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American views on Europe’s geopolitical clout

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What have American politicians had to say about Europe, its role, significance or insignificance and its relationship with America? Naturally, the USA has had different views of Europe over time: early in its history when it was a colony; later, as the weaker and less developed half of the western world watching Europe colonize the world in awe or with contempt; and, later still, as a global power shielding Europe from the Russian threat.

Our concern here is with the present and the recent past, the post-war period. In an excellent book, John L. Harper, professor at Johns Hopkins University, compares the visions of Europe of three influential American statesmen: President (1933-45) Franklin D. Roosevelt, the diplomat and political scientist George F. Kennan and  Secretary of State (from 1949-53) Dean Acheson. [1] The views of these three men on Europe’s significance and role and thus about US foreign policy show striking contrasts. Roosevelt’s vision reflected America’s Euro-phobia. He believed that Europe’s time was over and the old continent belonged in a retirement home. Roosevelt was almost as hostile to France’s aspirations to play an independent role as to Nazi Germany. He was also opposed to Churchill’s idea of a United States of Europe on the grounds that an integrated Western Europe with all kinds of independent aspirations was not in America’s interest. Roosevelt saw the world as a quasi-unipolar one in which the USA controlled international politics, nominally within the United Nations framework, together with China, Russia and the UK, but in reality as the unquestionably dominant actor. There were some contradictions in Roosevelt’s views: he would have liked a weak Europe but did not want to station US troops on the continent, simply because he did not consider it strategically as important as the Middle and Far East. The President was convinced that, with WWII, Europe had virtually written itself off and become irreversibly irrelevant. At this time, the idea of European integration and a European Union existed only as thought experiment in a handful of minds.

The main champions of the other fundamental US approach to Europe in the 20th century were President Eisenhower and the eminent diplomat George F. Kennan (the author of the famous “Long Telegram” from Moscow of 1946, which helped to galvanize awareness of the dangers posed by the Soviet Union). Their position was directly opposed to Roosevelt’s: they were convinced that Europe should be strengthened, not weakened, therefore it was essential to maintain an interim US military presence on the continent and encourage its economic and political integration. Only a reinforced Western Europe could resist the Soviet Union in the long run. Only a strong and prosperous Europe could solve the problem of a divided Germany and lure the satellite states of central and Eastern Europe with its positive example. But they insisted on the temporary nature of a US presence, arguing that eventually Europe should provide for its own defense: Europe should not get soft and used to the idea of having America protect it in any situation. As Eisenhower put it in the fifties: “It is not possible, and most certainly not desirable, that Europe should be an occupied territory defended by legions brought in from abroad…” The task of the USA was to encourage the emergence of a third great power bloc which would. become America’s friend and help it solve the international problems of a multipolar world order. But even the pro-Europe Kennan found it difficult to tolerate France’s vehement geopolitical ambitions to build a Europe keeping an equal distance from the USA and the Soviet Union. As he once quipped: I was a Gaullist before de Gaulle.

Dean Acheson’s Europe policy was a synthesis of the previous two, the one to subordinate Europe and the other to restore its strength and make it an equal partner. Acheson believed that the fate of Europe was too important to the US to be left to Europeans alone. And this would have been true even if the Soviet Union had not existed. Consequently — and this was in line with what he was hearing from most realistic European politicians — a Western alliance was needed in which Europe did not play an equal role with the USA. In other words, instead of a tripolar world order, Europe would become part of America’s western empire by invitation. The Acheson view, which became the predominant one from the 1950s onwards, was based on the following key assumptions: a certain degree of (Western) European integration was useful for the West and opposing it would trigger an anti-American reaction, nonetheless, US hegemony had to be maintained to guarantee that Europe could withstand Russia’s pressure. NATO was the key western institution of this setup as the guarantor and executor of America’s dominant role.

Harper calls this world order a semi duopoly, in which Europe recognized that it could not guarantee its own geopolitical position and security and the USA recognized that it needed Europe as its key ally to maintain this world order. It was within the framework of this paradigm, which existed for decades, that the European Union carried out its internal construction. Naturally, the end of the Cold War forced a reevaluation of many things, including the international order and EU-US relations in it. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the western world lived in euphoria for years. For a brief while it was even believed that the “end of history” had come, inasmuch as Professor Fukuyama’s theory was widely accepted that western liberal democracy, as the final form of human government, had claimed the ultimate victory. The United States had won the Cold War, which for Europe meant a significant devaluation of its geopolitical importance: the USA could finally turn its attention to emerging parts of the world and start consolidating a new unipolar world order. Europe could continue its ever-closer integration, introduce the euro as a single currency and allow in the former satellite countries of Central and Eastern Europe as fully-fledged members of the EU. The USA became intoxicated by unipolarity and allowed its frustration over grievances (for example during the Iraq conflict) to lead its relations with European countries to deteriorate. The paradigm of semi-duopoly was replaced by the unipolar worldview of the neoconservative Bush era. In other words, America no longer felt the need to have Europe by its side to manage the world’s affairs.

