Of all the anxieties surrounding this summer’s groundbreaking accord between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, concern over oil has been among the most prevalent. Once the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) are firmly in place, sanctions on Iran’s economy, including a set of rigorous restrictions on its oil industry, will begin to recede.
This could unleash a potentially-gargantuan supply of Iranian oil onto an already-saturated world oil market and augment the abilities of the Islamic Republic to influence regional politics. The Washington Institute has warned that a “post-sanctions windfall” will allow Iran to “rescue the Syrian regime, reshape Iraq’s political environment, expand its terrorist proxy activities in various theaters, and otherwise amplify the effects of its destabilizing regional posture.”
There is fuel for such speculation. Iran has the fourth-highest proven oil reserves in the world, and the second-largest gas reserves. If it gains the ability to tap these enormous resources, Iran could potentially become a major world oil and gas producer, rivaling Saudi Arabia, its major regional competitor.
Yet it is far from certain that the JCPOA will have anything like the cataclysmic effect some have predicted. Moreover, it is questionable how far Iran will push its newly-freed oil economy once sanctions are lifted, with a host of infrastructural challenges, as well as some compelling historical experience, potentially foiling the country’s rise into major petro-state status.
Before the U.S. began pressuring it to give up its nuclear ambitions, Iran was a major oil exporter, second only to Saudi Arabia among the OPEC member-states. Production reached 4 million barrels per-day (bpd) in 2007 before dropping to 3.6 million bpd in 2011; sanctions took that down to 2.85 million bpd by July of 2015, with exports dropping from 2.6 million bpd to 1.4 million bpd.
Expectations for Iran to immediately increase its production one sanctions begin to taper off are high. Iran’s oil minister Bijan Zhanganeh boasted in July that Iran would increase its national production by 1 million bpd within one month of sanctions being lifted. While more moderate analysts debate this figure, most agree that Iranian production will increase by the end of 2015, dropping the anticipated price of crude by $10-12 per barrel.
While the impact of greater Iranian production could further depress oil prices which have struggled for over a year, Iran will likely experience a sudden economic stimulus. The World Bank estimates that Iran’s economic growth forecast for 2016 could increase from 3% to a robust 5% if the JCPOA is approved, signaling a real end to the economic stagnation that set in with the sanctions regime.
Commentators and skeptics of the Iran deal have suggested that Iran’s aspirations to regional hegemony will finally become attainable once oil revenues are freed from sanctions limitations. There is the immediate impact of $150 billion in frozen assets to consider, money Iran will potentially be able to access once sanctions are lifted. This enormous windfall along with greater oil revenues will lead to a more strident Iranian policy, challenging Saudi and Gulf interests and ratcheting up support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.
But considerable debate surrounds the precise amount of capital Iran has locked away in overseas accounts: $150 billion is the oft-quoted sum, but the Obama Administration has dropped its estimate from $100 billion to $50 billion, and one analysis in Fortune based on information from Iran’s Central Bank suggests that only $29 billion will be immediately available.
Depressed world oil prices will likely increase Iran’s oil revenues by a relatively small amount, from $50 billion to about $65 billion, roughly what it was earning in 2013 before prices fell. Rather than a sudden, tremendous surge in new assets, Iran will see a modest and gradual financial windfall over the course of 2016 and 2017.
How that new income will affect Iran’s foreign policy is difficult to say with any precision. The regime spends an estimated $10 billion per year on foreign “adventures” like the wars in Syria and Yemen, yet this amount dropped in 2014 in light of lower oil prices and seems trifling when compared to the amounts spent by Riyadh on similar endeavors. Saudi Arabia military spending surpasses that of Iran by five times and the UAE’s small force spends 50% more than Tehran on new weapon systems and arms. It is unlikely that any increase in oil revenues will upset this balance.
Support for Iran’s regional allies, proxies and clients will likely be overshadowed by investment that Iran will direct towards is domestic oil industry. Some of Iran’s most important oil fields are 70 years old and after a decade of sanctions the country’s infrastructure, from the wellhead to the refinery, has suffered considerable degradation for want of investment. Even the CIA, in a recent intelligence analysis, predicts that Iran’s economy will take precedence over support for regional allies.
An estimate from Iran’s oil ministry puts the total cost of industry upgrades at $200 billion, roughly half of Iran’s gross domestic product. Iran will have to pump a considerable amount of its new revenues into re-building its industry, and while external agents (including the massive Western oil firms like Royal Dutch-Shell, ENI and Total) have shown considerable interest in investing, the Obama Administration continues to warn off American companies, arguing that Iran’s aging infrastructure makes it a poor candidate for increased investment.
Even if its production reaches former levels, Iran must fight to win back market share from Saudi Arabia, which has increased its own production to record levels in order to force out new producers and bring the price back up. Saudi Arabia dominates the oil market and will likely continue to do so, as its production level (nearly 10 mbd) dwarfs that of Iran. Iran must effectively triple its current production level in order to compete, a feat that could take decades to accomplish.
Finally, a strong historical argument exists that might very well deter Iran from aggressively embracing increased oil production. Oil revenues largely funded the 1960s and 1970s regime of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, who pumped most of the country’s earnings into its military and expansive modernization programs. The Shah’s policies made Iran a regional power but over-heated the economy, created powerful inflationary effects and so destabilized his regime that it collapsed in the 1978-79 Islamic Revolution.
Ayatalloh Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s Supreme Leader, cut Iran’s oil production in half after 1980, causing it to fall from 6.6 million bpd to 3 million bpd. He believed Iran needed a “revolutionary economy” separate from the wider capitalist world.
Khomeini may have been driven by ideological concerns more than hard economics, but his reasoning was largely validated by post-1970s scholarship. Influential texts by Terry Lynn Karl, Hossein Mahdavy and Richard Auty point to a “resource curse” that affects country’s overly dependent on export earnings and rents from oil production. Today, oil-rich economies like Venezuela and Russia are struggling with such dependence.
If history is any guide, Iran will likely steer clear of such a policy, using its new oil revenues to bolster domestic economic growth and infrastructural development, shoring up the political support for its hardline regime (which has staked a considerable amount on reducing sanctions) while continuing its support for regional proxies and allies. The effect of a sanctions-free Iranian oil industry may take some years to reveal itself, but it is unlikely to be as dramatic as some have speculated. After all, the world oil market remains glutted; the Middle East remains a region riven by conflict; and neither the U.S. nor Iran have indicated that they plan to alter the nature of their postures towards one another. Iran’s oil may alter this situation, but it probably won’t upend it completely.
Turkey’s presence in Syria
Following their meeting in Sochi on October 23, 2019, Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyp Erdogan officially announced a ceasefire throughout Northern Syria.
The bilateral agreement reached in Sochi strengthens the role played by Bashar al-Assad in the region between the Syrian Kurdish world and the area on the border with Turkey. It also ensures the permanence of Russian forces throughout Syria and finally serves to formalize the Turkish military presence in the region and in Syrian territory. A position of the Turkish forces on the border between Syria and Turkey, for about 32 kilometres from the borderline between the two countries.
With a view to separating the Syrian Rojava (which means “East”, in Kurdish) from the Kurdish areas of Iran, Turkey and Iraq.
Russia regards this agreement as the final confirmation of the victory of the Syrian forces of Assad (and Russia) in the long Syrian war.
The Russian Federation won in Syria because it bet on the comparatively stronger horse, i.e. Assad’s regime, and also because it had a coherent and stable strategy, compared to Obama’s and Trump’s ambiguities. An additional reason was that no European country, frightened by the instability of the North American attitude, joined the United States in its actions on Syrian soil.
The agreement between Erdogan and Putin in Syria, which was born as early as the Turkish leader’s repression of the 2016 attempted coup d’état, has even created the “Astana Process” involving also Iran in a negotiation which has metaphorically “killed” the Geneva talks, where many pro-American elements were also present and active.
However, even after the knocking out of the Geneva talks, the United States was still significantly present in North-Eastern Syria, before the arrival of Turkey throughout Northern Syria.
Now the U.S. forces have largely withdrawn, precisely as a result of Turkish operations. Hence there is no possibility, however remote, that the USA can wage again a war against Assad starting from North-Eastern Syria.
That was Russia’ greatest fear.
In Syria, as early as 2015, Russia has always attached greater importance to operations in Western Syria, while the recent Turkish attack against Afrin has ensured that Turkey and Russia actually expelled the Kurds from the area – the Kurds who, after all, were the only U.S. real strategic asset.
