The aim of this paper is to contribute to academic and public debate on issues critical to the future of the European Union as well as to outline recommendations addressed to EU institutions and member state decision-makers.
This concise paper may only serve as an introduction to some bottom-line ideas, without trying to summarize the ongoing academic and political debate on the subject. Nor does it claim to present extensively formulated supporting arguments for the policy actions it recommends. This has to come once the first rounds of discussions on the viability and or the necessity of the outlined actions have taken place. In most cases, actions proposed are not entirely new to public debate.
This paper does not present several sets of possible policy choices to select from, nor does it elaborate on the different “visions on the future of the EU”. It provides one single set of recommended actions, without pondering the chances of implementation.
Federalism in the EU-related discourse is contentious, and lacks a stable definitive value, therefore misleading and unhelpful, I would therefore not relate to it, nevertheless most of the policy recommendations in this proclamation point towards a more unified Union.
The European Union has a remarkably charged political agenda in a turbulent world. Russia is more and more assertive, there is a probably prolonged military crisis in Ukraine, political and military situation is escalating in Europe’s southern and south-eastern neighbourhood with imminent impact on Europe’s societies. The spectre of Grexit reflects the fact that there are fundamental flaws in the Euro project as far as its long-term sustainability is concerned which necessitates further political and economic policy reforms at EU level. Brexit on the other-hand (although the UK’s case is admittedly extreme) is a clear indication of popular disenchantment from the idea European integration. The above factors indeed hinder coordinated action to counter the ever-stronger popular sentiment and well-articulated political agendas that question the usefulness of European integration and sometimes even the basic European values. European institutions and member states suffer to focus and face these challenges including the rising anti-European and in some cases anti-democratic tendencies that will pose significant risks to European integration in the medium-term.
The key message of this proclamation is that the EU does not only need to overhaul its political priorities – which it normally does from time to time – but also needs a new approach towards its very existence, especially the way it interacts with the world and with its own citizens. Similar messages have been reiterated for a long time now by the academia and by some ranks of EU and national political classes, political action nevertheless has been scarce and slow. This to a great extent explains the rise of anti-European or Euroskeptic views.
The author of this paper holds that an overhaul of the functioning of the EU as well as of the general approach to the raison d’etre of European integration is necessary for at least three interconnected reasons:
-firstly, to establish a new societal contract by establishing trust in a disenchanted public without whom no major reforms will be possible, be it economic or political; (“Entice people”)
-secondly, to manage inherent tensions stemming from economic (e.g.: Eurozone long-term sustainability), institutional and political (both central and especially member state) imperfections that loom large in a more and more unpredictable global environment;
-thirdly, to reverse Europe’s gradual slide to global irrelevance (or put in a different way: to harness its economic might in geopolitics by a stronger Union foreign and military policy profile), moreover to reinforce its failing international competitiveness. (“Engage the world”)
The key determinants of EU-level policy-setting are the following:
-A new geopolitical order is on the rise. Pax Americana has started to give way to a new world order whose defining features are very unpredictable but which most probably be a more unstable one than we live in today by the major rearrangement of the global equilibrium following the rise of new powers, and with a potentially significant level of hostile competition between the key actors.
-Inside the EU major new geopolitical dynamics are gathering importance which includes a quasi-dominant role of Germany, a weakening France, a UK drifting away and in general a more and more heterogenetic and multiple-speed EU with institutions still in the process of self-redefinition.
-European societies are ageing. The old-age dependency ratio will double by 2040. At the same time, the average fertility rate in Europe is below reproduction. These factors represent serious challenges to the long-term sustainability of the European way of life as know it. Immigration as a tool to face and counter the spectre of unsustainability, mainly due to issues of social integration, as it is demonstrated in several EU member states, raises significant social and political challenges if managed badly.
-European economies and societies under pressure will probably be more susceptible to anti-EU sentiment and propaganda.
-The EU, the home to some half a billion people has no story to tell, or rather its story does not reach its citizens.
Based on the above premises, the EU needs:
-A way more unified diplomatic approach to global political developments and clear political stance on the final boundaries of the Union;
-A stronger capacity to exercise hard power; European army
-A stronger and more unified internal security policy;
-A more effective immigration policy and policies to make integration successful;
-Effective responses to negative demographic trends;
-An institutional and political setup and an economic policy framework that guarantees the long-term survival of the common currency, including a separate Eurozone budget;
-A strongly coordinated energy policy including energy diplomacy that guarantees independence, sustainability and competitiveness;
-A stronger sense of ownership and self-identification of European citizens with the European project;
-A new budgetary arrangement, a budget with a new approach that reflects this policy overhaul including the phasing out of controversial policies such as CAP and a fundamental reform of the cohesion policy and introducing a revenue that creates ownership in the society;
The list of actions proposed necessitate fundamental alterations in the way the EU exists. These alterations will probably be precipitated (or maybe to the contrary: jeopardized) by “inbuilt” political developments that are only partly foreseeable (Brexit, Grexit, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey), partly belong to the realm of a less and less predictable geopolitical environment. These alterations often will take the form of new institutional arrangements. Also efforts to reinforce the currently almost inexistent EU-wide political (democratic) sphere are poised to get stronger – in parallel with the continuous rise of anti-EU sentiment and the political articulation thereof by member state political actors.
One has to be realistic: the list of proposed action provided in this paper is not what will be, many of these suggestions seem radical and certainly contested at this point. Most probably member states as usual will look at any to do list with the well-known mind set: how could an almost certainly hopeless Treaty change be avoided, how one can muddle-through on a business as usual basis? Well, this would not lead us any far in the long-term, only towards disarray, insignificance and instability. Some (both in politics and academia) are fascinated by proposing new institutionally focused arrangements to reform the EU. While these are most of the time reasonable suggestions, people simply don’t care. They do not care or even understand why a bi-chamber EP incorporating the Council or a Eurozone budget (so far referred to in the Euro-discourse under as the ‘fiscal compact’ to make sure nobody understands it) is the magic solution. One should therefore be bold to offer things that are tangible, meaningful and educative for the citizen. One should not cynically pretend that people are fully aware of what is going on in the politics let alone international relations, they do need better information and much broader involvement otherwise no major reforms will be possible in the future.
