In early July, naval delegations from Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran and Kazakhstan met in St. Petersburg to discuss the idea of a collective security system among the Caspian Sea States, alongside other important security issues.
The proposed collective security system would include the creation of “a council of naval commanders” and “a five-sided agreement on preventing incidents on the Caspian and the airspace above it,” Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu described. In addition, the joint security initiative will include emergency response exercises likely to be carried out in 2016. Although the proposal of such a collective security system has been hailed as a major move forward for the Caspian Five, interestingly, Turkmenistan was not represented among the delegations at the meeting. Such an absence may reflect a larger dilemma for Turkmenistan in this collective security proposition.
In particular, the proposed collective security system has been perceived by some as a Russian attempt to limit Western influence in the Caspian Sea region. This likely stems from tensions mounting as a result of the crisis in Ukraine which has undoubtedly put Russia at odds with the West, threatening both Russia’s economic viability and its military influence in the region. However, a collective security system would eliminate virtually all outside military presence on the Caspian, allowing Russia to maintain a monopoly of military power. Considering Russia has built up its Navy on the Caspian, to include adding stealth frigates to its collection, and the fact that the former Soviet states Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan only began building their navies after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a monopoly of military power on the sea is not inconceivable. In addition, the Trans-Caspian Gas pipeline is meant to transport gas from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan, and finally to eager European nations looking to circumvent Russia’s dominance as Europe’s largest external gas supplier. Naturally, Russia is opposed to the pipeline which would divert considerable profits from Russia’s state-controlled gas company, Gazprom. Therefore, a Caspian Five collective security system can be seen as a Russian attempt to reorient Turkmenistan from the West, enough to discourage the creation of the pipeline. Needless to say, Russia has a lot at stake in the formulation of a collective security agreement.
Russia is not the only Caspian Sea state banking on a collective security system, however. Iran also maintains a significant military presence in the region, particularly through its naval force comprised of 90 vessels, which certainly exceeds that of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Consequently, isolating the Caspian Sea from any potential outside interference will only strengthen Iran’s military clout on the sea. Although Iran very recently struck a UN Security Council-endorsed agreement with major world powers its less-than-perfect reputation for honoring past agreements makes more violations possible. Thus, increasing the gap between Iran and the Western sphere of influence will only benefit the defiant state.
All of these competing interests stand to create a major dilemma for Turkmenistan. Firstly, Turkmenistan maintains considerable ties to Western nations, particularly the U.S. The strategically located nation has acted as a valuable transportation hub for American forces in Afghanistan, notably by supporting refueling operations and supplying a substantial amount of fuel for the war effort. Moreover, the U.S. has been helping Turkmenistan build up its naval capabilities on the Caspian, namely by providing equipment and technical assistance. Turkmenistan has also acquired naval equipment from Turkey, including two patrol boats. Turkmenistan’s relationship with Europe is arguably even more consequential than its relationship with the U.S., considering the high hopes for the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. The Central Asian nation holds the fourth largest gas reserves in the world, making it a prime candidate for a long-term supply relationship with Europe and thus a prime recipient of billions of dollars’ worth of revenue. For better or worse, these competing geostrategic interests make Turkmenistan’s role in the Caspian Sea region highly complicated.
Ultimately, it seems Turkmenistan has found itself facing a double-edged sword in the Caspian Sea. More specifically, getting on board with a Caspian Sea collective security system could severely compromise Turkmenistan’s ties to the West. A Russian monopoly of military power coupled with a security system that blocks all possibilities of outside intervention could leave Turkmenistan highly vulnerable to Russian influence and coercion. At a minimum, Russia could use military dominance in a Caspian Five collective security agreement to influence the outcome of any future pipeline projects. Such an outcome would prove detrimental to Turkmenistan’s future economic prosperity. Additionally, completely eliminating the possibility of a foreign military presence, including NATO or U.S. military bases, as well as the use of airspace over the Caspian Sea would leave Turkmenistan virtually exclusively dependent on its Caspian neighbors for defense. However, due to the fact that the Caspian Five harbor serious mistrust issues with each other, collective defense will prove highly difficult and likely ineffective. This may become a serious issue when confronting regional security threats like terrorism, as dangers such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (DAESH in Arabic) undoubtedly require international cooperation and information-sharing which these nations at the moment simply do not have. Further still, Turkmenistan’s staunch principle of neutrality may prove challenging in a collective security system in which Iran is a member state. Iran’s aggressive stances on numerous issues with the West may drag members of the Caspian security system, including Turkmenistan, into a conflict in which they must choose between their collective security arrangement and major Western powers. While this scenario is difficult to determine considering the fact that the terms of the collective security system have not yet been clearly outlined, it is apparent Turkmenistan’s firm principle of neutrality may soon be tested.
Turkmenistan’s dilemma does not end with its reasons to not endorse the Caspian collective security system. The Russo-Turkmen relationship is complicated, characterized by empire and linguistic ties. Turkmenistan’s considerably limited experience in self-governance, combined with a cultural inclination towards Russia, makes maintaining close security ties with the world power a reasonable option for the weak Turkmen diplomatic corps. Turkmenistan has received naval equipment from Russia as well, including several military ships which the underdeveloped Turkmen navy undoubtedly needs. Finally, Turkmenistan’s close proximity to Russia and Iran incentivizes it to ensure security becomes a collective obligation in the Caspian. Essentially, rejecting a collective Caspian security system could see Turkmenistan facing a highly formidable and potentially resentful Russian neighbor. Without a doubt, Turkmenistan has some serious options to weigh in considering these future defense paths. Hopefully, it finds one that does not result in it being impaled on an extremely sharp, double-edged geopolitical sword.