All the Turkish projects for Northern Syria, ranging from the transfer of the Turkey-supported jihadists from Idlib eastwards to the use of the many Syrian Sunni refugees in Turkey to replace the Kurds in North-Eastern Syria, are a strategic blessing for Russia.
On the one hand, it is currently possible for Assad to directly hit Idlib alone but, on the other, we also need to consider the Turkish pressure on the Kurds towards the East, which jeopardizes the link between Turkey and the United States.
This is another excellent result for the Russian strategy in Syria. There was also the U.S. forces’ hasty relinquishment of their role in protecting the Syrian Democratic Forces, led by the Kurds, which put the Kurds themselves in a position to accept the new Russian “protection”.
Russia also reaffirmed the 1998 Adana Agreement between Syria and Turkey, which envisaged the possibility for the Turkish forces to cross the border and exert strong pressure on the Kurds.
Nevertheless, what does the Russian Federation really want from the Kurds and especially from their Syrian Democratic Forces?
The agreements reached so far to organize Turkish-Russian “joint patrol units” on the Syrian border enable Russia to become the only future peace broker in Syria, while Assad’s army has moved to North-Eastern Syria, by establishing itself well away from the safe zones that Turkey has already occupied.
A “zero-sum game” for everyone, except for the United States. The European Union, as usual, is not part of the game.
Russia, however, does not want to shoulder the whole burden of territorial control of Eastern Syria, but it lacks the new proxies, i.e. the autonomous forces acting in its name and on its behalf.
At the beginning of Russia’s engagement in Syria, its aim was only to support Assad and put an end to the US obsession for the “Arab springs”, which were destabilizing as never before. However, now that there are multiple actors on Syrian territory, Putin wants to manage relations with everyone and with the utmost care, considering that his primary goal is currently not to accept a simultaneous clash with many opponents.
Other problems for the Russian strategic decision-making are to avoid the clash between Iran and Israel passing through Syria, but not only on Syrian territory, as well as to limit the Turkish, Kurdish and even Syrian expansion on Syria’s northern border – a situation that would no longer enable Russia to manage military equilibria with a minimum effort.
However, what are Turkey’s real regional aspirations?
Firstly, there is the stabilisation of Syria, and not just for the Kurdish issue. Secondly, there is the Eastern Mediterranean region and finally the Turkish positions in the Black Sea region.
The Kurdish issue, which is well clear for Turkey, is related to its awareness of having to control its East without problems: if there are opposing forces in the Turkish expansion line towards Iraq, Syria and Central Asia, the deep core of Turkey’s current foreign policy disappears.
There is also the energy issue, considering that Turkey buys most of its oil and gas from Russia and that it wants to play a decisive role in the new extractions that are being prepared in the Eastern Mediterranean region, between Cyprus, the Lebanon, Israel and Greece.
Turkey is hungry for foreign investment and this must also be taken into account when defining the Turkish strategic equation.
Turkeys’ recent purchase of the Russian S-400Triumfmissile and defence systems (NATO reporting name: SA 21 Growler) places Turkey in the position of having to rebalance its military relations with the United States but, in the Black Sea area, Turkey’s and Russia’s interests tend to conflict.
As stated above, the relationship between Russia and Turkey was born from the Turkish perception that the United States is somehow involved in the 2016 attempted coup.
Moreover, Russia wants to take Turkey out of the NATO geostrategic environment, both through the sale of weapons such as the S-400 and with the wise exacerbation of tensions between Ankara, the EU and the USA.
All potential breaks that will not occur. President Erdogan still has his own European policy in mind and has no interest in definitively abandoning the USA just now that – with President Trump – the United States is showing its desire to move away from NATO’s European axis, but certainly only to a certain extent.
Turkey is not so much interested in this axis.
With specific reference to Syria, Russia has so far shown it wants to keep the Kurds in their traditional areas, without changing the borders of Iraq, Syria and Iran.
On the contrary, Russia – which has not yet a formal relationship with the Kurdish YPG, i.e. the “self-defence force” of the Kurdish community – wants to create a sort of autonomy agreed between the Kurds’ Rojava in Syria and Bashar al-Assad’s government – a special autonomy guaranteed by a new future Syrian constitution.
It is also extremely important to note that Russia is the second economic partner of Turkey, immediately after Germany, while Turkey is only Russia’s fifth largest trading partner.
In 2018, the last year for which data is available, trade between Turkey and Russia increased by as much as 37%, while Turkish exports to Russia alone increased by as much as 47%.
Not to mention the planned renewal of the Turkish Stream Project, the natural gas transport line going from Anapa, near Krasnodar, Russia, through the Black Sea, up to Kiyikoy, on the Thracian coast of Turkey.
We should also recall the Turkish-Russian project for the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant.
For the time being and also for a long time in the future, Turkey will not leave NATO.
In terms of structures, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is not even comparable to the traditional network of the Atlantic Pact.
The three factors that make full security and defence cooperation between Turkey and Russia difficult are respectively the still important presence of Turkey within NATO, the Ukrainian crisis and finally the Russian annexation of Crimea.
With specific reference to the purchase of the Russian S-400s, Turkey maintains that this stems from the particular difficulty of acquiring the new Western weapon systems, but Russia has not offered any co-production of its advanced weapons to Turkey.
If Turkey could decide quickly and well on the F-35s, the new Patriot missiles, and on some co-productions of weapons with the West, it would certainly know how to get out of the agreement with Russia for the S-400s tactfully, without even severely undermine its relations with Russia.
As to the energy trade between Turkey and the Russian Federation, the former depends on the latter for 55% of its natural gas requirements and for 12% of its oil ones.
It is not possible, however, to easily replace imports from Russia.
Moreover, Turkey exports most of its oil and gas imports from Russia to the EU. In this sector, it is second only to Nord Stream’s Germany.
Moreover, a joint financial fund has been established between Turkey and Russia to organise their bilateral relations.
Turkish leaders argue that this fund strengthens local currencies against the US dollar.
It is probably true.
The Fund, however, also serves to support Turkey’s true and traditional vocation to become the great oil hub from Russia, but also from the Middle East and the Caspian Sea to Europe.
This is the reason why Turkey entered Syria.
This is one of the necessary keys to rationally interpret the Syrian issue.
Currently Turkey’s primary strategic interest is to reduce its dependence on Russian oil and gas, but also to increase its clout as a necessary transit area for all energy trade from the Middle East and from the Russian Federation.
In 2003, the Blue Stream completion multiplied Russian gas exports to Turkey.
The future Turkish Stream will bring 15.75 billion cubic meters of gas from Turkey to Southern Europe within 2020.
Russia wants to build two parallel lines, at least for the first phase.
Obviously one for Turkey alone, and another one only for Europe.
In the Black Sea area, the USA has so far counterbalanced the Russian Federation only through Atlantic Alliance’s operations.
NATO’s presence in the Black Sea area is fundamental also for Turkey, which mainly fears that the Black Sea will become a “Russian lake” – just to use President Erdogan’s words.
Even before the war in Syria, Russia has been using Sevastopol for actions towards the Eastern Mediterranean region and this is certainly not good for Turkey.
Moreover, at the time, Turkey favoured NATO’s institutional rooting in the Black Sea, by means of a task force between Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy and Germany with the U.S. tactical support.
The project, however, failed.
Nevertheless, the Russian military presence in Syria, Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as in the Crimean Peninsula, continues to fuel the Turkish fears of Russian encirclement.
Turkey, however, also avoided supporting the Western sanctions for the annexation of Crimea and Donbass, for obvious reasons of expediency, but it carried out a careful and subtle action against the Russian annexation of Crimea and for the protection of the local Tatar minority.
Turkey is also a direct competitor of the Russian Federation in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Here Turkey has operated in connection with the European Commission to create the Southern Gas Corridor, also operational as from 2020, which will bring resources from the Middle East and Central Asia (and especially from the Caspian Sea) to the EU countries.
Since 2015 Turkey has also been supporting Georgia’s adhesion to NATO, while preserving its special relationship with Azerbaijan – a country with which Turkey signed a Strategic and Mutual Aid Agreement in 2010. Here the issue of the structural contrast between Armenia and Azerbaijan comes to the fore.
As is well known, Russia supports Armenia, as it already did at the dawn of the Cold War.
The Russian Federation, however, also sells weapons to Azerbaijan, with a view to favouring the success of the Russia-Iran-Azerbaijan Initiative.