The contemporary neoconservative view of Europe is influenced not only by geostrategic considerations but also by moral value judgments: Europe is becoming objectively weaker, on top of which its leaders are seen the same way as those soft and feeble Europeans who appeased Hitler in the 30s and watched with their arms folded while the Nazis extended their power. Europe is a decadent society living in a postmodern dream world leading to complete decay. In addition, Europe continues to sabotage the international policy and ambitions of the USA, the only remaining standard bearer and defender of western civilization (just think of America’s sense of mission). Naturally, the post-9/11 atmosphere of revenge present in American political circles and society greatly contributed to the dominance of neoconservative principles. Much of Europe responded to various US military actions coldly, with rejection or sabotage, which stirred in US government circles a degree of anti-Europeanism unseen for a long time. The opinion of Richard Perle, an influential neocon political advisor, reflects these sentiments well. He once said that Europeans were unwilling to invest in the defense industry because they were only interested in their own comfort. Europe’s wariness of excessive American power, however, pre-dates the neocon era; it developed gradually in Western Europe, especially France following World War II. The contemporary French critique of the United States as a “hyperpuissance” did not begin during the Bush administration but was already to the fore during the Clinton administration, which maintained friendly ties with Europe. Its main outlines were strongly marked in Gaullism and indeed the historical roots are deeper still: as early as 1817, John Quincy Adams, who went on to become US President, forewarned that Europeans would one day see the USA as a “dangerous nation”.

Although they may not admit it, neocons are bothered by the fact that Europe rejects a foreign policy based on sheer force and presents an alternative approach to the world and its problems. The neoconservative era had brought about one psychological novelty for Europeans: their covert anti-Americanism has been an almost natural element of trans-Atlantic relations but, during the war in Iraq, they experienced the same resentment from the side of the USA. The election of President Obama seemed to hold the promise of a fresh start in trans-Atlantic relations, not only because of the President’s personality but also because his advocacy of a new rulebook for the new world order would necessitate close cooperation between the two western power blocs.

How do American politicians and commentators see Europe’s present and future geopolitical role and relations with the USA? Once again, there are plenty of theories to choose from.

Fareed Zakaria, the prominent foreign affairs columnist, believes that Europe could greatly contribute to the world’s stability by accepting Turkey’s bid for EU membership, but as it holds Turkey in limbo (with an eventual “No” more likely than not), it contributes to increased international instability. But above all, Europe is missing the opportunity to regain its status as a key geostrategic actor to be reckoned with.

Robert Zoellick, former deputy Secretary of State and President of the World Bank since 2007, is a popular figure in Europe. He is convinced that Europe’s worldview is distorted by its own self-identity. International negotiations and consultations are a successful means of solving problems in an EU context but do not always work in every case elsewhere in the world. The innate European attitude means a clear preference for maintaining the status quo, whatever the international issue. This attitude makes it difficult to adapt to a rapidly changing world. Europeans are convinced that any effort to change the world is doomed to fail.

Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor who shaped American geopolitical thinking for decades, is a member of the right-wing realistic school. He sees a growing gap between the US and Europe in military capabilities, as well as technological and economic development. Europe is going downhill, without the political will and the ability to pursue its geopolitical interests successfully or protect itself in the swiftly changing circumstances of the 21st century. Its troubles are further aggravated by its catastrophic demographic prospects. At first glance, it is not easy to distinguish between the realist and the neocon views of Europe, but there is a huge difference: realists are saddened by Europe’s decline, while neocons are pleased about it. Kissinger believes that the future shape of the world is going to be fashioned by three geopolitical processes (revolutions, as he calls them). Firstly, the drift of the center of gravity of international affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Secondly, the radical Islamist challenge to historic notions of sovereignty. Thirdly, the transformation of the traditional state system of Europe. All of these may even lead to the creation of a European political union.

It was Henry Kissinger, the then National Security Advisor, who in 1972 famously posed the oft-quoted rhetorical question: “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?” The question remains unanswered; Europe still does not speak with a single voice, it still does not have a common foreign policy and the political union is still not a reality. Europe’s economic unity is tangible both within its boundaries (for European companies and citizens) and outside. However, the Kissinger question pertained to the lack of political unity. It is unlikely that — as many Europeans believe — Kissinger was trying to poke fun at Europe.

To non-Europeans, “European foreign policy” is an obscure, complicated, multi-tier system. On the one hand, it incorporates member states’ own traditional foreign policies (especially of those who are significant actors internationally); on the other hand, it includes the nominally common EU foreign policy as well as the defense policy (launched in the wake of the wars of former Yugoslavia). In other words, it is the sum of principles and actions that member states consult each other on or adopt with unanimity. Finally, it even includes those truly common foreign policies that are more commercial in nature, such as development policy or trade policy, both of which are run from Brussels.

With member states taking turns at the helm of the EU for six-month stints, its international partners find it difficult to take Europe seriously. Member states have never really warmed to the idea of a common foreign policy; most of them persist with their own national foreign policies. These are far more important than Community projects, which are slow and cumbersome to implement. In a European Union of 28 one cannot seriously talk about equal diplomatic partners, even if that would be formally correct. The foreign policy horizon of smaller member states rarely extends beyond relations with neighboring states or emergencies; therefore they can add little value when it comes to deciding global issues. The key problem remains that nobody knows who makes the common foreign policy, who speaks for Europe. This issue has not been solved by the Lisbon treaty and the establishment of the post of the European foreign policy representative and the EU external action service.

The evolution of a “common” European foreign policy is a painfully slow process: the so-called European Political Cooperation (a synonym for consultations between foreign ministries) was only superseded by foreign policy coordination — misleadingly labeled the common foreign and security policy — a quarter of a century later. European defense cooperation is in an embryonic stage. Europe’s total defense spending is about half of the USA’s 350 billion, but the main reason behind its military weakness is the fragmentation of its national armies. The number of American soldiers readily deployable oversees nears half a million, compared with less than a hundred thousand in the EU.

When World War II ended and the Cold War began, the European powers realized that their glory days were over and they desperately needed the American nuclear umbrella. With the Cold War over and former satellite countries inside the EU, the former relative cohesion loosened and during the Iraq crisis European foreign policy failed spectacularly. The old continent split into two camps along the lines of their position on the war; trans-Atlantic relations fell to their lowest ebb in decades. In November 2003, Donald Rumsfeld, the Defense Secretary who was later forced to resign because of failures in Iraq, put Germany in the group of “problem countries” together with Iran and Libya. In return, the German Minister of Justice compared him to Hitler. Who would have thought just a few decades earlier that such a thing could ever happen? Statements like “you are either with us or with the terrorists” by President Bush or the “old Europe — new Europe” classification by the Defense Secretary did not exactly help either. Implicit or open messages, covert or overt threats of armed response, sophisticated economic sanctions and abusive statements escalated on both sides of the Atlantic. Europe’s response to the US policy of “divide et impera” was a surge of anti-Americanism. The two nests of Western culture seemed to have drifted apart. America’s arrogance only stoked the fire of Europe’s deep-seated anti-Americanism. Displays of American-friendliness by Central and Eastern European countries, which had just shaken loose of Russian oppression, earned them reproaches from Western Europe and the ratings of the British prime minister fell fast. During the second term of the Bush administration and especially after the election of President Obama things began to return to normal, but the US still does not consider the EU a potent foreign policy actor capable of unified and determined action.

Let me cite one example to illustrate my point! In 2008, The Wall Street Journal called the EU’s ultimatum to Russia on Georgia a joke. “Stop! Or we’ll say stop again! With apologies to comedian Robin Williams, that’s the line that comes to mind when weighing the European Union’s declaration Monday on Russia’s continued occupation of Georgia.” — the front-page article ran.
“At a special meeting in Brussels, EU national leaders told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to abide by the terms of a French-brokered cease-fire, including a pullback of Russian troops to their pre-conflict positions. If he doesn’t do so, they warned they will hold another meeting. It’s been almost three weeks since Mr. Medvedev signed the cease-fire, and five days since Moscow broke with the world by recognizing the self-declared independence of Georgian provinces South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Yet European leaders evidently need more time to ruminate over the situation in the Caucasus.”
The Wall Street journal added that during a post-summit press conference Nicolas Sarkozy was justly posed the question: Is the EU a “paper tiger”? Mr. Sarkozy, visibly angered, responded: “Demonstrations of force, verbal aggression, sanctions, countersanctions . . . will not serve anyone.” “What Europe needs is political will”, the conservative paper wrote, adding that “Mr. Sarkozy would do better to name and shame those member states whose desire to curry favor with Moscow keeps the EU from taking a firmer stand.”
The same thing happened a few years later at the time when the Ukraine crisis hit: US foreign policy staff was very disappointed by the slow and timid reaction of the EU.
Would Americans be irritated by a move towards closer political integration in the EU, making it a federation of states with a more united and robust foreign policy and a higher profile? This was the question I put to all the analysts, diplomats and political scientists I met over the last few years. Much to my surprise, they all said: No. On the contrary, the USA has an interest in ensuring that the EU can respond in a united way to conflict situations and play a diplomatic and military role that its economic might entitles it to.
The idea of creating a European political union has intrigued both European and American leaders for centuries. George Washington, whom Napoleon deeply admired, prophesied in his correspondence to the Marquis de Lafayette that one day Europe would follow the example of the United States of America. It looks like we are in for a long wait.
During the Cold War it was the Soviet Union, in the 21st century it will be Asia, and in particular China that will lie at the heart of American foreign policy. The China-focused nature of US foreign policy is the consequence of geopolitical realities, which Europe can do little about. Nonetheless, by being fragmented, Europe devalues its international role and makes it difficult for the US to consider it an actor with as much influence as its real weight would justify. Europe does not have a face, does not speak with one voice, does not even speak the same language and cannot be relied on when help is needed quickly. This is roughly how I can summarize the criticism of American diplomacy.
The interests and positions of big EU member states often differ on strategic issues such as involvement in military intervention or managing the global financial crisis. A more important, albeit less obvious problem is that major European powers have different visions about Europe’s role and future. These differences make it extremely difficult to forge common, coherent and effective international action.
America is aware of Europe’s key dilemma of “deepening or widening”: push on with enlargement and let new members in or focus on building a political union instead? The United States faced a somewhat similar situation in the 19th century when the original 13 states acquired new territories through wars and land purchases, expanding their influence and principles of state organization to a growing area. This expansion was the key to America’s success: it created the world’s largest single market, which spawned the world’s largest corporations in just a few decades’ time. A vast economic and political bloc was formed, which was protected by oceans both from the east and the west, making the USA inward looking in many aspects.

By the end of the Bush era, the United States looked like a bust state with no self-confidence. The intervention in Iraq was not only and primarily a military and political failure; it isolated the United States internationally and sparked anti-American sentiments globally. By the end of 2008, the economy was badly shaken, the world’s biggest banks were wiped out in days, and the stock markets went into freefall. President Bush delivered a dramatic televised speech explaining to the American people why a record-size 700 billion dollar government rescue package was needed and why — against the most fundamental of Republican and American instincts — large corporations needed to be nationalized. The country wanted change and wanted it badly, which led to the election of a Democrat as President with an impressive margin unseen since the victory of Lyndon Johnson in 1964.

But Barack Obama (called simply “the post-imperial president” by Newsweek [2]) could not do wonders. He inherited the leadership of a country with a dented image, which was spiritually uncertain and economically on its knees. It says a lot that, in the run-up to Election Day, Barack Obama’s bedside reading was Fareed Zakaria’s The Post-American World. The situation of Obama’s America is very similar to the situation of Great Britain in his grandfather’s time, when it was on the eve of its 20th century decline. The economic challenges of today are comparable to those that Franklin D. Roosevelt had to face at the time of the Great Depression – except that, in the 1930s, the United States was a rising power in geopolitical terms. “America is like a company on the brink of bankruptcy. In the last eight years we have lost most of our credibility”.”Let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.” These words come from Roosevelt’s inaugural address in 1932, but could just as well have been from Obama at the start of his presidency in 2009.

Today it is universally accepted that, after the end of the Cold War, in turn the unipolar world order and America’s hegemony are coming to a close. American foreign policy must respond to the changing realities. The Obama administration has declared its intention to adopt a “smart power” approach to foreign policy, which puts diplomacy and foreign aid on an equal footing with military action.

Obviously, the previous administration’s stance was incompatible with the new administration’s commitment to multilateral, cooperative international politics. More money is devoted to improving the linguistic skills of American diplomats – in particular for languages such as Arabic, Chinese, Hindi and Urdu, which gives us a broad idea of the new diplomatic priorities. A number of American authors, among them the pro-European Democrat Sven Steinmo, warned Europe not to have exaggerated expectations, arguing that the United States will not be radically different under Obama. As Steinmo points out, America’s laws are passed by Congress and the President only has the right of veto. Members of the House and Senate are elected to serve the interests of their voters in their respective constituencies and states and most of them have little insight into international affairs. Moreover, the United States remains divided.

As it normally does, the Obama’s popularity started to fall, but he still could secure a second term. As for the EU-USA relations and the perceptions of the US government of the EU: those who predicted that no miracle would occur in this respect were right: the Obama administration did not alter the geopolitical focus of the US in the favour of Europe. Notwithstanding the fact that some of his political opponents portrayed Obama as a closet European (there were remarks such as why doesn’t he run a Western-European country, or he seems to agree with the European, anti-American sentiment, or even that he wants to build the United States of France) his government’s geopolitical focus further drifted towards the Pacific from the Atlantic. At the same time, the honeymoon between Europe and Obama’s America was over as well. By October 2009, The Economist [3] had already started to speak again about the Atlantic divide. Obama shocked Europeans by staying away from the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and humiliated the EU by refusing to come to Madrid to the EU-US summit. These were strong and clear negative signals to Europe already half a decade ago. By the end of 2010, Obama mania seemed to be over in Europe.

The new and robust impetus for the reinforcement of bilateral relations is the grand trade and economic agreement the so-called TTIP. A lot will depend on how this is being managed and how successful this partnership will become over the next decade.

A smooth and mutually fruitful economic partnership will nevertheless not solve everything in itself. Better geopolitical cooperation is also necessary to mend fences and to guarantee the delivery of mutually accepted foreign policy objectives. The US clearly expects Europe to pledge to stand by its main ally if firm action becomes necessary.
America wants Europe to take a firmer stance against China, and an ever more provocative Russia. In essence, the United States would like the European Union to cooperate more closely and operate more effectively as a partner by its side. The USA would not mind an EU with a more pronounced international political profile, especially if it meant a quicker and more efficient response to international crisis situations.

[1] American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan and Dean G. Acheson New York, Cambridge University Press 1994.
[2] Newsweek, 14 December, 2009. p. 1.
[3] The Atlantic gap.” The Economist, 1 October 2009.

Hungarian economist, PhD in international relations. Based in Brussels for fourteen years as diplomat and member of EU commissioners’ cabinets. Two times visiting fellow of Wilson Center in Washington DC. University professor and author of books on EU affairs and geopolitics. Head of department, National University of Public Administration, Budapest.

Americas

Trump Lost, Biden Won. Is Joe Biden’s presidency a signal towards Obama’s America?

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image source: obamalibrary.gov

Greek statesmen, Pericles once said, “Just because you don’t take an interest in politics doesn’t mean the politics won’t take interest in you”. The same is the case of United States politics which knowingly or unknowingly has an impact on world politics. That is why the result of the US elections are of great interest to states across the world. Although, for the United States, the goal is to maintain American primacy, to see a world in which the United States can use its predominant power to get its way, regardless of what others want. However, it is a fact that the political landscape of the United States has mostly been dominated by two parties, Republicans and Democrats, who not only differ in their ideas, policies, priorities but also in their approaches towards addressing the key issues facing the country. 

Comparing the two, we see the Republicans are more conservative in their approach as compared to the liberal Democrats. Therefore, the recent election in the US (2020), with Biden (Democrat) won and trump (Republican) lost is also a signal towards a changed approach in many issue areas The focus is to see, whether the new President, Joe Biden who remained the 47th vice president during Obama’s administration for eight long years is going to follow the same lines as Barack Obama and whether he going to reverse the policies of Donald Trump?

Looking at first the climate change issues, President Joe Biden’s plans to tackle  it seems more ambitious than any of the US presidential candidates so far. Biden during his presidential campaign proposed $2trillion over four years to significantly escalate the use of clean energy in transportation, electricity and building sectors. His public health and environment platform planned the establishment of a climate and environmental justice division. He further intends to make the US electricity production carbon-free by 2035 with achieving net-zero emissions by middle of the century. Apart from all these, the most noticeable is President Joe Biden’s promise to reverse Trump’s plan to exit from the Paris climate agreement that was signed back in 2016 under Obama’s administration. 

As Joe Biden in response to the former President, Donald Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the agreement on 4th-Nov 2020, tweeted “Today, the Trump Administration officially left the Paris Climate Agreement. And in exactly 77 days, a Biden Administration will rejoin it.” He further stated“Reversing the decision would be one of my first acts as president”. This is exactly what happened as Joe Biden’s first act in the Oval Office was his signing an executive order to have the United States rejoin the Paris climate agreement.  Thus, while Trump has taken a strident anti-climate approach, President Joe Biden decision shows his intentions to bring back the policies of Obama towards climate change. 

Considering the health sector, we again find difference in approaches of Joe Biden and Donald Trump, yet similarity between Biden and Obama. As, President Joe Biden in his presidential campaign speech in Lancaster on June 25, 2020 defended the first American healthcare law also known as the Affordable Care Act or Obamacare that was initiated by Obama’s administration. He stated, “I’m proud of the Affordable Care Act. In addition to helping people with pre-existing conditions, it delivered vital coverage for 20 million Americans who did not have health insurance”. This depicts President Joe Biden’s plans to restore Obama’s health care policies. 

America is known as the land for all, a land of cultural diversity, but we have seen with Donald Trump coming to power, the immigration rules became very strict as he imposed restrictions on foreigner’s visits to the US. An example of this is Trump’s first Muslim travel ban announced on January 27, 2017, whereby five Muslim-majority countries, including Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, were banned from traveling to the United States. Trump stated, the act is needed for national security and to save the country from terrorism. However, this discriminatory act was opposed by ex-President Obama, who in 2016, stated: “America was a country founded on religious freedom. We don’t have religious tests here”. 

This is what President Joe Biden also believes in, as he called Trump’s actions on immigration a pitiless assault on American values. On November 8, 2020 during the presidential campaign, he said,“My administration will look like America with Muslim Americans serving at every level,” and “on my first day in office I’ll end Trump’s unconstitutional Muslim ban.”So, President Joe Biden did what he said, as on his first day in office he signed 17 executive orders, memorandums and proclamations, including orders to rejoin the Paris Climate Accord and end the Muslim ban

Then racism that increased in the US under former President Donald Trump is now challenged by President Joe Biden as he came up with a very different idea just like Barack Obama’s notion of “A more perfect Union”. Example of which is Kamala Harris, who became the first black Asian America woman vice-president in American history. More can be seen by Joe Biden giving credit to African Americans for helping him win the election. So, his presidency is seen as a sign of hope to end racism in the country. 

Moving further, we know globalization has cut the long-distance short, it has made countries more interconnected in all aspects, especially economic. To name a champion of globalization, obviously no other than the USA comes into the mind of every single person. Under the administration of Obama, we have seen the US convening the G-20 summit, introduced macro-economic policies, signed Trans pacific partnership, and much more. However, the question is, whether the US is going to retain this all under Joe Biden’s presidency? What would be his approach towards the ongoing US-China trade war? 

President Joe Biden from the very start has focused on rebuilding the domestic economy, as the slogan ‘Build Back Better’. Therefore, he clearly stated that the US will not enter any international trade deals unless the domestic concerns of labor and the environment are fully addressed. Moreover, looking at the US-China trade war, which started back in 2018 when the Trump administration imposed tariffs on Chinese goods worth more than $360bn, we don’t find much difference except the tactics. As Joe Biden too in his presidential campaign accused China of violating international trade rules, subsidizing its companies, and stealing U.S. intellectual property. He promised to continue with Trump’s heavy tariffs on Chinese imports, but while Trump did this all unilaterally, Biden would continue it together with the allies.

On issues related to national security, we again find President Joe Biden’s approach a bit different from that of Donald Trump. Considering the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or p5+1 deal that was signed between Islamic Republic of Iran and 5 permanent members of UNSC along with Germany. It imposed several restrictions on Iran in exchange for sanction reliefs and was achieved by Obama’s administration under his “constructive engagement policy“in 2015 But Trump smashed it by calling it a historical blunder and in 2018 under his “Maximum pressure policy” pulled the USA out of the deal and reinstated sanctions. Iran too after the withdrawal of US from JCPOA and upon Iran Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) commander Qasim Sulemani killing by the US airstrike announced that it no longer adheres to the 2015 Nuclear Deal. 

Now, the hope is President Joe Biden, as he stated in his presidential campaign that the “maximum pressure” policy has failed, emphasizing that it led to a significant escalation in tensions, and that Iran is now closer to a nuclear weapon than it was when Trump came to office. Therefore, he pledged to rejoin the nuclear accord if Iran returns to strict compliance. Here again it shows President Joe Biden’s intention to follow Obama’s approach of constructive engagement towards Iran. 

When it comes to Afghanistan, Trump decided to end the endless war in Afghanistan by having a peace agreement with the Afghan Taliban, according to which the US will withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan. However, Joe Biden has not taken any clear decision on it yet. But he is under pressure as the Taliban wants the new president to follow the same peace accord achieved by the Trump administration. Yet, the Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani has requested President Joe Biden to rethink the Afghan peace deal. Therefore, it is too early to say what Biden would do. 

To sum up, the 78 years old Joe Biden who has smashed the election records by securing more votes than any presidential candidate in the history of United States elections, he has not only raised high expectations, but there are numerous challenges on his way as well. This is because his policies would now be a center of focus for many. In most of the issue areas, we see President Joe Biden reversing the policies of Donald Trump and following the path of Obama’s Administration. Something which he promised during his presidential campaign as he said to take the country on a very different path from what it has been in the past four years under former President Donald Trump’s administration. However, it’s just the start of a new journey for America and the future decisions by President Joe Biden will uncover a lot more

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Americas

How Uncle Sam views the world by 2040

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How the US is seeing the future world is revealed in a recent report, Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World, published by the National Intelligence Council of the US. This report of political, social and economic estimates is prepared through an integrated process for every incoming President of the USA. For Biden, the report was published in March this year. The world, its politics, economics and societies, is going to change under the forces stemmed in changes in demographic modalities, environmental fluctuations, economic preferences and technological transformations. These together are going to impact on societies, states and international systems which would end in sketching five different futures of the world. Uncle Sam seems to be shaking the world, and this time even more intensely.

Starting off how the forces will interact and intersect, it all begins with the changes in demographics. The developed economies are aging bringing a global slow economic growth whereas the contracting working age will weigh on the economies of these developed countries as Japan and South Korea will reach the median age of 53 and Europe the median age of 47 by 2040. On the other side, in developing countries the converse will be happening as Sub Saharan Africa will reach median age of less than 15 years whereas Pakistan, Egypt and Afghanistan will reach the median age of 30 years. This seems opportunity but these economies will be challenged to meet the demands of the growing working age populace in their economies with the slow global economic growth remaining constant dragging the societies into  social volatilities while testing the performances of states too.

The forces of environment will leave no country unaffected especially the developing countries that lack in adaptations skills and technologies. The occurrence of heat waves, melting of Arctic, land degradation, water misuses, food insecurity, loss of biodiversity, rising sea levels and pollution will erode the ‘human security’ while affecting states and societies, politics and economics coequally. For curtailing environmental threats, countries may apply geoengineering by interacting with the natural system of earth to counteract threats of climate change like releasing the sun’s energy back into space through Solar Radiations Management or Stratospheric Aerosol Injection spraying to cause global dimming. The developed countries especially US and China will see suspicions on sincerely working on environmental threats as this would require economic sacrifices.

In the sphere of Economics, the national debt management will push countries to avoid funding on the issues of environment as they will already be pressed hard for matching the needs of the growing demands of their elderly and younger populations alike. Covid 19 has already left indelible imprints on the economies of the world especially the developing countries two fifths of which, according to 2019 IMF assessment, were at debt distress. Automation and rapidly growing AI will reduce 9 percent global jobs and transform one third by 2040 while at the same time creating massive new technology and automation stemmed jobs which will test the states adaptability to manoeuvring technology. This will have disproportionate effect across the countries and regions. The element of Superstar firms, the new multinationals, will critically affect world economies and make definitive inroads in the affairs of politics.

The technological forces will surpass all other forces in intensity especially with the significant rise of AI and Biotechnology. The US-China rivalry in this sphere will be rampant. AI will disrupt global current workforce while also creating new dimensions of labor compelling the countries to remodel their working force structures. The application of AI in warfare will be on the rise and will be adding a new element to the geopolitical dynamics. AI is well positioned to fly and reach space which will turn the space diplomacy in new form and bring the two global rivals face to face. AI will siphon out the human element of emotions in making decisions having social effects.

As these forces interact, world will see five possible scenarios in which the first three are the prominent.

In the first scenario, it will the US and allies led democracy which will manipulate the world. Being democratic, there will be more space for innovation and the rise of technology with robust public private partnerships will prosperously affect economic growth of the countries. This will enable the states to be responsive to their people’s needs while the same time making adaptations unlike in the repressive regimes of Russian and China whose policies will let them on steady decline.

In the second scenario, it will be China which will be mastering the world arena but not exactly acting like leading it due to its inherent repressive dynamics. This will happen on account of failure of international organizations with least interest paid to them by the major powers. The factors of high national debt, the costs of caring for aging populations, and hazardous environmental occurrences will havoc states’ budgets and keep them away from spending on education, infrastructure, and scientific research. In these circumstances due to the integrally centralist and controlled Chinese centralism will help China gain global attention through its global infrastructure packages and other initiatives. Many countries will thus tilt to the Chinese sidelines.

In the third effectual scenario, it will be a contested coexistence of US and China which will emerge. This will be based on shared economic and growth preferences and agreements.

Much of what is stated in the report must be happening in the world ahead but much of what is left unstated is more critical. Summed up, there will be more instability, pandemics, economic recessions, state conflicts and disorders in the five different worlds that lay ahead.

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Americas

Understanding Ronald Regan’s approach to the Cold War

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President and Mrs. Reagan at the 1981 inauguration parade. Image source: Wikipedia

President Ronald Reagan’s ascendency in the political hierarchy of the United States, ending in him becoming the President is often regarded as a triumphant victory by American conservatives. His conception of the world order, domestic and international relations show a reflection of a conservative understanding of issues. His legacy as president remains as having effectively brought down the Soviet Union and the threat of Communism. His policies towards the Soviet Union have a transformative nature, as his understanding and approach to US-Soviet relations changed radically after his first term. Though being a staunch Anti-communist and regarding the Soviet Union as an “evil empire”, he sought to ensure that America and its idea of a “Free World” prevailed and later on, that the two most significant military powers would reach common ground in order to make peace more sustainable.

In studying his approach to tackling the Soviet threat, it’s important to first understand the correlation between the policies adopted by previous administrations and Reagan’s own pursuit of defeating the Communist threat which at the height of the Cold War, threatened to spill into a full-scale conflict between the two regional hegemons. Previous administrations had traditionally approached the threat posed by the Soviet Union with a policy of preventing the collapse of European allies at the hands of the Soviet Union. This included stymieing the spread of Communism across the world and the consistent development of Ballistic missiles in order to deter a Soviet military advance into Europe by providing a “nuclear umbrella” to European Allies.  Before the Reagan administration this policy was in large part accepted as the means through which the Soviet threat could be effectively challenged. President Reagan followed a similar policy by pursuing aggressive military buildup and focusing on development of a vast range of ballistic missile platforms which would act as a comprehensive deterrent in preventing the Soviet decision-making elite to pursue a path unacceptable to US strategists (ARBATOV 2019). Being disillusioned with the far left, his opinions and campaign slogans had strong ideological underpinnings which would later on influence his dealings with the Soviet Union.

 The changes in Reagan’s policy weren’t without the influence of another very important personality, Mikhail Gorbachev. The Soviet leader’s role in Reagan’s change in policy from antagonism to rapprochement is widely claimed by academic scholars as a major contributing factor for the rethink in Reagans approach to Communist Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s revolutionary approach to International Relations was followed by America’s “reactionary response” in the shape of pursuance of arms control and softening of political rhetoric (Fischer 1997). Ronald Reagan second term in office was marked by a change in his policy of pursuing aggressive development of arms and making space-based missile defense systems having the capability of destroying incoming Soviet missiles. The Strategic Defense Initiative was seen by many in the Soviet ranks as a dangerous escalation of arms race which had the potential of transforming into military conflict. (Britannica, T.Editors of Encyclopaedia 2021). Seeing and acknowledging Gorbachev’s new approach as “revolutionary” President Reagan sought to rely on an intense sustained engagement with the Soviet leader in order to achieve what his previous approach had failed to do (Talbott 2004).

Mikhail Gorbachev’s approach to the subject of foreign policy was based on establishing relations with the west and a recalibration of ties with the United States. At the time of the Cold War a large part of the effort by the two nations was to prevent the other state from gaining a definitive edge in the area of technology, military and nuclear weapons. Apart from the ideological conflict the Cold War witnessed many states in the world becoming the conflict grounds in which the US and USSR sought to establish their control and influence. Mikhail Gorbachev’s arrival into the political spectrum and pursuing a policy of peace and prevention of creation of arms was in large part influenced by the domestic environment of his country. The Soviet Union after Brezhnev had a weakened economy due to extensive spending building and maintaining large military industries and sophisticated missile delivery and defense systems. The Russian political elite largely dominated by Russians. Gorbachev’s “restructuring” in order to improve the economic conditions of the state was also followed by a rethink at the foreign policy front. In his famous interview at Harvard University he described how the conditions of repression, arrests and suppression of critical voices against the state were silenced. This led to perestroika which gained support from the Russian masses. (The Harvard Gazette 2004).

The question as to the extent to which the effect of President Reagan and Gorbachev’s relationship caused “reversal” of US foreign policy with regards to the Soviet Union should be considered through different metrics. Firstly it’s important to study how the “Reagan doctrine” which formulated the plan of tackling soviet expansionism into countries across the globe evolved during the time of Reagan’s Presidential terms. Ronald Reagan’s doctrine was a shift from previous administrations approach to the Soviet threat. In what was previously termed as “containment” of Soviet expansionism, Reagan’s approach constituted of a “roll back” of Soviet expansionist forces across the world. From “Afghanistan to Nicaragua” Reagan’s approach was an active effort to subdue Soviet expansionist forces seeking to gain a foothold in important areas such as South Asia and Central Americas. (US Department of State archive 2001). While toning down the harsh rhetoric and signing important arms control treaties, US efforts to prevent Soviet expansionism continued despite a thaw in relations and a warm cordial relationship between the two world leaders. 

Reagan’s original agenda of an aggressive military buildup and development of ballistic missiles saw a reversal during his second term. Both leaders sought to control the arms race and roll back on the creation of such weapons. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-1) and other similar treaties was a ‘break away’ from Reagan’s original doctrinal approach. Gorbachev’s willingness to engage in talks was what initiated this change. What is also interesting to note is that despite belonging to radically different ideologies, both leaders shared a similar view on important matters. This is significant as both leaders expressed the desire to regulate arms control and to promote peace.

Another important element is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which saw an all-out Soviet effort to establish control over the region and reach the warm waters of the Arabian sea. The United States, eying an opportunity and realizing the threat of a possible soviet hold of South Asia, actively supported the Afghan Mujahedeen. Through Pakistan, the US pivotal role resulted in the Soviet forces failing to defeat the guerrilla forces despite huge numbers of troops and highly sophisticated weapon systems. This costly conflict was to prove detrimental to Soviet morale and the economy. After having effectively taken over, Gorbachev became heavily involved in restoring the economy and control over the production of arms between the United States and the Soviet Union. Gorbachev sought to move away from previous Soviet leaders doctrines and open diplomatic channels which would result in the final culmination of the Cold War.

President Ronald Reagan’s presidency was marked with a significant contrast in approaches to the Soviet threat. Having become president, his strong ideological standpoints were the driving forces behind his policies. With the Soviet Union, Reagan’s original approach was that of confronting, condemning and a protectionist mindset. Being a vocal proponent of American values of free speech, liberty and democracy his political campaigns to his televised addresses portrayed the Soviet Union as the principals threat to the very principals that America stood for. Like previous administrations, combating soviet expansionism and attaining global hegemony were prized objectives which defined much of US policies during the first term of President Reagan. His second term however saw a ‘shift’ in part of Reagan’s understanding of greater and more pressing issues at hand which demanded attention. Having originally promoted military spending and development of sophisticated missile weapon systems, Reagan’s view changed by the coming of Mikhail Gorbachev.

Both leaders, seeking initially to control production of arms, sought other means to create an environment more conducive for peace. While motivations differed, there was consensus between the two leaders on important matters which made diplomatic summits productive and resulted in many arms treaties. Both leaders established a relationship of trust and warmth which had largely been unseen since the start of the Cold War. These meetings were then followed by confidence building measures and trips to respective capitals which allowed a further thaw in the relations. Despite continued conflict in other states, both leaders relationship saw a significant reversal in the policies of US under the Reagan administration.

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