The phrase ‘Cold War’ typically brings about thoughts of a worldwide geopolitical struggle. However there is a new ‘Cold War’ brewing in the Caucasus with Turkey’s growing relations in the region.
Through the new establishment of close military ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan, Turkey is showing its geostrategic goal of dominating the Caucasus region. Georgia and Azerbaijan’s individual interests that are adversarial to Russia align with Turkey’s goal of being the dominant player in the region thus beginning the Caucasian Cold War between Russia and Turkey.
Ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey has been seeking to expand its influence in the former Soviet Republics in the Eurasian region. This has typically come through economic ventures and cultural exchanges due to many of these states having Turkish backgrounds or minorities. These moves have been of great importance to the growing Turkish economy and for the expansion of Turkish soft power within the region. However forging large scale military ties in this region highlights Turkey’s desire to secure these interests.
Turkey has much to gain economically from solidifying its relationships with Georgia and Azerbaijan. The elephant in the room of this relationship pertains to the involvement in the pipeline system from the Caspian Sea onward. In addition to this access to the pipeline there are other economic incentives that can be built upon such as the free trade agreement with Georgia. Azerbaijan also does significant trade with Turkey as well. Ensuring the security of the pipelines through these alliances will benefit Turkey most of all.
Through establishing these closer relationships with Georgia and Azerbaijan, Turkey will grow its soft power in the Caucasus region. There are few cultural links with Georgia to build upon, but keeping the Russians out is a shared interest which Turkey can build upon through this defense cooperation. Azerbaijan is a majority Muslim state, though it is Shia and Turkey is Sunni, but this and shared cultural backgrounds have already paved the way for Turkish influence in Azerbaijan. Like in Georgia, keeping the Russians out will cement Turkey’s stance in the region. Therefore Turkey is seeking to continue steering these states away from Russian and into its umbrella of influence through this defense cooperation.
Georgia has perhaps the most to gain from this defense cooperation. Having suffered a defeat from the massive Russian military in the 2008 war, with Russian forces occupying Georgian claimed lands, Georgia has been seeking further security guarantees. Before that war and after it has sought NATO membership to no avail thus far. This defense cooperation could get Georgia what it wants though.
Turkey has one of the best militaries in the world. Having a security guarantee from Turkey would ease the Georgian stress concerning their neighbor to the north. This defense cooperation accomplishes their shared goal. Turkey will increase its power in the Caucasus region through keeping Russia out. Georgia will keep Russia out through teaming up with Turkey. Although Turkey and Georgia have this shared goal, Georgia has other motives as well.
Before and after the 2008 war, Georgia has sought NATO membership to no avail. By increasing their ties with Turkey, a NATO member, Georgia will also build its rapport with the alliance. NATO’s unofficial strategy of moving into former Soviet States to deny Russian influence is in alignment with Turkey’s strategy to gain influence in the Caucasus. Therefore in addition to securing itself through Turkey, Georgia may make headway with getting its NATO membership.
Azerbaijan is set to benefit from the new defense cooperation with Turkey as well. Since its independence it has moved closer and closer to Turkey, much to Moscow’s chagrin. This has been due to the cultural links between these states. The defense cooperation will ensure the integrity of Azerbaijan’s economy and will ensure their security against Russia.
Although Azerbaijan hasn’t come into direct conflict with Russia as Georgia has, it still remains threatened. Moves away from Russia by former Soviet states such as in the Georgian or Ukrainian case have been met with aggression from Russia. This necessitates the need for Azerbaijan to ensure its security through an external backer which works for Turkey since it wants to increase its own influence in the region.
The main security concern for Azerbaijan comes from Armenia. Conflicts in the 1990s and recent border clashes still are fresh wounds in Azerbaijan. Having a defense relationship with a regional power like Turkey will act as a deterrent for Azerbaijan. This deterrent is particularly in regards to Armenia’s relationship with Russia that involves large amounts of Russian troops being stationed in Armenia. Therefore similarly to the Georgian case, Azerbaijan and Turkey both want to keep the Russians out to ensure security and influence in the Caucasus respectively.
Ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has sought to retain influence in the former Soviet republics. This has been done through attempts at forging economic ties and alliances. This has also been done through shows of force and aggression. Being that this has been the Russian modus operandi since the end of the Soviet Union, this behavior has set the stage for this Caucasian Cold War.
Russia has been linked to both Georgia and Azerbaijan since Soviet times. As time has passed, like other former Soviet states, Georgia and Azerbaijan have moved further and further away. Russia went to war with Georgia in 2008 in part due to Georgian movement away from Russia which has created a permanent strain upon their relationship. In 2014 this occurred in Ukraine as well. Both of these cases still have unresolved grievances though the guns have fallen silent in Georgia and not Ukraine. Being that Russia is willing to use force to get what it wants, it only makes sense for former Soviet states to seek external security guarantees.
Russia has been seeking to be the preeminent power in the Caucasus region since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This has been done through courting Georgia and Azerbaijan economically, but to no avail. It has also been done militarily through the 2008 war with Georgia and the military ties with Azerbaijan’s rival Armenia. Also since the end of the Soviet Union, Turkey has been seeking to increase its influence in the Caucasus. Up until now this influence was restricted to economic and some cultural links. However since Turkey now has a defense agreement with Georgia and Azerbaijan, the wheels are in motion for a Caucasian Cold War. Only time will tell how Russia reacts to the growing Turkish influence in the region. At a minimum this Caucasian Cold War will pit Russia against Turkey through these states, despite their Turkish leaning, but Russia has shown recently that it is willing to use force to retain influence in its former Soviet territories.
Latvia developed new tasks for NATO soldiers
Member of the Latvian Saemas’ national association “Everything for Latvia!” and Freedom”/LNNK Jānis Dombrava stated the need to attract NATO troops to resolve the migration crisis. This is reported by la.lv. In his opinion, illegal migration from the Middle East to Europe may acquire the feature of an invasion. He believes that under the guise of refugees, foreign military and intelligence officers can enter the country. To his mind, in this case, the involvement of the alliance forces is more reasonable and effective than the actions of the European border agencies. Dombrava also noted that in the face of an increase in the flow of refugees, the government may even neglect the observance of human rights.
The Canadian-led battlegroup in Latvia at Camp Ādaži consists of approximately 1512 soldiers, as well as military equipment, including tanks and armoured fighting vehicles.
Though the main task of the battlegroup in Latvia is country’s defence in case of military aggression, Latvian officials unilaterally invented new tasks for NATO soldiers So, it is absolutely clear, that Latvian politicians are ready to allow NATO troops to resolve any problem even without legal basis. Such deification and complete trust could lead to the full substitution of NATO’s real tasks in Latvia.
It should be noted that NATO troops are very far from being ideal soldiers. Their inappropriate behaviour is very often in a centre of scandals. The recent incidents prove the existing problems within NATO contingents in the Baltic States.
They are not always ready to fulfill their tasks during military exercises and training. And in this situation Latvian politicians call to use them as border guards! It is nonsense! It seems as if it is time to narrow their tasks rather than to widen them. They are just guests for some time in the territory of the Baltic States. It could happen that they would decide who will enter Latvia and who will be forbidden to cross the border!
Changes are Possible: Which Reforms does Ukraine Need Now?
The past 16 months have tested our resilience to sudden, unexpected, and prolonged shocks. As for an individual, resilience for a country or economy is reflected in how well it has prepared for an uncertain future.
A look around the globe reveals how resilient countries have been to the COVID-19 pandemic. Some have done well, others less so. The costs of having done less well are almost always borne by the poor. It is for this reason the World Bank and the international community more broadly urge—and provide support to—countries to undertake economic and structural reforms, not just for today’s challenges but tomorrow’s.
One country where the dialogue on reform has been longstanding and intense is Ukraine. This is particularly true since the economic crisis of 2014-2015 in the wake of the Maidan Revolution, when the economy collapsed, and poverty skyrocketed. Many feared the COVID pandemic would have similar effects on the country.