The following is only a list of policy actions deemed desirable for a stronger and more successful Union. It is not a political itinerary, nor does it discuss in detail how these actions should be put in place. Otherwise – as experience shows – it we would end up in a scattered discourse on how this could (not) be done for political and institutional reasons before even a proper appreciation of the proposed actions could take place. Most of the proposed actions are not realistic for the EU28 as a group, they are instead policy options for member states (should things develop in that direction) of the “core”.
Next to some items on the list “B” “T” or “C” signs are visible. “B” denotes that the proposed action involves major budgetary reform and or funding, while “T” means that the action necessitates a new Treaty. “C” represents that it is only or primarily realistic or relevant for a core group of member states that are ready and able to reinforce their unity.
Getting European societies on board is a sine qua non condition for any major change. Endless complaining about the remoteness of the EU has led us nowhere and clearly no ineffective and underfinanced communication campaigns are the solution either. Instead the following actions need to be considered:
•Create post of European (Eurozone) speaker position in national parliaments (who preferably does not bear the host country’s nationality) with the right of intervention if European issues debated (T) (C);
•Introduce the instrument of European referendum – one single pan-EU referendum on the same day counted as a whole on key EU issues (T);
•Replace low-profile bureaucrats at the top of EU Representations, create high profile EU presence in capitals (C);
•If a project is financed by 51% EU it should be inaugurated by EU representative;
•Increase Erasmus spending by at least five times (B);
•Introduce preferably mandatory European values curriculum at elementary and secondary schools;
•Finish with national party lists at EP elections, vote on pan-European platform same day all across EU (T);
•Create a special channel of national parliaments at EP – as MEPs are less and less national, MPs should have a vehicle which is visible and effective to intervene at EP debate. This must be much stronger an instrument than ad-hoc invitations; an institutionalised and permanent solution is preferable (T) (C);
•Elect President of the European Commission or the European Council directly by citizens (T);
•Promote EU values abroad (joint EU cultural and political institutes – having in mind Alliance Francaise, Goethe, etc) (B);
•Facilitate national public and political debates on new European reform initiatives such as the recent one (June 2015) by the German and French economy ministers.
•Run EU joint teams (or individual Olympians) in up to 10 percent of Olympic sports by the 2024 Olympic Games;
•Support language teaching and learning; acknowledge reality: English is lingua franca of the EU, support it (B);
•Set up national offices of the Court of Justice to deal local legal matters with EU relevance more promptly and transparently (T);
•Support Europe-related news broadcasting by national broadcasters. Euronews (in a significantly enhanced quality) minutes in local channels. (B);
Here I mean a much more comprehensive change than normally envisaged by the EU in its subsequent Treaty changes, or new policy initiatives and (most of the time unfulfilled) grand programmes on a change as usual course.
•Embrace reality which is inevitable for the long-term success of the EU: declare existence of multiple (two)-speed Europe (instead of deleting the reference to an “ever closer union” in the Treaty as the UK requests), and make the institutional setup best fitted to embrace it (T);
•Let UK have a special status (T);
•Let Greece exit Eurozone (T);
•Make Eurozone exit legally possible and planned (T);
•Establish Eurozone budget of 3-5% of Eurozone GDP to use as macroeconomic buffer (T) (B) (C);
The EU budget is not only small but is not at all designed to tackle macroeconomic shocks and crisis in a monetary union, which needs a puffer for shocks and a stable transfer pool which can be deployed in a prompt manner (this may even include pan-Eurozone social benefit schemes as well.)
•Introduce European tax by unionizing a certain percentage point of national VAT rates and thereby finish with member state membership fee. (This can be budget neutral for member states at the end of the day and at the same time underpins the sense of ownership in the society). (T) (B) (C);
The annual EU budget is €142bn (2014 figures) – a large sum in absolute terms, but only about 1% of the GDP generated by EU economies every year. Traditional own resources usually represent about 12% (10,14% in 2013) and the VAT-base related own resource about 10% (9,38% in 2013) of the total budget. At present European budget is financed mostly by member states as a membership or rather ownership fee. Citizens are completely detached from the act of contributing to the common EU budget. “No representation without taxation”. In the proposed new system (European tax) some percentage points from the VAT (standard) rate applicable in member states is payed by the citizen to the EU budget. (It is important to note that this proposed revenue source is completely different from the present levy on national harmonised VAT bases which constitute a resource of the EU budget). This solution is more or less budget-neutral for member states since this source supplements the previous member state contributions (citizen’s money in disguise by the way). Citizens’ act to finance the EU budget (by buying a product or a service) should be clearly indicated for them on every price-tag. By the member state fee terminated, ownership is delegated to people. In this scheme VAT rates do not have to be augmented either only divided into national (say 18%) and EU (2%) shares. Obviously there are currently major differences among member states’ net positions in relation to the EU budget. This has to be calculated with when fine-tuning any new schemes.
•Establish Eurozone finance minister with defined veto rights over national budgets (T) (C);
A Monetary Union without a genuine economic and some degree of a political union is not sustainable. The Euro needs to be accompanied by a solid European economic governance with sufficient own resources and policy leverage. This entails a separate Eurozone budget, an EU treasury headed by a Eurozone finance minister with veto power over national budgets, the transformation of ESM into a European Monetary Fund, finalising the Banking Union, issuance of Eurobonds.
•Cut back CAP drastically (B);
The European Union will spend 373,2 billion EUR on the Common Agricultural Policy between 2014-2020. Although it indicates an 11% decrease compared to the previous EU programming period, CAP still has one of the highest shares – 38.9% – in the total EU budget until 2020. (Approximately, three quarters of the CAP budget is devoted to market related expenditures and direct payments, while one quarter for rural development.) This has to change: a drastic cut in especially direct payments needs to take place.
•Decrease and rationalize cohesion policy spending and establish more possibilities for rapid suspension in case of misuse, fraud or corruption (T);
The efficiency and usefulness of regional policy funds are controversial, dead-weight is very high, moreover they sometimes contribute to corruptive practices.
•Establish full-fledged Energy Union;
•Promote industries, technologies to cater for and institutional arrangements best suited for an ageing society;
•Establish European demography Figure (minister) to initiate and co-ordinate ageing-related policies and to deal with cross-generation tensions in the EU, helping member states to carry out tough reforms and cuts back in the welfare systems (T).
