Connect with us

Economy

Airlines as Geopolitical Agents of Power

Published

on

Airlines are agents of geopolitical power. They are agents of geopolitical power, because they have the power to become the bridge between the core and peripheries of the world.

For example, in spite of the current civil strife in Mogadishu, Somalia, Turkish Airlines, during March, 2012, was the first and only internationally-acclaimed airline that began flying (via Khartoum at the time) to Somalia. Flying into Somalia, for Turkish Airlines, meant: We back Somalia. And let this flight herald our trust in Somalia and our Somali partners.

Geopolitically what does this mean? Since 2011 it was President (former prime-minister at the time) Recep Tayyip Erdogan that first visited Mogadishu (the highest non-African ranking official that Somalia has ever received after years of internal strife). Despite of the fact that Turkey initially began its bilateral relation with Somalia based on humanitarian aid, the Turco-Somali relationship would evolve into that of a political and commercial interest, particularly in Turkey’s interest of supporting vital infrastructure—i.e. ports—programs in Somalia by investing approximately over $500M. Yet, going back to the main topic of this article (airlines and geopolitics), what does it mean when an airline goes to another poorly served, connected country? It means one thing and one thing only: geopolitical trust (country stability) and geopolitical territorial linkage (exertion of state power from the airline’s country of origin. Think of Netherlands and Suriname).

Before studying and working in geopolitics and investment projects, I, myself, lived some kind of a hybrid life. Let’s say somewhere between business and aviation. From 2007—2011, I studied business administration at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (which actually has a huge military culture and values, and which also taught me, generally speaking, how many of my American colleagues in the military perceive the world), focused in the geographies of air transportation; in other words, commercial geographies and mobilities, combined with business administration critical thinking. Yet, throughout those years I became a pilot and even did an internship in Panama City, Panama, in Copa Airlines headquarters (Panama’s main airline).

Now, fast forwarding time, by combining both geopolitics and aviation studies, I have undoubtedly learned that airline routes are one of the prime indicators when a country’s socioeconomic status is improving, heading in the wrong direction, or a sign of the geopolitical influence one state exerts into another; airlines are the first geopolitical agents that have the power to suspend or completely terminate a destination, consequently, eliminating the bridge between one space and another, isolating an entire country, for example (e.g. Google: Yemen Sana’a airport).

Take for example Bangui, in the Central African Republic. What if I tell you that if you were to fly to the CAR, it is Air France (as the former—and still—colonial power) the only European airline that serves Bangui only once a week? What if I tell you that though Royal Air Maroc serves Bangui as well, it does so in the same degree—once a week—as Air France? And the same can be said for the relatively internationally known TAAG Angola airlines, which operates from Luanda. Regardless of how you look at it, if you were to fly to Bangui M’Poko International airport, in a trustworthy international airline (those that fly into Europe and the US are considered safe, trustworthy and high-standard airlines, because of both the FAA and EASA high-standard requirements on aircraft safety), most likely, you would have a really hard time in securing the correct flight schedule, price and, most importantly, the time and date you’d like to fly into the CAR. In the commercial aviation network and planning parlance, the CAR would be technically isolated. If Air France is the only European airline serving the CAR, can this mean that there are still some colonial, pastoralist-type of linkages? Or that an ex-colonial power controls the mobility and connectivity to its former colonies? I’ll let you be the judge of that question.

But, also, did you know that Air France has, from Europe, a complete monopoly on Cayenne, French Guiana, and to a certain extent to Papeete, French Polynesia? (Air Tahiti Nui—Air France’s only competitor—is supported by the French Government in the form of +$300M in subsidies, in spite of the fact that its main shareholder is the French Polynesian government, and though I am indeed generalizing, I am suspecting that the same French Government’s subsidies are the ones that are partially supporting Air Tahiti Nui vis-à-vis the Government in Tahiti). And, lastly, the same can be said about West Africa and the Sahel air travel network—until Turkish Airlines has come into play.