The good news is that thanks to a sustained, even if often difficult, movement on reforms, Ukraine is better positioned to emerge from the pandemic than many expected. Our initial projection in the World Bank, for example, was that the economy would contract by nearly 8 percent in 2020; the actual decline was half that. Gross international reserves at end-2020 were US$10 billion higher than projected. Most important, there are far fewer poor than anticipated.
Let’s consider three reform areas which have contributed to these outcomes.
First, no area of the economy contributed more to the economic crisis of 2014-2015 than the banking sector. Powerful interests captured the largest banks, distorted the flow of capital, and strangled economic activity. Fortunately, Ukraine developed a framework to resolve and recapitalize banks and strengthen supervision. Privatbank was nationalized and is now earning profits. It is now being prepared for privatization.
Second, COVID halted and threatened to reverse a five-year trend in poverty reduction. Thanks to reforms of the social safety net, Ukraine is avoiding this reversal. A few years back, the government was spending some 4.7 percent of GDP on social programs with limited poverty impact. Nearly half these resources went to an energy subsidy that expanded to cover one-in-two of the country’s households.
Since 2018, the Government has been restructuring the system by reducing broad subsidies and targeting resources to the poor. This is working. Transfers going to the poorest one-fifth of the population are rising significantly—from just 37 percent in 2019 to 50 percent this year and are projected to reach 55 percent in 2023.
Third, the health system itself. Ukrainians live a decade less than their EU neighbors. Basic epidemiological vulnerabilities are exacerbated by a health delivery system centered around outdated hospitals and an excessive reliance on out-of-pocket spending. In 2017, Ukraine passed a landmark health financing law defining a package of primary care for all Ukrainians, free-of-charge. The law is transforming Ukraine’s constitutional commitment to free health care from an aspiration into specific critical services that are actually being delivered.
The performance of these sectors, which were on the “front line” during COVID, demonstrate the payoff of reforms. The job now is to tackle the outstanding challenges.
The first is to reduce the reach of the public sector in the economy. Ukraine has some 3,500 companies owned by the state—most of them loss-making—in sectors from machine building to hotels. Ukraine needs far fewer SOEs. Those that remain must be better managed.
Ukraine has demonstrated that progress can be made in this area. The first round of corporate governance reforms has been successfully implemented at state-owned banks. Naftogaz was unbundled in 2020. The electricity sector too is being gradually liberalized. Tariffs have increased and reforms are expected to support investment in aging electricity-producing and transmitting infrastructure. Investments in renewable energy are also surging.
But there are developments of concern, including a recent removal of the CEO of an SOE which raised concerns among Ukraine’s friends eager to see management independence of these enterprises. Management functions of SOE supervisory boards and their members need to remain free of interference.
The second challenge is to strengthen the rule of law. Over recent years, the country has established—and has committed to protect—new institutions to combat corruption. These need to be allowed to function professionally and independently. And they need to be supported by a judicial system defined by integrity and transparency. The move to re-establish an independent High Qualification Council is a welcome step in this direction.
Finally, we know change is possible because after nearly twenty years, Ukraine on July first opened its agricultural land market. Farmers are now free to sell their land which will help unleash the country’s greatest potential source of economic growth and employment.
Ukraine has demonstrated its ability to undertake tough reforms and, thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic, has seen the real-life benefits of these reforms. The World Bank looks forward to providing continued assistance as the country takes on new challenges on the way to closer European integration.
This article was first published in European Pravda via World Bank
Liberal Development at Stake as LGBT+ Flags Burn in Georgia
Protests against Georgia’s LGBT+ Pride parade turned ugly in Tbilisi on July 5 when members of the community were hunted down and attacked, around 50 journalists beaten up and the offices of various organizations vandalized. Tensions continued the following day, despite a heavy police presence.
On the face of it, the Georgian state condemned the violence. President Salome Zourabichvili was among the first with a clear statement supporting freedom of expression, members of parliament did likewise and the Ministry of Internal Affairs condemned any form of violence.