ENGAGE THE WORLD
Without credible hard power capabilities and with its soft power potential seriously underutilized the EU is scoring well under its global weight. The world is becoming less predictable and more turbulent especially at the Union’s imminent borders and close neighbourhood. Illegal immigration related issues put a pressure on European societies. Immigration’s societal consequences and relevant EU and member state policy responses are getting prominence in the daily life of EU citizens and in EU-policy discourse.
•Establish a European army in the medium to long term; (T) (C);
The European Parliament adopted the Synchronized Armed Forces Europe (SAFE) concept in 2009 to create a scheme for joint civilian and military structures and forces under EU leadership on the voluntary basis. This initiative advocates a Defence Ministers Council and a free service based European soldier status law. SAFE would be operated on joint training, tactics and procedures approved by the participating member states. Actual implementation has been almost none but the Russian aggression in Ukraine changes things. The European Corps (Eurocorps) in Strasbourg and the Corps Headquarters in Münster and Szcezin are existing elements to build upon.
•Member state should stop military spending cuts and they should aim for synergy (B);
The European defence capabilities have been gradually reduced over the years. One and a half million soldiers served in the EU member countries in 2013, half a million less than in 2006. EU countries spent only 190 billion euro (12% of total world spending) for military purposes. From 2006 to 2013, the European defence spending decreased by 15% (€ 32 billion). World military expenditure in 2013 was 1.747 billion $, around 2.4% of World GDP. However, China (188 billion US $) and Russia (88 billion US $) continuously increases the military budget. 80% of the European defence spending is by France, Germany, United Kingdom, who also reduce their military budgets.
•Reform CFSP: do away with unanimity, or at least make prompt actions possible by an easily applicable flexible institutional solution for a group of member states, something similar but more flexible than the so-called reinforced cooperation. (T) (C);
The new functions brought about by the Lisbon Treaty are modest innovations. The High Representative is very far from a European Foreign Minister, so is the European External Action Service from a European Foreign Ministry.
•Reform EU immigration policy, render it more effective, and base it on a way longer-term oriented policy approach that encompasses factors of sustainability (in a broad sense including long-term demographic and budgetary considerations) and societal sentiment (B);
For 2014-20, the overall Home Affairs budget amounts to only EUR 9.26 billion. Immigration policy is not only underfinanced but remains fragmented in the EU marred by conflicts of policy objectives, namely the paradox of the free movement, solidarity and security. The issue of legal and illegal immigration and refugees and even terrorism are often fudged in the minds of people which is sometimes reinforced by demagogic and or Euroskeptic national politics. At the same time, the growing feeling of insecurity in the society and also the failures in the integration of migrant communities in European societies are key issues to face. In 2014 276000 migrants entered the EU irregularly, which represent an increase of 138 percent compared to 2013. The number of asylum applicants registered in the EU has also increased significantly in 2014 (626.000 applications). The mandate of the EU agency EASO (European Asylum Support Office) should be significantly expanded to make it a proper Common European Asylum Service. In general for migration and asylum matters more resources have to be deployed at EU level. A special representative on migration for the External Action Service is to be established.
•Reinforce Frontex significantly (B).
Cyprus conflict: How could be Resolved and Reunified?
Cyprus conflict has been regarded as one of the conflicts that are so far difficult to find a resolution for it. The conflict has been considered intractable, due to its complexity multiple endeavors failed to bring on a solution. The conflict that erupted between Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the island had a different language, culture, and religion. These two components are the triggers of the Cyprus conflict which have dragged external actors into the conflict. After independence, these two ethnic groups were granted self-governance as one state on the Island. They have been given an authority based on a constitution that has been enacted by the presence of external actors. They shared the governance of the island until the Coup of 1974 that led to separate these two ethnic groups into two constituencies which resulted in two separate regions. Turkish intervention in the 1980s divided the island into two republics. The self-declaring of an independent state for ethnic Turkish in Northern Cyprus has made the conflict intractable. The tension grew strain between them until 2014 when the reunification discussions opened between the two sides. (1)
There is a primary and secondary actor in the conflict, both actors have their interests in the conflict. Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are the main actors and the external actor such as Turkey, Greece and Britain are the main secondary actors.
Historical background of the conflict
Cyprus has been a victim of its geographical significance, due to its geopolitical importance has been conquered by multiple empires in the region. The ownership of Cyprus has changed hands among the empires such as Greeks, Egyptian, Roman, Ottoman. And British as the last empire took over from the Ottoman empire from 1878 until independence in 1960.Cyprus conflict has national, regional, and international dimensions, so the solution should take the account of multiple actors. In addition to the ethnic nationalism in terms of conflict between Greek -Turkish Cypriots, there are other actors such as Turkey and Greece. Moreover, there are international actors such as the EU,NATO, and the United Nations.(2)As Cyprus connects three continents, its geopolitical importance has lent it both vulnerability and strengths. That is why history has been of external powers’ interest.
The root cause of the conflict attributes to the lack of national identity within Cypriot society, lack of commonality has paved the way to disagreement over multiple cases. When Britain took over the administration of the island did not allow these two ethnicities to intermingle, during the independence made them too strange to each other to get along together under one state. The actual independence struggle itself was to reunification with motherland Greek which was unacceptable for Turkish Cypriots. The guerrilla war itself that was initiated by Greek Cypriot was to reunify with Greece, not for its independent state. The reunification was not in the interest of both Turkey and Great Britain. So, the conflict started, and later the North Cypriots self-declared their ethnic state. External powers fuelled the conflict for their interest. In so case, the conflict in Cyprus took in the international aspect which later UN involved to stop fighting.(3)
One of the main causes of the conflict between these two groups was security, the Turkish Cypriots did not experience security towards their Cypriots counterpart. There was inequality both socially and economically. The Greek Cypriots within the republic had more power in all sectors of life, therefore the Turkish experienced alienation which gave them a feeling of a stranger inside their own country. To fill the security vacuum they resorted to external support and Turkey was ready to present them this security. In this way, external powers such as Greece, UK, and Turkey shifted their role from guarantor to a supporter of one side over the other that made the conflict more intractable. In the referendum, the majority of Turkish Cypriots voted yes to Annan Plan but on the other side most of the Cypriot Greek vote no to this plan. Annan’s plan was an initiative to start the process of the reunification of the Island in one whole state instead of two divided states.(4)
Divide and rule
Divide and rule strategy has been a tactic of all European colonizers from the time of the Roman empire until the end of the colonization. The Dutch and the Spanish have made benefit from this strategy. All of these empires including Britain and France have employed different ways but most Western colonialist have used four basic tactics as 1)“The creation of the differences within the conquered population 2) the augmentation of existing differences 3) the channeling or exploitation of these differences for the benefit of the colonial power; and 4) the politicization of these differences so that they carry over into the post-colonial”. Britain even used an educational system to promote segregated education between ethnic Greece and Turkish Cypriots. In such a way Greek schools were staffed by teachers from Greece and Turkish schools by teachers from Turkey. They used the same tactics in Nigeria between the South and the North in a way opened more schools in the South than in the North which created different education levels.(5)
The policy of divide and rule was one of the most important strategies that have been employed by the British empire during its colony and after decolonization. The British empire has divided the people of the colonized states into multiple parts. The division policy has been followed to facilitate the governing process such as the Partition policy in India. Adoption of this strategy was the paramount goal for British empire expansion. Otherwise, it had been difficult for Britain to keep control over all these places in the world. There are various examples regarding partition policy such as in Palestine in the Middle East or Zimbabwe in Africa. Britain in contrast to France has employed segregation by dividing people to rule better. Internal Cyprus conflict is the result of the independence movement and decolonization process which led to dividing the state between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.(6)The treaties of guarantors and alliances or unworkable constitutions were the start of the intercommunal conflict between Greeks and Turkish on the island.