There is also the long-standing and unresolved problem of Nagorno-Karabakh, a low-intensity conflict that has been lasting with ups and downs since 1994.
In this case, nothing has been decided yet in the relations between Turkey and Russia.
Turkey, however, will keep on strengthening its relations with the Russian Federation.
Nevertheless, Turkey will never establish a stable strategic relationship with Russia, to the detriment of its participation in NATO as the second force after the United States.
Also in the case of Italy, we will need a broader and naturally complex vision of the international relations and the national interests of Turkey and the Russian Federation itself, which are not the strategic monoliths that many Italian decision-makers unfortunately imagine.
Ending the Gulf crisis: Natural gas frames future Gulf relations
Natural gas could well emerge as the litmus test of how relations among the Gulf’s energy-rich monarchies evolve if and when a Saudi-United Arab Emirates-led alliance and Qatar bury their hatchet.
It could also position Gulf states as key players in shaping the future of the energy architecture of Eurasia.
This week’s summit in Riyadh of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that groups Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain is likely to determine how close the kingdom and its allies are to lifting a 2.5-year-old diplomatic and economic boycott of Qatar.
Qatari foreign minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani suggested that secret Saudi-Qatari talks in recent weeks had “moved from a deadlock in the Gulf crisis to talks about a future vision regarding ties.” It was not immediately clear whether the UAE was equally willing to find a way out of the Gulf crisis.
The bellwether of how much progress has been made will be the level of Qatari representation at the Riyadh summit. Qatar emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani has refrained from attending GCC summits since the boycott was imposed in June 2017 in a bid to force Qatar to fall in line with Saudi and UAE regional policies and effectively accept the two Gulf states’ tutelage.
An end to the boycott potentially could open the door to the creation of a regional gas network at a time that Qatar plans to increase its annual Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) production by a whopping 64 percent to 126 million tons by 2027 and Saudi Arabia is investing up to USD$ 150 billion in becoming a major gas player.
The network would facilitate Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman’s plans to streamline and diversify the kingdom’s economy. It would further enable Saudi Arabia to capitalize on the fact that Iran is hobbled by crippling US sanctions in its efforts to maintain its status as a key swing producer serving Eurasian markets.
Building a regional network may be easier said than done even if the Gulf states succeed in putting their debilitating dispute behind them. Healing the scars of the dispute that impacted people’s lives on both sides of the divide to the point where countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar would be willing to become dependent on one another is likely to take time.
That kind of trust didn’t exist even before the Gulf crisis. Saudi Arabia initially opposed the construction of the Dolphin gas pipeline, the region’s first cross-border gas project that links Qatar to the UAE and Oman.
Qatar continued to supply the UAE with two billion cubic feet of gas a day despite the boycott, which the Emirates would have found difficult to fully replace.
An end to the boycott would significantly enhance Saudi plans announced in early 2019 to establish a natural gas network with the UAE and Oman that eventually would extend to Kuwait, Bahrain Iraq, Jordan, Egypt and possibly Palestine.
Potential moves to enhance gas cooperation in the Gulf come as the eastern Mediterranean emerges as a potential competitor, particularly in future exports to Europe, Asia and China.
Huge gas finds in Israeli, Cypriot and Egyptian waters have seen industry eyes swivel to the Levant Basin, which, according to a 2010 estimate by the US Geological Survey, could hold as much as 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, the equivalent of Iraq’s reserves.
Energy experts argue that Qatari gas could significantly help Prince Mohammed rationalize Saudi Arabia’s energy market at a time that climate change is casting doubts on the sustainability of oil.
The King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center estimated that Saudi Arabia burned some 900,000 barrels per day of liquid fuels for industrial use and power generation in 2017.
“Replacing this oil with natural gas could generate more than U$10 billion of additional export revenue at current market prices… Qatar is one of the cheapest ways for the kingdom to remove oil entirely from power generation,” said Andy Critchlow, head of Europe, the Middle East and Africa at S&P Global Platts.
While Qatar may be willing to assist Saudi Arabia once the boycott is lifted, its is certain to ensure that it does not become dependent on gas exports to the kingdom.
Diversification of its gas exports is a pillar of Qatar’s soft power strategy that helped shield it from the effects of the boycott.
Some Qatari officials have long believed that gaining control of Qatari gas reserves was a main objective of the Saudi-UAE boycott.
As a result, Qatar is likely to be weary of plans by Saudi Arabia to become a global gas player. The kingdom holds the world’s fourth largest gas reserves that it so far has been unable to develop.
Amin H. Nasser, CEO of Aramco, the Saudi national oil company, said earlier this year that he expected the kingdom to massively invest in the Saudi gas sector over the next ten years. Mr. Nasser envisioned gas production increasing from 14 billion standard cubic feet to 23 billion by 2030.
“We are looking to shift from only satisfying our utility industry in the kingdom, which will happen especially with the increase in renewable and nuclear to be an exporter of gas and gas products,” Mr. Nasser said.
Qatar laid down its marker a year ago when it decided to leave OPEC, the cartel of oil exporting countries, to focus on its gas exports.
Speaking at the time, Qatari energy minister Saad Sherida al-Kaabi, articulated what is likely to shape the Gulf state’s policy even if the boycott is lifted.
“We are not saying we are going to get out of the oil business, but it is controlled by an organization managed by a country,” Mr. Al-Kaabi said.
Qatar, he said, was unwilling “to put efforts and resources and time in an organization that we are a very small player in, and I don’t have a say in what happens.”
U.S. Foreign Policy Threats to Israel’s National Security: Strategic Imperatives for Jerusalem
“Things fall apart; the center cannot hold.”-W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming
Though U.S. President Donald Trump describes himself as pro-Israel, any seriously analytic assessment of his foreign policies would point toward a different conclusion. On the surface, of course, Mr. Trump’s earlier transfer of America’s embassy to Jerusalem, his recent acceptance of Israel’s established West Bank settlements and his undiminished rhetorical support of Israel’s overall security posture suggest a sympathetic U.S. administration. Still, however unwitting or unintentional, the actual expected consequences of Trump foreign policies are sorely injurious for Israel, not gainful.
As for the tangible dangers posed by these policies, they could be sudden and immediate or incremental and long-term.
For doubters, core examples are readily available. These include the American president’s strengthening of certain leading Sunni Arab military forces (as a presumptive counter-vailing power to Shiite Iran) and his declared U.S. departure from Syria. Already, this staged withdrawal is emboldening Hezbollah.
At this particular stage, for Israel, the well-organized Shiite militia supervised from Tehran poses a greater overall strategic threat than any traditional Arab army. In specific reference to a commonly perceived threat from Iran, Saudi and Egyptian military objectives are now more closely aligned with Israeli security goals than once might have even been thought possible. Still, in predictably short order, those Sunni Arab states joined together in a common Trump-led struggle against Shiite Iran could falter in their apparent allegiance. Any such substantial weakening could be triggered by altogether reasonable fears that a US-generated war with Iran would produce irrecoverable harms.
One unintended corollary of any such Sunni-Arab weakening could be a more militarily capable and worrisome regime in Teheran and Moscow.
All things considered, and however one might choose to analyze Israel’s dynamic geopolitical challenges – a task that must inevitably prove both multi-layered and expansively complex – Donald Trump’s foreign policies will remain determinably “net-negative” for the country’s national security. Upon considered reflection, the American president’s conspicuous policy declarations concerning Israel’s “eternal capital,” its West Bank settlements and its enduring access to conventional arms transfers will provide few if any strategic benefits to Israel. Moreover, from an international law perspective, these declarations will prove essentially irrelevant.
In Israel, it is time to inquire: what is the bottom line? The correct response? It is that the Trump presidency, even if well-intentioned toward the Jewish State, lacks sufficient intellectual resources. Longer-term, this seat-of-the-pants or “doctrine-free” American administration is likely to become as darkly injurious for Israel as it has already become for the United States. This U.S. presidency, after all, believes more in “attitude, than preparation;” in virtually all matters of substance, it remains determinedly anti-historical and anti-intellectual. Also, this presidency is glaringly unconcerned about peremptory human rights, as evidenced, inter alia, by Trump’s flagrantly open abandonment of America’s Kurdish allies.
For Israel, the salient message here should be clear. This abandonment should stand as an unambiguous warning against placing too much faith in American security pledges or commitments, especially during the persistently dissembling “Trump Era.”