But behind the scenes, another less tolerant message had been spread before the attacks. Anxiety about this year’s events had been rising as a result of statements by the government and clergy. Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili suggested the march “poses a threat of civil strife.” The Georgian Orthodox Church meanwhile condemned the event, saying it, “contains signs of provocation, conflicts with socially recognized moral norms and aims to legalize grave sin.”
For many, these statements signified tacit approval for the abuse of peaceful demonstrators. Meanwhile, the near-complete absence of security at the outset of the five-day event was all too obvious in Tbilisi’s streets and caused a public outcry. Many alleged the government was less focused on public safety than on upcoming elections where will need support from socially conservative voters and the powerful clergy, in a country where more than 80% of the population is tied to the Georgian Orthodox Church.
The violence brought a joint statement of condemnation from Western embassies. “Violence is simply unacceptable and cannot be excused,” it said. The Pride event was not the first and had previously been used by anti-gay groups. Violence was widespread in 2013 — and the reality of attacks against sexual minorities in Georgia remains ever-present.
In a socially conservative country such as Georgia, antagonism to all things liberal can run deep. Resistance to non-traditional sexual and religious mores divides society. This in turn causes political tension and polarization and can drown out discussion of other problems the country is marred in. It very obviously damages the country’s reputation abroad, where the treatment of minorities is considered a key marker of democratic progress and readiness for further involvement in European institutions.
That is why this violence should also be seen from a broader perspective. It is a challenge to liberal ideas and ultimately to the liberal world order.
A country can be democratic, have a multiplicity of parties, active election campaigns, and other features characteristic of rule by popular consent. But democracies can also be ruled by illiberal methods, used for the preservation of political power, the denigration of opposing political forces, and most of all the use of religious and nationalist sentiments to raise or lower tensions.
It happens across Eurasia, and Georgia is no exception. These are hybrid democracies with nominally democratic rule. Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and others have increasingly more in common, despite geographic distance and cultural differences.
Hungary too has been treading this path. Its recent law banning the supposed propagation of LGBT+ materials in schools must be repealed, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on July 7. “This legislation uses the protection of children . . . to discriminate against people because of their sexual orientation . . . It is a disgrace,” she said.
One of the defining features of illiberalism is agility in appropriating ideas on state governance and molding them to the illiberal agenda.
It is true that a mere 30 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union is not enough to have built a truly liberal democratic state. Generations born and raised in the Soviet period or in the troubled 1990s still dominate the political landscape. This means that a different worldview still prevails. It favors democratic development but is also violently nationalistic in opposing liberal state-building.
Georgia’s growing illiberalism has to be understood in the context of the Russian gravitational pull. Blaming all the internal problems of Russia’s neighbors has become mainstream thinking among opposition politicians, NGOs, and sometimes even government figures. Exaggeration is commonplace, but when looking at the illiberal challenge from a long-term perspective, it becomes clear where Russia has succeeded in its illiberal goals. It is determined to stop Georgia from joining NATO and the EU. Partly as a result, the process drags on and this causes friction across society. Belief in the ultimate success of the liberal agenda is meanwhile undermined and alternatives are sought. Hybrid illiberal governments are the most plausible development. The next stage could well be a total abandonment of Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Indeed what seemed irrevocable now seems probable, if not real. Pushback against Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic choice is growing stronger. Protesters in front of the parliament in central Tbilisi violently brought tore the EU flag. Twice.
The message of anti-liberal groups has also been evolving. There has been significant growth in their messaging. The anti-pride sentiment is evolving into a wider resistance to the Western way of life and Georgia’s Western foreign policy path, perhaps because it is easily attacked and misrepresented.
To deal with this, Western support is important, but much depends on Georgian governments and the population at large. A pushback against radicalism and anti-liberalism should come in the guise of time and resources for the development of stronger and currently faltering institutions. Urgency in addressing these problems has never been higher — internal and foreign challenges converge and present a fundamental challenge to what Georgia has been pursuing since the days of Eduard Shevardnadze – the Western path to development.
Author’s note: first published at cepa
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