Multiple differences within Cypriots society laid the foundation of conflict that was exploited by external powers. They have different languages, religions, and cultures which mistakenly have been a catalyst of the conflict.
Cyprus geographically is important for major powers in the region therefore all three so-called guarantor countries such as Greece, Turkey, and Britain sought to keep influence on the Island. Through developing nationalism, the external powers gained a foothold there, from the 1960s onwards they urged national identity based on primordial principles. Both Greek and Turkey alongside Britain in a variety of ways intervened in the internal situation of the people of Cyprus. The population in Greece attached to different countries to protect themselves from another side. In such a way the idea of union with Greek the mainland for Greek Cypriot was the goal. And for the Turkish Cypriots, the partition of the Island was a case of maintaining the Turkish identity. The importance of the Island came to the surface even more in the period between 1960 -1974 when the two ethnic groups divided, and the external powers entered the conflict with support confined to nationalism toward both sides(7)
National identity is what binds the people together, in Cyprus, there are religion and language have been the main elements of their national identity. But for the new generation in Cyprus, there are other elements alongside religion and language to become an individual identity. Most of the new generation are speaking fluently English which gives them a new allegiance and a new identity. In the modern era, principles of gender, human rights, freedom, and democracy are the main goals for human beings to stand for it. So multiple factors replaced the traditional elements of identity building.(8)
The conflict in Cyprus starts directly after the independence before the independence both Turkish and Greek Cypriots were fighting Britain and seeking independence. But after Britain’s withdrawal, primordial values in terms of ethnic affiliations were promoted, and intercommunal fighting erupted between them.
Geopolitical interests in Cyprus have played a big role in regional politics in the Middle East. This significance made the Island a victim of regional and international politics. It is an important gateway for three continents namely Asia, Europe, and Africa. Due to its location which is connecting three continents, has attracted major powers. It locates in a place that can control the connections of the most important chokepoints in the Mediterranean such as Bab-el-Mandeb, the Suez channel, and the Hormuz Strait. Where through these chokepoints import and export from oil and gas producers are transported to industrialized countries. Due to its significance has become of external powers’ interest throughout history. From Cyprus, it is easier to surveil all these chokepoints and from modern time, the USA has established an intelligence base to observe the Eastern Mediterranean and further.(9)
Even though Cyprus far away from most of the international powers, due to its importance geopolitically most of the major power through one or another way established a kind of link with it.USA under the excuse of NATO alliances with Turkey and Greece has a presence there. Britain has physical military bases and works as a guarantor based on the London-Zurich agreement. Turkey as a guarantor and links to ethnic Turkish Cypriots, Greece as a guarantor and links to Greek Cypriot, European Union through the republic memberships. So, the conflicts in Cyprus have both national and international aspects. (10)
Late discoveries of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean surfaced the importance of the Island again. Egypt, Israel, and the Republic of Cyprus started to explore gas in the area which provokes Turkey. Against this background, Turkey intensifies its presence in the Mediterranean by starting to explore natural gas alongside other actors there. This development triggers the start of shifting a balance of power and new alliances which leads to a new equilibrium in the region. Even Turkey has threatened to blacklist those firms that are developing offshore gas exploration.(11) findings of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean have enhanced amicable relationship among Israel, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus, on the other side Turkey got a foothold in the waters of Southern Cyprus through the Northern republic which is recognized by only Turkey. These alliances made all countries in the region insecure which reflected negatively on the other conflicted areas such as Syria and Libya.(12)
The conflict in Cyprus is considered intractable which means resolving is more difficult than the other. Establishing peace on the Island can be achieved by adopting a conflict transformation approach. In this method, all walks of society participate in the peacebuilding process. , through individual participation, reconciliation will be materialized in a way that all citizens on the island are direct contributors and participators in the process. In doing so conflict transformation make benefits from civil society promoting which binds individual from both ethnic groups. In so case the allegiance shifting away from ethnicities to citizenship based on individual rights and interests. Conflict transformation is suited to the case of Cyprus which refrains the two ethnic groups form an in-group attachment.
So far peacemakers on the Island have sought to find a solution for the conflict based on the conflict resolution approach. This kind of solution has promoted ethnic nationalism and in-group allegiance, therefore international mediation whether coercive or non coercive has failed to find a common interest between these two ethnic groups. Coercive peacebuilding is a Modell that is practiced by Russia which has never given sustainable peace such as Russia’s mediation in Ukraine, Chechenia, Libya, and Syria. (13)
There is non-coercive intervention conflict resolution such as the ideas of William Zartman which allows the conflict parties to reach a mutually hurting stalemate. This method at the end of the day creates a time ripeness for negotiation in which both sides reach a level of damage in terms of the utility of war.Ripeness moment has been used as a strategy to convince and force the conflicting sides to apply to the negotiation and come into a sustainable agreement which results in peacebuilding.(14)
Resolving the conflict through international and external mediation results in a temporary solution that potentially re-emerges after the international system and shifting of their interests. Thus, the conflict can be sustainable only in the case of internal solutions based on individual rights and finding common interests among the population regardless of religion, language, and cultures.
