The Orthodox Church and the Christian tradition have always assumed a role of primary importance in Russian history and tradition.
The origins of Christianity in Russia go back to 988 and coincide with the baptism of Prince Vladimir the Great. He had come to Constantinople, following which the evangelization of the Principality Kievan Rus’ started. The latter included the space currently occupied by the areas of Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus, considered the predecessor of the Russian Empire. Formed by Igor in 882, the Principality Kievan Rus’ is the first political form organised by the Oriental Slav tribes placed on those territories. This gave rise to the common orthodox faith and the Russian people’s sense of national belonging.
Retracing the path of the Principality one can indeed observe that the Orthodox Christian Faith was immediately embraced by those populations. It also succeeded in asserting itself in the Eastern zones, where there was strong pagan influence. This barely digested the advent of the new creed and accompanied their evolution, acting as a stalwart for the Country’s national and cultural identity. Orthodoxy is even granted with Scripture, which is surely a culture’s fundamental principle. It was introduced via the spread of Christianity among the Slav tribes through the creation of the Cyrillic characters due to two great saints, Cyril and Methodius. It also constituted the prerequisite for the political and cultural development of the Principality of Kiev, leaving a heritage that would last even after its disintegration.
Indeed, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Orthodox religion regained that role it traditionally enjoyed.
To understand the extent of this phenomenon, one can analyze some statistics carried out by the International Social Survey Programme:“Russians return to religion, but not to Church 10/02/2014” relating to the number of the faithful in the Country between 1988 and 2008.
If in 1988, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Orthodox church counted 67 dioceses, 21 monasteries, 6,893 parishes, 2 academies and 3 theological seminars. In 2008 it counted 133 dioceses, over 23,000 parishes, 620 monasteries (including 298 male ones), 322 convents, 5 academies and 32 theological seminars, 43 schools for seminary preparation, 1 theological institution, 2 orthodox universities and 2 female diocesan theological schools.
Examining the data also reveals that between 1991 and 2008, the share of Russian adults considering themselves orthodox had grown from 31% to 72%, while the share of the Russian population not considering themselves religious had dropped from 61% to 18%. However, research carried out by the International Social Survey Programme also reveals that the return to religion does not correspond to its practice. The research demonstrates two substantial facts: only one in ten of those declaring themselves religious attended mass at least once a month; the growth in practisers was ridiculous when compared to that in believers. The latter is borne out by the fact that from 1991 to 2008 it was just 5 percent, going from 2% to 7%.
The growth in the population towards the various religious affiliations was also analyzed over various demographic groups. This analysis revealed that from 1991 to 2008 there was an increase of around 38% in women approaching Orthodox religion, going from 43% to 81%; and an increase of 46% in men, going from 17% to 63%. It also reveals that the increase in identification with Orthodox religion grew by 43% in youthful groups, aged between 16 and 49, going from 26% in 1991, to 69% in 2008, and by 39% amongst those aged over 50, going from 40% in 1991 to 79% in 2008. One may further register that approach to the Orthodox Faith grew substantially in the population with a high level of education, and in particular graduates. This can be augmented by the facts that in 2008, women of faith were the majority and practicing more than men, and that the over-70s were a more religious group than the youngsters. Reference to age therefore, highlights that the elderly form the most religious: 82% of the over-70s declare they are orthodox, in comparison with 77% of people aged between 50 and 69 and 74% of those aged between 30 and 49. Finally, the 62% of youths aged between 16 and 29 remains.
Although the above-mentioned study displays a clear discrepancy between the practicing and non-practicing faithful, the great rebirth of orthodoxy in the Russian people cannot be denied. In this regard, it is interesting to quote the episode of great mass participation occurring in November 2011. Three million Muscovites, facing the cold and rain, poured onto the streets to venerate the belt of the Virgin. This had benn brought from Mount Athos to the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour (the church destroyed by Stalin and substituted by a pool, but rebuilt in a few years under El’cin).
There is no doubt that this rebirth was supported by the collaboration between the Church and political power. This significantly grew over time and intensified on the occasion of two events in particular: the election of Archbishop Cyril Somolensk as patriarch of Moscow and all Russia in 2009, and Vladimir Putin’s return to power in 2012.