From a geopolitical point of view, Air France’s destination network is one of the most interesting to research as well as the rapid expansion of both Emirates and Turkish airlines’ networks (e.g. from Tajikistan to Eritrea). For example, Turkish airlines currently competes with Air France’s extensive West Africa network. Turkish airlines flies into the same cities were Air France’ airline empire once had a complete monopoly, including cities like Nouakchott (Mauritania), Niamey (Niger), Ouagadougou, (Burkina Faso), Conakry (Guinea), N’Djamena (Chad), and Libreville (Gabon). Therefore, as a result, one could generally conclude that Turkish Airlines is challenging many airline networks that aroused during colonial times (e.g. Turkish is challenging Aeroflot’s network in Central Asia; Air France and Brussels’s airlines West African network; and Turkish Airlines will eventually challenge US-based airlines hegemony in the Latin America-Europe-and-Asia controlled transit passengers market). Also, many of the gulf airlines (Etihad, Emirates, Qatar, particularly) have been gradually catching up by flying to cities like Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo, while continuing their expansion on US airspace (e.g. Emirates will fly into Orlando, Qatar is flying into Miami, Etihad is serving Los Angeles), which is why I am not surprised that many of the US legacy carriers’ CEOs are accusing the Gulf airlines from being heavily subsided, claiming unfair competition. Yet, I will leave that question to the legal experts.

What is the main lesson here? That airlines compete for power and influence as much as a state would.

An airline’s main geopolitical power is manifested as: 1) the power in controlling mobilities; 2) the power of transporting cargo, reducing the time, compared to shipping vessels and railway transportation; and 3) the power of being part of the propaganda and media machine of an hegemonic and/or rising power. For instance, in my country (Guatemala), which, unfortunately, due to high criminal violence and corruption, has been part of America’s illegal migration problem for a while. In spite of this migration problem, Guatemala is currently served by four US legacy airlines (Delta, American, United and Spirit), with 9 non-stop flights to United States, and with +50 frequencies of flights between America and Guatemala in a week. In turn, there are only five Latin American—and one European, Iberia—airlines legacy carriers that serve Guatemala, one of them is from Panama (Copa); three from Mexico (Aeromexico, Interjet and Volaris); and one is from Colombia (Avianca). Henceforth, and compared with the Latin American airlines, US-based carriers at least control 44% of the Guatemalan market; additionally controlling European and Asian mobility into Guatemala and the rest of Central America, except for Panama City—which is rapidly growing and served by major European legacy carriers (Iberia, KLM, Air-France, TAP, and Lufthansa this coming march 2016).

Last but not least, airline’s propaganda can dwell in our geographic imagination and induce our hearts and pockets. How? Well, they capture the essence of curiosity. The curiosity of traveling into their countries of origin. The curiosity of using them as linkages into another unknown, untraveled destination. The Curiosity of imagining what is life like in the airlines’ countries of origin. And, the curiosity of having the ‘experience’ of traveling with them. At least, from a Guatemalan standpoint, many of the US-legacy carriers advertise American hallmarks of touristic and geopolitical power, such as photos of the White House, the Statue of Liberty, the Golden Gate Bridge, and the giant Hollywood emblem in the hills of Los Angeles.

With that kind of propaganda, no wonder why many of my countrymen must imagine that as soon as you step in the US, your life will become great, suddenly change, and why not, you will be part of the American dream—and from a business and marketing standpoint, of course, that I congratulate the American airlines. They are making a fine job in serving and connecting Guatemala with the rest of the world.

Yes, airlines can provide many things for our self-esteem (the joy of looking forward to relax in a nice, sunny beach) and our egos (the joy of telling your family and friends that you will travel to a destination they are eager to go but can’t). But, the airlines are also part of the geopolitical architecture of a state’s power: connecting, uniting or burning the bridge between one space and another. The core and the periphery. The served and unserved.

So, my dear reader: are airlines agents of geopolitical power?

Continue Reading
Comments

Economy

Beyond Being Friends: Russia and China Need an Exclusive Trade Deal

Published

on

RIAC’s 6th “Russia and China: Cooperation in a New Era” conference in early June showcased once again the will of the two countries to develop exclusive relations. Over the past 1,5 years, during the global COVID crisis, both sides have even strengthened mutual trust. In December 2020, Russia and China extended their agreement on notifying of missile launches for ten years. The document was first signed back in 2009. In March, the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was prolonged, an agreement that has been cementing relations between the two countries for the past 20 years.

Economy contrasted with diplomacy

However, despite the long-sustained foreign policy rapprochement, Russia and China are far from fully utilizing their bilateral economic potential. In 2020, according to the Russian Federal Customs Service, China accounted for 15% of Russian exports, slightly more than the CIS (14%), but significantly less than the European Union (41%). In the structure of Russian imports, China is also behind the EU (24% versus 35%), although European food producers have been excluded from the Russian market since 2014.

In turn, Russia’s share was only 2% in Chinese exports in 2020 (with the U.S. share at 17%), and only 3% in imports (compared to 7% for the U.S., according to the ITC).

The same proportions are typical of mutual investments. By the beginning of 2020, according to the Bank of Russia, China accounted for less than 0.1% of accumulated direct investment from Russia (with the share of UK and Germany at 4.7% and 2.2%, respectively). As for the accumulated direct investments in Russia (private equity and debt instruments), China’s share reached only 0.8% in early 2020, while the share of France stood at 4.5%.

State support and guarantees

So far, Chinese investments are mainly focused on energy projects, directly or indirectly supported by the state. Yamal LNG plant is a good example (20% owned by CNPC, 9.9% by Silk Road Fund): to launch construction, Novatek raised a loan from the NWF (the sovereign National Wealth Fund). Another example is the Amur Gas Chemical Complex (AGCC) of Sibur (40% owned by Sinopec)—the project will enjoy tax benefits as a resident of one of the Far Eastern territories of priority social and economic development.

Ensuring guaranteed demand is equally important, as is the case for AGCC, which is located in close proximity to the world’s largest consumer of polyethylene and polypropylene, the basic petrochemical products. It is no coincidence that Sinopec acquired the share in the Amur GCC in December 2020. By that time, it became obvious that the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic would not undermine China’s growing demand for petrochemicals and gas chemicals: according to the ICIS forecast, China’s share in global polyethylene imports will grow from last year’s 35% to an even more impressive 43% by 2030.

Looking for viable opportunities

The lack of proper state support and guarantees restrains export in a number of other industries that could have enjoyed demand in the Chinese market. This is apparent in trade frictions between China and the U.S. (in 2019, China imposed a 25% duty on methanol imports from the United States) and Australia (in late 2020, China stopped buying Australian coal). And vice versa, it is possible to increase exports by searching for opportunities in the market niches where Russia’s sales potential is coupled with absolute competitive advantages, such as in helium market, where Russia may become one of the leading suppliers in the coming years.

Another option is the supply of Russian hydrogen, which may allow China to partially replace petroleum imports from other markets.

In 2018, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), some 1,790 hydrogen-fuel vehicles were operated in China out of 12,952 vehicles globally; the Chinese fleet grew to 6,180 out of 23,354 units by the end of 2019. And by 2025, China plans to increase the number of buses and trucks utilizing fuel cells to 50,000, jumping to 1 million by 2030.

Moreover, in 2035, according to the official plans of the Chinese authorities, half of vehicles sold should be climate-neutral, while the other half should be powered by hybrid engines or fuel cells. A similar shift will have to occur in Japan, where the IEA forecasts the number of fuel cell vehicles to increase from 3,633 in 2019 to 200,000 in 2025 and to 811,200 in 2030.

Russia has its competitive edge in hydrogen energy development, taking into account both global leadership in natural gas reserves (used for blue hydrogen stored in ammonia) and 50+ years of experience in nuclear and hydropower, needed for production of yellow and green hydrogen. Understanding these advantages is already reflected in regulatory plans: for example, according to the Energy Strategy adopted last year, Russia will increase its hydrogen exports from 200,000 tons in 2024 to 2 million tons in 2035.

Towards a New Trade Deal

We need to admit though that a long-term strategy requires long-term investment, while the latter requires secure return. To ensure there is a horizon for planning your business, you do not have to necessarily rely on budget support: this is where exclusive trade agreements can step in. This is exactly what the Trump administration did in January 2020, concluding an agreement that obliged China to boost U.S. imports by $200 billion above the 2017 level within two years, including energy ($52.4 billion), industrial production ($77.7 billion) and agriculture ($32 billion). The deal, among other effects, has revived the U.S. oil exports to China: supplies grew to 482,000 barrels per day (bpd) after a drop to 137,000 bpd in 2019 amid trade wars.

An exclusive trade deal between Russia and China could be smaller in volume and longer in tenor (aiming to increase the trade turnover by $100 billion in at least five years) to help resume, for example, the Eastern Petrochemical Company project, in which ChemChina planned to participate previously but which remained on paper. In return, Russia could extend the tax benefits, which are now granted to residents of the territories of priority social and economic development (TOSER), to all projects with Chinese shareholding. Thus, the success story of cooperation between Sibur and Sinopec in the Amur GCC would be replicated and should provide a new impetus to bilateral relations.

From our partner RIAC

Continue Reading

Economy

Emerging Global Market: The Arctic on Sale

Published

on

The Arctic Region has been on a journey of geographical transformation induced by Climate Change. There has been an unprecedented percentage of what can be called as ‘Arctic metamorphosis’, witnessed as deterioration of climate twice as rapidly as in any other parts of the globe. There has been a decline in permafrost, sea ice, icesheets on ocean and glaciers in Canada, Alaska and Greenland.  There has been a notable decrease in the snow cover that earlier occupied the land. These alarming changes in the physiography were first recorded in the 1980s, and have been on a surge ever since. Around 1 million sq. miles of sea ice has shrunk over the past 50 years, halving the size of Arctic icecap. The transition has been so dramatic that it actually cut the turf to Asia, revealing the fabled North West Passage that European voyagers sought for shipping, for over centuries. As of now, it is not a matter of ‘if’ but ‘when’ will the Arctic Passageway open for regular marine transportation and when would the exploration of lucrative natural energy-resources deposits be possible.

The regressing ecosystem has been the least of the concerns of our capitalist, market-oriented, energy-hungry world economy. The melting ice caps and glaciers are paving way to access the 13% of globe’s undiscovered oil and 30% of globe’s undiscovered natural gas lying at the Arctic Ocean seabed, a home for world’s largest unexplored hydrocarbon resources. These percentages translate to 1,669 trillion cubic ft. of natural gas and 90 billion barrels of oil. The economic potential for these energy resources exceeds $2.7 trillion for Russian and American Arctic claims alone. Moreover, there are massive reserve potential for rare mineral resources also referred to as “strategic minerals” including palladium, nickel and iron-ore which might prove to be a greater economic driver than the energy resources. Apart from these, Arctic has tremendous new opportunities for high sea fisheries. The Ocean has vast stocks of marine resources including shrimp, pollock, crab, pacific salmon, squid, scallop and halibut. It would prove to be a new arena of industrial-scale commercial fisheries.

Whether the sought resources are hydrocarbon or mineral, they must procure their route via pipelines or shipping routes to the receptive markets. Along with the transitory passageways, there would be need for improved icebreakers, satellite and communication and navigation, deep water ports, double-hulled shipping vessels, operational search and aviation infrastructure development.

An even better incentive would be the inception of new sea-lanes initiated by the great Arctic melt. The shipping shortcuts of Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route would reduce the nautical transit times by days, saving the shipping corporations thousands of miles. The sailing distance between Yokohama and Rotterdam on the Northern Route would be reduced from over 11,200 nautical miles to 6,500 nautical miles, in comparison with the current Suez Canal Route which would amount to the savings of up to 40 percent of shipping expenses. Likewise, the voyage from Rotterdam to Seattle would be trimmed by the North West Passage by over 2000 nautical miles, reducing the distance up to 25 percent in comparison with the current Panama route.

Taking into consideration the fuel costs, canal fees and various other miscellaneous charges that amount to lofty freight rates, these alternative passages will cutback the charges of a single voyage down to at least 20%, saving around $17.5 million, saving billions of dollars per annum for the shipping industry. These savings would be far greater for the megaships that have to sail all the way down to Cape Horn and Cape of Good Hope.

The world’s shipyard’s have already started building ice-capable ships, beginning with the groundwork for the navigation through these sea-lanes and for the transport of Arctic’s natural gas and oil. Billions of dollars are being invested by the private sector for the fleet of Arctic tankers. As of now, around 496 ice-class ships have been built worldwide. The gas and oil markets are investing in development of the avant-garde technology and assemblage of advanced ships, possessing double-acting tankers, that have the dual technology of steam bowing through open waters and proceed stern to smash through deep ice. These ships are capable of sailing unobstructed to Arctic’s burgeoning gas and oil fields independent of ice-breakers. These breakthroughs will turn previously unviable commercial projects into booming businesses.

Of all the Arctic States, the largest stakeholder with greatest intrinsic interests in the region is Russia. A significant 20% of Russia’s GDP comes of Russian North, and accounts for 22% of all exports. The resources of Arctic are of strategic importance for Russia; therefore, it has been so far the largest investor in the region. It has invested in the fleet of nuclear-icebreakers, the only of their kind in the world. Further, Russia is planning on increasing this fleet of 4 to 13 with a cost of over $1.5 billion. Moreover, Russia has endeavored to aim for 92.6 million ton of cargo by 2030. These hefty investments indicate the importance of Arctic as a market. Russia aims at charging for providing the sea-routes since it has the largest geographical proximity to the ocean as well as providing shipping and infrastructure in the region. The claims of oil and gas reserves are only an addition to the gains Russia has planned to make.

Considering the economic and strategic importance of Arctic and its potential to add to the world’s oil, gas, minerals, fisheries and shipping reserves makes it an alluring marketplace. The region itself has been divided among the ‘Arctic States’ that include Russia, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and United States. Instead of making efforts to preserve the deteriorating environmental conditions and the physiographic challenges, these states are only in a race of dividing the resources among themselves and reaping as much assets as they can. All domains of Arctic are on sale; including the sea, land, sea-life, mineral resources, and fossil fuels. The world has turned a blind eye towards the environmental consequences for the region of the planet which will surely cost more than the gains. Putting nature’s commodities on sale have never worked in anyone’s favor.

Continue Reading

Economy

Covid-19 and food crisis

Published

on

COVID-19 has hit at a time when food crisis and malnutrition are on the rise. According to the most recent UN projections, the pandemic-induced economic slump would cause as many as 132 million people to be hungry. This would be in addition to the 690 million people going hungry now. At the same time, 135 million people suffer from acute food insecurity and in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. Although the pandemic’s transmission has slowed in certain countries and cases have decreased, COVID-19 has resurfaced or is spreading rapidly in others. This is still a global issue that needs a worldwide solution.

This epidemic threatens both lives and livelihoods. COVID-19 has had a wide-ranging and disruptive influence on the agriculture system. We fear a worldwide food crisis unless we act quickly, which may have long-term consequences for hundreds of millions of children and adults. This is mostly due to a lack of food availability — as wages decline, remittances decline, and in certain cases, food prices rise. Food insecurity is increasingly becoming a food production concern in nations that already have high levels of acute food insecurity.

Agriculture continues to serve a reliable and major part in world economy and stability, and it remains the primary source of food, income, and work for rural communities, even in the face of a pandemic. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the agricultural system and sector has been wide-ranging, causing unprecedented uncertainty in global food supply chains, including potential bottlenecks in labor markets, input industries, agriculture production, food processing, transportation and logistics, as well as shifts in demand for food and food services.

The COVID-19 epidemic not only created a new sort of agricultural catastrophe, but it also occurred at a difficult moment for farmers. In most years during the last few years, global commodity output has exceeded demand, resulting in lower prices. In 2013, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) predicted decreased global agricultural output growth due to limited agricultural land development, rising production costs, expanding resource restrictions, and increasing environmental concerns.

An expanding global population remains the main driver of demand growth, although the consumption patterns and projected trends vary across countries in line with their level of income and development. Average per capita food availability is projected to reach about 3,000 kcal and 85 g of protein per day by 2029. Due to the ongoing transition in global diets towards higher consumption of animal products, fats and other foods, the share of staples in the food basket is projected to decline by 2029 for all income groups. In particular, consumers in middle-income countries are expected to use their additional income to shift their diets away from staples towards higher value products. Meanwhile, environmental and health concerns in high-income countries are expected to support a transition from animal-based protein towards alternative sources of protein.

When people suffer from hunger or chronic undernourishment, it means that they are unable to meet their food requirements – consume enough calories to lead a normal, active life – over a prolonged period. This has long-term implications for their future, and continues to present a setback to global efforts to reach Zero Hunger. When people experience crisis-level, acute food insecurity, it means they have limited access to food in the short-term due to sporadic, sudden crises that may put their lives and livelihoods at risk.

However, if people facing crisis-level acute food insecurity get the assistance they need, they will not join the ranks of the hungry, and their situation will not become chronic

It is clear: although globally there is enough food for everyone, too many people are still suffering from hunger. Our food systems are failing, and the pandemic is making things worse.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

EU Politics2 hours ago

Innovation performance keeps improving in EU Member States and regions

The Commission has today released the European Innovation Scoreboard 2021, which shows that Europe’s innovation performance continues to improve across the...

Economy4 hours ago

Beyond Being Friends: Russia and China Need an Exclusive Trade Deal

RIAC’s 6th “Russia and China: Cooperation in a New Era” conference in early June showcased once again the will of...

biden-syria biden-syria
Americas7 hours ago

Joe Biden’s European vacations

Joseph Biden, better known as Joe Biden, is an American politician from the Democratic Party who won last year’s presidential...

Tourism9 hours ago

Promoting ‘Brand Africa’ to Realize the Continent’s Tourism Potential

UNWTO’s African Member States will work together to establish a new narrative for tourism across the continent. To better realize...

East Asia10 hours ago

High time for India to Reconsider the One-China Policy

Sino-Indian bilateral relations have seen major challenges in the recent years, beginning with the Doklam crisis to the current pandemic situation. The sugar-coated rhetoric of Beijing proved to be mere duplicity after...

Environment12 hours ago

How food waste is trashing the planet

18 June is Sustainable Gastronomy Day, an international celebration of local cuisine that is produced in ways that are both...

Development14 hours ago

COVID-19 and social protection

The June segment of the 109th International Labour Conference  has come to a close – the first virtual ILC in...

Trending