Promoting common interest within the conflicting sides can result in sustainable peacebuilding. to achieve this goal enhancing the principles of democracy such as human rights, freedom, and supporting civil society which finally binds the individuals together based on citizenship than ethnicities allegiance. Through the principles of democracy, primordial nationalism is replaced by civic nationalism. This strategy has been used in Canada which resulted in positive consequences in terms of coexistence between Quebec and the rest of the populations. The people of Quebec find their interests with the English people than with the French people in the other land.(15)
“There are four main factors which tend to create internal conflict: discriminatory political institutions; exclusionary national ideologies; intergroup politics; and elite politics”. (Michael E. Brown 1997).These factors apply to the conflict on the island, due to the longevity of the conflict common national identity has been weakening year after year. And there are four main schools to settle ethnic disputes that can be used to mitigate the hostility between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The first school concentrate on coercive intervention to create a balance of power(Fen Osler Hampson1997),the second school concentrate on non-coercive intervention through confidence building or ripe moment and power-sharing(Fen Osler Hampson1997),and the third schools argue that just political order is important and supporting civil society(Fen Osler Hampston1997),and the fourth school includes the use of the conflict resolution workshops which seek to reduce stereotyping in the citizen level(Jhon Burton1972)(16)
Creating a national identity in Cyprus is of paramount importance to mitigate the hostilities between the two ethnic groups, in away the people of Cyprus should promote their Cypriots attachment instead of external attachment towards Greece by Cypriot Greek and attachment to Turkey by Turkish Cypriots. Finding commonality between these two ethnicities inside Cyprus in away way both ethnicities feel secure toward each other is a path for a solution. Geopolitically a powerful Cyprus is not in the interest of external stakeholders such as Turkey and Greece therefore they always are seeking to hold the republic of Cyprus divided and weak. In such a way they would be able to intervene and make benefit from its geopolitical importance in the region which has its importance by locating among three continents. Creating a sense of Cypriot’s identity facilitates establishing a civic nationalism which paves the way to coexistence and cooperation toward a common goal. Democratic principles that give citizenship, equal economic and social rights, and free political participation are elements that can be achieved under civic nationalism, in such a way materializing a Cyprus nationalism based on duty and rights, not ethnic belongings.(17)
Through civil society promoting and confidence-building measures, the relationship between communities is possible to yield positive results. As Christopher Michell says, “Local peacebuilding and national peace” In a way Channels of communication can be promoted through grassroots communication. Building multiple organizations would lead to building more trust among the ordinary people in such a way mutual interest facilitates the foundation of peace. Through civil society promoting the relationship between local and national level which ultimately peacebuilding is achieved.(18)
Enhancing the role of civil society based on track two diplomacy, the two communities can open multiple channels of communication which at the end of the day the fear of insecurity is dissipated for those who voted no in the referendum in 2004. As these two ethnicities have different backgrounds in terms of language and religion and both of them have a connection to the different motherlands, they are seeking security from their respective motherlands. But in the case of building internal security through low politics strategy and micro-level communication, this fear is covered as Oliver Richmond says “NGOs fulfill vital roles that states and their agencies cannot take on”. (19)
Another alternative to promote peace and finding a resolution for the Cyprus conflict is economic factors through gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean which gives benefits for economic prosper for the people of Cyprus. In 2014 enormous gas discovery in the region has given the prospect of the reunification of Cyprus and ending the long conflict. As multiple actors have been involved in the Cyprus conflict, its resolution should be internationally in a way all actors experience security towards each other.(20)
After Cyprus accession to the European Union, there was more possibility of finding a mutual solution thatyields joint interest for both communities in Cyprus. The people of Cyprus have lived peacefully through history the conflict flared up in 1950 during the independence war against the United Kingdom, therefore, the application of the methods of Roger and Fisher (2011) can result in positive consequences. There are some of the methods that underpin the process of negotiation of the resolution of the conflicts. These methods are” 1)Don’t bargain over position 2) separate the people of the problem 3) focus on interests, not positions 4) invent options for mutual gains 5) insist of objective criteria”.(9) In the case of Cyprus, joint gains can be achieved through gas exploration and redistribute the resources’ revenue equally over the Cyprus population.(21)
Based on the oven mentioned points Greek and Turkish Cyprus can find commonality and mutual interests which leads to coexistence and cooperation instead of fighting each other and experiencing insecurity.
Cyprus has been a pivotal case for most empires in the old and new history. All empires had sought to keep control over the island, which they were using as a corridor between East and West. As it connects Asia, Africa, and Europe, the major powers were interested to keep control over it. The Island was occupied by the Greek, Roman, and Ottoman empires until 1870 was deliver to the British empire. These external powers made the way for inter-communal groups to fight each other. Its significance urged these external powers to sow the soul of dissension between the two main ethnic groups as a divide and rule strategy. There are primary and secondary actors in the Cyprus conflict, the primary are the two ethnic groups such as Turkish and Greeks who are living on the Island. Finding the solution for this conflict can start from the primary actors such as Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Through the transformation approach, the relationship between these two ethnic groups is promoting and based on low-level interaction peacebuilding starts to flourish. Moreover, there are secondary actors are playing an expansive role within the Cyprus conflict. The fatherlands of Greece and Turkey are involved by supporting their ethnic groups on the Island. Through establishing the bases of security for both ethnic groups is the foundation of the conflict resolution for the intractable conflict of Cyprus.
Getting to Yes which is concentrating on interests than position is helpful to resolve disputes between conflicting sides. In the case of Cyprus looking forward than looking back is facilitating the process of negotiation. Some points can be used in the process of negotiation in the Cyprus conflict. Most important points er 1) bargaining over interests than position 2)separating the people from the problem 3)mutual gain 4) insisting on objective criteria.(22)
Based on the conflict transformation strategies and win-win negotiations, citizens can be drawn into the negotiations. These measures within conflict resolution by engaging civil society the fear of insecurity can be dissipated. In that case, the conflicting parties within Cyprus society could be reunified and the main causes of their internal conflicts are transformed and resolved.
- 1)Bishku, Michael B. “TURKEY, GREECE AND THE CYPRUS CONFLICT.” Journal of Third World Studies 8, no. 1 (1991): 165-79. Accessed January 17, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/45193321
- 2)IlkeDagli, “The Cyprus Problem:Why Solve a Comfortable Conflict?”,5 April2017.Accessed 15 Januar2021.https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Blog/the-cyprus-problem-why-solve-a-comfortable-conflict
- 3)ZenovStavrindes,The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and statehood, Second edition 1999, accessed Januar 15,2021. https://www.academia.edu/25355954/THE_CYPRUS_CONFLICT_National_Identity_and_Statehood
- 4)Hadjipavlou, Maria. “The Cyprus Conflict: Root Causes and Implications for Peacebuilding.” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 3 (2007): 349-65. Accessed January 4, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27640515.
- 5)Morrock , Richard. “Heritage of Strife: The Effects of Colonialist “Divide and Rule” Strategy upon the Colonized Peoples.” Science & Society 37, no. 2 (1973): 129-51. Accessed January 13, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40401707.
- 6) Christopher, A. J. “‘Divide and Rule’: The Impress of British Separation Policies.” Area 20, no. 3 (1988): 233-40. Accessed January 5, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20002624.
- 7)Navda Morag.” Cyprus And the Clash of Greek And Turkish Nationalisms”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics(2004), 10:4, 595-624.AccessedJanuary5,2021. DOI: 10.1080/13537110490900368
- 8)ErgünÖzgür, Nur Köprülü& Min Reuchamps,” Drawing Cyprus: Power-sharing, identity, and expectations among the next generation in northern Cyprus”, Mediterranean Politics,(2019) 24:2, 237-259, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2017.1404720
- 9) Legh,James &VukovicPredrag.”A Geopolitics of Cyprus” A Middle east review of the international affair,Vol15,Iss.4(Dec2011)pp 59-70.Accessed January Dec2021. https://search.proquest.com/openview/549749e72a734a643fd5ce00fa64b493/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=54955
- 10)Roucek, Joseph S. “CYPRUS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN GEOPOLITICS.” Il Politico 41, no. 4 (1976): 732-46. Accessed January 6, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43209935.
- 11)Tagliapietra, Simone, Towards a New Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor? Natural Gas Developments between Market Opportunities and Geopolitical Risks (February 26, 2013). FEEM Working Paper No. 12.2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2225272 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2225272
- 12) Efrain Inbar &Shmuel Sandler,”The Importance of Cyprus” Middle East Quarterly,spring2001,pp.51-58.Accessed Januar132021, https://www.meforum.org/29/the-importance-of-cyprus
- 13)David Lewis,”Russia as Peacebuilder?Russia’s coercive mediation strategy,”George CMarshall European Center for Security Studies,June 2020,Nr.061.Accessed Januar142021,
- 14) William Zartman,” The timing of peace initiatives: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments”, Global Review of Ethnopolitics2001, 1:1, 8-18, DOI: 10.1080/14718800108405087
- 15) Raymond Breton, “From ethnic to civic nationalism: English Canada and Quebec, Ethnic
- and Racial Studies”, 11:1, 85-102, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.1988.9993590
- 16) Oliver P. Richmond , “Ethno‐nationalism, sovereignty and negotiating positions in the Cyprus conflict: obstacles to a settlement”, (1999),Middle Eastern Studies, 35:3, 42-63, DOI: 10.1080/00263209908701278
- 17) Christopher Mitchel, “ Beyond Resolution: what does Conflict Transformation Actually transform?”, Peace and Conflict Studies, 5,1,2001,Vol.9,Nr 1.Accessed 13Januar 2021.https://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1020&context=pcs/
- 18) Landon E. Hancock & Christopher Mitchell, “Local Peacebuilding and Legitimacy: Interactions between National and Local Levels”, Routledge,2018.
- 19) Henry Carey &Oliver Richmond, “Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs” 2003 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
- 20) Ayla Gürel& Laura Le Cornu, “Can Gas Catalyse Peace in the Eastern Mediterranean?”, The International Spectator, (2014) 49:2, 11-33, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2014.906799
- 21) Roger Fisher & William Ury,“ getting to yes: Negotiation an Agreement without Giving in”,2011, penguin books, New York.
- 22) Roger Fisher & William Ury,“ getting to yes: Negotiation an Agreement without Giving in”,2011, penguin books, New York.
Disconnecting From SWIFT? No, We Did Not Hear About It
The European Parliament has adopted another resolution on Russia. It reflects the key political claims against Moscow which have recently been on the Union’s official agenda. These include the aggravation of the situation in Ukraine, the “Navalny case”, the diplomatic scandal between Russia and the Czech Republic concerning the explosion of a military warehouse in 2014. The resolution contained radical proposals. Disconnect Russia from SWIFT and stop imports of energy resources in the event of an aggravation of the conflict in Donbass, reconsider relations between Russia and the EU, develop new sanctions regimes, etc. These proposals generated headlines in the media. However, the stock markets ignored them. The resolution did not cause any fluctuations of the ruble or Russian blue chips. Why did this happen and should the resolution be taken seriously?
At first glance, the resolution confirms that high consensus of one of the key (along with the EU Council) legislative bodies of the EU. It was adopted by 569 votes in favour, 67 against, and with 46 abstentions. Kiev and Prague welcome the resolution. Their political positions are uncompromisingly reflected in the document, although, for example, in the case of the explosion at a Czech military depot, there is no consensus, even in the Czech Republic itself. Not to mention the situation around Donbass, where the military build-up was carried out on both sides. According to an already established tradition, Russia is declared guilty of all obvious and perceived problems. Naturally, the document also reflects the “Navalny case”. Earlier, the European Parliament had already issued two resolutions. One in connection with the alleged poisoning, and the other after the arrest of the Russian opposition YouTuber Navalny. Tough measures against Moscow were proposed in previous resolutions as well. In some ways, their intention is consistent with American bills on “draconian sanctions”, such as DASKA: to designate a “lowest denominator” and possible measures that the European Union could potentially take. The threat of disconnection from SWIFT was the “icing on the cake”, which, as expected, was popular in the media success.
However, the markets ignored the resolution of the European Parliament. There are several reasons for this.
First, the period of aggravation of the situation in Donbass is clearly over. Yes, the problem itself has not been resolved. The conflict will smoulder for a long time, and new rounds of escalation will be still felt. There are no prospects for the implementation of the Minsk agreements. However, the prospect of an open military clash, which loomed on the horizon a month ago, has receded into the background. Ukrainian diplomacy was unable to achieve progress towards the revision of the Minsk agreements, although it temporarily returned the topic of Donbass to the political and media mainstream. Russia has shown that it is ready to balance the military build-up in Donbass without hesitation and to respond to a possible attempted military solution. The next round of exacerbation has so far fizzled out without leading to qualitative changes in the sanctions regime against Russia, or in the political positions of the parties.
Second, the radical proposals of the European Parliament are unlikely to find a response in the European Commission and the EU Council. The head of EU diplomacy, Josep Borrell, has already noted that decisions on restrictions on SWIFT and Nord Stream 2 are not within the competence of the European Union. It is obvious that disconnecting Russia from SWIFT will lead to colossal losses for both Russian business and EU companies doing business with Russia. The refusal to purchase Russian energy resources will also lead to significant costs. The Nord Stream 2 project remains in the interests of the European Union and Germany. Moreover, the disconnection from SWIFT, taking into account its consequences for the Russian economy, can simply be perceived by Moscow as an act of aggression with all the ensuing political consequences. The EU is losing the opportunity to strengthen and promote the role of the euro as a more desirable instrument for international payments. In particular, the share of the euro is likely to grow in trade between Russia and the PRC, ousting the US dollar. Manipulation with SWIFT will hurt Brussels’ plans to promote the euro globally.
Finally, thirdly, the real magnitude of the political contradictions between Moscow and Brussels is clearly not up to such radical steps. Yes, relations between Russia and the EU are in a deplorable state. The political dialogue periodically breaks down amid mutual accusations. There are no ways to resolve the most serious contradictions so far. However, the “level of support” of the existing, albeit bad, relations is still strong and its “breakdown to the bottom” has not yet taken place, even despite a number of recent local shocks. The “warehouse case” in the Czech Republic has not generated a pan-European chain reaction and has mostly damaged bilateral relations between Moscow and Prague. Most of the EU members are not eager to get involved in this scandal. The Navalny case will remain a toxic asset for a long time to come. But it, too, has not yet led to fundamental shifts. As for Ukraine, Moscow is clearly not eager to get involved in a military conflict, although it has demonstrated its force. To a certain extent, such demonstrations even reduce the likelihood of a violent scenario in the resolution of the conflict. At the same time, they do not bring political solutions closer. In general, the existing problems are large-scale. Their cumulative effect will increase. But its weight for the measures proposed in the European Parliament resolution is clearly not enough.
The only innovation that currently has a political perspective is the proposal for a new sanctions mechanism on corruption. A similar mechanism has recently been established in the UK. It involves freezing the assets of persons suspected having ties to corruption. The European Commission may well develop proposals for such a mechanism and submit it to the EU Council for consideration. The chances of its approval are very high. However, even if it is used against Russian individuals, its impact on economic ties between the EU and Russia will be extremely low. This may be the reason for the possible success of such an idea. The European Commission and the EU Council will show that they are loyal to at least some of the requirements of the European Parliament. At the same time, the use of the mechanism will remain in their hands, and the risks for the business will be minimal.
Moscow will also draw its conclusions from the rhetorical exercises of the European Parliament. Despite the fact that the risks of it implementing the recommendations of parliamentarians are negligible, this is another incentive for the Russian authorities to continue working on an alternative financial infrastructure in partnership with their foreign partners, who are also the target of unilateral restrictive measures.
From our partner RIAC
When diplomacy cannot get the best of geopolitics: Cyprus’s lack of a way forward
On April 24, people from both sides gather in proximity of the demarcation line splitting the capital, Nicosia, in two. Near this highly-contest frontier, Turk and Greek Cypriots alike demanded their leaders achieved the hoary aim of a united Cyprus. The most common motto protestors had written on their placards was a call for peace and unity across ethnic divides: We are Cypriots. This hopeful, determined appeal was addressed to the then-upcoming UN-sponsored meeting between the leaders of the two communities in Geneve. Three international guarantors partook also in the meeting: the UK as the former coloniser and, obviously enough, Greece and Turkey.
Four years have passed since the UN hosted in Geneve peace talks on the future of Cyprus — and their collapse. Failed mediations are also due, in part, to the great power imbalance between the two sides. The so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’s only ally and supporter is Turkey, on which it is “almost completely dependent”. On the other hand, the Greek-Cypriot government is internationally recognised and a member of the European Union since 2003. Yet, Secretary General Antonio Guterres is putting renewed energies in the long-standing issue that thorns the region. But, according to many commentators there were little to no hopes that anything concrete would be achieved. Actually, the positions at the negotiating table seem more divergent they have ever been and peaceful unification farthest than ever.
The Cypriot question is highly internationalised, which makes its resolution easier and harder at the same time. History can reveal why this is the case. and, hopefully, shed a light on the way forward.
A long-standing issue
Commentators and diplomats began talking compulsively about the island of Cyprus as a hotspot in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1974. Yet, any solution must account for the fact that Cyprus’s problematic history goes back well before that year.
The way to independence (1960)
In the modern and early-contemporary period (16th–19th century), the Ottoman Empire’s wider frame of ethnic coexistence guaranteed Cyprus’s stability. Turks and Greek were actually just Rum Christians and Muslims, and the Sultan vied for their diversified rights and obligations. The Porte experienced a deep crisis in the runup to the Great War, accepting to cede many peripheral territories. Thus, the British Empire administered the island of Cyprus from 1878 to the island’s formal annexation during in the 1910s. Nevertheless, the two communities still cohabited peacefully for several decades. If anything, Greek Cypriots started fighting against the Brits using terroristic methods.
Cohabitation started to be a problem when Cyprus became independent in 1960. In order to ensure that the region would not descend into utter chaos, there was the need for an agreement. Hence, Britain sat down with Greece and Turkey to establish the framework within which to establish the Republic of Cyprus. Athens had to backtrack on many of its requests on behalf the Greek Cypriot majority. Eventually, principles of bi-national independence, political equality and administrative partnership the two communities prevailed and became part of the constitution.
More importantly, the three signed a controversial Treaty of Guarantee reminiscent of colonial mandates. According to this agreement, each of the signatories could intervene militarily to defend Cyprus’s status from any sort of threats.
