplomacy