Russia is not widely known for its outstanding abilities in soft power. That could be explained, albeit not justified, for the strong concision characteristic of the communist regime during the Soviet Union years, which resulted in East European countries in general – and Russia specifically – understanding and applying a stricter conduct when it comes to international relations.
Russian Idol
One of the most interesting points of view concerning Russia’s soft power is the one elucidated by Joseph Nye, the scholar who coined the terms and definitions for hard, soft and smart power. He argues that what is intriguing is not the fact of Russia using soft power, but how the country conceives its theory.
Whereas America is as good in causing amazement as it is in using its weapons, Russia still cannot read the American way of life – that is, for itself, an incredible tool of soft power – nor replicate it with facility. What the US have long understood is that it is not about diplomacy only, not about governmental spheres. They realized it was necessary to foment and sell a whole system whereunto culture, education, style and many other aspects of society convert and allure people to consume and admire it. All this enchantment caused by the Stars and Stripes does not undercover, but surely equilibrates the hardness with which it, more frequently than likely, makes use of the sticks.
The Slavic country, for its turn, tends to concentrate its source of culture and welfare transmission in the public administration. On its side, at least, it counts with a former Russian diaspora that results in people craving for identity in the neighbour countries. Also, communication, migratory fluxes and religion end up playing an important part in its relation with fellow nations. In terms of international affairs, it works for the construction of strong union between the ex-Soviet countries, through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, that ideally would counter NATO and the EU.
Russia counts on a vast communication group – RT, the former Russia Today – which is known not only internally, but abroad too. There, investments are high and the speaking languages Russian and English, so the spreading of information is effective, since the group is big in the niche. The pieces of news are diverse and multi biased, in a sense that many ideas are expressed in different ways, also meaning many opinions on a same topic, which sometimes appears dizzying. Besides, the country made it internationally appealing with Rusnet (‘Russia beyond headlines’) and influences the near countries with local transmission, like the First Baltic Channel (FBK), that counts with millions of viewers on the Baltic region, with a flood of articles, not necessarily information. That comes, nonetheless, under the label of freedom of expression – showing us that the media, besides its advances, still has a long way to go.
On the other hand, the country continues to be a dreamland for the several migrants from the near countries. With more work opportunities and a relatively easy procedure to grant citizenship, plenty of workers from Central Asia go to Russia to earn a living (and are undoubtedly an important trump for Russian statesmen when it touches political negotiation).
Those Russian speakers share not only the language, but also culture, beliefs, sometimes religion. That is why traditional values end up having great influence, and politicians found an opportunity in that – a clear example was that the dissemination of the idea that the European politics accepted and stimulated homosexual romantic relationships and that Western behavioursindicated corrupted values kept politically divided and strongly traditional border countries from approaching the European Union, luckily enough for a strong and moralizing Russia that dreams of enhancing its EEU bloc.
The culture is, naturally, another instrument for gathering and working the national sentiment in the peoples spread inside and outside the Russian territory. Designed for this is Rossotrudnichestvo, the State’s agency for soft power. The Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation promotes events in memoir of historical facts that are important for the community in the Commonwealth of Independent States (especially for those people who are abroad, that end up being somewhat enthusiasts and feeling closer to their roots). Ideally, the agency serves the objective of fostering friendly ties and, thus, helping achieve and reinforce Russian economic and cultural development. In April, as a matter of elucidation, the agency supported the St. George Ribbons campaign – a tradition that dates from the XVII century but gained a new meaning with the Russian victory over the Nazi Germany in World War II, exact 70 years ago.
A soft spot for a hard conduct
Diplomacy is not what Russia is widely known for, though. Amid the latest polemics, the annexation of Crimea in late 2014 brought extensive criticism for the Russian action towards Ukraine and, unavoidably, there were parallels between the situation then and in 2008, with South Ossetia.
Back in that year, Georgia had some deep separatist issues with South Ossetia, a part of the population from a different ethnicity that wanted to join North Ossetia, an autonomic republic inside the Russian Federation. It has never been proven that Russia really fomented the insurgents against Georgia, nonetheless history does not lie about what happened later and its aftermaths – Russia entered the Georgian territory, supporting South Ossetia and the thousands of Russian citizens that lived there during the process of separation, which culminated in the creation of a new country (recognized by Russia and heavily criticized by the NATO members). Here, even though one must claim the clearness of the use of hard power, it can also be argued that the Russian influence came long before in the region, both culturally and linguistically. Even more than that, in peace missions in Ossetia and Abkhazia.
In Crimea, the situation was partly repeated. Hard power came with militarily intervention (claimed to be necessary to ‘normalize’ the situation in Ukraine), however soft power was already there, alive and kicking. Ethnically, they were Russians; democratically, decided to join another country. It should not be taken as sheer free will, especially because of the non-bellicose impregnation of Russian values in its neighbours; likewise, no sort of coercion through weaponry, vodka or Matrioshkas could result in a spontaneous demonstration of willingness to belong to another country in a plebiscite. It is therefore to believe that a process of ‘conquering’ Crimea has started many years before 2014, be that for the importance of that region to the former Soviet Union, be that for the Russian population deeply dissatisfied with the Ukrainian instability in that moment. It is needless to say, on the other hand, that these measures, too, were not supported by the EU or the USA and they used their own hard power through sanctions and suspension of agreements related to Russia. After more than one year, the international community still believes that the intervention harmed Ukrainian sovereignty.
What can be taken from that is that Russia aims to develop its persuasive politic manoeuvres and has been working hard towards it. Maybe in a more sinuous, Spartan way, that shows some points of improvement, but also gives the country the chance of analysing how much it is different from the West and in which points it really wants to be that distinct.