There is more. From the start, North Korean nuclear negotiations have been mismanaged by Trump; correspondingly, Pyongyang continues to expand and modernize its advanced nuclear weapons missile programs. While the American president has repeatedly drawn false comfort from “falling in love” with Kim Jung Un (a demonstrably unrequited love), the North Korean dictator makes any once-credible hopes for “complete denuclearization” unassailably nonsensical.
Similarly, Mr. Trump’s unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the July 2015 JCPOA pact concerning Iran has accelerated that adversarial state’s worrisome nuclearization. Ominously, too, fearful strategic nuclear/hypervelocity missile developments are expanding in Russia, a superpower foe which sees in this unreflective American president an optimally convenient surrogate for achieving Moscow’s national military goals.
The principal reason for identifying the unreliability/unpredictability of US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy for Israeli security is intellectual. Persistently, wittingly, Donald Trump has revealed a near-total lack of historic or strategic understanding, and a derivative disregard for all constitutive elements of civilized international relations. In Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, the following critical question ought soon be posed:
Should those officials responsible for meeting Israel’s security obligations place their existential bets on such evidently fragile analytic foundations?
It’s not a complicated question.
The comprehensive security dilemma for Israel posed by U.S. President Trump is augmented by various similarly serious jurisprudential deficits. These legal shortcomings include an apparent unconcern for certain “peremptory” obligations of national and international law. Without suitable embarrassment, this president has argued that he maintains a personal right to override US Constitutional expectations concerning birthright and US citizenship, and that the US had properly terminated its codified obligations under the INF Treaty with Russia.
Regarding the specific matter of this president’s INF Treaty termination, which was not ipso facto illegal, the deleterious security outcome could still prove multi-faceted and broadlyoverwhelming.
More concretely, this more-or-less negative outcome could be made manifest in certain measurable or indecipherable increments, or rather in sudden “bolt-from-the-blue” enemy attacks. Often, because the foreign and defense policies of nation-states are not only intersecting, but “synergistic” (situations wherein the “whole” would be greater than the aggregate sum of its “parts”), these attacks would not necessarily stem directly from Russia. Instead, they could represent a derivative but by no means insignificant nuclear involvement of North Korea.
One conceivably plausible outcome of various Trump-induced misunderstandings will be a continuously-expanding nuclear arms race between the superpowers. For Israel in particular, any such corrosive expansion could spawn serious “spillover” risks for itself and for the wider Middle East. Taken together, these mutually-reinforcing risks would concern incessant destabilization, terror and war, and could present in many possible configurations and/or synergistic interactions.
President Donald Trump’s earlier “seat-of-the-pants” withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA pleased his political “base” at home, but it also enlarged the overall Iranian nuclear threat to Israel. Looking back, even if the JCPOA had been a manifestly imperfect agreement – a reasonable judgment – it did not necessarily follow that unilateral abrogation would be in America’s or Israel’s best interest. Once again, the major problem here with Donald Trump’s strategic assessment was that it was wholly devoid of any logical or persuasively analytic underpinnings.
It derived from “attitude, not preparation.”
There is more. For Israel, there is a relevant early history. Then, openly, presidential candidate Donald Trump had advised “killing the families” of terrorists and being less openly concerned about humanitarian international law – that is, about the civilizing rules of engagement found collectively at the Law of War or the Law of Armed Conflict. In essence, inter alia, heeding this president’s lawless counsel on such a salient matter would have amounted to a US reversal of incontrovertible Nuremberg Principles.
Such a law-violating reversal would carry unforeseeable but still fearful consequences involving nuclear weapons and nuclear war.
All things considered, Israel now faces a unique and markedly complex dilemma. Whatever the logical underpinnings and determined coherence of its own unilateral foreign policies, President Donald Trump’s continuing missteps with Syria, Iran, Russia, China, Yemen, Venezuela, North Korea, Saudi Arabia and certain still-compliant European allies will further destabilize the Middle East – directly or indirectly; and suddenly or incrementally. Whatever Jerusalem should decide to do or not to do about the “big picture” – a security vision that must include the tangible emergence of “Cold War II” – this unsteady region could slip irretrievably into ever-deeper levels of authentic “chaos.”
The most presently meaningful question for Jerusalem should concern whether this slippage is apt to be the immediate result of some Trump-generated catastrophe, or whether it will manifest itself instead in certain calculable and episodic bouts of Trump policy-induced suffering.
With this query in mind, one critical issue must concern imperative re-evaluations of “deliberate nuclear ambiguity.”
To date, the “bomb-in-the-basement” policy has made eminently good sense for Israel. Presumptively, both friends and foes already recognize that Israel possesses significant nuclear capabilities that are (1) survivable; and (2) capable of penetrating any determined enemy’s active defenses. For these adversaries not to acknowledge these capabilities would require a very hard-to-explain and implausibly generalized intellectual deficit.
Going forward, what should Israel do about its vital nuclear posture? How, exactly, should this traditionally ambiguous stance be adapted to the convergent and inter-penetrating threats of potentially still-impending Middle Eastern/North African revolutions, a nuclear Iran, and Israel’s justifiably constant concern about negotiating useful agreements with various state and sub-state (terrorist) organizations.
The conventional wisdom routinely assumes that credible nuclear deterrence is somehow an automatic consequence of merely holding nuclear weapons. By this argument, removing Israel’s nuclear bomb from the “basement” would only elicit new waves of global condemnation, and would do this without returning any commensurate benefits.
History, however, reveals that the conventional wisdom is often unwise. The pertinent strategic issues for Israel are not at all simple or straightforward. Instead, in the inherently arcane world of Israel’s nuclear deterrence, it can never be adequate that enemy states merely acknowledge the Jewish State’s nuclear status. Instead, it is important that these states further believe that Israel holds usable nuclear weapons, and that Jerusalem/Tel-Aviv would be willing to employ such weapons in certain definably clear circumstances.
Still to be generated Trump instabilities in the Middle East could create more good reasons to doubt that Israel would benefit from any uninterrupted continuance of deliberate nuclear ambiguity. It would seem, moreover, from certain apparent developments within Israel’s intersecting defense and intelligence communities, that the country’s senior leadership already understands such informed skepticism. To best augment such an understanding, however, Israel’s nuclear strategists should proceed interrogatively – in effect, creating a continuously self-refining “strategic dialectic” from which suitable answers and policies could be incrementally extracted and/or systematically deduced.
This will call for refined “preparation,” not “attitude.”
One basic point now warrants reiteration. Israel is imperiled by existential threats that fully justify its nuclear weapons and that require a correspondingly purposeful strategic doctrine. This basic need exists beyond any reasonable doubt. After all, without such weapons and doctrine, Israel could not expectedly survive over time, especially if certain neighboring regimes should sometime become still more adversarial, more jihadist and/or less risk-averse.
Israeli nuclear weapons and purposeful nuclear doctrine could prove vital to those more-or-less predictable scenarios requiring preemptive action or suitable forms of retaliation.
Generically, military doctrine describes how a country’s national forces would fight in various recognizable combat operations. The literal definition of doctrine derives from the Middle English, from the Latin doctrina, meaning teaching, learning, and instruction. Though generally unanticipated, the full importance of doctrine lies not only in ways that it can animate and unify military forces, but also in the particular fashion that it can transmit certain desired “messages.” In other words, doctrine can serve a state (especially an endemically beleaguered state such as Israel) as a critical form of communication, and to its friends and foes alike.
Israel could benefit from any such broadened understandings of doctrine. The principal risks facing Israel are now more specific than broadly general or benignly generic. This is because Israel’s extant adversaries in the region could at some point be joined by: (1) a new Arab state of “Palestine;” and by (2) a newly-nuclear Iran. In the presumptively worst case, any such inauspicious “joining” would take place at the same time.
For Israel, merely possessingnuclear weapons, even when fully recognized by pertinent enemy states, could never by itself ensure successful deterrence. In this connection, though starkly counter-intuitive, an appropriately selective and nuanced end to deliberate ambiguity could substantially improve the overall credibility of Israel’s nuclear deterrent. With this key point prominently in mind, the injurious potential of assorted enemy attacks in the future could be reduced by making selectively available certain additional information.
This additional information would concern the security of Israel’s nuclear weapon response capabilities.
Carefully limited yet helpfully more explicit, it would center on distinctly major and inter-penetrating issues of Israel’s nuclear capability andits decisional willingness.
