Control of the Caspian Sea has been highly sought after due to its abundance of natural resources. Nearly 3 billion gallons of crude oil are produced every day and 3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas are produced every year. It is estimated that there could be well over 48 billion barrels of crude oil and over 292 trillion cubic feet of natural gas that still remain to be discovered.
Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan surround the Caspian Sea, each battling for the territorial rights to the land and seabed near each country’s borders since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Prior to 1991, only Iran and the Soviet Union controlled the Caspian Sea. The two countries had a series of bilateral treaties that equally divided the Caspian. The fall of the Soviet Union, however, created many challenges for both countries. For Russia the collapse of the Soviet Union meant losing valuable land and seabed rights of the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Iran was faced with the challenges of competing with and negotiating with these new countries as well as losing its equally-shared rights of the Caspian with Russia.
The Caspian has been called a sea since its discovery in ancient times, but there has been much debate over the years whether the Caspian should be considered a lake rather than a sea. The rationale behind this debate is because a lake would be equally divided while a sea would not. Bilateral treaties between Iran and the Soviet Union dating back to 1921 called the Caspian a lake rather than a sea. Calling it a lake would specify that its waters and resources would only be divided by the surrounding countries. As a sea the United Nations Convention on the Seas would regulate the Caspian’s waters and resources, making them available to the surrounding countries as well as the international community. The equal division of the Caspian and renaming it a lake has been rejected by several of the littoral states and divisional agreements of the seabed still has not been reached. So the legal battle for the Caspian continues to quietly rage.
Countries surrounding the Caspian Sea are not the only ones that have great interest in the sea’s natural resources. Individuals, international communities (U.S., China, Turkey, EU) and multinational corporations all have a financial interest or desire to invest, in addition to those that wish to utilize the Caspian’s natural resources, and are trying to wedge their own agendas into the process, adding fuel to the fire. It would seem that the territorial disputes could not be more complex, but now the nuclear deal with Iran could cause even more legal and geopolitical wrangling. The removal of international sanctions against Iran would once again allow it to export crude oil and natural gas. Iran could potentially join the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline that would connect with the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, allowing Western Europe to receive natural gas from the Islamic republic and nearly bypass Russia completely.
The removal of sanctions could thus be viewed as both beneficial and dangerous. These potential export developments with Iran could threaten the current revenue and natural resource funding for the other states surrounding the Caspian Sea. Historically, during previous wars and battles near the Caspian, transportation problems with oil and natural gas cascaded into the world market. Problems included deliberate sabotage of pipelines, incidental destruction during the course of battle, and improper maintenance of pipelines due to fighting in the area. So it is clear that there is no Caspian conflict that can remain a purely parochial or local problem. It will always be innately transnational. Currently Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan produce the largest amounts of natural resources from the Caspian Sea. Russia has created a monopoly on the export of natural resources, as travelling through its country’s pipelines was the easiest and most cost effective way for the resources to reach their final destinations. Once Iran is allowed to export these natural resources again it is likely that they will receive substantial international investment to increase their production levels as well as create new pipelines. It is estimated that Iran possesses the second largest natural gas reserve in the world and could produce up 600,000 barrels of oil daily. All of this potentially makes Iran the largest producer of oil and gas from the Caspian, as well as providing new transportation routes that might massively disrupt the geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation.
On the surface these changes for Iran may seem rather insignificant as the full breadth of potential power it will gain has yet to be seen. Iran could use this power to control others by withholding its natural resources or using them to influence other nations’ policies against it (in short, something like a mirror of the concerns presently being levied against Russia by the EU). Skepticism surrounds its nuclear program as countries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia view the program as a direct threat, no matter what accord has been signed. Countries who view the nuclear deal with Iran negatively may take actions into their own hands to prevent Iran from rising to its fullest potential prosperity and global integration. So the evolution of Caspian fallout from the Iran nuclear deal will likely soon show how much International Political Economy bleeds into global security concerns.
Bilateral treaties guaranteeing physical security have been created between the littoral Caspian states. In 2007, the treaties specifically included declarations of non-aggression against one another. In 2014, at the Caspian Summit, the five Caspian presidents signed a declaration to guarantee security and stability in the region by only allowing the Caspian littoral states to have their armed forces present in the Caspian Sea and agreeing to not allow military forces of any other nation to enter the sea. No longer is physical security the only concern that must be taken into consideration, however. The littoral states of the Caspian Sea, as well as the global oil and gas investors working with them, must take into account the potential for a cyber-attack. The emergence of a brave new dangerous cyber world with the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s facilities several years ago shows that Caspian security needs to move beyond expectations and definitions that are exclusively conventional. It is not implausible that a cyber-attack could determine which littoral state controls the natural resources and transnational agendas of the Caspian, especially if a serious attack like Stuxnet ever happens again. Such an attack could have devastating effects on the global community, not just the Caspian littoral states, as it is clear there is great hope from the United States all the way to China that the development of the Caspian region is something seen by all as a global economic and security priority. Thus is the nature of this fascinating region: a land full of promise and seen by many with great hope while also being laden with far too many potential minefields.
Transnational Crimes in the Maritime Realm
Maritime trafficking routes closely follow the commercial shipping lanes. The modalities, technologies and strategies put into place by criminals are often times more sophisticated in caliber than those used in regulated trade. The vast expanses of the sea, the complexity of the maritime transportation system, the immense volume of cargo transferred at each port, and the limited capacity for inspections of cargo creates opportunity for criminals. Seaborne trade in the maritime realm follows a defined set of “sea lines of communication” based on currents and weather. Because of the robustness of shipping and mass amounts of cargo moved, traffickers utilize the same shipping industry routes with great effect. Shipping and sea lanes tend to offer anonymity for criminals, whereas their activities can be hidden behind legitimate industries. Criminal activity, especially illicit trade in narcotics, humans, and weapons, has become so extensive that it is difficult according to various studies to rule out implications of states and corporations in the criminal enterprise.
Individuals from various nationalities, followed by multiple vessels flagged to different states, adds the UN Drug Trade Report 2019, are used in the networks which transit the waters of various states and call at different ports before reaching their final destination. Despite the abundance of laws designed to combat illicit trafficking and an apparent impetus to stop specific types of crime, government’s remains only marginally successful in preventing the global flow of illegal goods due to the overwhelming volume and complexity of the markets for illicit trade. Working in tandem, the maritime forces nevertheless have made successful efforts to disrupt the illicit supply chains as a result of sea-based security operations; cooperation and collaboration between law enforcement organizations.
Nevertheless, legal complexity arises as the high seas “fall outside the jurisdiction of any single state” under the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The ocean space is to be collectively policed by all states governed by principles of Freedom of navigation. Piracy and the illicit trafficking of narcotics, humans, and weapons comprise the main varieties of transnational crime. UNCLOS addresses these matter of concern in the realm of the sea, where various articles provide guidance in order to curb or limit the threats. Article 110 expounds the customary rule that warships may “approach and visit” on the high seas “any ship that is suspected of piracy, human trafficking, unauthorized broadcasting; and is without nationality”; or, “is flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag.” Article 111 addresses the right of “hot pursuit”, allowing warships of one state to follow a vessel through the different maritime zones of the ship if based on “reasonable grounds,” it is suspected of illegal activity.
UNCLOS under Article 108 empowers states to cooperate and offer assistance to suppress drug trafficking by other state-flagged vessels. Traditionally, drug traffickers used overland routes, but since last two decades, they have shifted transportation into the “Indo-Pacific Ocean”. The majority of this trafficking has proliferated in the littoral regions, and often within territorial waters. In the latter years, advancement in technologies, providing for larger ships have allowed traffickers to move further into the sea to capitalize “blue water” areas, outside the 12-nautical mile mark and at times further than the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of any country. It is a documented fact that U.S. is the world’s largest consumer of illegal drugs, also according to various studies the source and transit zones of drug trafficking between South America and the U.S despite high patrols on the border.
Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea
Piracy has been one of the most ancient forms of maritime crime that is treated rigorously under the provisions of UNCLOS. Article 101 defines piracy as “any illegal act of violence or detention, any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or private aircraft on the high seas against another ship or aircraft, outside the jurisdiction of any state.” The latter parts highlights an important aspect that piracy is a type of transnational crime conducted by non-state actors in international waters. Article 105 of UNCLOS grants everystate the authority to seize any vessel, associated property and to arrest any persons engaged in piracy. Domestic courts of the state conducting the seizure have the mandate prosecute the pirates under domestic law and determine what to do with the vessels; however, to date the courts remain inadequate or unsupported in many places.
Piracy became a security issue of international concern since the last decade and half, primarily in the Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea largely due to weak patrolling and sea blindness by the littoral states of the region. However, to an extent order at sea has been maintained with the presence Combined Task Force-151(CTF-151), focused on counter-piracy, and Combined Task Force-150 (CTF-150) to combat illicit activities at sea. Supported by several U.N. Security Council Resolutions, these task forces have “engaged with regional partners to build capacity and improve capabilities to protect global maritime commerce and secure freedom of navigation.”
Piracy in the Asia-Pacific remains a matter of concern, however most of the incidents are underreported and those reported are of such small scale that they cloud the assessment of major piracy events. In the region, although piracy has been contained in the eastern region of Africa whereas it has proliferated in the western Africa around the Gulf of Guinea. This subject-matter experts conclude is a result of an increased trafficking in narcotics from Latin America, along with the various other illicit elements involving illegal fishing and human trafficking. The increased in piracy is a reminder for states that piracy remains a persistent and widespread challenge to maritime security. The recent activities in Somalia and Yemen foreshadow a resurgence of piracy in the region, encouraged by trafficking of light weapons and small arms, along with non-state actor’s unprecedented access to ship monitoring, tracking devices, and use of unmanned systems and long range communications.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) identifies only certain types of transnational crime that affect maritime security, but there are many varieties and combinations of criminal activity that affect security and safety from the high seas to internal waters. Domestic laws however need be brought in line with international law, and cooperative partnerships between the states, law enforcement, and militaries to combat illicit activity needs to transcend the morass of politics that are often a hurdle in the way of more comprehensive legal regimes. It is recommended that information and intelligence sharing, along with TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures) need to be employed by the maritime forces to ensure freedom of the seas. UNCLOS provides a strong framework and multilateral efforts to deter criminal activity at sea for a more secure, safer operating environment for all. However, it is the difficulty in effective prosecution and applying of an equitable punishment to the culprits, involved in piracy, human trafficking and illicit drugs that must serve as a reminder to all states that much awaits for an all-inclusive solution.
Fighting Corporate Espionage by a Counterintelligence Agent
Corporate executives must bear the responsibility of today’s evolving corporate world entering into a global community where not only are the exposures to such a wide market area lucrative to an already thriving business, but also to a grave danger of the companies’ trade and technology secrets, systems, financial accounts and much more. No longer is “Security” to the facility and personnel all that is required. Many foreign countries and interests take short cuts to becoming competitive through the theft of trade secrets, products and overt and covert espionage of all sorts. Some of these entities are now facing a growing challenge from United States corporations with safeguarding of commercial information, proprietary information, and economic factors.
Many of the tactics utilized in private sector counterintelligence have much in common with the secrets and information the government does its best to safeguard from theft of foreign governments or non-traditional actor threats. The FBI estimates U.S. Corporations lose over $100 billion annually. There are open and legal methods of collection open that are harmful and a good counterintelligence program should target this as well as illegal activities such as electronic eavesdropping, hacking, etc. Passive counterintelligence tries to curtail what a collector may do through countermeasures, and awareness training. Active counterintelligence will prove beneficial to identify and detect a threat, and will conduct operations including eliminating threats or ongoing targeting. A mitigation policy should be of avail. After an attack it may raise shareholder concern which needs to be quelled quickly. Quick realization of a threat and implementing action promptly and efficiently can stop immeasurable damage.
The leaders in the private sector need to be proactive and realize that it is no longer only local threats they face. The threats can be global and may not only be an economic threat but also a threat to national security. In the U.S. private sector ties to the Defense, Intelligence and other government entities can be vast with a great deal of interplay and interconnectedness. Also, corporations do not employ many of the safeguards put in place by the defense and other government departments. Compartmentation, clearance, and many operations taken for granted in the government aren’t serving the corporate structures well-being at all or as well as it should be. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Title 18, Sections 1831 and 1832 of the U.S. Code covers economic espionage and also if they are considered trade theft prosecutions.
Where once economic espionage meant directly infiltrating a company or recruiting an employee within the corporation our biggest challenge today is cyber espionage. In reality secrets and information are stolen often and not even known they were taken. And a much less chance of apprehension. Cybercrimes operate in a stealth mode in many ways, but in a contrast way can be identified and detected and countered with effective counterintelligence methods. The U.S. economy has changed over the past 20 years. “Intellectual capital rather than physical assets now represent the bulk of a U.S. corporation’s value.”
With the growth of cybercrimes including corporate espionage some tips for safeguarding and thwarting foreign hostile intrusions include
Conduct real-time monitoring of networks and retaining access records
Software tools for content mgt., data loss prevention, network forensics
Utilize multi-factor authentication measures such as biometrics, PINS, passwords
Mobility policy in which measures are developed to oversee which connections can and cannot be made to corporate systems
Limits on social networking
Establish contingency plans
When deciding to emplace a counterintelligence program to safeguard a corporation the first stepis to conduct a risk assessment by assessing vulnerabilities and estimating the consequences of losing critical assets. This should be headed up by a board member or senior executive.
Then move to step two in which groundwork is laid for establishing a corporate counterintelligence program. Hire a manager dedicated to counterintelligence. Hook up the company’s security, intelligence assurance, general counsel and HR departments. Develop liaison with government law and intelligence. Ensure centralized management of the counterintelligence program. And have legal counsel provide guidance on the counterintelligence program actions.
Identify the Capabilities needed
Threat awareness and training
Analysis, Reporting and Response
Suspicious activity reporting
Implement the Counterintelligence Program
A basic counterintelligence program description will look something like this: PM (Program Manager) interplay such as:
PM develops and implements CI program
PM oversees a centralized CI Program office
PM maintains insight into all corporate elements
PM is responsible for liaison with US Government
Security officers responsible for tactical CI
PM provides CI guidance through training programs
Also be aware that not only high tech companies are targeted since the targeted information they seek may be deemed important by who is doing the shopping.
Where does allegiance lie?
Dongfan “Greg” Chung who is a native of China and a naturalized U.S. Citizen had “secret” security clearance while working with Rockwell and Boeing Corporations on the Space Shuttle project. He had retired in 2002 but returned a year later as a contractor until fall 2006. The government proved Chung committed espionage by taking and concealing Boeing secrets regarding the Delta IV rocket and also the Space Shuttle. He did this for the People’s Republic of China. He was convicted on charges of acting as an agent of the PRC as well as economic espionage.
The investigation of a different engineer working within the U.S is what led to Chung’s investigation and resulting conviction. He was sentenced to more than 24 years in prison.
The Chinese had sent letters requesting information as far back as 1979. In correspondence with the PRC Chung expressed his wishes to help the PRC modernize. He also sent 24 manuals related to the important B-1 Bomberfrom Rockwell Corporation which was very damaging.
Travel trips to the People’s Republic of China occurred on multiple occasions to lecture but he also met with government officials. In letters from his handlers they use his wife Rebecca and Chi Mak to transmit information. In the fall of 2006 FBI and NASA agents searched his home and discovered more than 250,000 documents from Boeing, Rockwell and others which were secret.
The Shuttle Drawing System or “SDS” that Rockwell and Boeing engineers created held information regarding performing processes regarding the Space Shuttle. The engineers need a password and authorization to be able to access this system and files. This is a clear case that defensive counterintelligence measures could have prevented printing, concealment and removal of documents from the workplace. One great example of offensive counterespionage was the search of Chung’s trash which led to much revealing evidence.Also his extensive travel to the PRC was an indicator that his scope of activities while in the PRC were above speaking engagements, seminars, teaching, personal. The authorities did conduct offensive counterintelligence to the best of their abilities once it learned via the other agent implicated in similar dealings with the PRC.
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