The Orthodox church’s policies can actually be easily reconciled with Putin’s vision and his strong call to the Country’s traditions. Patriarch Alexei II had already set himself clearly apart from the Western concepts of “human rights” and “globalization”, considering them unsuited to Russian specifics. Further, Cyril I, his successor, issued the “Declaration of Human Rights of Russia’s Orthodox church”, after repudiating the Western Universal Declaration of Man’s Rights.
The intensification of relations between Church and State has become even more evident in recent years. Indeed, on the forth anniversary of the nomination of Patriarch Cyril, the Kremlin explicitly wished for the Orthodox church to raise its beneficent role in society. In a meeting between the State and religious exponents, held on 11 February 2013, Putin also underlined the need to give the Orthodox church more space. This extended, to political questions regarding matters like the family, education of youths and the patriotic spirit. With reference to defending these values, in particular the family, Russia has often wished to confirm and remark defending traditional, natural values of human society. To this end it has underlined its conception of “family” – understood as the basic element in ordered development for State and society – and the realization of a political and social strategy favouring it. These have decisively contributed to inverting the very negative demographic trend afflicting the Country over the last decades, warding off out-and-out social disaster. If one considers that the “demographic Winter” striking Russia around 1991 to 2005 is now a common situation in most European states, there can be no doubt that the Russian model constitutes an international example.
Keeping these facts in mind, in some alarming cases the attempt to define and orient States’ policies supporting families and young mothers is even more important and current. It aims to guarantee correct demographic development, crucial for effect on the process of State’s main internal and external policy. In this regard, President Putin has often insisted how humanity today clashes with very serious challenges, like continuous attacks on the institution of the family. This explains why Putin’s Russia is very interested in demographic and family matters. Protecting the rights and interests of families, motherhood and childhood is a priority for public authorities. This actively support and encourage politics and initiatives in their favour: they, benefit from the close collaboration with non-governmental organisations and voluntary citizen associations. Russia’s objective is to defeat this long-lasting demographic deficit, by reaching a fertility rate of 2,1 instead of its current 1,7.
Indeed, for the Russian authorities the problem of birth reduction cannot only be attributed to the economic sphere. It has deeper, cultural roots hence the need to intervene in the fields of education and information too. On many occasions, both Putin and Patriarch Cyril have emphasised that the globalised financial system caused the world economic crisis as of 2008, creating and making hegemonic speculative, parasitical financing. It is also responsible for the ethical, moral yielding developing internationall to create a dangerous ‘tendency to destroying human society’. This moral crisis had exacerbated a tendency to selfishness and individualism. These phenomena appear in Russia as the “social orphan”: 80% of abandoned children normally have both parents, who intentionally choose not to bring them up.
One may further note that a new agreement between the Church and the Counts’ Court was recently signed at Moscow. It aimed to raise morale in Russia, impaired by corruption, a real blight there; and safeguard the national spiritual, historical and cultural heritage, necessary for the social good. On the occasion of signing, Patriarch Cyril declared that “The work of the Counts’ Court has a substantial impact on society’s moral climate. We know that corruption degrades human beings. And if corruption reaches a significant extent, it erodes the healthy fabric of society and undermines the basis of the State.”
In fact, for Cyril, the “current vices, connected with theft of public and state property” are attributed to the difficulties faced by the population in the ’90’s and early 2000’s. They are, “the collapse of the economy, the destruction of certain ideals and the attempt to create new ones”.
For these reasons, the Kremlin considers the Church a fundamental ally to preserve Russia’s spiritual and cultural identity. Politics and the Church are intertwined: the Kremlin needs to promote the Church as an organ representing the nation’s values to regroup consensus; it is opportune for the Church to collaborate with politics to promote choices protecting the family and safeguarding public morality. With reference to safeguarding life, the Orthodox church has worked hard to explain that abortion is nothing but the killing of an innocent human being. The work of many NGOs promote the pro-life cause in Russia.
Another emblematic case of the common political strategy linking the Orthodox church and the Kremlin is the anti-blasphemy. This was adopted following the episode of three feminist activists, Pussy Riot, who played in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. Their rock music, blasphemous in character, was performed on the platform of the altar, to protest against Putin’s policy. For the secular authorities the gesture was considered as one by hooligans or vandals; for the Ecclesiastical leaders it was blasphemous profanity.
Further, the Church supported the new regulations limiting access to abortion; and Putin’s law forbidding the publication of material portraying homosexuals, lesbians, bisexuals and transsexuals.