Skeptics, no doubt, will disagree. It is, after all, seemingly sensible to assert that nuclear ambiguity has “worked” thus far. Arguably, while Israel’s current nuclear policyhas done little to deter multiple conventional terrorist attacks, it has plainly succeeded in keeping that country’s enemies, whether singly or in collaboration, from mounting any existential aggressions.
Inevitably, as the nineteenth-century Prussian strategic theorist, Karl von Clausewitz, observed in his classic essay, On War, there can come a military tipping point when “mass counts.” Israel, of course, is very small. Its enemies have always had an undeniable and irreversible advantage in “mass.” Perhaps even more than any other imperiled state on earth, Israel needs to steer clear of any such tipping point.
For the several reasons already mentioned, this imperative is more compelling in the Trump years than before, even if the American president is more expressly “pro-Israel” in his rhetoric and policy formulations than his predecessor.
An integral part of Israel’s multi-layered security system lies in effective ballistic missile defenses, primarily, the Arrow or “Hetz.” Yet, even the well-regarded and successfully-tested Arrow, augmented by the newer, shorter-range and systematically-integrated operations of “Iron Dome,” “David’s Sling,” and various related active defenses, could never achieve a sufficiently high probability of intercept to adequately protect Israeli civilians. No system of missile defense can ever be entirely “leak proof,” and even a single incoming nuclear missile that manages to penetrate Arrow or its corollary defenses could conceivably kill tens or perhaps hundreds of thousands of Israelis.
Potentially, this fearful reality could prove less consequential if Israel’s continuing reliance on deliberate ambiguity were suitably revised or altered.
In essence, current Israeli policy of maintaining an undeclared nuclear capacity is unlikely to work indefinitely. Leaving aside a jihadist takeover of nuclear Pakistan, the most obviously unacceptable “leakage” threat would come in the future from a nuclear Iran. To be effectively deterred, any newly-nuclear Iran would then need certain convincing assurances that Israel’s atomic weapons were both invulnerable and penetration-capable.
Any Iranian judgments about Israel’s capability and willingness to retaliate with nuclear weapons would then depend largely upon some prior Iranian knowledge of these weapons, including their perceived degree of protection from surprise attack and their presumed capacity to “punch-through” certain relevant Iranian defenses, both active and passive.
A nuclear weapons-capable Iran may already be a fait accompli. For whatever reasons, neither the “international community” in general nor Israel in particular has managed to create sufficient credibility to undertake timely preemptive action. Plausibly, any such critical defensive action would have required various complex operational capabilities, and could have generated manifestly unacceptable Iranian counter actions.
It is likely that Israel has already undertaken some very impressive and original steps in cyber-defense and cyber-war, but even the most remarkable efforts in this direction would not be enough to stop Iran altogether. The sanctions sequentially leveled at Tehran over the years have had an economic impact, but they have also had no determinable impact in halting Iranian nuclearization altogether or stopping Tehran’s discernible enhancements of intercontinental ballistic missile potential.
In time, a nuclear Iran could decide to share some of its nuclear components and materials with Hezbollah or with another kindred terrorist group.To prevent this destabilizing sharing, Jerusalem would need to convince Iran, inter alia, that Israel possesses a useful range of distinctly usable nuclear options. Accordingly, Israeli nuclear ambiguity could be loosened by releasing certain very general information regarding the availability and survivability of appropriately low-yield weapons.
Israel should now be calculating (vis-à-vis a prospectively nuclear Iran) the exact extent of subtlety with which it should consider communicating key portions of its nuclear positions. Naturally, Israel should never reveal any very specific information about its nuclear strategy, hardening or yield-related capabilities.
One more point. An Israeli move from ambiguity to disclosure would not help in the case of an irrational nuclear enemy. It is possible, at least, that certain elements of Iranian leadership might sometime subscribe to certain end-times visions of a Shiite apocalypse. By definition, such an enemy would not value its own continued national survival more highly than every other preference or combination of preferences.
Were its leaders to be or turn non-rational, Iran could effectively become a nuclear suicide-bomber in macrocosm. Such a challenging prospect is certainly improbable, perhaps even at the very outer fringes of plausibility. But it is also not inconceivable. A similarly serious prospect obtains in already-nuclear and residually coup-vulnerable Pakistan.
To protect itself against military strikes from irrational enemies, particularly those attacks that could carry existential costs, Israel will need to reconsider virtually every aspect and function of its nuclear arsenal and doctrine.
Removing the bomb from Israel’s “basement” could enhance Israel’s strategic deterrence to the extent that it would heighten enemy perceptions of the severe and likely risks involved. This would also bring to mind a so-called Samson Option, which could allow various enemy decision-makers to note and underscore that Israel is prepared to do whatever is needed to survive.
Irrespective of its preferred level of ambiguity, Israel’s nuclear strategy must always remain correctly oriented toward deterrence, and not war-fighting. The Samson Option refers to a policy that would be based in part upon some implicit threat of massive nuclear retaliation for certain specific enemy aggressions. Israel’s small size means, among other things, that any nuclear attack would threaten Israel’s existence and could never be tolerated.
A Samson Option would make sense only in certain “last-resort” or “near last-resort” circumstances. If the Samson Option is to become part of a genuinely credible national deterrent, an end to Israel’s deliberate ambiguity posture would be essential. The really tough part of this transformational process would be determining the proper timing for any such action vis-à-vis Israel’s core security requirements, and also pertinent expectations of the so-called “international community.”
The Samson Option should never be confused with Israel’s overriding security objective: Always seek stable deterrence at the lowest possible levels of military conflict.
There is more. In our often counter-intuitive strategic world, it could sometimes become rational to pretend irrationality. The nuclear deterrence benefits of pretended irrationality would depend, at least in part, upon a designated enemy state’s awareness of Israel’s intention to apply counter-value targeting when responding to nuclear attack.
But Israeli decision-makers would need to be wary of releasing too-great a level of any specific strategic information. Also worrisome, of course, is that the American president could be perceived as authentically irrational, thereby prodding “anticipatory preemptions” against the US directly, or (depending upon particulars) certain close U.S. allies. Israel represents a prospectively obvious case in point.
None of this is meant to suggest that an Israeli movement away from deliberate nuclear ambiguity would be prospectively helpful only on matters involving specifically nuclear threats. Plausibly, of course, the credibility and cost-effectiveness of any Israeli nuclear retaliatory threat would be greatest where the expected aggression were similarly nuclear. Still, there are recognizable circumstances in which a determined enemy or coalition of enemies might contemplate launching “only” a devastating conventional first-strike against Israel, and conclude that such an offensive move would be sensible because it would not expectedly elicit an Israeli nuclear retaliation.
In such altogether conceivable circumstances, the enemy state or coalition of enemy states would have concluded that any non-nuclear first strike against a nuclear Israel, however massive, would be perfectly rational. This is because the Jewish State’s anticipated retaliation would presumably stop short of being nuclear.
If, however, the expected aggressor(s) had previously been made aware that Israel was in possession of a wide-array of capable and secure nuclear retaliatory forces, both ion terms of their range and yield, these enemies would more likely be successfully deterred. Here, as a distinctly welcome consequence of various incremental and previously nuanced disclosures, Jerusalem will have signaled its pertinent adversaries that it can and will cross the nuclear retaliatory threshold in order to punish any potentially existential national harms.
In more narrowly military parlance, Israel’s actions here would be designed to better ensure “escalation dominance.” In this scenario, moreover, the relevant nuclear deterrence advantages to Israel of taking certain movements away from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” would lie in the uniquely compelling signal that it sends. This “signal” is that Israel will not necessarily need to retaliate with massive and conspicuously disproportionate nuclear force.
It will have available certain other more readily believable retaliatory options.
Such tangible advantages could also extend beyond the enhancement of credible threats of Israeli nuclear retaliation to supporting credible threats of Israeli nuclear counter-retaliation. If, for example, Israel should initiate a non-nuclear defensive first-strike against Iran before that state becomes nuclear capable (not an “aggression,” but an act of “anticipatory self-defense” under international law), the likelihood of any massive Iranian conventional retaliation could best be diminished if there were certain more openly disclosed and prior Israeli threats of aptly measured nuclear counter retaliations. In essence, and in illuminating historical terms, by following an incremental path away from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” Israel would less likely replicate America’s much earlier nuclear posture vis-à-vis the then Soviet Union, that is a posture of threatening “massive retaliation.”
In the final analysis, there are various specific and valuable critical security benefits that would likely accrue to Israel as the result of any purposefully selective and incremental end to deliberate nuclear ambiguity. The optimal time to begin such an “end” may not yet have come. But at the moment that Iran or any other obvious foe would have verifiably crossed the nuclear threshold, that critical time will have arrived. Moreover, should that critical moment come, Israel should already have configured (1) its optimal allocation of nuclear assets; and (2) the precise extent to which this particular configuration should now be disclosed.
Significantly, such preparation could meaningfully enhance the credibility of Israel’s nuclear deterrence posture.
A fully-recognizablesecond-strike nuclear force should then be revealed. Of necessity, such a robust strategic force – hardened, multiplied, and dispersed – would be fashioned to inflict a decisive retaliatory blow against major enemy cities. Iran or another prospective nuclear adversary, so long as it is led by presumptively rational decision-makers, should be made to understand that the actual costs of any planned aggressions against Israel would always exceed any conceivable gains.
To more comprehensively protect itself against potentially irrational nuclear adversaries, Israel still has no logical alternative to developing an always- problematic conventional preemptionoption. Operationally, especially at this very late date, there could be no reasonable assurances of any success against multiple hardened and dispersed targets. Regarding deterrence, however, it is also noteworthy that “irrational” is not nearly the same as “crazy” or “mad.” An irrational enemy leadership could successfully maintain national preference orderings or hierarchies that are both consistent and transitive.
Even an irrational leadership could sometime be subject to threats of deterrence that credibly threaten certain deeply held religious as well as public values. The principal difficulty, for Israel, is to routinely ascertain the precise nature of these core enemy values. Should it sometime be determined that an Iranian leadership were genuinely “crazy” or “mad,” that is, without any decipherable or predictable ordering of preferences, all usual deterrence “bets” could necessarily give way to preemption.
By definition, such vital determinations would be strategic, rather than jurisprudential. From the discrete standpoint of international law, and perhaps in view of Iran’s occasionally genocidal threats against Israel, a preemption option could still represent a fully permissible expression of anticipatory self-defense. Again, this purely legal judgment would be separate from any parallel or coincident assessments of operational success. For now, at least, these assessments all point overwhelmingly to the avoidance of any still-residual preemption option.
Whether or not a prompt or incremental shift from deliberate nuclear ambiguity to express nuclear disclosure is indicated will depend upon several very complex and interdependent factors. These factors include the specific types of nuclear weapon involved; the presumed reciprocal calculations of designated enemy leaders (state and sub-state); the expected effects on rational decision-making processes by these enemy leaders; and the expected effects on both Israeli and adversarial command/control;/communication processes. Correspondingly, if bringing Israel’s bomb out of the “basement” were ever expected to produce selected enemy pre-delegations of nuclear launch authority and/or new and seemingly less stable launch-on-warning procedures, the likelihood of certain unauthorized or accidental nuclear wars could be increased.
In many ways, growing instability in the Middle East is the plausible outcome of US President Donald Trump’s disjointed foreign policies. Such instability, in turn, could heighten the potential for assorted expansive and prospectively unconventional wars. Israel, it follows, must continue to prepare capably to upgrade its strategic posture, especially its national military nuclear strategy and its corollary longstanding policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity.
recalling the Irish poet W.B. Yeats, Israel and America could sometime have to bear
witness to abundantly measureless lamentations; that is, to the irremediably grievous
observation that because of once-avoidable US White House derelictions, “….
the center cannot hold.”
 See, for example, latest INSS Strategic Survey (Israel): https://www.inss.org.il/publication/conclusion-strategic-assessment-policy-recommendations/
 “Whenever the new Muses present themselves,” says Spanish existentialist philosopher Jose Ortega y’ Gasset, “the masses bristle.” See Ortega’s The Dehumanization of Art (1925) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), p. 7.
 A 2016 monograph published in Israel examines Israel-American strategic relations from the opposite direction; that is, it considers the impact of Israel’s nuclear strategy on US national security. See Louis René Beres and General (USA/ret.) Barry R. McCaffrey, Israel’s Nuclear Strategy and America’s National Security, Tel-Aviv University, Yuval Ne’eman Workshop for Science, Technology and Security, December 2016: https://sectech.tau.ac.il/sites/sectech.tau.ac.il/files/PalmBeachBook.pdf
 In all such scholarly examinations of any nation-state’s security policy, operational issues must be carefully distinguished from jurisprudential ones. Accordingly, Trump US foreign policy decisions could prove harmful to certain Israeli military operations, but helpful to that country’s legal position in one setting or another, or vice-versa.
 Earlier, North Korea had assisted Syria in constructing a nuclear reactor, the same facility that was destroyed by Israel in it Operation Orchard on September 6, 2007. Although operationally unlike Israel’s earlier (June 7, 1981) Operation Opera, this second preemptive attack in the Deir ez-Zor region of Syria was also an expression of the so-called “Begin Doctrine.”
 Even in the midst of an historic or “Westphalian” anarchy in international relations, there obtains a dominant jurisprudential assumption of solidarity between states. This fundamental expectation is already mentioned in Justinian, Corpus Juris Civilis (533 C.E.); Hugo Grotius, 2 De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, Ch. 20 (Francis W. Kesey, tr., Clarendon Press, 1925) (1690); and Emmerich De Vattel, 1 Le Droit des Gens, Ch. 19 (1758).
 Under international law, the idea of a Higher Law – drawn originally from the ancient Greeks and ancient Hebrews – is contained, inter alia, within the principle of jus cogens or peremptory norms. In the language of pertinent Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969: “A peremptory norm of general international law….is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole, as a norm from which no derogation is permitted, and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” Also worth pointing out here is that international law is always an integral part of US law, an incorporation that can be found both in the US Constitution (especially at Article 6, “The Supremacy Clause”) and at various US Supreme Court decisions, most famously at The Pacquete Habana (1900).
 Still, the US force withdrawal from Syria will plausibly exacerbate risks of a direct Israel-Russia confrontation. See, on this scenario: https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Avoiding-an-Israeli-Russian-conflict-in-Syria-after-US-withdrawal-577015 More generally, this withdrawal will enhance Russian power and influence in the Middle East, a deleterious consequence for Israel that may or may not accurately reflect Trump’s intentions. Though it would first appear prima facie absurd that an American president would actually seek to expand rather than curtail Russian military power, such an expectation would be fully consistent with several other unexpected policy positions taken by Trump vis-à-vis Vladimir Putin.
 See Louis René Beres, “Nuclear Treaty Abrogation Imperils Global Security,” Yale Global Online November 1, 2018 https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/nuclear-treaty-abrogation-imperils-global-security
 Risks threatening Israel’s security may form an intricately interconnected network. Purposeful assessments of such risk must always include a patient search for possible synergies and for potential cascades of failures that would represent an especially serious iteration of synergy. Other risk properties within this genre that will warrant careful assessment include contagion potential and persistence.
 The worst case scenario here brings to mind utterly core queries of the ancient Greek tragedian: “Where will it end? When will it all be lulled back into sleep, and cease, the bloody hatred, the destruction?” (1 The Complete Aeschylus: The Oresteia 146, Peter Burian and Alan Shapiro, eds., 2nd ed., 2011).
 Regarding earlier strategic assessments of prospective nuclear threats from Iran, see Louis René Beres and John T. Chain (General/USAF/ret.), “Could Israel Safely Deter a Nuclear Iran”? The Atlantic, August, 2012; and also: Professor Louis René Beres and General John T. Chain, “Israel and Iran at the Eleventh Hour,” Oxford University Press (OUP Blog), February 23, 2012. General Chain was Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC).
 In large measure, the law of armed conflict is concerned with the principle of proportionality, which has its jurisprudential and philosophic origins in the Biblical Lex Talionis, or the law of exact retaliation. Specifically, the “eye for eye, tooth for tooth” posture can be found in three separate passages of the Jewish Torah or Biblical Pentateuch.
 These Principles – like the Nuremberg trial judgment itself – are based fundamentally upon natural law. In turn, the very idea of natural law is based upon the acceptance of certain principles of right and justice that prevail solely because of their own intrinsic merit. Eternal and immutable, they are external to all acts of human will and interpenetrate all human reason. This idea and its attendant tradition of human civility runs continuously from Mosaic Law and the ancient Greeks and Romans to the present day. For a comprehensive and far-reaching assessment of the natural law origins of international law by this writer, see Louis René Beres, “Justice and Realpolitik: International Law and the Prevention of Genocide,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 33, 1988, pp. 123-159. (This article was adapted from Professor Beres’ earlier presentation at the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide, Tel-Aviv, Israel, June 1982.)
 For Israel, Mr. Trump’s disjointed plan to pull US forces from Syria can only be disadvantageous. See, earlier, https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Avoiding-an-Israeli-Russian-conflict-in-Syria-after-US-withdrawal-577015
 Hypothesizing the emergence of “Cold War II” means expecting that the world system is becoming increasingly bipolar. For early writings, by this author, on the global security implications of just such an expanding bipolarity, see: Louis René Beres, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Reliability of Alliance Commitments,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 25, No.4., December 1972, pp. 702-710; Louis René Beres, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Tragedy of the Commons,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 26, No.4., December 1973, pp, 649-658; and Louis René Beres, “Guerillas, Terrorists, and Polarity: New Structural Models of World Politics,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 27, No.4., December 1974, pp. 624-636.
 See this writer’s latest book, Louis René Beres, Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016; 2nd ed., 2018).
 In regard to the core underlying issue – Israel’s right to develop and deploy nuclear weapons – the following point is worth emphasizing: No state is under any per se legal obligation to renounce its own access to nuclear weapons; under certain markedly residual circumstances, moreover, even an actual resort to such weapons could conceivably be lawful. On July 8, 1996, the International Court of Justice handed down its Advisory Opinion on “The Legality of the threat or Use of Force of Nuclear Weapons.” The closing paragraph of this Opinion concludes, inter alia: “The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law. However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”
 On these core points, see: Israel’s Strategic Future: Project Daniel, The Project Daniel Group (Louis René Beres, Chair), Ariel Center for Policy Research, ACPR Policy Paper No. 155, Israel, May, 2004. This special report was delivered by hand to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on January 16, 2003 by Ambassador Zalman Shoval. The Group’s six members were: Professor Louis René Beres (Chair); Naaman Belkind, former Assistant to the Israeli Deputy Minister of Defense for Special Means; Major-General /Professor Isaac Ben-Israel (IDF/ret.); Dr. Rand Fishbein; Dr. Adir Pridor, Lt. Colonel (ret.), Israel Air Force, and Head of Military Analyses, RAFAEL, Israel; and Colonel (ret.), Israel Air Force and Member of Knesset, Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto.
 The agreements that put an end to the first Arab-Israeli War (1947-1949) were general armistice agreements negotiated bilaterally between Israel and Egypt on February 24, 1949 (42 U.N.T.S. 251-70, 1949); Israel and Lebanon on March 23, 1949 (42 U.N.T.S. 287-98. 1949); Israel and Jordan on April 3, 1949 (42 U.N.T.S. 303-20, 1949); and between Israel and Syria on July 20, 1949 (42 U.N.T.S. 327-40, 1949).
 Regarding the antecedent legal obligations of certain sub-state or insurgent surrogates, Israel must remain wary about signing pacts resembling the Oslo Agreements, inter alia, because such agreements can impose unequal obligations. In this connection, several U.S. federal court decisions affirm that legal agreements between sub-state and state parties may even impose asymmetrical compliance expectations. More precisely, in the case of Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, a 1981 civil suit in U.S. federal court wherein the plaintiffs were Israeli survivors and representatives of persons murdered in a terrorist bus attack in Israel in 1978, Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards opined: “…I do not believe the law of nations imposes the same responsibility or liability on non-state actors, such as the PLO, as it does on states and persons acting under color of state law.”
 There are two recorded incidents in which an explicit reference was made to Israel’s “bomb” by a prime minister, but neither of these events went beyond a purely vague and general commentary. On December 22, 1995, then Prime Minister Shimon Peres had declared to the Israeli press that Israel would be willing “to give up the atom” in exchange for peace. Years later, on December 11, 2006, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert uttered a very similar remark.
 The base term, “dialectic,” originates from the Greek expression for the art of conversation. A common contemporary meaning is method of seeking truth by correct reasoning. From the standpoint of shaping Israel’s nuclear strategy, the following representative operations could be regarded as essential but nonexclusive components: (1)a method of refutation conducted by examining logical consequences; (2) a method of division or repeated logical analysis of genera into species; (3) logical reasoning using premises that are probable or generally accepted; (4) formal logic; and (5) the logical development of thought through thesis and antithesis to fruitful synthesis of these opposites.
 Some Israeli supporters of a Palestinian state argue that its prospective harms to Israel could be reduced or even eliminated by ensuring that new state’s immediate “demilitarization.” But for informed reasoning contra this argument, see: Louis René Beres and (Ambassador) Zalman Shoval, “Why a Demilitarized Palestinian State Would Not Remain Demilitarized: A View Under International Law,” Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, Winter 1998, pp. 347-363; and Louis René Beres and Ambassador Shoval, “On Demilitarizing a Palestinian `Entity’ and the Golan Heights: An International Law Perspective,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vo. 28., No.5., November 1995, pp. 959-972.
 For much earlier writings by this author concerning the prospective impact of a Palestinian state on Israeli nuclear deterrence and Israeli nuclear strategy, see: Louis René Beres, “Security Threats and Effective Remedies: Israel’s Strategic, Tactical and Legal Options,” Ariel Center for Policy Research (Israel), ACPR Policy Paper No. 102, April 2000, 110 pp; Louis René Beres, “After the `Peace Process:’ Israel, Palestine, and Regional Nuclear War,” DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 15, No. 2., Winter 1997, pp. 301-335; Louis René Beres, “Limits of Nuclear Deterrence: The Strategic Risks and Dangers to Israel of False Hope,” ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, Vol. 23., No. 4., Summer 1997, pp. 539-568; Louis René Beres, “Getting Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Israel, Intelligence and False Hope,” INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, Vol. 10., No. 1., Spring 1997, pp. 75-90; Louis René Beres, “On Living in a Bad Neighborhood: The Informed Argument for Israeli Nuclear Weapons,” POLITICAL CROSSROADS, Vol. 5., Nos. 1/2, 1997, pp. 143-157; Louis René Beres, “Facing the Apocalypse: Israel and the `Peace Process,'” BTZEDEK: THE JOURNAL OF RESPONSIBLE JEWISH COMMENTARY (Israel), Vol. 1., No. 3., Fall/Winter 1997, pp. 32-35; Louis René Beres and (Ambassador) Zalman Shoval, “Why Golan Demilitarization Would Not Work,” STRATEGIC REVIEW, Vol. XXIV, No. 1., Winter 1996, pp. 75-76; Louis René Beres, “Implications of a Palestinian State for Israeli Security and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential Assessment,” DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 17., No. 2., 1999, pp. 229-286; Louis René Beres, “A Palestinian State and Israel’s Nuclear Strategy,” CROSSROADS: AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIO-POLITICAL JOURNAL, No. 31, 1991, pp. 97-104; Louis René Beres, “The Question of Palestine and Israel’s Nuclear Strategy,” THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Vol. 62, No. 4., October-December 1991, pp. 451-460; Louis René Beres, “Israel, Palestine and Regional Nuclear War,” BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS, Vol. 22., No. 2., June 1991, pp. 227-234; Louis René Beres, “A Palestinian State: Implications for Israel’s Security and the Possibility of Nuclear War,” BULLETIN OF THE JERUSALEM INSTITUTE FOR WESTERN DEFENCE (Israel), Vol. 4., Bulletin No, 3., October 1991, pp. 3-10; Louis René Beres, ISRAELI SECURITY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PSIS Occasional Papers, No. 1/1990, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, 40 pp; and Louis René Beres, “After the Gulf War: Israel, Palestine and the Risk of Nuclear War in the Middle East,” STRATEGIC REVIEW, Vol. XIX, No. 4., Fall 1991, pp. 48-55
 Even before the nuclear age, ancient Chinese strategist Sun-Tzu had recognized the importance of strategic depth. Although he did not use such a precisely modern term, Sun-Tzu did note expressly as follows: “If there is no place to go, it is fatal terrain.” See Sun-Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 11, “Nine Terrains.”
 Pakistan has been tilting more recognizably toward small or tactical nuclear weapons, indicating a growing preference for “counterforce” or nuclear war fighting strategies of deterrence. Since Pakistan announced its first test of the 60-kilometer Nasr ballistic missile back in 2011, that country’s emphasis upon smaller nuclear ordnance has been very conspicuously oriented toward the primary deterrence of conventional war.