Ethnic conflicts (1963–1974)
Tensions escalated immediately after, with Greek Cypriot leaders making pressing attempts to erode their neighbour’s representation and rights. Finally, in 1963’s Bloody Christmas, Greek elites staged the expulsion of Turkish Cypriot representatives from all levels of government. As a result, about 25% of all Turkish Cypriots had to leave their villages for safer Turkish “enclaves”. That year inaugurated a season of inter-ethnic strife and conflict on the Mediterranean island. The situation was so dire that the UN stationed its blue helmets on a peace-keeping mission in December 1963.
The turning point of Cyprus’s recent history is 1974, when the Greek government organised and carried out an artless golpe. Back then, the colonels who animated the military junta sitting in Athens felt that power was slipping away from them. Clearly, the economy was in ruinous conditions and people started to grow unresponsive to the colonels’ efforts to repress discontent. Thus, they thought Greek nationalist fractions’ victorious insurrection in Cyprus and the island’s annexation would have raised morale.
But the situation evolved for the worse as Athens’s actions violated of 1960 agreement with Ankara and London. In a swift counter-manoeuvre, the Turkish army occupied the island invoking its right of interference under the Treaty of Guarantee. For determined it could be, the Greek junta could not afford the risk of a full-scale confrontation with Turkey. Not least, because they are both formally member of NATO, a cornerstone of the Cold War’s bipolar system of alliances. Therefore, the Turkish-majority northern half of the island was able to seceded from the Greek-dominated south thanks to Ankara’s support.
State of the art
The brief war of 1974 marked the pike in Greek-Turkish tensions and determined the current status quo on the island. Fortunately, both sides have been taking steps towards the normalisation of South-North relations. For instance, since 2003 it is possible to cross the frontier roughly established almost half a century ago. Moreover, the situation has stabilised and the number of inter-ethnic clashes diminished in the last 50 years. Thus, the international contingent in the ‘buffer zone’ dividing the capital Nicosia in two is now thinner than ever before.
Nevertheless, Cyprus is still divided into two parts which find it difficult to talk to one another. Thus, there are not a lot of reasons to be optimistic for those who aspire to the Cyprus’s reunification. In 2004, on the eve of Greek Cyprus’s accession to the EU, two contemporaneous referendums took place on the island. The question voters had to answer regarded the so-called Annan Plan, named after then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The Plan foresaw joining the two current entities in a State federal in name, but de facto confederal. Cypriots went to the polls en masse: 87.83% of registered voters went to the polls across the island. Of them, about 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the Plan, which they approved. Yet, over 75% of Greek Cypriots who voted were against the proposal, which both communities had to approve.
In the last few years, the North has also retrenched in its positions, possibly in response to the Greeks’ ‘No’. Last in order of time, Northern Cypriot elected as head of State Ersin Tatar, a protégé of Erdogan, Turkey’s President.
Conclusion — Peace talks won’t solve the issue
Against this background, Greek and Turkish Cypriot authorities’ approach to these renewed peace talks is unexpected. The Greek Cypriot foreign minister, Nicos Christoduidis, declared that the negotiations’ aimed at “Cyprus’ reunification as a bizonal bicommunal federation.” At the same time, Greek Cypriot President, Nicos Anastasiades, has started to acknowledge the need for a “decentralised federation”. That is, the sort of surreptitious confederal project laid out in the Annan Plan.
On the other hand, Northern Cyprus’s foreign minister Tachsin Ertugruloglu, argued that the “solution is: one island, two states.” President Tatar echoed these remarks arguing that there are two “separate regions and peoples in Cyprus.”Symbolically, Tatar stopped in Ankara to meet President Erdogan before reaching Geneve for the UN’s three-day talks.
After several days of fruitless negotiations, Guterres declared that despite “all our efforts, we have not yet found enough points of contact to allow the resumption of formal negotiations.” But he has also proposed a new meeting in the same format “probably in two or three months.” Yet, these endeavours will fail again unless the situation on the ground changes drastically in or around Cyrus. As a matter of fact, the real power broker in this game in now Turkey’s Erdogan. When he first became Prime Minister, Erdogan looked for a peaceful resolution to the Cypriot issue and accession to the EU. However, since 2011 he has undergone a change of heart turning more illiberal at home and reckless abroad. Most recently, Erdogan’s Turkey has irresponsibly reignited the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, by claiming gas fields located in Cyprus’s and Greece’s economic areas.
Thus, Cyprus may have ceased to be a piece of the larger puzzle called ‘Cold War’. But the island’s division has found a new raison d’être in this complex, quasi-multipolar 21st century. A new geo-political and geo-economic confrontation has started and Turkish Cypriot authorities are playing their part.
Covid-19 and Liberal World Order
The liberal international order (sometimes referred to as the rules-based international order or the US-led liberal international order) involves international...
Myanmar coup: ‘No sign’ of end to brutal crackdown on all fronts
One hundred days since the Myanmar military seized power, the “brutal” repression of protesters has continued, despite all international efforts...
Vaccine inequity posing ‘significant risk’ to global economic recovery
Although the outlook for global growth has improved, the ongoing impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as inadequate progress on vaccination in...
Attack On Jerusalem – Where Is The International System?
Since mid-20th century the conflict has been referred to as the ‘most intractable conflict’ in the world with the ongoing...
Boko Haram: Religious Based Violence and Portrayal of Radical Islam
Modern-day global and domestic politics have set forth the trend that has legitimized and rationalized the use of religion as...
Cyprus conflict: How could be Resolved and Reunified?
Cyprus conflict has been regarded as one of the conflicts that are so far difficult to find a resolution for...
Bhashan Char Relocation: Bangladesh’s Effort Appreciated by UN
Bhashan Char, situated in the district of Noakhali, is one of the 75 islands of Bangladesh. To ease the pressure...
South Asia2 days ago
Has Modi Conceded ‘South Asia’ to the United States?
South Asia3 days ago
India’s Decision to Deport Rohingyas- How Fair?
Defense2 days ago
5th Generation Warfare: A reality or Controversy?
Russia3 days ago
Russia becomes member of International Organization for Migration
Intelligence3 days ago
Security of nuclear materials in India
Economy2 days ago
Eastern Balkans Economic update: Romania’s and North Macedonia’s new data for 2020
Development3 days ago
Conflict Affected Families in Armenia to Receive World Bank Support
South Asia2 days ago
Political Lessons from Kerala: People’s Response to the Communist Welfare System