The Orthodox church’s action also spreads internationally, appearing as the promoter of dialogue between different religions and cultures. Patriarch Cyril actually stated the need to build orthodox geopolitics, in line with Putin’s foreign policy. To favour this role, the “Inter-Religious Council of the Russian Federation” and its analogous “Inter-religious Council of the CSI” (Community of Independent states) were set up in 1998. Orthodox Christians, 230 million in all, include: countries orthodox by tradition (Belarus, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, Macedonia, Moldavia, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, the Ukraine), with their own orthodox national Churches, countries containing orthodox ethnic-cultural minorities (Albania, Czech Republic, Finland, Poland, Slovakia), and countries containing orthodox faithful, principally in Western Europe. Patriarch Cyril often visits countries from the former Soviet belt to consolidate cultural, religious, but also political relations. The Orthodox church moves in the former Soviet area, which the Kremlin aims to regroup. All this, supports the government’s foreign policy, continually appealing to a shared values between the “sister nations” with “a unique story, a unique Church and unique future”.
To understand the importance one may refer to Eirini Patsea’ article, “Church diplomacy: Greece, Russia and beyond”.
The author stresses that “after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Orthodox post-Soviet states chose to submit to the spiritual leadership of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople; not the Patriarchate of Moscow. It was important, for those states and for their western interlocutors, that they cut the cord from the ROC and the Soviet politics”.
With reference to foreign policy, the situation lived in the Ukraine following the conflict is also interesting. In this country Orthodox church exponents were submitted to pressure from the Ukraine’s new “nationalist” authorities and other organisations. The latter wished to take over faculties to transfer the clergy depending on the Moscow Patriarch under the Kiev Patriarch (the latter not recognised, not even by the Constantinople Patriarch). In this regard it should be stressed that the Ukraine counts the highest number of orthodox parishes after Russia.
To conclude, it is fundamental to underline that this type of collaboration between Church and state has facilitated the rebirth of faith in Russia. It is possible in the traditional acephalus-national reality of Orthodoxy, which has made the “symphonic” Caesaropapism the true foundation of Russian identity for centuries. It is then clear that the model cannot be exported. However, the National character of the orthodox Ecclesiastical reality has not hindered the possibility of an “orthodox ecumenism” open to international dialogue between cultures and religions.
For a Resilient Recovery and Long-term Prosperity, Russia Must Invest in All its People
Alexei is a young man living in a suburb of Moscow, where he was born and raised. His estimated life expectancy is between 74-79 years. Mikhail, who is the same age as Alexei, lives in Chukotka region in the far east of Russia, where he was born. His expected life expectancy is much shorter, at between 59-63 years.
Stark differences exist across Russia not only in life expectancy but also in educational attainment. People living in Moscow or Saint Petersburg, for instance, are twice as likely to complete higher education as those living in Saransk or Volgograd. The earning potential of people in these regions differs dramatically.
Why is human capital so important?
Today, in OECD countries, human capital accounts for 70 percent of wealth, whereas for low-income countries, natural capital remains the biggest asset. In Russia, human capital accounts for 46 percent of the economy. Reaching the level of OECD countries could ensure long-term sustainability for Russia in the context of a global movement away from fossil fuels. Human capital has become a high priority for countries around the world, because its development lays a pathway to greater well-being and prosperity. Within countries, regardless of their income level, people with greater human capital are better off in life than those without.
How big are the gaps in Russia’s human capital development?
Let’s take a closer look. A child born in Russia this year will be 68 percent, on average, as productive as she could be, when she grows up, if she enjoyed complete education and full health. This compares well with the global average, whereby a child born today can expect to be just 56 percent as productive as she could be. From 2010 to 2020, Russia increased from 0.60 to 0.68 on the Human Capital Index, making it one of the fastest improving countries worldwide.
However, the 2020 Human Capital Index, which includes additional indicators for countries in Europe and Central Asia, shows that Russia is underperforming in some key areas compared to the regional average: in health and education sector spending by 1.8 points, and in human capital as a share of GDP by 0.9.
The probability of dying between ages 30 and 70 from cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes, or chronic respiratory disease is 25 percent in Russia, which is higher than the average for the Europe and Central Asia region (17%) and for higher-middle-income countries (20%). A major reason is the high prevalence of risk factors related to non-communicable diseases (NCDs).