 This also brings to mind the essential “seamlessness” of Israel’s nuclear deterrent. In this connection, see the recent joint article by Professor Beres and former Israeli Ambassador to the United States Zalman Shoval: https://mwi.usma.edu/creating-seamless-strategic-deterrent-israel-case-study/
 “Everything is very simple in war,” says Clausewitz, in his classic discussion of “friction” in On War, “but the simplest thing is difficult.”
 See recent article by this author at Modern War Institute, West Point: Louis Rene Beres, https://mwi.usma.edu/israel-samson-option-interconnected-world/
 Comments Emmerich de Vattel in his legal classic, The Law of Nations (1758): “The first general law, which is to be found in the very end of the society of nations, is that each nation should contribute as far as it can to the happiness and advancement of the other nations.”
 The Israeli nuclear strategist could benefit here from Basque philosopher Miguel de Unamuno’s instructive remark about the German philosopher Hegel: “Hegel made famous his aphorism that all the rational is real, and all the real is rational; but there are many of us who, unconvinced by Hegel, continue to believe that the real, the really real, is irrational – that reason builds upon irrationalities.”
 The term “preemption” has strategic but not legal meaning. Usually, it references a defensive military strategy that involves striking a presumed enemy first, with the more-or-less carefully calculated expectation that the only determinable alternative is to be struck first itself. A preemptive attack differs from a preventive attack in that the latter is launched merely out of an ongoing concern (whether correct or incorrect) to halt any longer term deterioration in a particular military balance, and not in response to any precise fear of imminent hostilities. As a preventive strike can never be per se permissible under international law, the distinction between preemptive and preventive war is always jurisprudentially important.
 Preemption has figured importantly in previous Israeli strategic calculations. This was most glaringly apparent in the wars of 1956 and 1967, and also in the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. Significantly, it was essentially the failure to preempt in October 1973 that contributed to heavy Israeli losses on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts during the Yom Kippur war, and almost brought about an Israeli defeat. During January, May, and October 2013, Israel, understandably apprehensive about Damascus’ supply of military materials to Syria’s Hezbollah surrogates in Lebanon, preemptively struck pertinent hard targets within Syria itself. For a jurisprudential assessment of these undeclared but still-appropriate expressions of anticipatory self-defense, by this author, see: Louis René Beres, “Striking Hezbollah-Bound Weapons in Syria: Israel’s Actions Under International Law,” Harvard National Security Journal, Harvard Law School, Online, posted August 26, 2013.
 Even in such potentially fearsome circumstances, authoritative law stipulates that Israel must first seek to exhaust all peaceful remedies. A similar jurisprudential imperative can be found in Jewish religious law. “When thou comest near to a city to fight against it,” proclaims Deuteronomy 20:10, “then proclaim peace to it.” Maimonides also calls for diplomatic solutions before hostilities begin to milhemet mitzvah (a war commanded by the Torah or Pentateuch): “No war is declared against any nation before peace offers are made to it.” The biblical commentator Abrabanel (1437-1508) argues not to hurry to go to war. For more complete examinations of war in the Jewish tradition, consult Efraim Inbar, “War in Jewish Tradition,” The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 1987, pp. 83-99.
 On the crime of “aggression,” see especially: RESOLUTION ON THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION, Dec. 14, 1974, U.N.G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631, 1975, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710, 1974; and CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Art. 51. Done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945. Entered into force for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, Bevans 1153, 1976, Y.B.U.N. 1043.
 For a potentially contra view, see: See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 272-73 (1963) (asserting that the United Nations Charter modified the international custom of anticipatory self-defense and that self-defense is justified only in response to an actual armed attack); Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM J. INT’L L. 546, 559-63 (1963) (interpreting Article 51 in conjunction with Article 33 to allow only a “peaceful means” of dispute resolution and a prohibition on the use of unilateral force until an actual armed conflict occurred); L. HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 141-44 (2d ed. 1979) (arguing that the Charter restricts the traditional right of self-defense to those situations where an armed attack has occurred); L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO, A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 178 (1946) (advocating a restrictive interpretation of Article 51 under which self-defense is only justified in response to an actual armed attack).
 Regarding “massive retaliation,” it was followed, in the United States, by the doctrine of “flexible response,” and ultimately evolved into doctrine known as a “countervailing nuclear strategy.” Codified in Presidential Directive # 59, which was signed on July 25 1980, and later reaffirmed by President Ronald Reagan, this strategy represented the then latest retreat from the core doctrine authoritatively defined by John Foster Dulles on January 13, 1954. To demonstrate continuing flexibility, the countervailing strategy envisioned a broad array of nuclear retaliatory choices operating within a carefully defined spectrum of deterrence. See, in this connection, by this author: Louis René Beres, “Presidential Directive 59: A Critical Assessment,” Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College, Vol. XI, No. 1., March 1981, pp. 19-28.
 The core point here had already been understood by Israeli strategist and IDF Military Intelligence Head, Yehoshafat Harkabi, back in the mid-1960s. Writing in Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace, Harkabi indicated: “It must be emphasized that the impulse to act first, the competition to preempt, is not a result of aggressive tendencies or bloodlust on either side. It is a defensive action inherent in the very instability of an unfortunate situation, in which survival depends upon opening fire first, or, in other words, upon initiating a surprise attack.” (See Y. Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace, translated from the Hebrew, Israel Program for Scientific Translations, 1966, p. 42).
 On madness, see Seneca, 1st Century AD/CE: “We are mad, not only individuals, but nations also. We restrain manslaughter and isolated murders, but what of war, and the so-called glory of killing whole peoples? Man, the gentlest of animals, is not ashamed to glory in blood-shedding, and to wage war when even the beasts are living in peace together.” (Letters, 95).
 For the very earliest scholarly commentary by this author on anticipatory self defense under international law, with special reference to Israel, see: Louis René Beres and (COL./IDF/Res.) Yoash Tsiddon Chatto, “Reconsidering Israel’s Destruction of Iraq’s Osiraq Nuclear Reactor,” TEMPLE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 9., No. 2., 1995, pp. 437 – 449; Louis René Beres, “Preserving the Third Temple: Israel’s Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law,” VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 26, No. 1., April 1993, pp. 111- 148; Louis René Beres, “After the Gulf War: Israel, Preemption and Anticipatory Self-Defense,” HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 13, No. 2., Spring 1991, pp. 259 – 280; Louis René Beres, “Striking `First:’ Israel’s Post Gulf War Options Under International Law,” LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 14, Nov. 1991, No. 1., pp. 1 – 24; Louis René Beres, “Israel and Anticipatory Self-Defense,” ARIZONA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, Vol. 8, 1991, pp. 89 – 99; and Louis René Beres, “After the SCUD Attacks: Israel, `Palestine,’ and Anticipatory Self-Defense,” EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, Vol. 6, No. 1., Spring 1992, pp. 71 – 104. For an examination of assassination as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense by Israel, see, Louis René Beres, “On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel,” HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW, Vol. 20, No. 2., Winter 1991, pp. 321 – 340. For more general assessments of assassination as anticipatory self-defense under international law by this author, see: Louis René Beres, “The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During Peace and War,” TEMPLE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1991, pp. 231 – 249; and Louis René Beres, “Victims and Executioners: Atrocity, Assassination and International Law,” CAMBRIDGE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Winter/Spring, 1993.
 A related question concerns legality in any ongoing war begun by another state. Here we may recall the opinion of Grotius in his COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY: “…it is obvious that a just war can be waged in return, without recourse to judicial procedure, against an opponent who has begun an unjust war; nor will any declaration of that just war be required…. For as Aelian says, citing Plato as his authority–any war undertaken for the necessary repulsion of injury, is proclaimed not by a crier nor by a herald, but by the voice of Nature herself.” See H. Grotius, DE IURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS, ed., by James Brown Scott, a translation of the original manuscript of 1604 by Gladys L. Williams, with the collaboration of Walter H. Zeydel, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1964, p. 96.
 In this regard, one ought to bear in mind the still-relevant warning of Sigmund Freud: “Fools, visionaries, sufferers from delusions, neurotics and lunatics have played great roles at all times in the history of mankind, and not merely when the accident of birth had bequeathed them sovereignty. Usually, they have wreaked havoc.”
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