One in five adults in Russia are obese, 30 percent are smokers, and 39 percent are heavy drinkers. About 32 percent of the population aged 18 and older suffer from hypertension.
The COVID-19 pandemic has compounded these vulnerabilities and challenges.
According to Rosstat Data, there were 71,700 more deaths in Russia during January-August 2020 compared with the same period in 2019. A broad set of measures is necessary to combat COVID-19, including testing, tracking and treatment of patients. But equally important is continuing to ensure routine health services and care for chronic conditions such as non-communicable diseases, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis. The elderly and people with NCDs are particularly vulnerable to the coronavirus. Mental health services should also be strengthened.
Given the lengthy, but necessary, school closures this year, Russia may see sizeable declines in education outcomes. We previously estimated a loss of around 16 PISA points for all students, equivalent to just under half a year in missed learning. Students from poor and vulnerable families are disproportionally affected. With learning losses so deep, significant compensation measures will be necessary.
So, what can be done to close the gaps?
Strengthening primary health care to manage common NCDs and emerging infectious diseases is key for building a resilient healthcare system. Making essential outpatient drugs for the coronavirus and NCDs affordable could save people’s lives and prevent complications which are expensive for the health system.
Expanding resources for the treatment of COVID-19 patients is the most pressing need, but starting to reorient the health care system toward prevention and primary health care could help avoid unmanageable escalation of health spending in the medium-term.
New digital services, including telemedicine and remote access to care, could make health and social care more easily available to more people, help change the way services are provided through allowing the elderly and patients with chronic diseases to receive care at home, and decrease unnecessary risks in institutional facilities.
The adoption of virtual diagnostic and treatment protocols would not only help protect doctors from the disease, but also prevent new outbreaks. Strengthening integration and coordination between health and social services could substantially improve support to the elderly and vulnerable. Relaxing telemedicine restrictions and establishing a regulated environment for virtual technologies could help build an integrated patient-centered model of healthcare delivery.
Social assistance also plays a role in human capital development. Russia has introduced measures to better support families with children, non-able-bodied persons, and the unemployed. Our research shows that these measures should be broadly effective to counteract the increase in poverty brought about by the pandemic.
Now is the right time for Russia to implement a fundamental national social assistance program which could expand during adverse economic conditions and contract when economic growth picks up. Many countries have similar programs that are specifically designed to reduce poverty and promote self-reliance by the poor. Russia has the capacity to substantially mitigate the impact of the crisis and, at the same time, build the foundation for eradicating extreme poverty in the future.
The gaps in Russia’s human capital development are not so wide they cannot be closed. To move forward requires action and collaboration across different sectors – health, education, and social protection. Policies must work in tandem for the benefit of families and individuals who need access to adequate healthcare, for children who need an education suited to future labor market demands, and for those who need help and protection in times of hardship such as these.
By investing in all its people, across the entire country, Russia can hope to achieve more equitable human capital development, a more resilient recovery from the pandemic, and greater long-term prosperity. And both Alexei and Mikhail, and their families can all hope for long, healthy, prosperous lives.
Originally published in Russian language in Vtimes via World Bank
Russia at Crossroads with Europe
The European politics has been hazy over the course of the last decade. Whether it highlights the shocking exit of Britain from the European Union, the march towards counting the ultimate end to the legacy of German Chancellor, Angela Merkel or even the unprecedented crackdown launched by France against the radical Muslim groups in the climax of the decade long ethnic mockery within the peripheries of the French community, Europe took a new metaphorical shape in regard to its position in the world. Though the stabilising relations of Germany with Russian was an astounding turn in the usual progression of the regional politics, the completion of the phase one of the gas pipeline project Nord Stream 1 in 2011 promised a bridging to the gap serving decades long rift between the ex-soviet and Europe. However, the improving relations were impeded time and time again either due to Russia’s abrasive involvement in the Syrian war or the brewing instability in Belarus; right on the borders of Europe.
The recent hurdle in the already perilous relations is the arrest of Alexei Navalny, Russian opposition leader and the leading Anti-Putin activist, immediately after his return to Russian on January 17th. Entitled as the forefront critic of Kremlin, Navalny is celebrated as the contemporary leader of modern Russia. His popularity brimmed when he valiantly stood unfettered against the Putin government, continually working to amass support in his mission to expose the corruption in Putin’s Russia. His golden campaign in 2011-12 during demonstrations against widespread allegations of rigged elections placed him at the alter as the fearless rival to Vladimir Putin and his representation of a totalitarian Russia. Navalny gained immense support when he was apparently poisoned in August by the members of Russian Federal security Service (FSB) while he was domestically travelling from Serbia.
While Navalny revived in Berlin, the tensing relations with Europe were rippled through Russia putting Putin’s regime in a dilemma. Even the softening Germany picked up its stern stance when Navalny briefly slipped into a coma while recovering. Navalny was arrested when he returned to Russia, while making true on his promise to drive the revolution from the streets of Russia and ‘not from Berlin’. Navalny faces a 30-day detention till his hearing scheduled on February 2nd on the account of violating the probation allotted to him back in 2014 that was due to expire in December 2020, had he ensured prompt in-person check-ins with the authorities. However, Navalny was not deliberately evading the check-ins but was convalescing for the past five months in Germany from the fatal effects of the poison delivered to him at the decree of Putin; accusations that have been repeatedly denied both by the FSB and the Kremlin regime.
While the Russian government is aiming to implicate Navalny for purposefully evading the probation, this casts an unwitting accusation on Germany for colluding with a convict. As Navalny looks to an estimate sentence of 10-year imprisonment, Germany had already made its heated stance on the matter clear back when Navalny was revealed to have been poisoned by the Putin regime. The German Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, asserted: “I hope the Russians don’t force us to change our position on Nord Stream 2”. The clean implication is the warning casted by Germany to abandon the second phase of the pipeline, which is tentative to be completed in late 2021. While Germany has always made good on its promise to keep the Pipeline project and politics separate, the brewing shift was solidified through the following statement of Merkel’s spokesperson stating: “The German Chancellor (Angela Merkel) agrees with the Foreign Minister’s comments”. The finality of the statement projects the diverting alliance of Germany that was constantly on the verge of collapse throughout the decade long opposition of European Union and piling threats of US to slap sanctions if Nord Stream was operated in the region.
Germany never cancelled nor deferred the project until now and despite of the relentless opposition to the project, Germany kept an open mind to the possibilities that could flow even at the cost of reliance on one of the notoriously untrustworthy regimes in the world. However, now as the protests across Russia have exploded through over 70 cities in support of Navalny, the Putin regime should ideally forgo the notion of a successful project completion. Navalny’s team is expected to launch an investigation against Putin’s corruption scandals, titled ‘Putin’s Palace. History of World’s Largest Bribe’; the investigation intents to uncover state run funds and donation embezzlement at the whim of Putin throughout his tenure in the office. With mass protests flowing in from Far East to central Russia, engulfing the capital Moscow, the situation is worsening as Navalny’s trial approaches.
Now as Europe prepares to tighten the screws against Russia and Germany no longer intends to bridge the relations, Putin faces two options: either submit to the opposition and release Navalny to patch diplomatic damage or continue down the path that could lead to both internal revolution and external crisis. However, with 3400 arrests already reported on account of illegal protests including the recent arrest of Navalny’s spokeswoman Kira Yarmysh, Putin’s choice could not be clearer, at least in the short run.
Russia is a part of Europe, which never became a part of Russia
The process of the new European integration coincided in time with the intensification of the process of globalization, which has stimulated and inspired the formation of the European Union. Presently, debates about the crisis of globalization are going almost simultaneously with discussions about the crisis of European integration. The European press is now wondering who is to blame for the fact that globalization, which, overall, has contributed positively to the process of global development, failed to become a universal and, most importantly, a harmonizing model of the world order.
According to the authoritative participants in the discourse, currently going on in the European press, “the inevitable trilemma of the world economy, namely, the contradiction between the realities of democracy, sovereignty and global economic integration” has been both a bone of contention and a stumbling block. Naturally enough, these global tendencies have reflected negatively on the integration process involving the better part of Europe. As Alexei Gromyko noted in one of his recent speeches, the old principles of European integration are no longer being emulated.
The pro-EU-minded European elites admit that the whole idea initially emerged as a political project, with a “top down” structure. According to the authors of a collective study of identification problems in Europe, published by Cambridge University, political scientists of the European Union, often sponsored by the European Commission, focus mainly on the Union itself and the influence of its institutions, while virtually ignoring how the sense of community was being formed “from the down up” also outside the EU institutions or close to them. They added that the financial and economic crisis had clearly shown that external disciplinary principles of integration are ahead of, and in some cases run counter to internal integration, as well as its regional diversity.
Europe is now fully aware of the need to maintain its global competitiveness and exercise a rapid transition to a new industrial revolution. As for the East European countries, however, they do not have sufficient financial and economic resources to build a fully competitive industry of their own, and, therefore, EU subsidies to the tune of 20 percent of these countries’ budgets helped to narrow to some extent the yawning gap in the socio-economic development between the “old” and “new” Europe.
According to the director of the Minsk-based Center for European Integration, Yuri Shevtsov, “what we see today is a clear transition of European integration to a new principle of dealing with less developed states. The previous level of hidden and open subsidies is no longer possible. Juncker’s stimulus plan for the EU’s high-tech sector … was mainly applied to the countries of “old” Europe that are better prepared for it … The inevitable cuts in subsidies to Eastern Europeans create a new reality for them for the long haul and essentially perpetuate the longstanding negative tendencies of the region’s economic development. What can Eastern Europe hope for during the 10-15 years? What are the consequences of the EU’s switch to a new development model? “
This leads to another important question of whether this new reality will set the stage for a new historical rapprochement between Russia and the countries of this part of Europe.
It is not only economic issues and stability of the European market for the consumption of our energy resources that we are concerned about, of course. There is no denying the fact that Russia is a part of Europe. The French cultural historian, Pierre Chaunu, argued that involvement in an intra-civilizational dialogue is the only criterion of someone’s belonging to European civilization. Russia fully meets this criterion, of course. And yet, where does the feeling of a certain watershed, a barrier separating Europe from Russia that once was so acutely felt by the Slavophiles and Westernizers, really come from? From the point of view of anatomy, Russia is a part of Europe, which never became a part of Russia. How about the powerful influence of Byzantine culture on European civilization? Don’t we see enough traces of this culture in Italian, German and other European cities? And still, Byzantium never became part of Europe, which tried so hard to destroy the civilization of which Russia became a successor…
It is highly symptomatic that the Dutch authorities recently listed Russia as one of the countries “around Europe,” including this status in the concept of the kingdom’s foreign cultural policy for 2017-2020. We know, however, that the Netherlands is not alone in this assessment. Paradoxically, it was Holland that was the main partner of and a source of inspiration for Peter the Great, who opened the “window on Europe.”
We say that Russia is a part of Europe as if we were standing on the opposite bank. Why so? It would be more natural for us say: “Europe is a part of Russia,” especially since Russia is not absorbed by Europe and has a significant part of it belonging to Asia, and not only geographically.
At the dawn of the past century, one Russian thinker wrote: “When reading the press and listening to public moods, I am saddened to see just how neglected our Russian thought really is and how timidly, as if apologizing, Russian people think in Russian when their thoughts differ from those of the West. ”
The Institute of Europe is more than just an academic institution; it is the center, the focus of Russian thought about Europe. Moreover, in your work you have managed to maintain an important balance that is often ignored, especially by our education system, which prioritizes one part of Europe over the other. This is our eternal problem. Just as was so sadly noted by the observer I mentioned before, “We know something from history, from German, French and English literature, but we don’t know a thing about the history and literature of the Slavs. If the Russian people were examined on the history of Slavism, I think the result would be pretty much instructive, as we would feel ashamed of our ignorance. We learned about Karl, Friedrich and Louis at school, but not about the Slavs.”
The Russian philosopher Vladimir Ern famously said that in relation to Russia, Europe was making a rather rapid transformation from “Kant to Krupp.” This is something we should always keep in mind.
What trends will prevail in Europe? Centripetal, deepening the next internal convergence, or centrifugal, which will make Europe a conglomerate of nation states again? After all, history does not repeat itself in details only.
I think there is no need for any of us to become Eurosceptics or Euro-optimists, even though sometimes it seems to me that there are more Euro-optimists among our political analysts (in percentage terms) than anywhere else in Europe. It is important for us to understand just how Europe’s political, cultural and economic development is going to affect us. What will these changes mean for Russia? What do we need to prepare for?
The work being done by your institute and its unique team, acquires a truly invaluable role in solving these problems, and I want to wish all of you every success in this all-important endeavor!
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